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ADOPTED OCTOBER 3, 2000
CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
PERSONAL INCOME TAX APPEAL
DECISION
Proposed Assessment
---------------------------------
Appellant Year Tax Penalty
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Steven E. Lundy 1996 $1,397 $279.401
Case No. 28592
Representing the Parties:
For Appellant: Steven E. Lundy
For Franchise Tax Board: Mark McEvilly, Tax Counsel
Counsel For Board of Equalization: Donald L. Fillman, Tax Counsel
QUESTIONS: (1) Whether appellant's California wages are subject to California's
tax laws.
(2) Whether respondent properly determined appellant's tax liability.
(3) Whether appellant has maintained a frivolous or groundless position
before this Board.
Facts and Contentions
[1] Appellant filed a personal income tax return form for
1996 that contained zeros except for the taxes withheld.
It claimed a full refund based on a stated zero "state
wages from your Form(s) W-2," and zero taxable income.
However, attached to the return form was a Form W-2 that
showed wages and other compensation of $35,232.60. Respondent
relied on appellant's claim of no taxable income and issued
the refund. Subsequently, respondent received information
that appellant's federal adjusted gross income was $35,232.
Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment (NPA) dated
September 28, 1998. The NPA calculated additional tax of
$1,397. (An accuracy- related penalty was also imposed. But
since respondent withdrew the penalty, it is not an issue
in this case.) Appellant filed a protest. After the protest
hearing respondent issued a Notice of Action that affirmed
the NPA. Appellant appealed. Appellant contends that wages
are not subject to income tax. In both his protest and his
brief, appellant cites many pages of "authorities" that
purport to support this contention.
[2] Tax Law. Respondent's determination is presumed correct
and appellant bears the burden of proving that it is erroneous.
(Todd v. McColgan (1949) 89 Cal.App.2d 509.) Appellant's
contention has been universally rejected by the Board, as
well as by the courts, since it was first presented many
years ago. (See Appeals of Fred R. Dauberger, et al., Cal.
St. Bd. of Equal., Mar. 31, 1982; Appeal of Alfons Castillo,
92-SBE-020, July 30, 1992, and Appeal of Walter R. Bailey,
92-SBE-001, Feb. 20, 1992, and cases cited therein.) R&TC
section 17071 provides that IRC section 61, which defines
gross income, shall apply, except as otherwise provided.
IRC section 61 provides as follows:
"(a) General definition. Except as otherwise provided
in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever
source derived, including (but not limited to) the following
items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits,
and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
(Emphasis added.)
[3] Appellant correctly cites R&TC section 17071 as
defining gross income with reference to IRC section 61. Yet
appellant proceeds to grossly miscite and misapply the history
of this section of the law to conclude that only certain
narrow types or sources of income are subject to the tax
laws. This limited list is contended to include only sources
of income listed in "26 CFR Section 1.861- 8(f)(1)." (App.
Br., p. 8.) The United States Tax Court, in Solomon v. Commissioner
1993 RIA TC Memo Para. 93,509, dismissed this contention
as frivolous, and imposed a $5,000 penalty for pursuing a
frivolous position before the tax court. Thus, appellant's
obvious misapplication of plain language has already been
determined to be a groundless and frivolous position.
[4] Appellant further contends that the term "income" is
not specifically defined in the tax codes. This should not
be surprising. Many words are not defined in the tax codes,
often because they have a commonly understood meaning that
the applicable legislative body did not feel obliged to define
specially for the tax code. The United States Supreme Court
has resolved many cases where complicated issues have made
it difficult to determine whether a certain type of payment
should be included in the commonly understood definition
of "income" (such as the proceeds from an insurance
policy). But the United States Supreme Court has never had
any difficulty with such commonly understood sources of income
as compensation for services, such as wages, salaries, and
tips.
[5] In United States v. Burke (1992) 504 U.S. 229, the United
States Supreme Court stated as follows, at page 233:
"The definition of gross income under the Internal
Revenue Code sweeps broadly. Section 61(a), provides that
'gross income means all income from whatever source derived,'
subject only to the exclusions specifically enumerated elsewhere
in the Code. As this Court has recognized, Congress intended
through Section 61(a) and its statutory precursors to exert
'the full measure of its taxing power,' Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940), . . . and to bring within the definition
of income any 'accession to wealth.' Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431(1955) . . . ."
[6] The United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth District (which includes
California) considered a case similarly argued as the present case. In United
States v. Romero (9th Cir. 1981) 640 F.2d 1014, in which the taxpayer's criminal
conviction was upheld on all five counts, the court stated at page 1016, as
follows:
"Courts are established at public expense to try issues,
not to
play games.
" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"Romero's proclaimed belief that he was not a "person" and that
the wages he earned as a carpenter were not "income" is fatuous as
well as obviously incorrect . . . . Compensation for labor or services, paid
in the form of wages or salary, has been universally held by the courts of this
republic to be income, subject to the income tax laws . . . .
" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"[Romero] is attempting willfully and intentionally to shift his burden
to his fellow workers by the use of semantics. He seems to have been inspired
by various ... groups across the land who postulate ... theories of tax avoidance,
all to the detriment of the common weal and of themselves.
"...............................................................
"In our system of government, one is free to speak out in open opposition
to the provisions of the tax laws, but such opposition does not relieve a citizen
of his obligation to pay taxes."
(Emphasis added.)
[7] It is apparent that appellant has not attempted to understand the meaning
of the material he cites, but rather, seeks to take words and phrases from
cases, statutes, and regulations and attempt to twist them to say what he wishes
them to say. Appellant is not alone in this pursuit. The federal courts have
had many years of experience dealing with these contentions, and have uniformly
rejected them. Yet they keep coming back. The following two citations are illustrative:
"Like moths to a flame, some people find themselves
irresistibly drawn to the . . . illusory claim that there
is no legal requirement to pay federal income tax. And, like
the moths, these people sometimes get burned."
(United States v. Sloan (7th Cir. 1991) 939 F.2d 499.)
"Some people believe with great fervor preposterous things that just happen
to coincide with their self-interest . . . . The government may not prohibit
the holding of these beliefs, but it may penalize people who act on them."
(Coleman v. Commissioner (7th Cir. 1986) 791 F.2d 68, 69.)
[8] Frivolous Appeal Penalty. R&TC section 19714 provides for a penalty
for filing a frivolous return, or maintaining a frivolous or groundless position
before the Board. These penalties are in addition to other penalties that may
be applied.
[9] We conclude that appellant has failed to meet his burden
of establishing that respondent's assessment of tax was erroneous.
We further conclude that the position appellant has maintained
before the Board, concerning the exclusion of wages from
the definitions of "gross income," "income," or "taxable
income", is frivolous or groundless. Accordingly, we
impose a penalty of $750 as authorized by R&TC section
19714.
[10] The action of respondent, subject to its concession
as stated in footnote 1, is sustained and we impose a further
penalty of $750.
FOOTNOTE
1 Respondent indicates that it has withdrawn
the (accuracy- related) penalty
END OF FOOTNOTE
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