Wikipedia as a tax authority?

[Florida]

Strangely enough neither the intent nor the wording was created to tax every single citizen on their earnings, the intent and historical record is clear, do away with Pollock which allowed large corporations to operate tax free. That's why the 1909 excise act was created; it intended to tax the very things they were trying to get to with the 1895 tax. The 16th was proposed by the populists, they were for the little guy they certainly weren't trying to get the thing passed so the federal government could tax every working person's frigging paycheck. It would have never been ratified.

From 1913 Congressional Record:

Mr. Gillet: It seems to me that an amendment like this which says that a man who gets an income over $1,000 shall pay one-half of 1 per cent tax would bring home to the people the fact that they are paying the bills as they really are. The tax would be very small only 50 cents on an income of $1,000 and $5 on an income of $2,000. If the Government were expensive, if the administration were extravagant, their little tax of $1 or $5 would be increased. If the Government were economical their income tax would decrease so that all the time they would have a little feeling in their pockets as to whether the Government was economical or extravagant.

Mr. Austin: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Gillett: Yes.

Mr. Austin: Does the gentleman not thin it would defeat every Member who would vote for this amendment if the fact were known at home?

Mr. Gillett: No; I do not. I do not believe the people are so unthinking and selfish. I am willing to take the risk at any rate, and this question, perhaps, illustrates the impulse which we all have. We area ll afraid to do anything which we think may hurt us at home, regardless of whether we thin it is right and best for our country or not.

Was it the House or Senate and what page? btw, not everything that came in was considered income back then.

I don't know Steve, the way he's talking, it doesn't look like income means only business or licensure-required activity profits. He's talking like it would apply across the board to everyone. That's why they're worried about their reputations because I would imagine quite a bit of people arnt going to like the idea of a tax, but then he says most people will realize the necessity of such a tax and won't be selfish. Plus, the more income one earns the higher the tax rate.

[SteveSy]

I don't know Steve, the way he's talking, it doesn't look like income means only business or licensure-required activity profits. He's talking like it would apply across the board to everyone. That's why they're worried about their reputations because I would imagine quite a bit of people arnt going to like the idea of a tax, but then he says most people will realize the necessity of such a tax and won't be selfish. Plus, the more income one earns the higher the tax rate.

Could be....I need the page number it came from. I would like to read it in its entirety.

Some in congress really did think the 16th enabled congress to lay a direct non-apportioned tax. If they understood that it did not then many may have not said what they said. In any case please post the page number.

btw, he was wrong about "necessity" there was no "necessity" at the time for the tax. If in fact they really needed the money from average people the tax would have included more than the less than 1% it did end up taxing. There was a quote earlier that made it clear some thought it was ridiculous they were even proposing such a tax because they didn't need it.

[Cpt Banjo]

Springer obviously did not hold that all taxes on income were indirect taxes if they had Pollock would have been dismissed. They held that a tax on Springer's income was an indirect tax. They never even considered the tax law as it concerned other people, they plainly state so in the first sentence of the case.

The rationale of Springer was that the only direct taxes under the Constitution were taxes on land and capitation taxes. From this it follows that all other taxes, including income taxes, would be indirect taxes. Pollock changed this rationale in only one sense: it held that taxes on the income of real or personal property were direct taxes (and, implicitly, that a tax on personalty as well as realty would be a direct tax). But Pollock did not suggest that income taxes on anything else would be a direct tax; to the contrary, it recognized that a tax on personal earnings is valid.

It's obvious that if the Pollock court thought that income taxes on personal earnings were direct taxes, it would have overruled Springer, which of course it didn't.

What's pathetic is your belief congress can make every income producing activity require a license. Btw, Congress did not license every occupation in 1865, they licensed people doing business, more to the point the tax was never challenged on that issue. I seriously doubt the SC would have allowed every occupation regardless of activity to be licensed it defeats the direct tax clause. Congress can not just lay blanket license taxes. It would in form a flat capitation tax.

