Bulten has finally taken the time to cut-and-paste some of his favorite gibberish, and I feel some sort of misguided obligation to respond.
John J. Bulten wrote:Our position is that "income" means, stated with great simplification, just "taxable gain".
Which is tautological. By inserting the word "taxable," Bulten has simply stated that he is only willing to consider something as taxable if he considers it to be taxable.
John J. Bulten wrote:As for "compensation", I must admit a synecdoche which I and others have consistently but unconsciously employed. We have frequently used the word "compensation" to mean only "income derived from compensation", i.e., the gain portion of compensation rather than the even-exchange portion as well.
A "synecdoche" is a figure of speech which substitutes one word for another word which has a larger (or smaller) meaning. So "head" might be used to refer to cattle (i.e., a word for a part of the animal is sued to refer to the whole) and "the law" might be used to refer to a police officer (i.e., a word for the whole of the legal system is used to refer to a part).
This is typical tax denial dishonesty, because Bulten is giving himself carte blanche to claim that anything he said in the past (or might say in the future) might not really mean what the words would appear to mean.
I say this is dishonest, because tax deniers often say things that look sensible, but are really gibberish because the tax deniers have secretly redefined the important words so that they mean something different from what is meant in both common speech and law. Tax deniers don't have the courage or honesty to say what they really mean, so they hide behind hidden meanings and sophistries.
Bulten has now set the stage for saying things like "all income is included in gross income" because he has already redefined "income" to mean only the gains he things should be taxable, and he has claimed the use of synecdoches as a fall-back rationale for deniability if he should accidentally say anything that might otherwise appear to be rational.
John J. Bulten wrote:To be technically correct, "compensation" is the first of "items of gross income" (26 CFR 1.61-1(a)), i.e., a source of income, not a portion or part of income.
Wrong.
If the things listed in section 61(a) are sources of income, and not income, then interest, dividends, rents, and business profits are also not income, which is absurd.
See
http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html#wagesource for details.
John J. Bulten wrote:1. The common meaning of income is gain, not "all that comes in" (Southern Pacific v Lowe). Only this common meaning accords with the phrasing of Springer v US, and the phrasing in the 1941 Treasury Report, "The largest portion of consumer incomes in the United States is not subject to income taxation." I can't imagine someone seriously disagreeing on point 1. And the Treasury Report also supports point 2, because how could there be income not subject to income taxation, unless the subject of tax is more limited than just the subject "gain"?
I don't know the source of the "1941 Treasury Report" quote, but I am quite sure that it has been taken out of context, and refers not to the *kinds* of consumer incomes that are subject to tax, but to the *amounts* of consumer incomes subject to tax. As has been explained in this forum several times, the personal exemptions in force before 1942 freed most wages earners from filing returns, not because wages were automatically exempt but because the amounts of the wages were usually too small to tax.
Earned incomes in larger amounts were obviously subject to tax, as the Supreme Court unanimously declared in Lucas v. Earl in 1922.
So Bulten has simply found a new deception to support an old canard.
John J. Bulten wrote:2. Statutory meaning of income is taxable gain, i.e. gain which Congress has jurisdiction to tax. Congress cannot tax anything they want (10th Amendment), but is limited by their Constitutional powers, as a canon of construction (Banana v Fruit).
Wrong, wrong, and wrong.
The *ONLY* limitation on the Congressional power to tax is that Congress cannot tax exports. Otherwise, the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress can tax "every subject," meaning any person, activity, or property within the states of the United States. See, e.g., the License Tax Cases, cited at
http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html#i ... tecommerce
John J. Bulten wrote: For instance, Congress does not have the power to tax 1st or 14th Amendment freedoms (Murdock v PA, analysis of state tax which is applied to any tax) or 10th Amendment rights (Bailey v Drexel).
Wrong and wrong again.
The Murdock decision confirmed that states can tax constitutionally protected rights, and interstate commerce, if the tax is nondiscriminatory. So, for example, a general income tax (or gross receipts tax) can apply to newspapers even though the publication of a newspaper is a first amendment right. See
http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html#rights for details.
And the Bailey decision reached the result that it did because it concluded that the "tax" in question was not a tax at all but an attempt to regulate something that the court had previously held could not be regulated. See
http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html#i ... tecommerce for details.
John J. Bulten wrote:3. Gain from work is taxable only by excise. Right to work is within the untaxable rights to liberty and property (Coppage v Kansas), aka Jefferson's inalienable rights (Butcher Union v Crescent City).
Wrong. Neither of those cases held that the right to work is untaxable.
And the Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in Steward Machine. See
http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html#rights for details.
John J. Bulten wrote:Congress may not tax right to work in itself because it would be a direct tax, but they have discovered how legally to move some of the gain from work into their jurisdiction, when it would not otherwise be there, by designating it an indirect tax (Pollock and Brushaber).
Two errors here:
First, Bulten is suggesting that Congress could not tax the "right to work" by a direct tax, Congress has the power to impose direct taxes as long as they are apportioned.
Second, it was the 16th Amendment and the Supreme Court that established that taxes on incomes should never be considered "direct taxes" subject to apportionment, and not Congress.
