New A.C.J. Rooke decision

[Hilfskreuzer Möwe]

Associate Chief Justice Rooke, the judge responsible for the Meads v. Meads decision, has authored a new decision in response to a Freeman-on-the-Land litigant, A.N.B.:

A.N.B. v. Hancock, 2013 ABQB 97: http://canlii.ca/t/fwx39

In brief, A.N.B. attempts to sue a bunch of judges, lawyers, RCMP officers, government officials, and child services workers to get lots of money ($20 million “in gold and silver bullion”) and custody of his children. The basis for his claims? A large stack of stereotypic and not so stereotypic OPCA documents. The lawsuit is struck, and the other parties are awarded solicitor and own client costs, totaling $20,000. A.N.B. does not complain about that as he has already left the courtroom.

With those formalities taken care of, what's new here? Well, actually something quite intriguing. A.N.B. apparently has convictions for harassment and intimidation of state employees, particularly lawyers, and on that basis the Court permitted the lawyers in this matter to appear but remain anonymous, and have all communications to and from them run through a kind of filter to keep their identities concealed, even from A.N.B.'s own lawyer.

A.C.J. Rooke presents this as an example of a more general rule:

[19] OPCA litigation and OPCA litigants represent an unusual and in certain senses unprecedented challenge to Canadian court procedures and processes. In Meads, at paras. 256 and 261, I observed that novel court procedures may be necessary to respond to this new and potentially dangerous social phenomenon. My Order that opposing Counsel are not required to provide their personal identification, including to Counsel acting for A.N.B., is, I believe, an appropriate and necessary response to the risk A.N.B. potentially represents to those who are part of the court, state, and legal apparatus.

[20] I believe that security precautions of this general kind should be broadly available where those precautions do not affect an OPCA litigant’s ability to advance and respond to arguments in court. A low threshold for these special procedures is therefore appropriate. A court may order a safeguard of this kind where a party establishes an air of reality to an actual or potential threat or danger. A.N.B.’s prior, admitted, criminal misconduct without question meets that threshold. The serious charges for which he currently faces trial only strengthens the foundation on which the Crown’s application was based.

[21] I leave to another day whether a person’s affiliation or self‑identification with an OPCA movement with known violent propensities is a sufficient basis to order precautions of this kind.

The threshold for these remedies is set very low, provided these precautions do not affect the substantive aspects of a proceeding. It will be very interesting to see in what other contexts this principle is applied, say for example, witnesses.

Beyond that, it appears that A.C.J. Rooke is using this litigation as a kind of tool to examine various OPCA litigation motifs, such as the spurious use of legal maxims (paras. 60-64), and to more fully explore the application of the Meads v. Meads concepts in a different factual setting. One thing I like about this decision is that the position of A.N.B. is reviewed and rebutted in detail, along with his litigation strategies and materials.

I am going to stop my commentary at this point given the statutory prohibition against actions that may identify A.N.B.'s children, see the publication ban in the judgment preamble.

SMS Möwe

[notorial dissent]

Regrettably, sounds like the northern cuckoos have been taking lessons from their southern cousins.

This sounds so similar to so many Sovrun divorce and custody cases I have seen of late, unfortunately right up to and including the threats and very real possibility of violence to anyone who has gotten involved, and I see it does indeed devolve out of a divorce and custody situation. It would also appear that the Plaintiff left the courtroom, undoubtedly declaring unilateral victory, and never heard the actual result. Apparently the main actor is an expatriate, which may explain his particular brand of imported crazy.

[Chados]

Love the way these judges use the language.

[Hilfskreuzer Möwe]

The Saga of A.N.B. continues:

AR v. Alberta (Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, Director), 2013 ABQB 280: http://canlii.ca/t/fxkb8

This appears to be the 'legitimate' appeal that is mentioned in the first A.N.B. decision at paras. 2, 44-46. A.N.B. appears as one of three parents who have appealed a permanent guardianship order that addresses four children. All four have the same mother, and that pool is split evenly with A.N.B. and another male as fathers. All three parents are represented by counsel; all three advance what can be called 'conventional' arguments.

A.N.B.'s chief ground of appeal is that he was unfairly denied the opportunity to make his case at the Permanent Guardianship Hearing because he was not allowed to call 20 witnesses who would testify as to A.N.B.'s good character, but also:

That I am not a public or legal entity. I’m a man, a real man, and my children are - - are - - are sovereign and so am I.

