Capitation Taxes - Redux

[Judge Roy Bean]

I'm with Demo on this one.


There once was a troll - Weston White
Who clearly was not very bright
Though his gibberish flew
The readership knew
It really was time for "good-bye"

[webhick]

Aw, he's so cute! How could someone resist giving a great big hug to something so sad and lonely?

[Gregg]

Yea I have never seen anything like this before, not even web development forums give this many people higher level access, clearly there is much more to the story than what you all publicly state. http://quatloos.com/Q-Forum/memberlist.php?mode=leaders

In forums like LH, the proportion of idiots is much higher, and the need to suppress opposing opinions is also much higher. Forums full of idiots need to keep the sharp tools locked up a lot more carefully than one where most of the members understand the meaning of common words, like "includes", "wages" and "From whatever source derived".
In short, we, as a group, have more members whom we think can be trusted. You'll notice that even though there are a lot more moderators here, there aren't a lot of people banned, posts deleted, or, outside of the long standing 100 post rule, not a lot of discussions locked or deleted.

Now, since you're not likely to get your posts deleted, I think I speak for more than myself when I ask, nay, beg you to either start making sense of STFU. You're getting annoying.

Oh, and by the way, I think you have done something original, I have never seen anyone quote Roman tax law before.

[Duke2Earl]

Oh, and by the way, I think you have done something original, I have never seen anyone quote Roman tax law before.

Nope, sorry... done that before. There was a geek (must be over 10 years ago now) who thought the reason taxes didn't apply to him mostly based on Roman law and especially the law around the concept of Usufruct. Never could quite understand it.

All magic words work, if you say them enough... don't you know?

[LPC]

By the way, a "capitation" is a kind of "direct tax."

No, every case, when referring to capitation taxes, references such taxes aside from 'direct taxes', it would be more correct to state capitation taxes are a kind or a class of direction taxation or exist within the category of direct taxes,

Which is what Famspear said.

[LPC]

Capitation Taxes - Tax in consideration of ones labor or business.

No. No federal court has ever ruled that this is definition of a capitation.

Yes they have, you just need to be willing to actually read what the case is saying, in most cases not outright, but in light and in consideration of the meaning and intention of the various classes of tax in respects to taxation (e.g. negative pregnant).

Then cite one case that supports that definition of "capitation."

Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.
Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913)

That's not it.

Must diversity of opinion has always prevailed upon the question what are direct taxes? Attempts to answer it by reference to the definitions of political economists have been frequently made, but without satisfactory results. The enumeration of the different kinds of taxes which Congress was authorized to impose was probably made with very little reference to their speculations. The great work of Adam Smith, the first comprehensive treatise on political economy in the English language, had then been recently published, but in this work, though there are passages which refer to the characteristic difference between direct and indirect taxation, there is nothing which affords any valuable light on the use of the words "direct taxes" in the Constitution.
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 8Wall. 533 533 (1869)

That's not it either.

All taxes on expenses or consumption are indirect taxes. A tax on carriages is of this kind, and of course is not a direct tax. Indirect taxes are circuitous modes of reaching the revenue of individuals, who generally live according to their income. In many cases of this nature the individual may be said to tax himself. I shall close the discourse with reading a passage or two from Smith's Wealth of Nations.

"The impossibility of taxing people in proportion to their revenue by any capitation seems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes upon consumable commodities; the state, not knowing how to tax directly and proportionally the revenue of its subjects, endeavors to tax it indirectly by taxing their expense, which it is supposed in most cases will be neatly in proportion to their revenue. Their expense is taxed by taxing the consumable commodities upon which it is laid out."

"Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries, may be taxed in two different ways: the consumer may either pay an annual sum on account of his using or consuming goods of a certain kind or the goods may be taxed while they remain in the hands of the dealer, and before they are delivered to the consumer. The consumable goods, which last a considerable time before they are consumed altogether, are most properly taxed in the one way, those of which the consumption is immediate or more speedy in the other; the coach tax and plate tax are examples of the former method of imposing; the greater part of the other duties of excise and customs of the latter."
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 3 Dall. 171 171 (1796)

Still not it.

