- R v Boxrud, 2014 SKQB 221: http://canlii.ca/t/g84nl
That’s right – Lorin is suing as the Crown. To enforce an alleged personal debt. Yeah.HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT
OF LORIN RUBBERT
PLAINTIFF
- and -
PEGGY BOXRUD
DEFENDANT
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT
OF LORIN RUBBERT
PLAINTIFF
- and -
COREY DUNCAN
DEFENDANT
This is the first point on which Justice Elson comments – he throws out Lorin’s lawsuit because the plaintiff is imaginary.
Justice Eldon goes on to make another interesting conclusion: that trying to sue as half of the double/split person concept also is a nullity:[14] As the term implies, a nullity exists where the relevant proceeding has no legal form or effect. Typically, this arises when the proceeding lacks an essential precondition or requirement, usually prescribed by statute. Where a nullity is found, the proceeding is void ab initio and is regarded as if it never existed. Further, without statutory authority or permission, the court has no power to amend or correct the nullifying deficiency or deficiencies. Rather, the court’s power is limited to declaring the matter a nullity, and dismissing it.
[15] It must also be remembered that a nullity differs substantively from a proceeding that is merely irregular. An irregularity exists where the flaw in the proceeding does not affect its essential validity and can be corrected. Such proceedings are not void from the outset, but they may well be voidable if left uncorrected.
[16] It is rare for a court to find an action to be a nullity. This was not always so. In earlier times, court proceedings often demanded unforgiving statutory obligations, including requirements for service or specific preconditions before they could be commenced. Failure to meet these requirements or preconditions would nullify the proceeding. Over time, these obligations have lessened somewhat or become more forgiving, primarily through legislative change. An illustration of this is the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in 1036122 Alberta Ltd. v. Khurana, 2012 ABCA 10 (CanLII), 2012 ABCA 10, 519 A.R. 221. There, the revival of the plaintiff’s corporate status, pursuant to a statute, was sufficient to defeat the defendant’s request for dismissal, based on the plaintiff’s non-existence. In para. 25 of the decision, the court specifically observed that the revival of the company cured what would otherwise have been a nullity.
[17] Despite these legislative changes, certain basic requirements remain. One such requirement is that named parties to an action must exist in law and possess the necessary capacity to sue or be sued. If there is no such existence and/or capacity, no statutory ability to correct or forgive the deficiency, the proceeding is a nullity.
…
[20] There is simply no basis in law for the named plaintiff to exist. Labelled in this way, the author of the claim has improperly sought to give the claimant a form of sovereign status by attaching the Crown’s authority to the right of an individual. Aside from reflecting a degree of hubris and impertinence, the description reflects a misunderstanding of the nature and authority of the Crown. Subject only to the distribution of powers to the federal and provincial governments, as set down in the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 the Crown’s power and authority in Canada is one and indivisible (see Montreal Trust Co. v. South Shore Lumber Co. reflex, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1030, [1924] 1 W.W.R. 657 (B.C.C.A.)). Absent the appropriate constitutional basis, none of the Crown’s power and authority is divided in favour of, or distributable to, an individual. It follows that a plaintiff, named as the Crown in the exercise of an individual’s right, does not exist in law.
[21] Under the circumstances, I find both actions are nullities and are void ab initio. As they never had any form or effect which was recognizable by law, the defendants need not have served or filed statements of defence. The fact that they did so, however, is of no consequence in that it is not possible for a nullity to be waived.
I believe this is new and a pretty fascinating response to a common OPCA litigant motif. If a plaintiff says he is representing his Strawman in some form or another, then that means there is no plaintiff. Our OPCA litigant is attempting to enforce the rights of something that simply does not exist. If the litigant were to reframe the pleading as himself, personally, then that’s a different matter. But a lawsuit to enforce the rights of the Strawman is no lawsuit at all. Presumably the same would be true for any defence.[22] Before leaving this issue, I think it worth noting that the description of the plaintiff in these actions, along with other variously formed references to Lorin Rubbert, is reminiscent of the so-called “double/split person” tactic employed by individuals who have come to be known in Canadian courts as Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (“OPCA”) litigants. The tactic, along with several others, was described by Rooke A.C.J.Q.B in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII), 2012 ABQB 571, 543 A.R. 215, a decision containing a thorough and helpful analysis of OPCA litigants and their practices.