Third, it was the Supreme Court that held that taxes on incomes from employment were "indirect" (Pollock and Brushaber) and not Congress.
John J. Bulten wrote:4. Gains are assessed by either the worker or the law. Usually only the worker may assess gain from work (section 93 of the 1862 act, RS 3173 as amended, 26 USC 6012 and 7602).
As others have pointed out already, Bulten is conflating two different issues: (a) Is there taxable income as a factual (or legal) matter; and (b) How is the tax assessed.
John J. Bulten wrote: Of course the Secretary may assess after protracted failure by the worker to assess and do so correctly. But the Secretary may not assess without statutory or regulatory permission, which permissions are carefully crafted to retain the excise nature of the tax.
The "carefully crafted" nonsense is more tax denier dishonesty, and border-line gibberish, because Bulten has casually slipped his conclusion into a sentence without any explanation, support, or rationale for how or why the income tax has an "excise nature" or how or why the "excise nature" of the tax could (or could not) be retained.
John J. Bulten wrote: For example, the IRS may assess upon credible report of "wages" or "trade or business" because (as CtC reveals) these are tied to excisable activities (3121, 3401, 1402, 6041).
The concept of "excisable activities" is another canard that tax deniers have invented out of whole cloth, and it has been repeatedly rejected by the courts. See
http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html#privileges for details.
John J. Bulten wrote:5. As for me, I and the law have assessed zero or negligible gain on my pay. First, I made a CtC assessment, properly reporting any gain I thought might conceivably be taxed under law (e.g., bank interest). Second, I could have been assessed under law if a misstatement (that certain payments were wages) were allowed to stand.
Bulten has once again stated his conclusion, that the payments he received were not "wages" without any explanation or justification.
John J. Bulten wrote:I could be assessed under law if it is proven in court that I was an independent contractor with "net earnings from self-employment" in the course of a "trade or business" (1402), or if I was paid in the course of someone else's "trade or business" (6041), or if other evidence of "income" is admitted in court. Toward this I am beginning to agree with diller72, babar, et al., and conclude that defensive rebuttal of these positions should also be proactively submitted to IRS with the Position Statement of Worker. However, this evidence could only be made by a firsthand party (FRoE), and must require admission of an excisable activity, usually via a term of art. If no such evidence exists, any contrary assessment is an IRS error and cannot be permitted to stand by the USSC. There is simply no other legal way to assess gain contrary to the worker's assessment.
As others have already suggested, there are two levels of mistakes here. One is a misunderstanding of the rules of evidence, and the other is a misunderstand of the difference between evidence (or the facts proven by evidence) and the legal conclusions derived from those facts.
1. Whether Bulten received payments from someone in exchange for services is a factual matter than can be proven by the duly authenticated business records of the payor (business records being an except to the hearsay rule).
2. Whether those payments should be included in gross income, whether as "wages" or "compensation for services" is a legal conclusion that the IRS (or the courts) can reach on the basis of the business records of the payor.
Since Bulten (and Hendrickson and other Crack-heads) do not dispute the receipt of the payments, the only issue is the character of the payments, and that is a question of law and not a question governed by the rules of evidence.
John J. Bulten wrote:Wages are assessed as being income in totality, i.e., on a zero-cost basis, and no other accounting basis is legal for wages. But if no correct evidence exists linking my pay with any accounting requirement, I am free to choose my accounting basis among Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. I could conceivably claim zero basis even in the absence of evidence of wages, and report all my pay as income. I was surprised to realize that we were free to do that all the way back to 1862: anyone who volunteered to treat his pay the same as a government salary would have been welcomed, and has been ever since. I could also claim cost basis and itemize my costs. I could also claim market value basis and assess no gain on an even exchange.
These claims are simply inventions of Bulten with no basis in law or any method of accounting.
And they have been universally rejected by the courts. See
http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html#exchange and #livingcosts for details.
John J. Bulten wrote:The fact that pay is now "generally" assessed on a zero basis does not impair my freedom. To impeach it, there must be evidence that zero basis is mandated. (And that will not happen under the Constitution.)
More conclusions without explanation or support, and completely contrary to all relevant court decisions.
John J. Bulten wrote:Citations will not do the trick because they must remain Constitutional, and cannot create facts.
Translation: I can ignore any court decision I choose if I call it "not Constitutional" or "creating facts."
John J. Bulten wrote:We are winning this battle in court and pressing their retreat to the next level.
That is just plain delusional. Hendrickson himself has lost, and the Crack-heads who are smart have settled.
John J. Bulten wrote:1. All taxes which fall indifferently on (i.e., are laid on) every species of revenue are capitations (i.e., direct taxes). "The taxes which, it is intended, should fall indifferently upon every different species of revenue, are capitation taxes." —Adam Smith, 1776 (Wealth of Nations 5.2.4)
Adam Smith's definition of "capitation" is irrelevant to the meaning of "direct tax" in the Constitution. Adam Smith had no role in the drafting of the Constitution, the above definition of "capitation" has never been accepted by any court, and the meaning of "direct tax" in the Constitution extends beyond "capitations" to include taxes on the value of land (which Adam Smith did not consider to be a capitation).
