Hooray for the 10th

[Disilloosianed]

This opinion is lengthy, so I'll just copy the part where the 10th Circuit tells sets criteria for the TP to proceed pro se in an action on any subject save an appeal of the instant decision:

As discussed above, these combined appeals are frivolous. Additionally, Springer has a long history of filing meritless federal actions and appeals pro se. We found his first tax appeal frivolous and imposed a $2,000 sanction. See Springer v. IRS, Nos. 95-5072 & 95-5142, 1996 WL 164459 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 1996) (unpublished). We dismissed four other tax-related appeals because Springer had not paid that sanction. See Springer v. United States, No. 98-5056 (10th Cir. June 15, 1998) (unpublished order of dismissal); Springer v. United States, No. 97-5095 (10th Cir. Oct. 16, 1997) (unpublished order of dismissal); Springer v. United States, No. 97-5093 (10th Cir. Oct. 16, 1997) (unpublished order of dismissal) ; Springer v. Comm'r, No. 97-9008 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 1997) (unpublished order of dismissal). In yet another tax case where Springer was a plaintiff but not an appellant, we noted the district court had properly granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs on their claim that federal taxation amounted to involuntary servitude and imposed monetary sanctions for the frivolous appeal. See Buckner v. United States, No. 98-5057, 1999 WL 61071, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 1999) (unpublished). And as noted above, the Tax Court imposed a $4,000 sanction for Springer's frivolous appeal from the notices of deficiency concerning his 1990-1995 income tax liability.

Springer has not found any more litigation success outside of the tax arena. In Springer v. Alabama, we imposed a $1,000 sanction on Springer for filing a frivolous appeal of the district court's dismissal, on sovereign immunity grounds, of his claim that the respective ballot laws of all fifty states violated his constitutional right to run for president. See No. 99-5227, 2000 WL 305492, at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 24, 2000) (unpublished). He also brought a similar suit against the election officials of all fifty states. In that case, we affirmed the district court's dismissal because Springer had failed to identify a legal theory entitling him to relief, see Springer v. Balough, No. 00-5071, 2000 WL 1616246, at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000) (unpublished), and we later affirmed the district court's assessment of costs against him, see Springer v. Rancourt, 17 F. App'x 824, 826 (10th Cir.2001). We summarily affirmed the district courts' dismissal of Springer's libel and slander claims in Springer v. The Infinity Group Co., No. 98-5182, 1999 WL 651391, at*2 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1999). And we affirmed the dismissal of another case in which Springer asserted that the defendants had breached a contract to pay a $1,000,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of anyone involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on the ground that Springer had sued the wrong defendant. See Springer v. Hustler Magazine, No. 99-5117, 1999 WL 979242, at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 28, 1999) (unpublished).

In view of his abusive pattern of filing frivolous or malicious actions and appeals pro se, we must restrict Springer's access to the courts. “The right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional, and there is no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious.” Winslow, 17 F.3d at 315 (quotation and alteration omitted). “[W]here, as here, a party has engaged in a pattern of litigation activity which is manifestly abusive, restrictions are appropriate.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Our filing restrictions must be narrowly tailored. See Tripati, 878 F.2d at 352. But as our review indicates, Springer has not limited the scope of his baseless attacks to the tax arena or a particular set of defendants. Thus, Springer's litigation history does not present circumstances similar to those we recently considered in Sieverding v. Colorado Bar Association, 469 F.3d 1340, 1345 (10th Cir.2006), where we modified a district court's filing restrictions by limiting them to filings against only those persons and entities against whom the plaintiff had a history of proceeding, without regard to subject matter. Therefore, subject to Springer's opportunity to object, as described below, we propose the following reasonable filing restrictions on future filings by Springer “commensurate with our inherent power to enter orders ‘necessary or appropriate’ in aid of our jurisdiction.” Winslow, 17 F.3d at 315 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)).

Springer is ENJOINED from proceeding in this court as a petitioner in an original proceeding or as an appellant in a civil matter (except in these combined appeals) unless he is represented by a licensed attorney admitted to practice in this court or unless he first obtains permission to proceed pro se. To obtain permission to proceed pro se, Springer must take the following steps:

1. File a petition with the clerk of this court requesting leave to file an original proceeding or to proceed pro se on appeal. If Springer seeks to proceed pro se on appeal, he must file the petition with the clerk of this court not more than ten days after filing his notice of appeal in the district court;

2. Include in the petition the following information:

A. A list of all lawsuits currently pending or filed previously with this court, including the name, number, and citation, if applicable, of each case, and the current status or disposition of the appeal or original proceeding; and

B. A list apprising this court of all outstanding injunctions or orders limiting Springer's access to federal court, including orders and injunctions requiring him to seek leave to file matters pro se or requiring him to be represented by an attorney, including the name, number, and citation, if applicable, of all such orders or injunctions; and

3. File with the clerk of this court a notarized affidavit, in proper legal form, which recites the issues Springer seeks to present, including a short discussion of the legal basis asserted therefor, and describing with particularity the order being challenged. The affidavit also must certify, to the best of Springer's knowledge, that the legal arguments being raised are not frivolous or made in bad faith, that they are warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, that the appeal or other matter is not interposed for any improper purpose such as delay or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation, and that he will comply with all appellate and local rules of this court. The affidavit must be filed with the petition and is therefore subject to the same ten-day filing deadline as the petition in the case of a pro se appeal.



LINDSEY K. SPRINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ex rel. United States of America, by and through its Officers and Employees, FRED RICE; SCOTT PENNEY; LELAND BOWEN, Defendants-Appellees. LINDSEY K. SPRINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ex rel. United States of America, by and through its Officers and Employees, Defendant-Appellee. LINDSEY K. SPRINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE by (C.A.10,2007)

[jg]

There is a fine line between having too much time on one's hands and insanity.