In 75 U. S. 543, 75 U. S. 544, 75 U. S. 546, the principal question was whether a tax on state bank notes issued for circulation was a direct tax. On behalf of the bank, it was contended by distinguished counsel that the tax was a direct one, and that it was. Invalid because not apportioned among the States agreeably to the Constitution. In explanation of the nature of direct taxes, they relied largely (so the authorized report of the case states) on the writings of Adam Smith and on other treatises, English and American, on political economy. In the discussion of the case, reference was made by counsel to the former decisions in Hylton v. United States and Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule. Chief Justice Chase, delivering the judgment of the court, after observing (as I have already stated) that the works of political economists gave no valuable light on the question as to what, in the constitutional@ sense, were direct taxes, entered upon an examination of the numerous acts of Congress imposing taxes. That examination, he announced on behalf of this court, showed
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 158 U.S. 601 (1895)

Still not it.

But Albert Gallatin, in his "Sketch of the Finances of the United States," published in November, 1796, said:

"The most generally received opinion, however, is that, by direct taxes in the Constitution, those are meant which are raised on the capital or revenue of the people; by indirect, such as are raised on their expense. As that opinion is, in itself, rational and conformable to the decision which has taken place on the subject of the carriage tax, and as it appears important, for the sake of preventing future controversies, which may be not more fatal to the revenue than to the tranquility of the Union, that a fixed interpretation should be generally adopted, it will not be improper to corroborate it by quoting the author from whom the idea seems to have been borrowed."

He then quotes from Smith's Wealth of Nations, and continues:

"The remarkable coincidence of the clause of the Constitution with this passage in using the word 'capitation' as a generic expression, including the different species of direct taxes, an acceptation of the word peculiar, it is believed, to Dr. Smith, leaves little doubt that the framers of the one had the other in view at the time, and that they, as well as he, by direct taxes, meant those paid directly from, and falling immediately on, the revenue, and, by indirect, those which are paid indirectly out of the revenue by falling immediately upon the expense."

In the debates in the House of Representatives preceding the passage of the act of Congress to lay "duties upon carriages for the conveyance of persons," approved June 5, 1794 (1 Stat. 373, c. 45), Mr. Sedgwick said that "a capitation tax, and taxes on land and on property and income generally were direct charges, as well in the immediate as ultimate sources of contribution. He had considered those, and those only, as direct taxes in their operation and effects. On the other hand, a tax imposed on a specific article of personal property, and particularly if objects of luxury, as in the case under consideration, he had never supposed had been considered a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution."

Mr. Dexter observed that his colleague "had stated the meaning of direct taxes to be a capitation tax, or a general tax on all the taxable property of the citizens, and that a gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Nicholas) thought the meaning was that all taxes are direct which are paid by the citizen without being recompensed by the consumer; but that, where the tax was only advanced and repaid by the consumer, the tax was indirect. He thought that both opinions were just, and not inconsistent, though the gentlemen had differed about them. He thought that a general tax on all taxable property was a direct tax, because it was paid without being recompensed by the consumer."

Black, writing on Constitutional Law, says:

"But the chief difficulty has arisen in determining what is the difference between direct taxes and such as are indirect. In general usage, and according to the terminology of political economy, a direct tax is one which is levied upon the person who is to pay it, or upon his land or personalty, or his business or income, as the case may be. An indirect tax is one assessed upon the manufacturer or dealer in the particular commodity, and paid by him, but which really falls upon the consumer, since it is added to the market price of the commodity which he must pay. But the course of judicial decision has determined that the term 'direct,' as here applied to taxes, is to be taken in a more restricted sense. The Supreme Court has ruled that only land taxes and capitation taxes are 'direct,' and no others. In 1794, Congress levied a tax of ten dollars on all carriages kept for use, and it was held that this was not a direct tax. And so also an income tax is not to be considered direct. Neither is a tax on the circulation of state banks, nor a succession tax, imposed upon every 'devolution of title to real estate.'"