[23] In Meads, Rooke A.C.J.Q.B., discusses the double/split person strategy and its related tactic, the divided/split strategy, in paras. 417 to 446. The discussion includes helpful references to cases which have encountered, and rejected it.
[24] In a nutshell, the strategy is based on the ill-conceived idea that people can exist in at least two different forms, one physical and one non-corporeal. The apparent purpose behind the strategy is to allow the physical form of a person to acquire property and wealth while liability and debt attaches to the other, non-corporeal form. The physical person then disavows or somehow kills off the non-corporeal form. In this way, so the theory suggests, the physical person extinguishes or avoids the liability and debt, without diminishing the wealth acquired by the physical form. The divided/split person strategy similarly creates imaginary non-corporeal persons, although there are two or more such persons and they are designed to interact with each other, presumably for the same principal purpose of insulating the physical person.
[25] Of course, the notion that a person can choose to exist in two or more forms, much less one that assumes the authority of the Crown, is both untrue in fact and untenable in law. One of the cases cited by Rooke A.C.J.Q.B. in this respect is Minister of National Revenue v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 (CanLII), 2009 FC 99, 340 F.T.R. 150, where Gauthier J. forcefully criticized the double/split person argument advanced by the respondent in reply to an application for a compliance order under s. 231.7 of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.). After describing the argument’s premise as “pure fiction” in para. 17, Gauthier J. said the following at para. 27:
27. ...Cory Stanchfield’s attempt to argue before this Court that his body comprises two persons which act in different capacities is one of two things: (1) an inadmissible division of his indivisible entity, or (2) an attempted creation of a second entity in a fashion which is not recognized by law, with the result of which amounts to nothing in the eyes of the law. It is an attempt at the impossible and the respondent cannot do the impossible. Therefore, “Cory Stanchfield (the Respondent)” and “Cory Stanchfield , in his capacity as a natural person (the Witness)” is but one person, with one single capacity ...[Emphasis added]
[26] In the actions before the court, the author of the claims has tried to create two non-corporeal entities, both in relation to Lorin Rubbert. One is the named plaintiff and the other is “Estate Lorin Rubbert”. The attempt to attach the authority of the Crown to one of these entities is particularly novel, but appears to be derived from the practice discussed in Meads. Presumably, this strategy was to allow one or both of the non-corporeal entities to incur liability for costs, in place of the physical person, in case the actions were dismissed. Whatever the reasons, the comments of Gauthier J. underscore the point that, in law, such attempts amount to “nothing”. It follows that, in the same way as such attempts cannot avoid liability, they similarly cannot support a basis to pursue the imposition of liability on others. In my view, the appearance of the double/split and divided/split person tactics reinforce my conclusion that both actions are nullities.
I’ve rattled that idea around my head and I think Justice Elson is correct. If so, then in Canada we have a new principle that provides a mechanism to shut down a wide range of OPCA-based actions. I’ll be curious to see if this catches on.
Ok, so enough of Lorin playing games with who and what he is. How about the basis for the litigation? Well, it’s a variation on the foisted unilateral agreement scheme, but with a twist. Not only is Lorin attempting to enforce obligations that emerge from an “un-rebutted Affidavit of Claim in Notary Default”, but this is then crystallized by a “Certificate” from the Federal Court of Canada - well at least that’s what it is called – signed by Lorin himself!
The judgment offers some details on how defendants had wronged Lorin – again we see typical OPCA interaction with government employees:[6] The first claim, issued on June 5, 2013, names Ms. Boxrud as the defendant. The “essence” of the claim against her is set out in paras. 3 to 6 of the claim, which I believe must be set out verbatim:
(3) The Plaintiff’s Claim against the Defendant is in the amount of $250,000.00 being the balance due and owing pursuant to an Un-rebutted Affidavit of Claim in Notary Default as of the 30th of May, 2013 wherein Credit was extended by the Plaintiff to the Defendant as a result of a legal determination the Defendant made and acted upon causing damage to the Plaintiff.
