Prof. SteveSy Gets His Due

[Mr. Mephistopheles]

Its my position simply exposing the BS is enough, besides its fun watching most of you show how programmed an controlled you are. Most of you have almost completely lost the ability to think for yourself. You believe you're free but only because they've told you you are.

To which was replied:

And this is why you are not going to get an answer to your question, Famspear. We have been down this road a million times with Stevesy and everytime the hard question gets put to Steve, he goes into stall formation hoping that the thread limit hits 100 and he gets to go home with a tie. Notice that he is now reverting back to his allegation that all of this is a conspiracy among the judges and that they are bending over backwards to keep everyone else in the dark.

Locking the thread here, but you are welcome to try pin Stevesy down in a continuation of the thread.

The recently locked thread of late wherein Stevesy is digging himself all the way down to China is much too entertaining to simply drift off into recent memory.

[SteveSy]

No, Steve, you are supposed to be a better reader than Professor Boris Bitter. Answer the question. Why did Frank Brushaber lose the case? Why did the Court uphold the unapportioned income tax?

Because he was wrong about how the 16th constitutionally operated? The tax in question, a tax on the income of a corporation, was an indirect tax not requiring apportionment to begin with?

First line of the case:

As a stockholder of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the appellant filed his bill to enjoin the corporation from complying with the income tax provisions of the tariff act of October 3, 1913 ( II., chap. 16, 38 Stat. at L. 166).

You tell me Famspear, I've given you my answer....

I answered his question...what do you want?

[Famspear]

The recently locked thread of late wherein Stevesy is digging himself all the way down to China is much too entertaining to simply drift off into recent memory.

Yeah, Steve, this is too much fun. Here’s what you wrote (a quote from the Brushaber case):

As a stockholder of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the appellant filed his bill to enjoin the corporation from complying with the income tax provisions of the tariff act of October 3, 1913 ( II., chap. 16, 38 Stat. at L. 166).

No, Steve, that’s not what I asked you. In response to my question, you said:

#1 reason is that a tax on the activities of a corporation regardless of activity is an indirect tax plain and simple, always has been always will be. The taxation of an activity of a corporation clearly falls within the common definition of an excise.

Again, that point was not even raised in the case. The phrase "activities of a corporation" never even came up. No mention of this point in the case.

You are supposed to be such a good reader, such an analyzer of case law -- you know better than Professor Boris Bittker, so you think. So let's hear it.

Answer the question. Why did the U.S. Supreme Court uphold the unapportioned federal income tax in Brushaber?

[SteveSy]

You are supposed to be such a good reader, such an analyzer of case law -- you know better than Professor Boris Bittker, so you think. So let's hear it.

Answer the question. Why did the U.S. Supreme Court uphold the unapportioned federal income tax in Brushaber?

He argued many points attempting to attack the constitutionality of the tax on several fronts...but one of the the main reason he lost is because the tax in question was a uniform indirect tax completely within the powers of congress to lay and not a direct tax at all.

If you believe differently please be my guest and show how incompetent I am by showing the "true" reason he lost. It's truly funny if you happen to be Boris...lol. I know of at least one other professor that writes here. I happen to agree with and enjoy reading most of his papers concerning taxation and constitutional theory.

[Paul]

The question you keep dodging, stevesy, is what was the reason the court gave for concluding that a "tax on incomes" is indirect? As has been repeatedly pointed out to you, it did NOT say that it was because the tax in that particular case was on corporation. You've been arguing all along that the 16th Amendment does not do what it clearly says because the courts said it didn't, but when we ask you what the courts actually said, you give your opinion of what they could have or should have said. Your arguments aren't based on what anything actually says (amendment or court opinion) but what you want them to say.

So what reason did the Brushaber court give for holding that a tax on income is indirect?

[SteveSy]

The question you keep dodging, stevesy, is what was the reason the court gave for concluding that a "tax on incomes" is indirect? As has been repeatedly pointed out to you, it did NOT say that it was because the tax in that particular case was on corporation. You've been arguing all along that the 16th Amendment does not do what it clearly says because the courts said it didn't, but when we ask you what the courts actually said, you give your opinion of what they could have or should have said. Your arguments aren't based on what anything actually says (amendment or court opinion) but what you want them to say.

So what reason did the Brushaber court give for holding that a tax on income is indirect?

They didn't really give a reason, except that it was in its nature an excise tax. This means that the activity must fall within the well established definition of an excise provided by the Supreme Court. "In its nature" means "having the character or qualities of" of the thing referenced in this case "excise".

Brushaber was wrong about how the 16th operated, the violation of the uniformity, and the violation of due process. All of his arguments were invalid, there is nothing he could have said to change the outcome.

[Famspear]

You are supposed to be such a good reader, such an analyzer of case law -- you know better than Professor Boris Bittker, so you think. So let's hear it.