In pre-trial hearings A.N.B. was ordered to produce statements of what his 20 witnesses would say, to verify that their testimony would be relevant. If not, those witnesses would not be allowed. Instead, A.N.B. did a switcheroo...

THE COURT: Have you provided the will-say statements? You said you did.

ANB: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: Where are they? Who did you send them to you?

ANB: I sent them to Mr. Kash. Actually, my agent dropped them off with Mr. Kash on one of these court appearances.

MR. KASH: Your Honour, what Mr. ANB is referring to is his friend gave me a few pieces of paper that said will-say statements on the outside, and then when you opened it up, they were clearly not will-say statements.

ANB: It was my - - it was my commercial security agreement. Okay? And that’s - - and that’s what my friend - -

The "commercial security agreement" and its supporting documents are examined in depth in the Rooke decision above.

In sum, A.N.B. has argued he was denied procedural justice because he was not allowed to make his case by calling whatever witnesses he wanted, and that it was unfair for the lower courts to require him provide evidence that those 20 witnesses were, in some way, relevant.

This argument is rejected by Marceau J., who notes that A.N.B. was nevertheless allowed to introduce relevant witnesses at the Permanent Guardianship Hearing, relevant as in these witnesses were actually going to testify as to A.N.B.'s capacity as a parent: para. 19. The Court notes it has a dual duty to not only quash OPCA litigation but preserve the genuine rights of OPCA litigants, paras. 15-17:

Once ANB disclosed that his witnesses were going to be called, at least in part, to advance his OPCA arguments, I conclude it was reasonable for the pre-trial conference hearing judge to make will-say statements from those witnesses a requirement so as to minimize the unnecessary and futile waste of court and litigant resources caused by arguments of that kind. Meads v. Meads at paras. 631-632 stresses that futile and wasteful OPCA litigation ought to be restricted where possible, but that courts should remain mindful and guard that OPCA litigants are permitted to present and argue their legal rights:

...

The instruction to provide will-say statements did not negate ANB’s capacity to enter evidence to support his case. ANB’s consistent, persistent, and vexatious litigation strategy meant that the will-say statement requirement was reasonable to ensure that evidence advanced on behalf of this particular litigant would be relevant. Instead of complying with this reasonable step, ANB substituted frivolous and vexatious OPCA litigation documentation, mislabelled as will-say statements. This says much about his intention to cooperate with the court and its processes.

Justice Marceau has quoted quite extensively from the transcript to illustrate A.N.B.'s position and conduct. A.N.B. is somewhat argumentative.

In the end a re-trial is ordered. The mother in this triad fired her lawyer on the day the hearing commenced, on what appears to have been plausible grounds for failure to comply with her client's instructions. The mother promptly sought replacement counsel, but was denied an adjournment even though the delay would be relatively short. Justice Marceau concludes this breached s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

It looks to me that the result will be a full re-hearing on permanent guardianship for the four children, so it appears A.N.B. will have another 'kick at the can'.

SMS Möwe

[Hilfskreuzer Möwe]

Regrettably, sounds like the northern cuckoos have been taking lessons from their southern cousins.

...

Apparently the main actor is an expatriate, which may explain his particular brand of imported crazy.

I think A.N.B. is an 'opportunist' in the classic sense, and will run with almost anything. In the Rooke decision there is discussion of "UCADIA" materials in A.N.B.'s package: paras. 83-88. I understand these are Australian in origin, and relate to these, among other, websites:

• http://www.ucadia.com/
  
  http://one-heaven.org/
  
  http://university.ucadia.info/news.php

The author's commentary on himself is a little unusual:

• http://www.ucadia.com/frank/frank.htm

To be honest, I don't even know where to start with this stuff. All I can say is that Frank O'Collins and UCADIA probably deserve a thread of their own.

SMS Möwe

[grixit]

I think the court needs to consider what the impact of that kind of mentality might have on the children.

[Paul]

I’m a man, a real man, and my children are - - are - - are sovereign and so am I.

"I'm Brian, and so is my wife!"

