Income and Compensation Defined

[John J. Bulten]

Somebody's webpage: “Employee” includes what you would normally think of as employees.

Oh Dan, I forgot you have no ear for subtlety. Please answer these questions directly. They will require all the lawying skills you can muster.

1. If a party meets the description of "employee" in 26 USC 3121(d)(2) but does not meet any of the explicit descriptions of "employee" specifically listed in 26 USC 3231(b), is that party a 3231(b) employee? Remember jkeeb answered an implied "no" by saying, "You are not an employee under IRC 32xx"; and remember the subsection includes the clause, "The term 'employee' includes an officer of an employer", and IRC inclusion is somewhat expansive.

2. If a party meets the description of "employee" in 26 USC 3121(d)(2) but does not meet any of the explicit descriptions of "employee" specifically listed in 26 USC 3401(c), is that party a 3401(c) employee? Remember you answered an implied "yes" by saying on your FAQ, "'Employee' includes what you would normally think of as employees" (link above); and remember the subsection includes the clause, "The term 'employee' also includes an officer of a corporation", and IRC inclusion is somewhat expansive.

3a. If you do not answer no to 1, where has anyone authoritative ever held similarly, i.e., stating that common-law employees are in themselves subject to Railroad Retirement?

3b. Or, if you answer no to 1 but do not answer no to 2, by what rationale do you answer the two cases differently, i.e., rejecting the implicit application of your FAQ statement above to 3231(b)?

3c. Or, if you answer no to both, by what rationale do you retain your FAQ statement, i.e., maintaining a contradiction?

I am guessing your answer and placing it in a sealed envelope.

[jg]

Food is an expense and thus a source of decrease in net worth. Please show me one law stating that food cannot be deducted for purposes of calculating income derived from compensation. (The laws stating that food cannot be deducted for purposes of calculating income derived from trade or business are irrelevant to this inquiry.).)

TITLE 26, Subtitle A, CHAPTER 1, Subchapter B, PART IX, Sec. 262 says:
"(a) General rule
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses. "

In fact, show me one law that states generally how to calculate income derived from compensation for those not government/corporate/similar workers. (The laws stating that wage earners are taxed on the full amount of wages are irrelevant to this inquiry.)

See my prior post.

[LPC]

See how much fun I'm having watching you guess!

Being vague (or incoherent) and then laughing when people guess wrong (or right) about what you meant to write is the Mark of the Troll.

[LPC]

Please answer these questions directly.

Nope.

You started this thread with a series of assertions that you claimed supported your conclusion. I took the time to explain why every assertion was either wrong or irrelevant.

Unless you can tell me why I'm wrong, you lose.

If you want to start a new game, that's fine. We'll make it a best out of three, with you 0 for 1 to start.

[LPC]

Somebody's webpage: “Employee” includes what you would normally think of as employees.

Oh Dan, I forgot you have no ear for subtlety.

And I forgot that you are a liar with no sense of honesty.

When I first saw the webpage quote, I didn't think anything about it, because it sounded like something I remembered writing, and was a sensible statement of the law. Now that you've taken it a step further, and are looking to attack my statement, I have looked into it and realized (once again) what a liar you are.

What you have quoted is NOT a sentence from my FAQ. It is PART of a larger sentence. Specifically:

As defined by I.R.C. section 7701(c), the use of “includes” does not exclude anything otherwise within the meaning of “employee,” so “employee” includes what you would normally think of as employees, as well as some things you might not ordinarily think of as employees, such as elected officials of state and local governments.

Even the complete sentence is not sufficient, because the sentence is part of a larger context. Specifically:

“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘employee’ includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term ‘employee’ also includes an officer of a corporation.” I.R.C. section 3401(c).

Notice the word “includes”? As defined by I.R.C. section 7701(c), the use of “includes” does not exclude anything otherwise within the meaning of “employee,” so “employee” includes what you would normally think of as employees, as well as some things you might not ordinarily think of as employees, such as elected officials of state and local governments.

Seeing the complete context, it is obvious that I was not making a general statement about the meaning of the word "employee," but a specific statement about the meaning of "employee" in a specific statute, section 3401(c).

This context is important, because section 3401 uses the word "includes" while the definitions of "employee" in section 3121 and 3231 use the word "means," which is completely different.

Because you have presented yourself as intelligent, I can only believe that you deliberately misrepresented the context of my statement in order to mislead and deceive.