Answer the question. Why did the U.S. Supreme Court uphold the unapportioned federal income tax in Brushaber?

He argued many points attempting to attack the constitutionality of the tax on several fronts...but one of the the main reason he lost is because the tax in question was a uniform indirect tax completely within the powers of congress to lay and not a direct tax at all.

If you believe differently please be my guest and show how incompetent I am by showing the "true" reason he lost. It's truly funny if you happen to be Boris...lol. I know of at least one other professor that writes here. I happen to agree with and enjoy reading most of his papers concerning taxation and constitutional theory.

Well, I hope I'm not Professor Bittker, because he passed away some time ago.

Seriously, Steve, you gave a fairly direct answer that time, and I'll credit you for that. So, you agree that the income tax in Brushaber was upheld because the Court ruled the income tax to be a uniform indirect tax, etc. We'll put aside the actual holdings in the case for the time being; I won't press you any more specifics for now. (The Court did give reasons for its holdings, by the way, but we'll pass that for now.)

So, here's a follow-up question: Cite a specific statement or statements by Professor Bittker (in the quote on the other thread) that was "wrong" in your view, and why the statement(s) was/were wrong.

[SteveSy]

So, here's a follow-up question: Cite a specific statement or statements by Professor Bittker (in the quote on the other thread) that was "wrong" in your view, and why the statement(s) was/were wrong.

simply eliminated the requirement that an income tax, to the extent that it is a direct tax, must be apportioned among the states.

We are of opinion, however, [240 U.S. 1, 11] that the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the 16th Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear
...
But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions [240 U.S. 1, 12] under it, if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one state or states than was levied in another state or states. This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must have been intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.

- BRUSHABER v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 240 U.S. 1 (1916)

I noticed in the other thread you said Brushaber made the erroneous assumption, it appears to me Bittker made the same assumption. It seems very clear to me the Supreme Court specifically stated this reasoning was "erroneous" and "would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system".

[Quixote]

This means that the activity must fall within the well established definition of an excise provided by the Supreme Court.

By "activity", you of course mean the tax. After all, only the tax has to fall within the nebulous definition of excise for it to be in its nature an excise.

He argued many points attempting to attack the constitutionality of the tax on several fronts...but one of the the main reason he lost is because the tax in question was a uniform indirect tax completely within the powers of congress to lay and not a direct tax at all.

And the tax in question is identical in all relevant respects to the current income tax. Which raises the question as to why Steve thinks the current income tax is somehow invalid.

[Dr. Caligari]

This means that the activity must fall within the well established definition of an excise provided by the Supreme Court. "In its nature" means "having the character or qualities of" of the thing referenced in this case "excise".

Yes, and that well-established definition includes a tax on the transfer of property from one person to another. (Bromley and Fernandez were quoted to you in the previous thread.) How does that definition not include an income tax?

[SteveSy]

This means that the activity must fall within the well established definition of an excise provided by the Supreme Court.

By "activity", you of course mean the tax. After all, only the tax has to fall within the nebulous definition of excise for it to be in its nature an excise.

Are you simply saying "in its nature" is in reference to just the activity of taxing in general or the word "tax" because an excise is a tax?

When someone says its in its nature something I and all of the dictionary's interpret that to mean it has the qualities or the characteristics of the thing referenced. Meaning you can look at the definition and see the qualities or characteristics of the thing referenced and assume its looks or acts similarly.

[SteveSy]

This means that the activity must fall within the well established definition of an excise provided by the Supreme Court. "In its nature" means "having the character or qualities of" of the thing referenced in this case "excise".

Yes, and that well-established definition includes a tax on the transfer of property from one person to another. (Bromley and Fernandez were quoted to you in the previous thread.) How does that definition not include an income tax?

Yes, I've seen that case....

I can not dispute what it said, all I can say is no definition ever known of an excise has included the mere transfer of property in general or any transactions whatsoever. If anything the court took it upon itself to redefine the constitutional word "excise", changing the constitution by fiat, to fit their own opinion. Assuming the court was correct on taxing any type of transaction with an indirect tax we would also have to assume the direct tax clause served absolutely no purpose whatsoever.
Everything requires some sort of transaction, including the use of slaves, which by most accounts by scholars, is the reason the clause was put in place. Nothing would ever require apportionment, congress could simply tax a transaction associated with the thing, including the use of real property or a flat tax on the use of labor in general. Everyone uses labor.

Its really strange how all of these cases expose congressional super powers never seen or spoke of prior to around 1865 even when the country was in dire need of money. Its even more amazing that courts can act like their positions are obvious when no historical support whatsoever can be found.


Regardless, an income tax is not a tax on the transfer of property or activities in general.

[Quixote]

This means that the activity must fall within the well established definition of an excise provided by the Supreme Court.