[Hilfskreuzer Möwe]

For some time I have been aware there is another written decision in this series, but it had not been released publicly. This judgment has now been made available on CanLII:

• R. v. A.N.B., 2012 ABQB 556: http://canlii.ca/t/g203r

My suspicion has been that the delay was because this judgment reports on A.N.B. being denied bail, and so was subject to a publication ban until A.N.B.'s trial had been completed. It looks like that guess is correct.

The judgment reports A.N.B. was denied bail on all three legal bases at his first appearance in provincial court: he was a risk to not appear, he was a risk to reoffend, and his being free on bail would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. The third ground is rarely used as a mechanism to deny bail. Judge Richardson's decision is attached as Appendix 1, and she doesn't mince any words. A.N.B.'s 'intemperate' language is used against him.

On review Justice Michalyshyn of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench confirms the denial of bail on the primary (won't show up) and secondary (is a risk to reoffend) headings. A.N.B. appears to have emphasized he had opted out of state authority with a package of documents, his "Security Agreement" (para. 44):

… what I've done is I've actually secured my person with the commercial affidavit in front of you, the commercial security agreement marked as ANB09041971SA … And I know the ‑ a lot of legal representatives like the Crown here seem to think that it's some sort of non-sensical document, but I'd like to ‑ to submit, Sir, that the IRS receipt in the very back, the IRS believes that it's valid, and the ‑ the United States Treasury believes that it's valid. So I believe what I've done here, Sir, is I've pulled myself out of this society …

Justice Michalyshyn attaches a rather over-the-top Notice of Understanding, Intent, and Denial of Governance from that Security Agreement as Appendix 2. Here's a couple paragraphs:

I am tired of living in fear, I might slip and fall and break a by‑law or statute, there are so many, and most do not follow any course of law or sense of fairness whatsoever. Police officers are forced to dawn a new hat, the oppressive enforcement hat, why? in the interests of profits? This is why we are being treated little better than animals!? I say this has to stop, and hereby deny my acceptance to governed by you, your office, or anyone representing your office and from any external fictional entity whatsoever!!! I was not fully informed, now I am, and I deny consent from this day forward. How do you like them chicks? Quack, quack...hey? Guess what? I am not through yet.

...

my name is [A.N.] of the [B.] family, I am a free sovereign man, I wish to govern myself, I am competent, I am in good mental & physical health. I am not on a fictitious corporation, created by a fictitious government, which is subsidiary to a fictitious country/corporation, with the only goal being commerce and profits, with no regard to human life and love, and compassion, and happiness. I am not not subject to your petty, degrading, unfair, unreal, unjust statute laws and by‑laws or anything else you people seem to hold above me to claim authority over me.

Is it small of me to note that juvenile ducks (quack quack) are usually called "ducklings"?

In any case, the Court is not impressed:

[50] The problem is not that 'nobody wants to address the security agreement'. The problem is that B. does not accept that his security agreement, and others like it, and the arguments which flow from it, are nonsense ‑ as is B.’s belief that by reason of "the doctrine of acquiescence" various authorities' failure to give what he calls "qualified rebuttals" of the security agreement justifies B.'s reliance on it.

[51] However, until B. abandons his faith in the security agreement and related documents and beliefs, his own reliance on them must be taken seriously. One thing follows the next: B. clearly believes he is entitled to and has withdrawn from society and from the rule of law; as long as he holds to these beliefs, this court can have no confidence in his expressions of remorse, or promises that he will abide by an order giving him "reasonable bail”: s. 11(e) of the Charter, or by an order that is "necessary for the protection or safety of the public": s. 515(10)(b) of the Criminal Code. To a similar effect, R. v. McCormick 2012, 2012 NSCA 58 at para. 43, although in the context of a bail pending appeal application.

This was an early case in the concept that OPCA affiliation is a basis to refuse to allow a person out on conditional release, and I think it takes the correct position: a person who refuses to acknowledge state and court authority is not one who can either be trusted to not reoffend (particularly if they claim to have an absolute right to engage in their alleged criminal actions), nor abide by the conditions of a release.

That pattern has since continued in Canada, for example:

• R. v. Jastrebske, 2013 SKQB 150: http://canlii.ca/t/fx72k
  
  R. v. Seagull, 2013 BCSC 1811: http://canlii.ca/t/g0s21
  
  R. v. Lavin, 2013 ONCJ 6 (not in CanLII)

I suspect there are more to follow.