If there were left a doubt as to what this established construction is, it seems to be entirely removed by the case of Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 86, 102 U. S. 602. Springer was assessed for an income tax on his professional earnings and on the interest on United States bonds.
…
"Our conclusions are that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate, and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complained is within the category of an excise or duty."
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)

In the first Pollock decision (157 U.S. 429), the court concluded only that a tax on rental income from real property was a "direct tax." Further, the court quoted from Veazie Bank v. Fenno, which stated that "This review shows that personal property, contracts, occupations, and the like, have never been regarded by congress as proper subjects of direct tax."

And, in the second Pollock opinion (158 ), the court ruled that a tax on incomes from property was a "direct tax," but that a tax on incomes from labor was NOT, stating "We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on income derived from real estate, and from invested personal property, and have not commented on so much of it as bears on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments, in view of the instances in which taxation on business, privileges, or employments has assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such."

So that case contradicts your understanding of "capitation."

The views expressed in this case are adopted by Chancellor Kent and Justice Story in their examination of the subject. [Footnote 9]

Duties are defined by Tomlin to be things due and recoverable by law. The term, in its widest signification, is hardly less comprehensive than "taxes." It is applied, in its most restricted meaning, to customs; and in that sense is nearly the synonym of "imposts." [Footnote 10]

Impost is a duty on imported goods and merchandise. In a larger sense, it is any tax or imposition. [Footnote 11]

Cowell says it is distinguished from custom, "because custom is rather the profit which the prince makes on goods shipped out." [Footnote 12]

Mr. Madison considered the terms "duties" and "imposts" in these clauses as synonymous. [Footnote 13]

Judge Tucker thought "they were probably intended to comprehend every species of tax or contribution not included under the ordinary terms, taxes and excises.'"

Excise is defined to be an inland imposition, sometimes upon the consumption of the commodity, and sometimes upon the retail sale; sometimes upon the manufacturer, and sometimes upon the vendor. [Footnote 14]
Pacific Insurance Company v. Soule, 74 U.S. 7 Wall. 433 433 (1868)

Which has nothing to do with the meaning of "capitation."

… The construction always given to Article 1, indicates that the only taxes which the Constitution regards as direct taxes, are capitation taxes and taxes imposed immediately on land, and which are capable of apportionment without producing any inequality or injustice. 15

The term seems to have been derived from the Roman law, which recognized two kinds of direct taxes; a capitation tax (capitis tributum) and a land tax (agri tributum). Italy and privileged towns, which were exempted from these taxes, paid a tax of five per cent. on all testamentary successions (vicesima hereditatum), and on manumitted slaves, which together with customs and excises, seems to have been first imposed in the time of Augustus. 16

Indirect taxes, such as duties of impost and excises and every other description of the same, must be uniform, and direct taxes must be laid in proportion to the census or enumeration as remodelled in the fourteenth amendment. Taxes on lands, houses, and other permanent real estate have always been deemed to be direct taxes, and capitation taxes, by the express words of the Constitution, are within the same category, but it never has been decided that any other legal exactions for the support of the Federal government fall within the condition that unless laid in proportion to numbers that the assessment is invalid. 24

Whether direct taxes in the sense of the Constitution comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax and a tax on land is a question not absolutely decided, nor is it necessary to determine it in the present case, as it is expressly decided that the term does not include the tax on income, [90 U.S. 331, 348] w ich cannot be distinguished in principle from a succession tax such as the one involved in the present controversy. 25

Neither duties nor excises were regarded as direct taxes by the authors of the Federalist. Objection was made to the power to impose such taxes, and in answering that objection Mr. Hamilton said that the proportion of these taxes is not to be left to the discretion of the national legislature, but it is to be determined by the numbers of each State, as described in the second section of the first article. An actual census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule, a circumstance which shuts the door to partiality or oppression. In addition to the precaution just mentioned, said he, there is a provision that all duties of imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. 26

Exactions for the support of the government may assume the form of duties, imposts, or excises, or they may also assume the form of license fees for permission to carry on particular occupations or to enjoy special franchises, or they may be specific in form, as when levied upon corporations in reference to the amount of capital stock or to the business done or profits earned by the individual or corporation. 27
SCHOLEY v. REW, 90 U.S. 331 (1874)

Which also does not explain what is meant by "capitation" in the Constitution.