Wrong. The hypothetical tax I referred to would require a license to engage in any activity that produces income, and the tax would be measured by the amount of income produced. It would not, therefore, be a capitation tax. As in the License Tax Cases, the "license" would be merely an artificial method of effecting taxation, and it would be necessary to use such a system only to satisfy complete idiots who persist in their delusions that an excise tax must be based upon some kind of governmental privilege or licensed activity.

Btw, I goofed in my reference to the Civil War licenses. The statute I was referring to was enacted in 1864 and the miscellaneous license provision applied only to any nonlisted trade that had more than $1,000 in annual gross receipts. My bad. Of course, this threshold was purely arbitrary -- it could as easily have been $10.

However, there were a number of trades that were specifically listed for which no gross receipts or other dollar test was required, such as peddlers, jugglers, butchers, photographers, tobacconists, and horse dealers. These were true licenses: almost all had flat annual rates. But if jugglers, for heaven's sake, can be licensed "for real", then, a fortiori, any other occupation could be artificially licensed as a way to impose an income tax.

[SteveSy]

Springer obviously did not hold that all taxes on income were indirect taxes if they had Pollock would have been dismissed. They held that a tax on Springer's income was an indirect tax. They never even considered the tax law as it concerned other people, they plainly state so in the first sentence of the case.

The rationale of Springer was that the only direct taxes under the Constitution were taxes on land and capitation taxes. From this it follows that all other taxes, including income taxes, would be indirect taxes. Pollock changed this rationale in only one sense: it held that taxes on the income of real or personal property were direct taxes (and, implicitly, that a tax on personalty as well as realty would be a direct tax). But Pollock did not suggest that income taxes on anything else would be a direct tax; to the contrary, it recognized that a tax on personal earnings is valid.

Not it didn't.

I assume you erroneously believe this means they recognized a tax on personal earnings as valid and of course you're wrong as usual.

We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on income derived from real estate, and from invested personal property, and have not commented on so much of it as bears on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments, in view of the instances in which taxation on business, privileges, or employments has assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such.

Income taxes aren't "on" employments, license taxes are.

[Paul]

As stevesy continues to try to prove that Brushaber was wrong.

And all he actually does is prove that he cannot even read. If a tax ON employments is valid, oh stevesy, then why exactly is it that congress couldn't tax the average wage-earner's employment with a tax measured by the income from that employment? Since Pollock was talking about an income tax act that expressly taxed income from employments, why would they say that they had not previously in the opinion dealt with that portion of the tax "because" and then have a "because" that did not apply?

[Cpt Banjo]

I assume you erroneously believe this means they recognized a tax on personal earnings as valid and of course you're wrong as usual.

Hardly. First, Pollock didn't overrule Springer. Second, had the Pollock court felt that taxes on personal earnings were also direct taxes, it wouldn't have spent all the time it did on the severance issue: that is, whether the tax on the income from property could be severed from the rest of the statute so that the latter could be salvaged. It could have avoided the severance issue by simply declaring the entire act unconstitutional, but it didn't do so.

Third, the Court stated in its second Pollock opinion:

According to the census, the true valuation of real and personal property in the United States in 1890 was $65,037,091,197, of which real estate with improvements thereon made up $39,544,544,333. Of course, from the latter must be deducted, in applying these sections, all unproductive property and all property whose net yield does not exceed $4,000; but, even with such deductions, it is evident that the income from realty formed a vital part of the scheme for taxation embodied therein. If that be stricken out, and also the income from all invested personal property, bonds, stocks, investments of all kinds, it is obvious that by far the largest part of the anticipated revenue would be eliminated, and this would leave the burden of the tax to be borne by professions, trades, employments, or vocations; and in that way what was intended as a tax on capital would remain, in substance, a tax on occupations and labor. We cannot believe that such was the intention of congress. We do not mean to say that an act laying by apportionment a direct tax on all real estate and personal property, or the income thereof, might not also lay excise taxes on business, privileges, employments, and vocations. But this is not such an act, and the scheme must be considered as a whole.

Pollock, 158 U.S. at 636

Since the "tax on occupations and labor" the Court was referring to was the income tax on personal earnings, it's clear that the Court didn't see any constitutional problem with such a tax.

[SteveSy]

As stevesy continues to try to prove that Brushaber was wrong.