(4) The Plaintiff has demanded payment of the said sum but the defendant has neglected and refused to to [sic] pay or make answer and still neglects to pay or make answer for her actions. As a result $250,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand) still remains owing, due and unpaid.
(5) The Plaintiff Claims no Interest on the said sum.
(6) The Plaintiff therefore Claims:
(a) Payment of or Judgment against the Defendant in the sum of $250,000.00.
(b) The Plaintiff also would add the Cost of this Action to the Claim as well as any administrative cost’s [sic] incurred in the Plaintiff’s Pursuit of Justice in this Matter.
[7] Attached to the statement of claim is a document entitled “Affidavit of Fact”, purportedly sworn by Luanne Koster (Rubbert) as well as a document entitled as a “Certificate”, purportedly issued from the Federal Court, but signed by an individual named “Lorin Rubbert.” The “Certificate” contains the following statement:
I Lorin Rubbert do hereby Duly Present this Certificate of Default Judgement [sic] pursuant to the Un-rebutted Affidavit’s [sic] of Commercial Claim Dated March 3rd 2013 and April 23rd 2013 Notary Default, the following is an undisputed outstanding amount payable by PEGGY BOXRUD and (Name omitted) the Amount of $250,000.00 (Two Hundred Fifty Thousand)
[8] An individual named Lorin Rubbert appears to have signed the purported certificate as a “Notary Acceptor” and as “Duly Authorized Executor Estate LORIN RUBBERT”. Despite the inclusion in this document of another person, whose name I have decided not to recite, that person has not been named as a defendant.
[9] Mr. Duncan is named as defendant in the second claim, issued on June 6, 2013. Except for a difference in the amount of the “Unrebutted Affidavit of Claim in Notary Default”, the wording of the claim against Mr. Duncan is identical to the one against Ms. Boxrud. For some reason, the claim against Mr. Duncan is for a considerably greater sum, although I note that two different amounts are mentioned. In para. 3, the amount claimed is described as $2.8 million while, in para. 6(a), judgment is claimed for $5 million. The attached “Federal Court” certificate, similar to the one attached to the claim against Ms. Boxrud, identifies the “undisputed outstanding amount” as payable by someone other than Mr. Duncan. This other person’s name does not otherwise appear in the pleading or any of the attached documents.
The application to strike is granted. There is a purely legal question which is interesting; it looks like Saskatchewan has a new set of rules of court, and Justice Elson takes the position that its ‘general interpretation’ principles mean the analysis of whether to toss an application as “frivolous”, “vexatious’, or as an “abuse of process” is now a contextual question of whether this litigation was conducted for an illegitimate purpose: para. 44. The court can infer the purpose of a lawsuit from its substance – i.e. a crap lawsuit probably is being conducted for an inappropriate reason: paras. 45-46. Here, these were crap lawsuits intended to harass honest public workers (para. 46):[29] In her affidavit, Ms. Boxrud deposed that she is employed as a Deputy Registrar and Deputy Sheriff for the Judicial Centre of Estevan. In May of 2013, the Sheriff’s office was asked to seize funds from the bank account of a person named Lorin Rubbert in the enforcement of a default judgment obtained against him by the Bank of Nova Scotia. The Sheriff’s office eventually succeeded in securing sufficient funds to cover the judgment, an amount just over $100,000.00.
[30] Ten days later, on May 31, 2013, an individual, who identified himself as Landon Lemieux, attended at the court house in Estevan and asked to review files kept by either the court or the Sheriff’s office relating to Mr. Rubbert. With respect to the Sheriff’s files, Ms. Boxrud advised Mr. Lemieux that these documents were not open to the public. At this point, Mr. Lemieux completed a handwritten document entitled “Affidavit of Commercial Claim” and provided it to her. Ms. Boxrud further deposed that she had received similar worded documents, in typewritten form and purportedly signed by Mr. Rubbert, in March and April 2013. These documents were followed by another document entitled “Notice of Default”, purportedly signed by Mr. Rubbert, in which it is stated that, by failing to rebut or respond to the so-called Affidavits of Commercial Claim, she had admitted the indebtedness described in the documents.