Finally, another opinion that contradicts you:

"I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND."
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), (opinion of Justice Chase; emphasis added).

[ASITStands]

Finally, another opinion that contradicts you:

"I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND."
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), (opinion of Justice Chase; emphasis added).

It's that little word "or" that trips tax deniers, and the little word "other."

Here, a capitation is aligned by the word "or" with a poll tax, which is clearly what the Act of 1798 imposed on slaves, as it was by an enumeration or poll that had been done earlier.

So, also, the language of Article I, Sec. 9, Cl. 4, "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax ..."

It's those little words "or" and "other" that trip tax deniers every time.

[Weston White]

Finally, another opinion that contradicts you:

"I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND."
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), (opinion of Justice Chase; emphasis added).

It's that little word "or" that trips tax deniers, and the little word "other."

Here, a capitation is aligned by the word "or" with a poll tax, which is clearly what the Act of 1798 imposed on slaves, as it was by an enumeration or poll that had been done earlier.

So, also, the language of Article I, Sec. 9, Cl. 4, "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax ..."

It's those little words "or" and "other" that trip tax deniers every time.

Nope, he is giving the definition of a poll-tax, which is a variation of a capitation tax: "without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance". Though you little quote means nothing for the mere fact that: "I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion". If anything could be stated from that quote is that he did not believe taxing labor was a taxable activity. Stop being dishonest in your quotes. Many others believe the poll-tax to exist within 'other direct taxes'.

BTW, you let out the following sentence, which affirms my above summation: "I doubt whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal property within he United States is included within the term 'direct tax.'""

Oh and look what else he said, prior to stating he does not give a judicial opinion: "The term duty is the most comprehensive next to the general term tax, and practically in Great Britain (whence we take our general ideas of taxes, duties, imposts, excises, customs, etc.)"... In other words guess where definitions of capitation and poll-taxes comes from genius!

... Whether direct taxes, in the sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax and tax on land is a questionable point. If Congress, for instance, should tax, in the aggregate or mass, things that generally pervade all the states in the Union, then perhaps the rule of apportionment would be the most proper, especially if an assessment was to intervene. ...

... All taxes on expenses or consumption are indirect taxes. ... I shall close the discourse with reading a passage or two from Smith's
Wealth of Nations.

"The impossibility of taxing people in proportion to their revenue by any capitation seems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes upon consumable commodities; the state, not knowing how to tax directly and proportionally the revenue of its subjects, endeavors to tax it indirectly by taxing their expense, which it is supposed in most cases will be neatly in proportion to their revenue. Their expense is taxed by taxing the consumable commodities upon which it is laid out."

Justice Paterson: "... In this way, the terms direct taxes and capitation and other direct tax are satisfied ..."

and

"Apportionment is an operation on States, and involves valuations and assessments, which are arbitrary and should not be resorted to but in case of necessity. Uniformity is an instant operation on individuals, without the intervention of assessments or any regard to States, and is at once easy, certain, and efficacious. All taxes on expenses or consumption are indirect taxes."

[OMG, indirect taxes do not require assessments and direct taxes do... and here is the poor IRS, unable to provide anybody with a signed assessment, oh my!]

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 158 U.S. 601 (1895)

[Weston White]

By the way, a "capitation" is a kind of "direct tax."

No, every case, when referring to capitation taxes, references such taxes aside from 'direct taxes', it would be more correct to state capitation taxes are a kind or a class of direction taxation or exist within the category of direct taxes,

Which is what Famspear said.