By "activity", you of course mean the tax. After all, only the tax has to fall within the nebulous definition of excise for it to be in its nature an excise.

Are you simply saying "in its nature" is in reference to just the activity of taxing in general or the word "tax" because an excise is a tax?

When someone says its in its nature something I and all of the dictionary's interpret that to mean it has the qualities or the characteristics of the thing referenced. Meaning you can look at the definition and see the qualities or characteristics of the thing referenced and assume its looks or acts similarly.

And I and all grammar books interpret the word "its" to refer to it, i.e., the thing under discussion. In this case, that thing, or as you referred to it, that activity, was "taxation on income".

[SteveSy]

And I and all grammar books interpret the word "its" to refer to it, i.e., the thing under discussion. In this case, that thing, or as you referred to it, that activity, was "taxation on income".

I disagree "an income tax is in its nature an excise" is referring to the qualities or characteristic of an excise not income.

1. an internal tax or duty on certain commodities, as liquor or tobacco, levied on their manufacture, sale, or consumption within the country.
2. a tax levied for a license to carry on certain employments, pursue certain sports, etc.

The Supreme Court has defined it almost the exact same way. I would assume that an income tax acts like or has the characteristics of the definition above.

[Quixote]

Regardless, an income tax is not a tax on the transfer of property or activities in general.

I agree. Contrary to numerous TP arguments, an income tax is not a tax on activities of any sort. An income tax is a tax on income, and everyone knows that taxes on income are in their nature excises.

[SteveSy]

Regardless, an income tax is not a tax on the transfer of property or activities in general.

I agree. Contrary to numerous TP arguments, an income tax is not a tax on activities of any sort. An income tax is a tax on income, and everyone knows that taxes on income are in their nature excises.

So how is it in its nature an excise? Why would the court allude to a characteristic or quality of an excise if we are not to look to the definition of an excise to see how an income tax operates?

Assuming you're right then a income tax isn't in its nature an excise at all but just another type of tax all together, it has little at all in common with an excise. It certainly doesn't fall within the characteristics or qualities of an excise.

[Cpt Banjo]

I can not dispute what it said, all I can say is no definition ever known of an excise has included the mere transfer of property in general or any transactions whatsoever. If anything the court took it upon itself to redefine the constitutional word "excise", changing the constitution by fiat, to fit their own opinion. Assuming the court was correct on taxing any type of transaction with an indirect tax we would also have to assume the direct tax clause served absolutely no purpose whatsoever.

Everything requires some sort of transaction...

No, it doesn't. A capitation tax doesn't involve a transaction, nor does a property tax. They simply require a certain status (being alive) or a certain relation (owning property).

Its really strange how all of these cases expose congressional super powers never seen or spoke of prior to around 1865 even when the country was in dire need of money.

Gee, ya think it just might be because Congress didn't get around to enacting an income tax until 1861?

Regardless, an income tax is not a tax on the transfer of property or activities in general.

Correct -- it's a tax on the receipt of income.

[Quixote]

I disagree "an income tax is in its nature an excise" is referring to the qualities or characteristic of an excise not income.

While true, that has nothing to do with what I wrote. The phrase "an income tax is in its nature an excise" refers to two things, an income tax and an excise. I was attempting to clarify what you were referring to by the word "activity" when you earlier stated that "the activity must fall within the well established definition of an excise". The only activity you could have been referring to was the imposition of the income tax, because no other activity is even under discussion.

[SteveSy]

I can not dispute what it said, all I can say is no definition ever known of an excise has included the mere transfer of property in general or any transactions whatsoever. If anything the court took it upon itself to redefine the constitutional word "excise", changing the constitution by fiat, to fit their own opinion. Assuming the court was correct on taxing any type of transaction with an indirect tax we would also have to assume the direct tax clause served absolutely no purpose whatsoever.

Everything requires some sort of transaction...

No, it doesn't. A capitation tax doesn't involve a transaction, nor does a property tax. They simply require a certain status (being alive) or a certain relation (owning property).

Being alive does require transactions, take your pick, you've then avoided the requirement to apportion the tax by calling it another name. Owning property requires transactions take your pick you've then avoided the requirement to apportion the tax by calling it another name.

"Transaction" has a very broad meaning.

[Quixote]

So how is it in its nature an excise?

I knew you'd start back pedalling. We have all agreed that the Brushaber Court said that taxation on income is in its nature an excise. Unless you disagree with the Court, that matter is settled.

Why would the court allude to a characteristic or quality of an excise if we are not to look to the definition of an excise to see how an income tax operates?

You seem to have a short term memory problem. You knew several posts ago that the Court pointed out that income taxes are indirect taxes to show that the 16th did not authorize a unapportioned direct tax. And we don't need to know whether any particular tax is direct or indirect to know how it operates. It operates the way Congress says it operates.