[31] Mr. Duncan’s affidavit also describes an interaction with Lorin Rubbert. In his capacity as an employee of the Canada Revenue Agency, Mr. Duncan signed letters to Mr. Rubbert on various dates in 2012 and 2013. In April and May of 2013, Mr. Duncan received notices from Mr. Rubbert. Nothing further was received until June and July when he learned Mr. Rubbert had registered a provincial judgment enforcement charge against him for $2,800,000.00. Fortunately for Mr. Duncan, the Registrar at the Saskatchewan Personal Property Registry took the necessary steps to discharge this liability.
The alleged basis for Lorin (as the Queen) to sue the defendants was a breach of contract. This fails because there is no actual agreement or meeting of the minds between the parties (para. 54) and no consideration from the government actor to support the alleged contract (para. 55).… From the uncontradicted evidence, it is clear that the claims are pursued for the sole purpose of harassing two public servants simply because the claimant took exception to the manner in which they did their jobs. Citizens who have legitimate complaints about the manner in which judgments are enforced or taxes are assessed and collected, have every right to voice their complaints in ways which are recognized by law. They do not have the right to clog the courts with meritless claims designed to harass or penalize individuals who are simply doing their jobs.
Then Justice Elson takes another interesting step – he steps back and returns to the foisted unilateral agreement concept and responds to a U.S. argument that public service is a contract with the public. This is a pretty neat analysis so I’m going to quote it in full:
The actions are struck out as nullities (para. 65) and frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process (para. 66). Though advanced by nullities Lorin’s participation in the background is implied, and he should pay the defendants costs.[56] The pleading in this case is another example of a OPCA litigant tactic, the so-called foisted unilateral agreement, which was also described in Meads, supra. Rooke A.C.J.Q.B. discussed the foisted unilateral agreement, in some detail, in paras. 447 – 528. Essentially, this strategy involves the OPCA litigant issuing a document which purports to impose an obligation or arrangement on others without their consent or agreement. They can take a variety of forms, with different purported effects, such as appointing someone as a fiduciary, declaring oneself to be free of obligations, terminating lawsuits or imposing liability on others, particularly public officials and public servants who are said to have wronged the OPCA litigant.
[57] Aside from the discussion in Meads, I took the time to read other material related to this issue. The specific tactic followed in this case appears to have been derived, at least in part, from the so-called “commercial lien” strategy employed by certain OPCA litigants in the United States. It may be of interest to note that one proponent of this tactic has tried to establish a theoretical foundation for it.
[58] In the January/February, 1993 edition of his now defunct “AntiShyster Magazine”, Alfred Adask, a self-proclaimed “sovereign citizen”, described the theory. It is based on the premise that public officials, by virtue of their holding office, enter into a contract with each individual member of the public to obey the law. It follows, according to Adask, that these public officials incur liability for breach of contract when they breach or ignore the law. This liability is purportedly imposed by the lien or the document issued by the individual seeking to impose the liability, unilaterally. In the United States, the lien is relatively easy to file, usually in the office of the local county clerk.
[59] In Canada, the ability to file a lien, encumbrance or similar charge is not as simple as it appears to be in the United States. Even where some form of encumbrance or charge is filed, as was the case in the action against Mr. Duncan, appropriate steps can generally be taken to vacate or otherwise remove the charge.
