A few comments. Though not categorized as such, Mr. Furqan is clearly an OPCA litigant as classified in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571. I attempted to find out more about Mr. Furqan, and struck out.Decision: (Orally)
[1] This case comes before me in Chambers this morning in the form of a
Registrar’s motion to dismiss the appeal because of a failure to “perfect” it
pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 90.43(3) and (4). The approach I take in such
matters is that once I am satisfied the deadlines prescribed under the Rules have
elapsed; that the Registrar’s action is well-founded; and that all interested parties
have been properly notified; the onus shifts to those who would be adversely
affected to persuade me that their appeal should not be dismissed. Islam v.
Sevgur, 2011 NSAC 114.
[2] Having reviewed the record I am satisfied that all of these requirements have
been met and that therefore it now falls to the appellant or other interested party to
persuade me that there are good and sufficient reasons to decline the Registrar’s
motion.
[3] Every step in this bizarre proceeding has been captured in the Registrar’s
comprehensive chronology, as well as my memorandum to the file following
Chambers on March 14, 2013, which also happened to be preserved on video
recording.
[4] I will, for the record, summarize my experience with Mr. Furqan in court.
[5] Mr. Furqan filed a notice of appeal on November 27, 2012, which purported
to appeal a decision of a Small Claims Court adjudicator dated March 8, 2012
whereby Mr. Furqan was convicted of driving while his license was revoked
contrary to s. 287(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 293, as
amended. The Registrar’s customary letter was sent to the appellant by mail on
November 30, 2012 indicating that his notice of motion for date and directions and
certificate of readiness had to be filed by March 26, 2013. Mr. Furqan filed a
motion for various relief including certiorari, mandamus, etc. returnable March 14,
2013. He did not file a motion for date and directions.
[6] When Mr. Furqan appeared in my Chambers on March 14 he emptied
several briefcases and spread across the table a variety of papers, Holy books,
Criminal Codes, law dictionaries, provincial and federal statutes, and what he
described as the “1793 Canada Slavery Act”, each reference flagged with countless
colored post-it notes. During the course of a rambling monologue Mr. Furqan
advanced several “arguments” which included : that the laws of Canada and, in
particular, Nova Scotia did not apply to him in any event; the Motor Vehicle Act
only applies to corporations, or taxi drivers or limousine drivers and because he
was none of those, he was not caught by the definition of “person” or “includes”;
he was not a “person” as recognized in law; therefore, no court had jurisdiction
over him anyway; he owes no allegiance to the Queen; he is “not Mr. Amir
Furqan” and any such reference to him is insulting; he preferred to be called
simply “Amir”; he was not an officer, official, or corporation under various
statutes; the 1793 Canada Slavery Act was an important reference; he followed
the lunar calendar; he “surrendered” his birth certificate (by leaving it in the
courtroom); and he only intended to appear in court as a “use plaintiff”. Sprinkled
throughout his submissions were phrases like “breach of contract” and “cestui que
trust”.
[7] Respectfully, it appeared to me that the appellant had lifted a series of words
or phrases from dictionaries or penal statutes, strung them together in an attempt to
persuade or impress, and was left with a submission that made no sense
whatsoever.
[8] After questioning by me, the appellant agreed that his Notice of Motion was
flawed and had no bearing or connection to this appeal, which was an appeal from
the SCAC decision of Rosinski, J., who had dismissed Mr. Furqan’s appeal from
the decision of the adjudicator, Judith Gass, sitting in Provincial Court (who had
convicted him of certain motor vehicle offences). In other words, his Notice of
Motion which sought relief of “writ of Certiorari, Mandamus, and Quo Warranto
...” were irrelevant to this appeal. Accordingly, I dismissed his motion.
[9] When I told him that his documentation to fix a date for his appeal was
incomplete and that he would require a transcript before proceeding, he said that he
could not afford to pay for one and asked that I waive that requirement or order
someone else to pay for it. Based on the authorities filed by counsel for the
respondent I said that I had no jurisdiction to waive the requirement, and that a
transcript would have to be filed and paid for by Mr. Furqan. To this he said that
he had no intention of proceeding with the appeal. I then cautioned him that the
Registrar would take steps to have his appeal dismissed for non-perfection, all of
which led to today’s hearing of the Registrar’s motion. The appellant declined my
request to provide a mailing address in case documents or correspondence had to
be sent to him saying that he was concerned about “blackmail”. As he was
packing up his belongings he threw down on the table what appeared to be a birth
certificate which he “surrendered”. After he left the courtroom I directed the clerk
to retrieve the item so that it would not be thrown out with the garbage by the
courthouse cleaners later in the day and ensure that it was later returned to the
appellant at his last known address with a cover letter from the Registrar dated
March 15, 2013 the text of which read:
You chose to abandon this birth certificate which on its face appears to be yours,
when you attended in Chambers at the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal on March
14th, 2013. You left it on a table in the courtroom saying you “surrendered” it. It
is neither an exhibit nor part of the record. I have no reason, authority or intention
to keep the birth certificate.
I am returning it to you and you can do with it as you please.
[10] Notwithstanding the fact that the Registrar’s letters providing notification of
today’s proceedings sent to Mr. Furqan both by regular mail and by registered mail
were returned to her office, I am satisfied that he has had appropriate notice and I
deem him to have been properly served. I say that for two reasons. First, I warned
him of the anticipated Registrar’s motion before he chose to leave the courtroom
during the course of my final remarks on March 14, 2013; and when I asked him to
provide contact coordinates so that documentation could be brought to his
attention, he refused to provide such information to, in his words “prevent
blackmail”. Based on that exchange, I find that he is deliberately attempting to
frustrate the process of the court and refusing to cooperate.
[11] On this record I will not hesitate to exercise my discretion and dismiss the
appeal. So ordered.
The "1793 Canada Slavery Act" is probably the Upper Canada July 9, 1793 "Act Against Slavery", which was the first law in the British Empire that restricted the capacity to own slaves and required all children of slaves to be made free at age 25. It remained in effect until slavery was generally abolished within the British Empire via the British "Slavery Abolition Act" of 1833. I have never seen this particular piece of legislation referenced by a Canadian Sovereign Citizen or Freeman-on-the-Land to this point, so I have no idea of exactly how it is (not) relevant.
Hilfskreuzer Möwe