In short, you are a liar.

[LPC]

If you [John Bulten] want to start a new game, that's fine. We'll make it a best out of three, with you 0 for 1 to start.

I retract my offer. I'm not willing to play games with liars.

[.]

In short, you are a liar.

I'm sure everyone is just shocked.

The only question is whether JJBullshite will attempt to explain away and/or obfuscate his multiple prevarications.

[wserra]

In short, you are a liar.

Careful, Dan. Bulten may mumble something about defamation.

[Imalawman]

What gets me about the CTC method is that they can never fully explain how not being an employee under a withholding statute makes them not liable for taxes under 61. Now, I've heard the BS about it, but in the end CTC only matters in terms of withholding. Not to mention that its extremely inane.

My other pet peeve is the tired argument about having basis in yourself. I always found the concept of basis straightforward. Lately, though, I've been thinking that maybe its more complicated than I thought (in light of the Murphy case) if you don't deal with it in everyday life.

This John fellow is quite a hoot, he's putting forth his best effort and then getting his ass handed to him. But then, instead of admitting his embarrassing defeat he doth protest that he is merely playing with us. I'd have to agree with LPC, he's a liar. Some are merely mistaken, but this chap is extremely dishonest.

[The Observer]

Have you ever met a TP so deep into the kool-ade that he or she didn't rely on lying in order to justify the reason for their beliefs?

[Quixote]

What gets me about the CTC method is that they can never fully explain how not being an employee under a withholding statute makes them not liable for taxes under 61.

That confused me too prior to Bulten's recent posts. Apparently CtCers are afflicted with that pseudo reverence for law held by many TPs. They know that wages are not, even in part, a return of capital, because the courts have said so repeatedly. Unfortunately, their delusion won't allow them to see why that is so. So they invent explanations that would not apply to their own wages. Then they invent reasons as to why the wages they receive are not wages. With the application of magical thinking, that makes the calculation of income from their wages an issue of first impression to which they can apply any rules they want.

Of course, what JB and the others in the tax dishonesty movement ignore is that they are stuck with the same accounting rules that applied before they applied the pixie dust. Their personal living expenses are still not direct costs of producing income and are therefore deductable only if specifically allowed by the IRC.

[rachel]

Somebody's webpage: “Employee” includes what you would normally think of as employees.

Oh Dan, I forgot you have no ear for subtlety.

And I forgot that you are a liar with no sense of honesty.

When I first saw the webpage quote, I didn't think anything about it, because it sounded like something I remembered writing, and was a sensible statement of the law. Now that you've taken it a step further, and are looking to attack my statement, I have looked into it and realized (once again) what a liar you are.

What you have quoted is NOT a sentence from my FAQ. It is PART of a larger sentence. Specifically:

As defined by I.R.C. section 7701(c), the use of “includes” does not exclude anything otherwise within the meaning of “employee,” so “employee” includes what you would normally think of as employees, as well as some things you might not ordinarily think of as employees, such as elected officials of state and local governments.

Even the complete sentence is not sufficient, because the sentence is part of a larger context. Specifically:

“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘employee’ includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term ‘employee’ also includes an officer of a corporation.” I.R.C. section 3401(c).

Notice the word “includes”? As defined by I.R.C. section 7701(c), the use of “includes” does not exclude anything otherwise within the meaning of “employee,” so “employee” includes what you would normally think of as employees, as well as some things you might not ordinarily think of as employees, such as elected officials of state and local governments.

Seeing the complete context, it is obvious that I was not making a general statement about the meaning of the word "employee," but a specific statement about the meaning of "employee" in a specific statute, section 3401(c).

This context is important, because section 3401 uses the word "includes" while the definitions of "employee" in section 3121 and 3231 use the word "means," which is completely different.

Because you have presented yourself as intelligent, I can only believe that you deliberately misrepresented the context of my statement in order to mislead and deceive.

In short, you are a liar.

You are correct about the 3401(c) "employee", but your not really walking a straight line Dan!
While 3401(a) uses the word "includes" it is strictly confined to those involved in 3121(a) wages for Social Security purposes and those federal and state individuals of Title 5.
Those not participating in 3121(b) "employment" dont make 3401(a) wages either.
As much as I tried to explain this to CtCer's that 3401(a) consists of 3121(b) they keep coming back argueing that it does not.
All you have to do is read 3401(a). A third grader can see that 3121(b) is in 3401(a).
But you cannot tell that to them. They keep following Hendrickson who says the SSn has nothing to do with taxes.