And all he actually does is prove that he cannot even read. If a tax ON employments is valid, oh stevesy, then why exactly is it that congress couldn't tax the average wage-earner's employment with a tax measured by the income from that employment? Since Pollock was talking about an income tax act that expressly taxed income from employments, why would they say that they had not previously in the opinion dealt with that portion of the tax "because" and then have a "because" that did not apply?

I'm not sure what you're talking about. What “because” are you referring too?
As far as I understand it they’re saying they haven’t commented on it as far as a judicial opinion. They do however imply that there is the possibility for such a tax in light of taxes that have been sustained “on” business and employments. It’s a far reach to assume just because they can do something to a few that they can do it to all. The court did not say an excise includes a tax on occupations in general. They said very clearly a tax on “certain” occupations is an excise. A blanket occupation tax would be in substance a flat capitation tax.

[SteveSy]

I assume you erroneously believe this means they recognized a tax on personal earnings as valid and of course you're wrong as usual.

Hardly. First, Pollock didn't overrule Springer. Second, had the Pollock court felt that taxes on personal earnings were also direct taxes, it wouldn't have spent all the time it did on the severance issue: that is, whether the tax on the income from property could be severed from the rest of the statute so that the latter could be salvaged. It could have avoided the severance issue by simply declaring the entire act unconstitutional, but it didn't do so.

Are you smoking crack? They killed the entire act.

Since the "tax on occupations and labor" the Court was referring to was the income tax on personal earnings, it's clear that the Court didn't see any constitutional problem with such a tax.

You obviously do not know about the history behind these cases. The entire act was not before the court, only the tax on a corporation was. Of course the court was going to focus on one part, that's their job. They address the issues before them not issues that are not. There was another case in line that dealt specifically with the tax on income from occupations. It was moot after Pollock killed the entire act. See, your entire theory is built upon an erroneous understanding of what transpired and why.


You said in another post:

Wrong. The hypothetical tax I referred to would require a license to engage in any activity that produces income, and the tax would be measured by the amount of income produced. It would not, therefore, be a capitation tax. As in the License Tax Cases, the "license" would be merely an artificial method of effecting taxation, and it would be necessary to use such a system only to satisfy complete idiots who persist in their delusions that an excise tax must be based upon some kind of governmental privilege or licensed activity.

If you believe the government can usurp the constitution by merely changing the form instead of the substance then there is no reason to continue. They could just re-label speech to be something else so they can regulate it, they can call anything interstate commerce so they can regulate it etc. etc.

What you suggest nullfies the direct tax clause. The government could have just made any capitation tax progressive and then declared it not a capitation tax. Historically capitation taxes were rarely laid in a flat fashion. You're next argument will surely be that an American captiation tax is flat, it doesn't matter what everyone else did. This of course is the epitome of intellecual dishonesty as we formed our law and traditions based on our origins, which of course came from those very same countries.

I can see the debates now....
Sir we understand your concern, we will make capitation taxes a direct tax requiring apportionment. However we all agree if we make the tax progressive then it's not a direct tax it's an indirect tax and we may lay it in a perpetual fashion. You do agree right? Yes, I agree as long as it's not flat. You may tax my slaves progressively and I shall have no issue with it.

The truth is no one made such a claim and in fact the only quotes relating to an income tax in that period very clearly stated it would require a direct tax to lay. But don't let that stop you, you'll invent support for your theory, direct evidence is not needed.

Give me a break.....

[Cpt Banjo]

I assume you erroneously believe this means they recognized a tax on personal earnings as valid and of course you're wrong as usual.

Hardly. First, Pollock didn't overrule Springer. Second, had the Pollock court felt that taxes on personal earnings were also direct taxes, it wouldn't have spent all the time it did on the severance issue: that is, whether the tax on the income from property could be severed from the rest of the statute so that the latter could be salvaged. It could have avoided the severance issue by simply declaring the entire act unconstitutional, but it didn't do so.

Are you smoking crack? They killed the entire act.

You missed the point. Had the Court thought that the personal income tax was unconstitutional as well, it would have discussed the severance issue in a completely different manner.