SMS Möwe

[Burnaby49]

I love the opening sentence of A. N. B.'s Notice of Understanding, Intent, and Denial of Governance:

Recent events have made me do an extensive search into to the law, I have devoted allot of my time studying it and becoming somewhat of a adept at the subject, in my own humble opinion of course.

A weekend hitting the books and he is more expert than the courts! Unfortunate that he isn't as adept at Spell Check and Grammar Check. Then he reveals his sources of information and conclusions therof:

Some very interesting information has come to light, and I wanted to share my understanding of it all, and let you know what I intend to do about it. Reading many, many law books, from such titles as The Bible, The Magna Carta, Bouvier's, Blacks, The Canadian Constitution, The U.S. Constitution, Bill of rights, UN laws, U.C.C., our various codes, law's and acts here in Canada, and the U.S. etc., just to name a few, I have found that securing your person, as it mentions in various constitutions, as well as the constitution here in Canada, means something entirely different than what I was led to believe!

Phew! That's a lot of material to research and digest. One common thread with these guys, they all love Black's Legal Dictionary. Chief Rock is a big fan, but only of the old editions before the meanings were all perverted.

Then he goes all :charles - norman: holmes unilateral agreements on us:

ALL CONCERNED PARTIES HAVE TWENTY (20) DAYS TO DISPUTE, DISPROVE OR DENY ANY OF THE FACTS MENTIONED ABOVE, WITH A SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF REBUTTAL SIGNED UNDER PENALTY OF PURJURY, AND IN THE EVENT YOU FAIL TO RESPOND IN THE ALLOTTED TIME IT SHALL INDICATE FULL ACCEPTANCE AND AGREEMENT.

While Chief Rock denies being a follower of the "silence implies assent" belief set the very numerous documents I've reviewed that he has "notarized" (I'm being forced into a lot of quotation marks) have, as their underlying theme, exactly that. Riddled with statements that if the recipient of the document, whatever it purports to be, does not reply with a satisfactory rebuttal within a stipulated time he has agreed to be bound by the terms of whatever is in the documents.

From the results of the decision that Mowe kindly linked us to it seems that unilateral contracts and denial of the primacy of statutory law worked about well for A. N. B. as it did for :charles "Call me Charlie" - norman: holmes. Well, except for the fact that Charlie didn't end up in jail. Yet.

A. N. B. was careful to make it all binding and legal by getting his Notice of Understanding, Intent, and Denial of Governance notarized. However I can't help but feel, from the quibbling under the notary's signature, that she may not be a fellow traveler.

Notary Public [signature]
ANNA SHULMAN
BARRISTER & SOLICITOR
A Notary Public in and for the Province of Alberta
WITNESSED AS TO
EXECUTION ONLY
NO ADVICE
SOUGHT OR GIVEN

[Kestrel]

Then he goes all :charles - norman: holmes unilateral agreements on us:

ALL CONCERNED PARTIES HAVE TWENTY (20) DAYS TO DISPUTE, DISPROVE OR DENY ANY OF THE FACTS MENTIONED ABOVE, WITH A SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF REBUTTAL SIGNED UNDER PENALTY OF PURJURY, AND IN THE EVENT YOU FAIL TO RESPOND IN THE ALLOTTED TIME IT SHALL INDICATE FULL ACCEPTANCE AND AGREEMENT.

While Chief Rock denies being a follower of the "silence implies assent" belief set the very numerous documents I've reviewed that he has "notarized" (I'm being forced into a lot of quotation marks) have, as their underlying theme, exactly that. Riddled with statements that if the recipient of the document, whatever it purports to be, does not reply with a satisfactory rebuttal within a stipulated time he has agreed to be bound by the terms of whatever is in the documents.

There are two elements to the "silence implies assent" formula:
1. Unless you make a satisfactory reply within X days you agree to the contract.
2. He gets to decide what constitutes of a "satisfactory" reply.

That second element - the denier gets to decide what is satisfactory - is key to the whole mess. There is no impartial judge or recognizable standard. The only standard is the fevered mind of the denier, whose "ALL RIGHTS RESERVED" includes the right to withhold complete disclosure of the rules he follows (as if there ever was a complete set of rules), and the right to change the rules at any time if he hears something attractive, without notice.