[LPC]

A third grader can see that 3121(b) is in 3401(a).

I think that third graders are smarter than that.

[John J. Bulten]

Hi Dan, I'll unseal my envelope later, but I did predict your response correctly.

[sarcasm]

But of course Evans realizes what hard work cut-and-paste is and why I take my time about it, even if this go-round I'm only going for the real howlers with a few sarcastic nonresponses thrown in. That's par around here, no?

I feel some sort of misguided obligation to respond.

This is typical tax beneficiary dishonesty, because Evans, by attributing his responses to a "misguided" obligation, is giving himself carte blanche to claim that anything he said in the past (or might say in the future) might not really mean what the words would appear to mean.

I say this is dishonest, because tax beneficiaries often say things that look sensible, but are really gibberish because the tax beneficiaries have secretly redefined the important words so that they mean something different from what is meant in both common speech and law. Tax beneficiaries don't have the courage or honesty to say what they really mean, so they hide behind hidden meanings and sophistries.

Evans has now claimed a fall-back rationale for deniability if he should accidentally say anything that might otherwise appear to be rational.

Our position is that "income" means, stated with great simplification, just "taxable gain".

Which is tautological.

Which means true by definition. Thanks for losing your whole argument upfront.

If the things listed in section 61(a) are sources of income, and not income, then interest, dividends, rents, and business profits are also not income, which is absurd.

Wrong. Wrong. Which I never said. I never said the things listed in section 61(a) are sources of income. Via the mishmash of the codification process, some are sources, some are income. The statutory language "income derived from", from 1862 to present, makes clear which are sources, e.g., compensation, salaries, property, business, insurance, etc.

The *ONLY* limitation on the Congressional power to tax is that Congress cannot tax exports. Otherwise, the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress can tax "every subject," meaning any person, activity, or property within the states of the United States.

Wrong. Wrong. What gives you the right to contradict yourself by adding limitations to that "only" limitation you so emphasize? You have fabricated into the USSC opinion bizarre notions which they never stated there, such as that "subject" is restricted to "person, activity, or property", and that taxation is limited to "within the states". Since they didn't state that, how can you add such self-serving notions to the unique Constitutional limitation you established?

Besides, you deceptively use only part of the USSC sentence:

Thus, limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion.

Which even by itself cannot be understood without the context:

Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus, limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion.

Which really should include the previous couple sentences as well:

It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus, limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion.

Which should be read along with the entire decision, and every other USSC decision, and every other court decision in existence. Which are incorporated herein by reference.

Which is to say that the two qualifications are also limits on taxation, and that a tax on 1st, 10th, or 14th amendment freedoms in themselves must be apportioned.

A general income tax (or gross receipts tax) can apply to newspapers even though the publication of a newspaper is a first amendment right.

You misleadingly make this appear to be a tax on 1st amendment rights, which merely shows your ignorance. This does not refer to a "freedom tax", it refers to income taxes and sales taxes (sales tax was the category of the receipts tax you cite). Repeating, Congress does not have the power to tax 1st or 14th Amendment freedoms (Murdock v PA, analysis of state tax which is applied to any tax) or 10th Amendment rights (Bailey v Drexel). So your position is just unsound. ( <<-- I wrote that last sentence without checking to see if it fits the context, just because this paragraph lacked a good closing insult.)

Right to work is within the untaxable rights to liberty and property (Coppage v Kansas), aka Jefferson's inalienable rights (Butcher Union v Crescent City).

Wrong. Neither of those cases held that the right to work is untaxable.

Wrong. Wrong. Which I never said. I never said those cases held that the right to work is untaxable, I combined the court info with its obvious implications in summary form. Coppage said that right to contract employment is included in right to property, which cannot be taxed indirectly. Butcher Union treated rights the same way, and the Declaration makes these rights "inalienable", meaning not taxable either indirectly or unapportionedly. I also explained Steward Machine in a footnote above. So your position is just unsound.

Two errors here: First, ... Second, ... Third,

Which is patently ridiculous.

Bulten is suggesting that Congress could not tax the "right to work" by a direct tax, [but I respond] Congress has the power to impose direct taxes as long as they are apportioned.