In its first opinion, the Court did not address three issues that were raised:

Upon each of the other questions argued at the bar, to wit: (1) Whether the void provisions as to rents and income from real estate invalidated the whole act; (2) whether, as to the income from personal property, as such, the act is unconstitutional, as laying direct taxes; (3) whether any part of the tax, if not considered as a direct tax, is invalid for want of uniformity on either of the grounds suggested,-the justices who heard the argument are equally divided, and therefore no opinion is expressed. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 586

After a second round of oral argument, however, the Court addressed the first two issues it had ducked in its first opinion. In addressing the first issue (severance), the Court would never have made the statement it did about the tax burden falling on labor if had felt that a tax on personal earnings was also a direct tax. It would have said something to the effect, "Hey, not only is a tax on the income from real and personal property a direct tax, so is a tax on wages and personal earnings. This entire income tax business is unconstitutional."

Now, was the statement about the hypothetical burden falling on labor dictum? Yes, it was. No one could argue that the language was a holding that a tax on wages was constitutional becasuse the issue wasn't before the Court. But since the only taxes held to be direct taxes in Pollock were those on the income of realty and personalty, the case did not otherwise disturb the holding in Springer and its rationale. That is, following Pollock, the only taxes that could be said to be direct were capitation taxes, taxes on realty and personalty, and taxes on the income from realty and personalty.

[SteveSy]

Hardly. First, Pollock didn't overrule Springer. Second, had the Pollock court felt that taxes on personal earnings were also direct taxes, it wouldn't have spent all the time it did on the severance issue: that is, whether the tax on the income from property could be severed from the rest of the statute so that the latter could be salvaged. It could have avoided the severance issue by simply declaring the entire act unconstitutional, but it didn't do so.

Are you smoking crack? They killed the entire act.

You missed the point. Had the Court thought that the personal income tax was unconstitutional as well, it would have discussed the severance issue in a completely different manner.

In its first opinion, the Court did not address three issues that were raised:

Upon each of the other questions argued at the bar, to wit: (1) Whether the void provisions as to rents and income from real estate invalidated the whole act; (2) whether, as to the income from personal property, as such, the act is unconstitutional, as laying direct taxes; (3) whether any part of the tax, if not considered as a direct tax, is invalid for want of uniformity on either of the grounds suggested,-the justices who heard the argument are equally divided, and therefore no opinion is expressed. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 586

After a second round of oral argument, however, the Court addressed the first two issues it had ducked in its first opinion. In addressing the first issue (severance), the Court would never have made the statement it did about the tax burden falling on labor if had felt that a tax on personal earnings was also a direct tax. It would have said something to the effect, "Hey, not only is a tax on the income from real and personal property a direct tax, so is a tax on wages and personal earnings. This entire income tax business is unconstitutional."

Why would it do that? That wasn't even before the court. The SC doesn't go off and find issues unrelated to the case at bar. That doesn't even make sense. When the court examines an argument against an act it doesn't consider everyone that act might affect and then write up an opinion dealing with every facet. They focus on the party that has raised the issue and deals with that issue.

Besides it was moot because they knew they were going to invalidate the entire act anyway. They simply wanted to make sure it was understood they didn't do what you think they were doing, deciding both issues. It would have been unjust if they had because there was another case in line that specifically dealt with that issue. It would have denied the plaintiff the ability to argue his case in full before the court.

Let's deal with what they did say not with what you believe they meant to say by your perception of their actions.

Anyway....we both know we're not going to change the others opinion....no sense in regurgitating the same ol' stuff over and over.

[Paul]

Why would it do that? That wasn't even before the court.

Not quite right. They had to determine whether the entire act was invalid or only part of it. The court chose to look first to see if any part of the act COULD be valid, and held that the tax on employments and vocations was an indirect tax. So they had to address the question of whether Congress intended the tax on employments to continue if the tax on rents were declared invalid, and concluded they did not, and so threw out the entire act.

And the "because" was: the court said we have not YET said anything about the tax on incomes other than rents because everyone knows that taxing those incomes is an excise. It then wen on to consider those other sources of incomes as explained above.