[60] It is not difficult to identify the flaws of a foisted unilateral agreement, even with Adask’s theoretical justification for it. First, and as pointed out in Meads, the existence of the contract depends on the requirement that both parties agree to its terms and binding effect. In paras. 461 and 462, Rooke A.C.J.Q.B. cited, with approval, the comments of Fraser C.J.A. in Ron Ghitter Property Consultants Ltd. v. Beaver Lumber Co., 2003 ABCA 221 (CanLII), 2003 ABCA 221, 330 A.R. 353, as taken from paras. 8 and 9:
8 Regardless of the theories underlying the enforcement of contracts, mutuality of agreement lies at the root of any legally enforceable contract. The required degree of mutuality of agreement mandates that the parties reach a consensus ad idem on essential terms. ... The accepted test is whether a reasonable observer would infer from the words or conduct of the parties that a contract had been concluded ... That is, on an objective basis, have the parties reached consensus ad idem?
9 The common thread running through the cases is that the parties will be found two of reached a meeting of the minds, in other words, be ad idem, where it is clear to the objective reasonable bystander, in light of all the material facts, that the parties intended to contract and the essential terms of that contract can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty ... This requires the court to decide whether “a sensible third-party would take the agreement to mean that A understood it to mean what B understood it to mean, or whether indeed any meaning can be attributed to it at all” ... “the consensus ad idem would be a matter of mere conjecture.
[61] Following the endorsement of this passage, Rooke A.C.J.Q.B. added his own comment at para. 463:
[62] People who use these agreements would likely respond to this comment by suggesting that the arrangements are not foisted on their recipients. Rather, and following Adask’s description of the practice, they would rely on the idea that public officials accept the contract with each citizen when they accepted their respective positions, and that the unilateral imposition of personal liability is a foreseeable consequence of that contract.463 This alone provide the basis for why the stereo typical foisted unilateral agreement cannot bind its recipient. An objective person knows that he or she cannot usually be held bound in contract by simple receipt of an offer. Many OPCA foisted unilateral agreements feature language that demands its recipient to respond or rebut an obligation by a certain deadline. If not, then the agreement proclaims the recipient is bound by its terms. A moment’s consideration shows it is absurd that the law would respect that requirement. What if the document was received, but not read within the deadline? What if the document was received by an illiterate person, or one who did not understand the document’s meaning? Could they have ‘meeting of the minds’? Of course not, no more than handing a document to a sheep and saying “By not repudiating this agreement, I may eat you.” establishes a mutual and common consent.
[63] Of course, Adask’s fundamental premise is wrong. A public official’s employment, along with any associated oath, cannot result in a contract with any individual member of the public. The only contract created by the official’s employment is with his/her employer. Typically, this would be the federal or provincial Crown, through one of its ministries or agencies. The terms and conditions of that contract, including the duties to be performed, are generally governed by a combination of statutory provisions and/or collective-bargaining agreements. Subject to whatever collective bargaining arrangements may be involved, Ms. Boxrud’s employment is governed by The Court Officials Act, 2012, S.S. 2012, c. 43.101 while Mr. Duncan’s employment is likely governed by the Public Service Employment Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22. While individuals, such as Mr. Rubbert, may be beneficiaries of, or subject to, actions of these public officials in the course of their employment, no direct contract between them arises. There is no enforceable privity of contract.
[64] Adask’s attempted justification for the “commercial lien” practice begs another obvious question. On the assumption that one could legitimately construe a contract between an individual and a public official in his/her personal capacity, how is it determined whether those officials have breached the terms or conditions of these contracts? In the Adask article I earlier referenced, the issue is conveniently ignored. Considering the manner in which the arrangement is said to unfold, one is unavoidably left with the conclusion that allegations of an official’s breach of contract are left to be adjudicated unilaterally. In Adask’s world, there is no objective and independent entity charged with this responsibility. As such, if it could be said that the agreements are not unilateral and foisted, the liability certainly is.
This is an interesting decision. We have a couple new general principles: an attempt to sue as the Crown or on behalf of a Strawman is a nullity.
We also have this intriguingly exploratory approach to OPCA concepts. Lorin never showed at this hearing, nor did an emissary. Nevertheless, here again we see a Canadian judge taking the opportunity to conduct an investigation of the ideas behind the litigation, even investigating and then commenting on a U.S. explanation for a facet of Lorin’s litigation – even though Lorin didn’t bring it up.