Wrong. Wrong. Which I never said. I never said Congress could not tax the 'right to work' by a direct tax. Apportionment is an obvious alternative. But the direct tax cannot Constitutionally directly reach the people because of apportionment. So your position is just unsound.

without any explanation, support, or rationale for how or why the income tax has an "excise nature" or how or why the "excise nature" of the tax could (or could not) be retained.

Wrong. Wrong. Some USSC decision said income tax has an excise nature and that its excise (indirect) nature must be retained. I'll play David and not tell you which one.

The concept of "excisable activities" is another canard that tax deniers have invented out of whole cloth, and it has been repeatedly rejected by the courts.

Wrong. Wrong. I don't see one case on your whole FAQ that rejects or even mentions "excisable activities", and per FindLaw, the USSC never used those words at least since 1893. But how can the income tax reach what is not excisable if it's in the nature of an excise? Or how can it reach what are not activities if it's indirect?

Bulten has once again stated his conclusion, that the payments he received were not "wages" without any explanation or justification.

Evans has once again stated his conclusion, that my conclusion is stated without any explanation or justification, without any explanation or justification.

Whether those payments should be included in gross income, whether as "wages" or "compensation for services" is a legal conclusion that the IRS (or the courts) can reach on the basis of the business records of the payor.

But if the IRS receives additional records disputing the business records of the payor, the IRS or the courts must incorporate that in reaching its legal conclusion.

These claims are simply inventions of Bulten with no basis in law or any method of accounting. And they have been universally rejected by the courts.

How can they reject my claim unless they stole my invention? I'll have to sue for patent infringement. I really like how Evans wants both sides of the argument, that I invented them de novo, and that they've already been rejected.

Citations will not do the trick because they must remain Constitutional, and cannot create facts.

Translation: I can ignore any court decision I choose if I call it "not Constitutional" or "creating facts."

Wrong. Wrong. Which I never said. Evans' flibbertigibberish seems to say that I find some decisions unconstitutional or creating facts, which I don't. More likely he means Translation: I can ignore any court decision I choose if I call its interpretation "not Constitutional" or "creating facts." If so, he is still wrong. I don't ignore the decision, just the unconstitutional/creative interpretation.

We are winning this battle in court and pressing their retreat to the next level.

That is just plain delusional. Hendrickson himself has lost, and the Crack-heads who are smart have settled.

Which is just plain delusional. Evans thinks I was referring to Pete's 3-0 win record, when I was referring to other battles complete and incomplete. No one seems willing to post Pete's "loss" in his 4th go-round, so I haven't counted that in his record yet. Which means Evans is once again mouthing off without any backing.

Adam Smith's definition of "capitation" is irrelevant to the meaning of "direct tax" in the Constitution. Adam Smith had no role in the drafting of the Constitution, the above definition of "capitation" has never been accepted by any court, and the meaning of "direct tax" in the Constitution extends beyond "capitations" to include taxes on the value of land (which Adam Smith did not consider to be a capitation).

Which doesn't disprove that all taxes laid on every species of revenue are direct taxes.

First, the proposition that "not every species of revenue is income" does NOT "follow" from propositions 1 through 3.

Wrong. Wrong. Try it formally: all taxes on all revenue are taxes on objects Constitutionally taxable directly; all taxes on objects Constitutionally taxable directly are taxes on objects which require Constitutional apportionment; this tax on incomes is not a tax on objects which require Constitutional apportionment; therefore this tax on incomes is not a tax on all revenue. (All A is B, all B is C, all D is not C, so all D is not A.) Ask someone schooled in logic if you need help.

Second, the Supreme Court said that not all *RECEIPTS* are income, and has never said that any *revenue* might not be income. Third, the legal issue in Southern Pacific had nothing to do with the issue of whether wages are income. (The actual question before the court was whether a dividend paid after the income tax was enacted in 1913 was taxable if paid out of profits earned before 1913.)

Which doesn't disprove that not all revenue is income.

A tax on income as property (i.e., an apportioned tax on income and property) is a direct tax.

And that principle of the Pollock decision was reversed by the 16th Amendment.

Wrong. Wrong. You wilfully ignore the fact that Congress still has power to tax real and personal property and the income from both by direct tax, if they so choose. The 16th merely relieves them of that onus as to income. Therefore the principle still stands, as I said last year. So you're just being ignorant or deceptive.