Then we find out the rulebook he follows is a curious hash cherry-picked from US law, Canadian law, British law, assorted conflicting religious texts, Hammurabic code, and various magistrates' decisions that have already been overturned on appeal. Stir together and serve with a garnish extracted from internet gurus. And he wonders why we don't want to play along?

Even if we were inclined to attempt making a satisfactory reply within X days, the attempt woule be pointless. WIthout a standard set of rules which works both for and against all of us, and against which all are held accountable, whether princes or peasants, there can be no satisfaction.

[Chief2k13]

a book on contracts say the following. Thoughts?

http://chiefrockmusic.files.wordpress.c ... 5710_n.jpg

http://chiefrockmusic.files.wordpress.c ... 4715_n.jpg

Silence = risk of uncertainty ?
http://chiefrockmusic.files.wordpress.c ... 4238_n.jpg
If the offeror proffers property or service with the offer, and the offeree, having a reasonable opportunity to return or refuse them, exercising ownership rights over the property or accepts the benefit of service
http://chiefrockmusic.files.wordpress.c ... 5455_n.jpg

Actions speak louder than words.
http://chiefrockmusic.files.wordpress.c ... 4885_n.jpg

[Kestrel]

a book on contracts say the following. Thoughts?

Yes, I have one.

How about citing a source showing author, title and page number, and not some anonymous photos of page fragments uploaded to "chiefrockmusic.files.wordpress"? Or are you afraid that someone is going to discover your source and use it against you?

[AndyK]

Perchance Contracts: Examples and Explanations by Brian Blum ?

"Blum is highly regarded for writing and teaching skills that help first-year students understand difficult concepts"

Please note that the text is directed towards students in AMERICAN law schools since it revolves around law (statutory and case) specific to the United States.

Also, please note that the photocopied images omit (intentionally ?) qualifying text which specifcally negates a generalized "silence is acceptance" theory.

[wserra]

AndyK is exactly right. ChiefDate's quotes are from Blum's text, which concerns U.S. law and cites U.S. cases. And he has indeed quoted selectively. For example:

The offeror cannot impose a duty on the offeree to take some affirmative step to reject the offer, making failure to act an acceptance. For example, the offer cannot impose a duty on the offeree to speak by stating ". . . if you do not wish to accept this offer, you must deliver notice of rejection to me by Friday, failing which you are deemed to have accepted."

Emphasis supplied.

So ChiefDate not only quotes from a work about U.S. law, he quotes the exceptions and leaves out the rule. Honest man.

[Chief2k13]

Yes, absolutely correct. It is Brian Blum Contracts and examples. I also have a book from Canadian law which i will upload once i get those photos taken. It was like 2am , my apologies for not citing the source. I will keep that in mind, i normally photo the cover page

So, either way, i also have books from other countries. They all have the same conclusion when it comes to contracts. So, the silence part of it can be used as acceptance if that is the mode described in the contract itself. Not sure if you read that but it does say it can be used as acceptance.

Question, is an inaction still an action ?

If the parties have an on going legal relationship of some sort, say a cell contract(boilerplate). Does the mega billion dollar company have a duty to reply to a counteroffer ? or are they exempt from counteroffers seeing they are over a billion in net worth ? (honest question)

At what worth does a company become above the law ? I spoken with companies who ignore legislature that clearly speaks of their conduct as illegal but yet say TD policy say this blah blah blah. I say the Bills of Exchange says this, she says we go by our policy. So, does a company policy out weight law ? It is in reference to making presentment of a cheq drawn on that bank. They dishonor the cheq by simply saying your not a customer of this bank, so we cannot cash this chq, company policy. Why is that okay? they can turn away a chq one of their clients wrote to a payee, who in turn gets rejected when presentment is made.

I also have a Canadian book on Bills of Exchange, quite an interesting book. I shall upload for another thread.

[Kestrel]

So, the silence part of it can be used as acceptance if that is the mode described in the contract itself. Not sure if you read that but it does say it can be used as acceptance.

Only IF... The contract already exists.

Only IF... The offeror and offeree have already agreed under what terms silence constitutes acceptance, and already inserted that language in the original contract.

