SteveSy wrote: Cpt Banjo wrote:SteveSy wrote:It does mean what it says....the case I quoted makes it clear what it means. The source the 16th speaks of is a source you control, like capital. Income from capital, it doesn't authorize a tax on revenue in general.
Your labor is a source you control as well, so income from labor would properly be subject to an income tax even under your interpretation of the 16th.
I don't believe that fits within the following:
Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of income essential for a correct solution of the present controversy. The government, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted, placed chief emphasis upon the word "gain," which was extended to include a variety of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was either overlooked or misconceived. "Derived from capital;" "the gain derived from capital," etc. Here, we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being "derived" -- that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal -- that is income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description.
The same fundamental conception is clearly set forth in the Sixteenth Amendment -- "incomes, from whatever source derived" -- the essential thought being expressed [252 U.S. 208] with a conciseness and lucidity entirely in harmony with the form and style of the Constitution.
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.189 (1920)
(emphasis same as court's)
It does with the part of Eisner appearing immediately before the passage you cited, which you didn't bother to quote:
For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term 'income,' as used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the amendment, and, having formed also a correct judgment as to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find it easy to decide the matter at issue.
After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard Dict.; Webster's Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 , 34 S. Sup. Ct. 136, 140 [58 L. Ed. 285]; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 467, 469 [62 L. Ed. 1054]), 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case, 247 U.S. 183, 185 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 467, 469 (62 L. Ed. 1054).
Since the case dealt with the taxability of a stock dividend and not personal earnings, the discussion following the definiton of income naturally dealt with income derived from capital; only an idiot would think that the Court was holding that income is limited to gain derived from capital.
Besides, its pretty stupid to claim a person has no cost basis in the investment of labor. It would be like saying a business has no cost in sending their workforce to a job site, has no cost in providing a place for their employees to eat, has no vehicle maintenance to get to the job site etc etc....A person doesn't work all year making a wage and have a 100% gain, profit or increase in wealth.
So you're saying that deductions are constitutionally required? Wow, who knew? Now the entire business community can go to court and get all of the following provisions of the Code declared unconstitutional:
(a) Section 162(c), denying deductions for illegal bribes and kickbacks.
(b) Section 162(f) and (g), denying deductions for fines, penalties, and a portion if treble damage liability under the antitrust laws.
(c) Section 267, disallowing deductions for certain losses and expenses involving related parties.
(d) Section 274, disallowing deductions for (among other things) one-half of meal and entertainment expenses (e.g., the three-martini lunch).
There are countless other limitations, but you get the idea. Deductions are matters of legislative grace, and no court has ever bought the argument that gross wages aren't income.
Moreover, since an unapportioned tax on revenue in general is authorized by Article I, Section 8, why the hangup on the 16th?
No its [sic] not
Why not? Answer the question: if a gratuitous transfer can be reached by an excise under Article I, Section 8, why can't a transfer for value? And if a transfer for value is taxable, does it make any difference from a constitutional standpoint whether the tax is imposed on the transferor (as in the gift tax, although the donee can be liable for the tax if the donor doesn't pay) or the transferee (as in a sales tax)?
"Run get the pitcher, get the baby some beer." Rev. Gary Davis