That is ONE definition of "excise." There are others.

Which doesn't disprove that excises are taxes on activities properly taxed indirectly.

And that definition includes within its scope the taxation of "occupations," which means that wages can be the subject of an excise.

Wrong. Wrong. You deceptively change "licenses to pursue certain occupations" into "occupations" and then deceptively change "occupations" into "wages".

The income tax cannot tax income as property, but taxes activity properly taxed indirectly (i.e., activity done for income).

Which is gibberish, and does not "follow" from 5-7.

Wrong. Wrong. Try it formally: this tax on income is an excise; all excises are taxes on activities properly taxed indirectly; no excises are taxes on income as property; therefore, this tax on income is a tax on activities properly taxed indirectly; and, this tax on income is not a tax on income as property. (All A is B, all B is C, no B is D, so all A is C and no A is D.) Ask someone schooled in logic if you need help.

Hull specifically included "salaries" as a kind of income subject to tax.

Wrong. Wrong. Hull stated that income embraces gains or profits from salaries, and he did not embrace salaries themselves.

This was written 30 years after the 16th Amendment was ratified and the first income tax was enacted, and there are many reasons to believe that Hubbard was simply wrong.

Which doesn't disprove that the income tax is a tax on income as a gain activity properly taxed indirectly, and not a tax on income as property. Hubbard in fact presciently stated that income could not be taxed "as a specific fund", i.e., as property.

The argument that taxation is a deprivation of property without due process was flatly rejected by the Supreme Court in Brushaber, and by every court since then.

Wrong. Wrong. Which I never said. I never said taxation is a deprivation of property without due process. I implied unapportioned taxation of the right to liberty is a deprivation of property without due process.

Which doesn't disprove that right to lawful liberty is a Constitutional right jurisdictionally reserved to the people.

And Congress can tax even income from "fundamental rights."

Which doesn't disprove that right to common work is part of right to liberty.

Given that 4 is irrelevant and 8 and 12 are wrong, it follows that the rest of the conclusions are also wrong.

Wrong. Wrong. Wrong in several ways.

First, you refer to "the rest of the conclusions", when there is only one conclusion remaining, #13.

Second, you merely repeat your unfounded charges against 4, 8, and 12.

Third, you fail to impeach the logic of the conclusion, thereby admitting by silence that if 4, 8, and 12 are true, 13 logically follows.

So you may as well breathe your vapor elsewhere.

[/sarcasm]

Now, Dan, that said, this is the point where a normal person would realize I was mimicking his form of argument, take a hearty laugh, and offer me a job for being so like-minded. You, however, have while reading been actively considering two other options: another cut-and-paste, or a dismissive harrumph. Take a break, consider the Inner Light, and see if you're going to continue the same worn path or not.

[Cpt Banjo]

I once thought that Stevie was the only intellectual masochist who liked to come in here and have his absurd ideas ripped to shreds, but now we can add Bulten to the list.

Dan hardly needs any help in demolishing this clown's ravings, but there are a few inanities that are so glaring that I can't resist butting in:

I never said the things listed in section 61(a) are sources of income. Via the mishmash of the codification process, some are sources, some are income. The statutory language "income derived from", from 1862 to present, makes clear which are sources, e.g., compensation, salaries, property, business, insurance, etc.

Considering that the tax on Mr. Springer's salary was upheld by the Court and considering that the 1913 Act provided for tax withholding at the source on wages and salaries, it's a good bet that Congress thought of them as income.

Repeating, Congress does not have the power to tax 1st or 14th Amendment freedoms (Murdock v PA, analysis of state tax which is applied to any tax) or 10th Amendment rights (Bailey v Drexel).

Since Congress has been specifically delegated the power to tax, the 10th Amendment is irrelevant, and as Dan has pointed out, the "tax" in Bailey wasn't a bona fide tax but a penalty.

I never said those cases held that the right to work is untaxable, I combined the court info with its obvious implications in summary form. Coppage said that right to contract employment is included in right to property, which cannot be taxed indirectly. Butcher Union treated rights the same way, and the Declaration makes these rights "inalienable", meaning not taxable either indirectly or unapportionedly.

News flash: the Declaration is not and never has been the law. Apparently Bulten is oblivious to the fact that my "inalienable" right to transfer my own property can be taxed without apportionment. See Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).

But how can the income tax reach what is not excisable if it's in the nature of an excise? Or how can it reach what are not activities if it's indirect?

