SteveSy wrote:See Famspear you're trying to do what the federal judges do to deny someone a fair trial. Maybe not intentionally on your part but its certainly, in my opinion, intentional on the court's part.
Yes, yes, that's what I'm trying to do - and it's working! All the judges are ruling the way I tell them to rule. Bwahhh hahahaaa I have the power!
Oh, wait, off my meds..... Ahem..
You automatically assume that presenting a statute upon which you formed your belief should automatically be viewed as an attempt to convince the jury the law means something.
Well, no, I don't. Some defendants would try that to negate willfulness. Others would do it to try to confuse the jury or to circumvent the legal process. It depends on the defendant and his or her own motives.
I would agree, a defendant should be barred stating what the law means. However, the defendant shouldn't be barred from showing how he arrived at his belief by reading the text of the law. The judge can be right there telling the jury the correct version and insure the defendant is not allowed to claim the law actually means this or that.
Great, Steve. And I believe that a few judges do allow that, to some limited degree. It's a judgment call by the judge in each case.
It's unfathomable in a free society that a jury could not see the very law upon which you formed your belief to see if you acted willfully or not.
Oh, come on Steve, fathom it! Fathom it!
That just reeks of a tyrannical injustice.
Wow, I need to set you up with Weston White. Have you met him? He has something called the "Tyrannical Response Team."
More importantly as a practical matter using the rule defies logic and common sense in a willfulness case. If, as you and the courts say, it's impossible to maintain a belief and not know you have a legal duty when someone is siting there who has been identified as an authoritative expert on the matter is offering the correct version. Then how could 12 people be convinced by a nobody? If he convinces them, which is supposedly impossible, then he's proven beyond a reasonable doubt he didn't act willfully.
OK, before you lose me, Steve, I would like to point out that sometimes the Cheek defense works. Tommy K. Cryer is a lawyer, for heaven's sake, and he was was acquitted. You're equivocating on the word "belief." In its ordinary, every day sense, lots of tax protesters actually believe that they are correct on the law.
Actually believe they are correct. An actual belief is not quite sufficient, under the Cheek doctrine. The Supreme Court has indicated that the kind of belief that negatives willfulness is an
actual belief based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law (I'll abbreviate that to a "Cheek actual belief"). Now, I don't think the trial courts necessarily put that veribage in their instructions to the jury. But that doesn't change the basic point that if someone is convicted and appeals, a trial court could well affirm [
Edit: That should read: "an appeals court could well affirm..."] the conviction by looking at the evidence presented at the trial and concluding, as a matter of law, that a reasonable jury could have concluded that the defendant's actual belief did not rise to the level of an actual belief based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law -- that the defendant's actual belief was really a self-inflicted delusion caused by what was, fundamentally, obdurate recalcitrance and an unwillingness to accept the law, or even a disagreement with a law of which the defendant was really aware.
Again, that's the jury's call. I didn't write the court's decision in the Cheek case, and I don't decide federal court cases myself.
Obviously, if 12 people could be convinced or confused with a judge right there face to face telling them differently then certainly someone reading a few court cases and having the IRS disagree could equally be convinced or confused and maintain a different belief.
Yep. So what?
The only potential issue would be that the jury might act out their new beliefs and not file or file in a way that is not acceptable. This is the only reason I agree that the jury should not be told what the law is according to the defendant but instead only view it as evidence to determine whether or not the defendant's belief was in good faith. This can be easily controlled by the judge.
You have my permission to make that argument to the judge if you're ever in the situation where you need to do that.
By the way your comparison to murder is flawed. You don't have to know that stabbing someone to death is illegal to be convicted of murder it has nothing whatsoever to do with willfulness.
No, you're confusing two different things. First, the reason you don't need to know that stabbing is illegal to be convicted of murder is that, in general, murder is not a "specific intent" crime. That means that the general rule applies. The general rule in criminal cases is the ignorance of the law is not a valid defense. For example, in Texas (if I recall), the mens rea element for murder is intent (conscious object or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result) or knowledge (awareness). There is no requirement that the defendant have been aware that there is a law against murder.
By contrast, the "willfulness" mens rea element in federal tax crimes is a "specific intent" element (the term "specific intent" has more than one legal meaning, but that's a separate story). In other words, federal tax crimes are an EXCEPTION to the general rule I just described.
Second, my reference to "murder" above does not relate to the mens rea requirement at all. Instead, the discussion relates to whether a defendant in a criminal case is allowed to present,
to the jury, the argument that
there is really no law against murder. That argument is not permissible. You can make that argument to the judge, but not to the jury. Likewise, in a federal criminal tax case, the tax protester defendant is not allowed to present,
to the jury, the argument that there is no law imposing the income tax. Indeed, neither side in a court case is allowed to present arguments about
what the law is to the jury itself.
You again confused two concepts. It doesn't matter what the mens rea requirement is for murder, or for tax evasion, or for anything else. Generally, neither side in a civil or criminal case is supposed to be allowed to make arguments, TO THE JURY ITSELF, about what the law is.
I don't make the rules.
"My greatest fear is that the audience will beat me to the punch line." -- David Mamet