No that is not what he said. He is attempting to concatenate the entire class of direct taxation into one neat little tidy word, thereby destroying the absolute distinctions of the class as a whole and ensconcing the truth. The discussion taking place within these cases is an honest effort to determine exactly what subjects are taxable under the phrase "other direct taxes", they were attempting to figure out what the intention of such a phrase was. They knew what was meant by direct vs. indirect taxation, that is evident.

The confusion never appears to be relevant to capitation or poll taxes, though poll-taxes is a variant of capitation taxes, they are not synonymous (similar to labor, business, and work) they each have very specific applications. However, there was obviously much confusion about what was to be constitutionally taxable within 'other direct taxes'. So much so that they relied upon legislative history to determine its meaning. The only case that had really expended an effort in exploring the meaning of capitation taxes as well as what is meant by direct taxation vs. indirect taxation, appears to have been POLLOCK. Though also it appears that there is no case that addresses the taxing of labor itself, so never was there a need to address that within any of the cases, at least not to any great length.

This only leaves you to conclude that taxing of labor was never an issue. As well you should also note that in cases dealing with the constitutionality of taxing bonds, shares, dividends, interest, and the like there was no simultaneous issue with the taxing of their remuneration, which if taxing labor was also being performed in conjunction with the taxing of their realized gains and profits, why would such person have not taken issue with the taxing of their labor along with their taking issue with the taxing of their profits from such investment related activities? That truly makes no sense at all.

[Weston White]

Geez, LPC why so willfully ignorant? Chanting “still not it” or whatever, besides making you look sort of crazy and giving the appearance that you are mentally challenged and unable to commit to a cause, just does not make it so. Those are real court cases based in reality… apparently though your thought processes are not. Do you act that way in a courtroom? Just curious… well sort of. Heh.

Then cite one case that supports that definition of "capitation."

I already did, read POLLOCK yourself, it is very clear. Though in actuality they all support that definition of capitation tax, though not so pointedly, not so directly. The only real confusion lies in the relational values of capitation and poll taxes; as poll-taxes are a sub-class of existing within “capitations” or capitatim (by the head, by the individual), ergo, both taxes are head taxes, taxes upon the person, while having individual characteristics specific to each class of direct taxation. If you were to thoroughly read through the cases it will enable you to actually surmise the specific intentions, distinctions, and purposes of levying such the various classes of taxes.

Finally, another opinion that contradicts you:

"I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND."
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), (opinion of Justice Chase; emphasis added).

This is merely a comment and has no legal significance, even it did later cases overruled it. Though that does not contradict what I am stating. He stated the definition of what a poll-tax is right after using the word. The most that can said is that this Justice did not believe that taxing labor is included in such taxes, regardless. This is most likely what you left of his next sentence…

“I doubt whether a tax by a general assessment of personal property within the United States is included within the term 'direct tax.'”

So the most that can said is that we are both wrong, though it still entirely destroys your understanding of the terms in play. In reality though this case is about consumable property not labor, therefore, that not the matter being addressed nor considered. Similar to later cases involving the subject of what are “income taxes”, they will only discuss the meaning as it pertains to the matter at hand, not regard it as an all encompassing discussion.

[ASITStands]

Weston ....

In all your rambling, you avoid the obvious! In Springer and Veazie, the Supreme Court of the United States discussed a capitation imposed by Congress on slaves in the Act of 1798.

It had nothing to do with payment in exchange for labor!

A capitation has always and only been a tax imposed directly on persons (or the whole of their property or estate), or a class of persons such as slaves, the only historical example being the capitation imposed by Congress on the enumeration of slaves in the Act of 1798.

A capitation has never been defined by an agency of the United States, either Congress, the Executive or the Supreme Court, as a tax on payment in exchange for labor. Pollock does not support your definition of a capitation as being a tax on payment in exchange for labor.

Both Springer and Veazie, as well as the Act of 1798, stand against your definition.

Your only recourse is to make your challenge in Court. You'll not prove it otherwise.