Paying $250 when you owe $1000, and writing on the memo line, "This is payment in full unless you object," does NOT constitute a valid offer/acceptance... unless the offeror and offeree had PREVIOUSLY agreed to permit such a change. Your creditor can still cash the cheque, ignore the memo line, and sue for the other $750.

Delivering paperwork to anyone, with or without proof of delivery via personal service or registered mail, and writing "your acceptance of this document constitutes acceptance of the contract unless you object" does NOT constitute a valid offer/acceptance. No contract existed in the first place. Such paperwork is only a solicitation to make a contract, and can be safely ignored.

And don't give me crap about "already agreed upon verbally". Those kinds of "contracts" are worth less than the non-existent paper they're written on. There is a VERY high standard of proof required for that to hold up in court.

[Arthur Rubin]

So, the silence part of it can be used as acceptance if that is the mode described in the contract itself. Not sure if you read that but it does say it can be used as acceptance.

Only IF... The contract already exists.

Only IF... The offeror and offeree have already agreed under what terms silence constitutes acceptance, and already inserted that language in the original contract.

Paying $250 when you owe $1000, and writing on the memo line, "This is payment in full unless you object," does NOT constitute a valid offer/acceptance... unless the offeror and offeree had PREVIOUSLY agreed to permit such a change. Your creditor can still cash the cheque, ignore the memo line, and sue for the other $750.

Delivering paperwork to anyone, with or without proof of delivery via personal service or registered mail, and writing "your acceptance of this document constitutes acceptance of the contract unless you object" does NOT constitute a valid offer/acceptance. No contract existed in the first place. Such paperwork is only a solicitation to make a contract, and can be safely ignored.

And don't give me crap about "already agreed upon verbally". Those kinds of "contracts" are worth less than the non-existent paper they're written on. There is a VERY high standard of proof required for that to hold up in court.

I ran across that in my Contracts class. Restatement of Contracts section 69 gives 3 conditions under which silence can be an "acceptance". The UCC has similar provisions in case of continuing dealings in which the "silent" party had previously rejected items. And verbal contracts are often good if recorded.

It is very rare than silence can indicate acceptance in a "first" contract, although it can happen in the case of offered services. (This is loosely based on a 1L understanding of US contract law.)

[Kestrel]

I ran across that in my Contracts class. Restatement of Contracts section 69 gives 3 conditions under which silence can be an "acceptance". The UCC has similar provisions in case of continuing dealings in which the "silent" party had previously rejected items. And verbal contracts are often good if recorded.

It is very rare than silence can indicate acceptance in a "first" contract, although it can happen in the case of offered services. (This is loosely based on a 1L understanding of US contract law.)

All true. The times silence is a valid acceptance are specific and narrowly drawn, and include instances when one party is clearly aware of/enjoying the benefit of the change in terms, and where the other party has clearly abandoned his rights and shown he has no interest in pursuing them. They are NOT broadly nor onerously imposed the way the Chief would wish. (See this thread about the Ohio sov'run house thief for a discussion of what constitutes abandonment of one's rights.)

If a creditor accepts a partial payment and ceases all attempts to collect the balance, it could be said that the debtor has won an "acceptance by silence". The Magic Words "paid in full" are unnecessary. As a practical matter this never happens, however. When the debtor defaults, the creditor sells the debt to a collection agency who ramps up the heat. And when a debtor files bankruptcy the debtor has to list ALL the debts he wants discharged, even the very old ones on which collection attempts have supposedly gone "silent."

There is one particular "acceptance by silence" which happens every day, but it is a silent acceptance agreed to in the original contract AND the party receiving the notice of change still has the right to reject the change terms. When I applied for a credit card I signed an agreement saying the CC company has the right to give me notice and modify the terms. If I agree to the new provisions I continue making new card charges (my "silent" acceptance). If I do not agree to the provisions I cease using the card and/or close the account, and I pay off the balance according to the original contract terms (NOT the changed terms).

And verbal contracts are often good if recorded.

Well, in that case there IS a "paper" on which the verbal contract is written.

[Arthur Rubin]

And verbal contracts are often good if recorded.

Well, in that case there IS a "paper" on which the verbal contract is written.

I was thinking of audio tape, although a .wav file would probably do just as well. It's not a "writing" (for the purpose of the statute of frauds), but it is a recording.

[Jeffrey]

Out of curiousity, Mowe ever watch Menard's response to Meads v. Meads?