John J. Bulten wrote:2. No direct taxes are both Constitutional and unapportioned. "No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken." —Constitutional Convention, 1787 (Constitution)
True, but irrelevant, because (a) the Supreme Court has stated that taxes on employments are not "direct taxes" and (b) the 16th Amendment specifically states that taxes on incomes do not need to be apportioned.
John J. Bulten wrote:3. The tax laid on incomes is both Constitutional and unapportioned. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." —Congress, 1909 (16th Amendment)
4. Given 1-3, it follows that: not every species of revenue (i.e., every payment), in itself, is income. "We must reject ... that all receipts— everything that comes in— are income." —Justice Mahlon Pitney, 1918 (Southern Pacific v Lowe, 247 US 330, 335)
Wrong in several ways.
First, the proposition that "not every species of revenue is income" does NOT "follow" from propositions 1 through 3.
Second, the Supreme Court said that not all *RECEIPTS* are income, and has never said that any *revenue* might not be income.
Third, the legal issue in Southern Pacific had nothing to do with the issue of whether wages are income. (The actual question before the court was whether a dividend paid after the income tax was enacted in 1913 was taxable if paid out of profits earned before 1913.)
John J. Bulten wrote:5. A tax on income as property (i.e., an apportioned tax on income and property) is a direct tax. "The power to tax real and personal property and the income from both, there being an apportionment ... is a direct tax in the meaning of the Constitution." —Chief Justice Melville Fuller, 1895 (Pollock v Farmers, 158 US 601, 634)
And that principle of the Pollock decision was reversed by the 16th Amendment.
John J. Bulten wrote:6. The income tax is in its nature an excise (i.e., indirect tax). "Taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such." —Chief Justice Edward White, 1916 (Brushaber v Union Pacific, 240 US 1, 17)
7. Excises are taxes on activities like commodity transfer, occupational license, or corporate privilege (i.e., activities properly taxed indirectly). "Excises are 'taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale or consumption of commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations and upon corporate privileges'." —Justice William Day, 1911 (Flint v Stone Tracy, 220 US 107, 151)
That is ONE definition of "excise." There are others.
And that definition includes within its scope the taxation of "occupations," which means that wages can be the subject of an excise.
John J. Bulten wrote:8. Given 5-7, it follows that: the income tax cannot tax income as property, but taxes activity properly taxed indirectly (i.e., activity done for income).
Which is gibberish, and does not "follow" from 5-7.
John J. Bulten wrote: "Tax is measured by net profits or gains, and is not imposed upon gross income nor capital nor other property .... Income as thus defined does not embrace capital or principal, but only such gains or profits as may be realized from rent, interest, salaries, trade, commerce, or sales of any kind of property, and so forth, or profits or gains derived from any other source." —Tax law draftsman Cordell Hull, 1913 (Congressional Record)
Which means that Hull specifically included "salaries" as a kind of income subject to tax.
John J. Bulten wrote: "It is an excise tax with respect to certain activities and privileges which is measured by reference to the income which they produce." —Tax law draftsman Morse Hubbard, 1943 (Congressional Record)
This was written 30 years after the 16th Amendment was ratified and the first income tax was enacted, and there are many reasons to believe that Hubbard was simply wrong. See
http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html#privileges for details.
John J. Bulten wrote:9. Right to liberty (i.e., lawful liberty) is a Constitutional right jurisdictionally reserved to the people. "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." —Thomas Jefferson et al., 1776 (Declaration) "Nor shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." —Congress, 1789 (5th and 10th Amendments) "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." —Congress, 1866 (14th Amendment)
The argument that taxation is a deprivation of property without due process was flatly rejected by the Supreme Court in Brushaber, and by every court since then. See
http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.htmle#deprivation
John J. Bulten wrote:10. Right to common work is part of right to liberty. "The liberty thus guaranteed ... denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life ...." —Justice James McReynolds, 1923 (Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399) "Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property— partaking of the nature of each— is the right to make contracts ... of personal employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property." —Justice Mahlon Pitney, 1915 (Coppage v Kansas, 236 US 1, 14)
11. Congress cannot tax, in themselves, Constitutional rights jurisdictionally reserved (i.e., reserved to the people). "The first amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the states, declares that 'Congress shall make no law ....' It could hardly be denied that a tax laid specifically on the exercise of those freedoms would be unconstitutional .... A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution." —Justice William Douglas, 1943 (Jones v Opelika, Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, 108, 113) "The power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights." —Justice George Sutherland, 1926 (Frost v California, 271 US 583, 593, 594) "To take over to its control any one of the great number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the states have never parted with, ... by a so-called tax ... would be to break down all constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress." —Chief Justice William Taft, 1922 (Bailey v Drexel, 259 US 20, 38)
And Congress can tax even income from "fundamental rights." See
http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html#rights
John J. Bulten wrote:13. Given 4 (not every payment, in itself, is income), 8 (income tax taxes activity done for income), and 12 (income tax cannot tax common work, in itself), it follows that: income tax cannot tax common work done for payment, in itself.
Given that 4 is irrelevant and 8 and 12 are wrong, it follows that the rest of the conclusions are also wrong.