[Weston White]

In forums like LH, the proportion of idiots is much higher, and the need to suppress opposing opinions is also much higher. Forums full of idiots need to keep the sharp tools locked up a lot more carefully than one where most of the members understand the meaning of common words, like "includes", "wages" and "From whatever source derived".
In short, we, as a group, have more members whom we think can be trusted. You'll notice that even though there are a lot more moderators here, there aren't a lot of people banned, posts deleted, or, outside of the long standing 100 post rule, not a lot of discussions locked or deleted.

Now, since you're not likely to get your posts deleted, I think I speak for more than myself when I ask, nay, beg you to either start making sense of STFU. You're getting annoying.

Oh, and by the way, I think you have done something original, I have never seen anyone quote Roman tax law before.

I didn't, see I quoted a SCOTUS case that did quoted where the meaning originated from. See there is a difference.

BTW, it is none of you that understand the concept behind statutory construction and how law is to be created in accordance with foundational law, and how it is to be written in crisp coherent verbiage, and how when there is an issue or discrepancy at hand the citizen's interpretation is to be favored.

[Famspear]

BTW, it is none of you that understand the concept behind statutory construction and how law is to be created in accordance with foundational law, and how it is to be written in crisp coherent verbiage, and how when there is an issue or discrepancy at hand the citizen's interpretation is to be favored.

Zooooooommmmmmmm!!!! Off to Planet Weston!!!!!!!!!

[Paul]

This only leaves you to conclude that taxing of labor was never an issue.

Except, of course, in Springer, which held that a tax on the income from that poor gentleman's labor was an excise.

[Famspear]

Geez, LPC why so willfully ignorant? Chanting “still not it” or whatever, besides making you look sort of crazy and giving the appearance that you are mentally challenged and unable to commit to a cause, just does not make it so. Those are real court cases based in reality… apparently though your thought processes are not. Do you act that way in a courtroom? Just curious… well sort of. Heh.

[ . . . . . ]

I already did, read POLLOCK yourself, it is very clear. Though in actuality they all support that definition of capitation tax, though not so pointedly, not so directly. The only real confusion lies in the relational values of capitation and poll taxes; as poll-taxes are a sub-class of existing within “capitations” or capitatim (by the head, by the individual), ergo, both taxes are head taxes, taxes upon the person, while having individual characteristics specific to each class of direct taxation. If you were to thoroughly read through the cases it will enable you to actually surmise the specific intentions, distinctions, and purposes of levying such the various classes of taxes.

ZZZzzzoooooooommmmMMMMMM! Off to Planet Weston!

So the most that can said is that we are both wrong, though it still entirely destroys your understanding of the terms in play. In reality though this case is about consumable property not labor, therefore, that not the matter being addressed nor considered. Similar to later cases involving the subject of what are “income taxes”, they will only discuss the meaning as it pertains to the matter at hand, not regard it as an all encompassing discussion.

Zoom! Zoom! ZZZZzzzzzoooooommmmmMMMMMM! Off to Planet Weston!

[Paul]

Finally, another opinion that contradicts you:

"I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND."
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), (opinion of Justice Chase; emphasis added).

This is merely a comment and has no legal significance, even it did later cases overruled it.

Name one. Since you said "cases," I should ask you to name 2, but I'll be happy with 1.

[Weston White]

Weston ....

In all your rambling, you avoid the obvious! In Springer and Veazie, the Supreme Court of the United States discussed a capitation imposed by Congress on slaves in the Act of 1798.

It had nothing to do with payment in exchange for labor!

A capitation has always and only been a tax imposed directly on persons (or the whole of their property or estate), or a class of persons such as slaves, the only historical example being the capitation imposed by Congress on the enumeration of slaves in the Act of 1798.

A capitation has never been defined by an agency of the United States, either Congress, the Executive or the Supreme Court, as a tax on payment in exchange for labor. Pollock does not support your definition of a capitation as being a tax on payment in exchange for labor.

Both Springer and Veazie, as well as the Act of 1798, stand against your definition.

Your only recourse is to make your challenge in Court. You'll not prove it otherwise.