Bulten is also oblivious to the Court's latest discussions of the nature of an excise:

"...this court has consistently held, almost from the foundation of the government, that a tax imposed upon a particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incidental to ownership, is an excise which neet not be apportioned..." Bromley v. McCaughn, supra.

"Receipt in possession and enjoyment is as much a taxable occasion within the reach of the federal taxing power as the enjoyment of any other incident of property." Fernandez v. Weiner, 326 U.S. 340 (1945)

I don't ignore the decision, just the unconstitutional/creative interpretation.

Which doesn't make the decision any less the law. Bulten sounds like the mid-50's segregationists who refused to acknowledge the legality of the Brown decision.

[Nikki]

John:

You have yet to state (supported by appropriate citations) how your theories remove your compensation for services from income as defined in the IRC.

[Quixote]

But how can the income tax reach what is not excisable if it's in the nature of an excise?

It can't and doesn't. If a tax on income is an excise, then income is excisable. Only TPs fail to see that tautology.

[John J. Bulten]

You have yet to state (supported by appropriate citations) how your theories remove your compensation for services from income as defined in the IRC.

What does it mean to remove compensation from income?

Please show me one law stating that food cannot be deducted for purposes of calculating income derived from compensation. (The laws stating that food cannot be deducted for purposes of calculating income derived from trade or business are irrelevant to this inquiry.).)

[26 USC 262] Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.

Let me clarify. Please show me one law stating that food cannot be deducted from compensation for purposes of calculating income derived from compensation. The laws stating that food expenses cannot be deducted from income do not apply, as I had no income.

[Quixote]

Please show me one law stating that food cannot be deducted from compensation for purposes of calculating income derived from compensation.

It's not a question of law, it's a question of fact. Your personal expenses are not a direct cost of performing the labor for which you were compensated. Just as indirect costs of producing goods are not included in cost of goods sold in computing gross income, indirect costs of producing labor are not deducted from compensation in computing gross income.

Nevertheless, accepting the conclusion that some kind of "gain" must be realized for there to be income, the flaw in petitioners' analogy of what they call the "cost of doing labor" to the "cost of goods sold" concept -- essentially its failure to acknowledge the difference between people and property -- may be shown. The "cost of goods sold" concept embraces expenditures necessary to acquire, construct or extract a physical product which is to be sold; the seller can have no gain until he recovers the economic investment that he has made directly in the actual item sold. See Estate of Johnson v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 441, 444-445 (1964), affd. per order 355 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1965), and cases cited thereat. Labor, on the other hand, is, in the current context, behavior performed by human beings in exchange for compensation. One's living expenses simply cannot be his "cost" directly in the very item sold, i.e., his labor, no matter how much money he spends to satisfy his human needs and those of his family. Of course we recognize the necessity for expenditures for such items as food, shelter, clothing, and proper [*734] [**10] health maintenance. They provide both the mental and physical nourishment essential to maintain the body at a level of effectiveness that will permit its labor to be productive. We do not even deny that a certain similarity exists between the "cost of doing labor" and the "cost of goods sold" concept. But HN3the sale of one's labor is not the same creature as the sale of property, and whether the distinction comports with petitioners' philosophical rationalization for their argument, it is recognized for Federal income tax purposes. See Hahn v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 195 (1958), affd. per curiam 271 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1959). One's gain, ergo his "income," from the sale of his labor is the entire amount received therefor without any reduction for what he spends to satisfy his human needs.

70 TC 730

[Nikki]

You have yet to state (supported by appropriate citations) how your theories remove your compensation for services from income as defined in the IRC.

What does it mean to remove compensation from income?

Please show me one law stating that food cannot be deducted for purposes of calculating income derived from compensation. (The laws stating that food cannot be deducted for purposes of calculating income derived from trade or business are irrelevant to this inquiry.).)

[26 USC 262] Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.

Let me clarify. Please show me one law stating that food cannot be deducted from compensation for purposes of calculating income derived from compensation. The laws stating that food expenses cannot be deducted from income do not apply, as I had no income.

There it is in a nutshell.

His mind (what there is of it) is made up, fixed, determined, and set in concrete.

No amount of discussion here will dissuade him from his blind obedience to his guru's mantra.

Even when the bills come in, he still won't believe that he was wrong.

John, you're not an ex-exterminator, are you?