No I am working my way up to your post. Though I do not understand why you keep quoting that case, it was involving an attorney and gains from bonds of course he was most likely involved in taxable activities. That case was addressing other direct taxes, not capitation taxes.

"4. Direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate."

See it is making two separate distinctions, (1) capitations is addressed and then it goes on to (2) address the meaning of what are "other direct taxes", e.g. taxes on lands and buildings.

He [Hamilton] suggests that the boundary line between direct and indirect taxes be settled by "a species of arbitration," and that direct taxes be held to be only "capitation or poll taxes, and taxes on lands and buildings, and general assessments, whether on the whole property of individuals or on their whole real or personal estate. All else must, of necessity, be considered as indirect taxes."

Lest you forget the obvious here, 1) You can't even actually define what a capitation or poll-tax is, (2) nowhere is there any definition available that offers such a definition, and (3) if that is what a capitation tax is, than there is not any other meaningful definition as to what other direct taxes are, because capitation taxes had already covered it. Again your logic is desperate and flawed.

BTW, under your own presumable understanding of what a capitation tax, which it to say is actually defining what is meant by 'other direct taxes' and not capitation or poll-taxes, ones revenue or stock would be included by the meaning of whole property or whole estate, therefore taxing labor would still be covered therein. Not only by definition but also by logic, to include the taxing of ones property real or personal would include their accumulated wealth as a whole, it would include all such related activities, this would be taken to mean the money that they make. If you are taxing their core value, assets, worth, who they are, established wealth, productivity, it is only to be done through direct taxation. Your are directly affecting them and if not careful you will serve to inflict and repress them.

Remember taxing the shadow is the same as taking the source, so there is not point in arguing that it is not labor that is taxed it is the remuneration earned from the labor that is taxed... otherwise Congress could just tax everything as an indirect tax if they truly wanted to. By circumventing the provisions of the Constitution. Still, you fail to grasp the distinction between direct and indirect.

Oh and POLLOCK directly states what the definition of what is meant by capitation taxes. Saying it does not will not make that ominous fact simply go away.

Also that 1798 RA that you keep citing does not appear to actually use the word capitation tax, I only found the word direct tax over and over and over. If I am wrong though please provide the URL to point out that error. Not that it relevant anyways.

[Weston White]

Finally, another opinion that contradicts you:

"I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND."
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), (opinion of Justice Chase; emphasis added).

This is merely a comment and has no legal significance, even it did later cases overruled it.

Name one. Since you said "cases," I should ask you to name 2, but I'll be happy with 1.

Springer and Pollock you goober-dork. Damn do any of you even read these cases or do you just quote completely out of context paragraphs from them?

[Weston White]

This only leaves you to conclude that taxing of labor was never an issue.

Except, of course, in Springer, which held that a tax on the income from that poor gentleman's labor was an excise.

Except, of course, in Springer, which held that a tax on the income from that poor gentleman's labor was an excise.

Attorney involved in bonds. Enough said. Though funny, take note not mention of income tax anyplace... Sort of odd no?

Our conclusions are, that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty. Pomeroy, Const.Law, 177; Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, and Scholey v. Rew, supra.

BTW this:
"capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument"
...it means no further discussion needed, we all know what it means. In other words the only thing that needs further elaboration is, are you ready for this you stud-muffins? ...
"other direct taxes".

[ASITStands]

Also that 1798 RA that you keep citing does not appear to actually use the word capitation tax, I only found the word direct tax over and over and over. If I am wrong though please provide the URL to point out that error. Not that it relevant anyways.

I have carefully stated THREE TIMES that the Act of 1798 was considered a capitation tax on slaves by the Supreme Court in Springer and Veazie, and I explained at least once that the act called itself a direct tax, though the result was a capitation.

THAT'S what I mean when I say that Springer and Veazie discuss the meaning of a capitation only in terms of a direct tax on persons, or a class of persons such as slaves.

The Supreme Court NOWHERE discusses a capitation in any other manner.