This is becoming a trend. Canadian judges are increasingly not just tossing these lawsuits but going on, conducting significant explorations of why they are doing so, and then commenting further on the implications of the litigation. I think this is an excellent development, particularly since so far it’s not common that litigants themselves take a broader theoretical approach, and of course our legal academics have been utterly useless on the subject.
So as usual I did some research on Mr. Rubbert. His accomplice, “Landon Lemieux” mentioned at para. 30 didn’t go anywhere, except that Landon is a close relative of a certain Gerald Blerot (http://www.hallfuneralservices.ca/book- ... ituary.php). Blerot is a Poriskyite Detax promoter who has managed to obtain a lengthy period of incarceration for his efforts (viewtopic.php?f=50&t=9275). Good for you Gerald!
But I’ve developed a profile of Rubbert himself and it’s interesting – this is a man with a life and career but who ruined it by his actions. I’m going to trace his misadventures in chronological order. It appears Lorin is a crop duster by trade, and operates Rubbert Aerial Spraying Inc. (http://www.salespider.com/bp-87520834/lorin-rubbert) (http://411.ca/business/profile/6825). Not just that, but Lorin has a longstanding professional interest in that trade. Back in 2003-2004 Lorin was president of the Canadian Aerial Applicators Association (http://www.docstoc.com/docs/106702890/N ... gly-severe) (http://www.canadianaerialapplicators.co ... 004-04.pdf).
In 2001 he won the annual “Award of Excellence” from that organization “For outstanding professionalism in agricultural aviation by an active member of the association.” (http://www.canadianaerialapplicators.co ... d-winners/). He helped develop a Saskatchewan provincial curriculum for crop dusters in Saskatchewan (http://www.agriculture.gov.sk.ca/19960478.pdf).
So Lorin has genuine skill and reputation in what is generally acknowledged as a difficult professional activity. But this is seed of where things went wrong. I identified several regulatory proceedings before the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada against Lorin by Canadian aviation authorities:
- Rubbert Aerial Spraying Inc. v. Minister of Transport: http://www.tatc.gc.ca/decision/decision ... dc_id=1349
Rubbert Aerial Spraying Inc. v. Minister of Transport: http://www.tatc.gc.ca/decision/decision ... dc_id=1350
The decisions confirm penalties against Lorin for his cropdusting activities. Lorin had not logged his flight plans (para. 3), nor did he have a commercial pilot licence even though he flew for hire (para. 6).
A background on the dispute is provided at paras 10-44. It turns out that in Canada you can own a plane and crop dust within a 25 mile radius of your farm without a commercial pilot's licence – these are called “flying farmers”. Fully accredited cropdusters are not happy when “flying farmers” poach their business outside that limit.
It turns out Lorin said he was one such “flying farmer”. He was hired along with another “flying farmer” named “Raymond Blerot” (oh, is there a connection?) to spray pesticide in reponse to a severe outbreak of Bertha armyworms. The planned activity led to concern by Transport Canada that these “flying farmers” were working without a licence. Lorin had allegedly also misrepresented his credentials. Transport Canada then detected Lorin’s company as well. Worse, it turned out that Lorin wasn’t even a “flying farmer” – he didn’t have a farm!
The tribunal had evidence that Lorin was neither farmer nor had a commercial aviation licence. It had documentary evidence that Lorin was cropdusting and being paid for his services. However, Lorin did not keep track of his flight plan obligations – another breach of regulations. Lorin’s professional activities were used against him – it was obvious from his participation in those organizations that he must have known he needed a commercial pilot licence – worse, in that organization he claimed he was a commercial pilot and a “flying farmer” – though he was neither!
Lorin was fined $5000 for each illegal incident of crop dusting. That amounted to a total of $220,000. Lorin had been busy. He was hit with another $7,500 fine for not keeping accurate flight logs.
This may have been a tipping point that led to further issues. The Federal Courts database identifies an Income Tax Act Certificate filed against Lorin in January of 2012 (Docket ITA-1071-12). This led to a writ of seizure and sale on the same date, quantum is not identified.
I located a foreclosure judgment in March 2013 against Lorin Edgar Rubbert by the Bank of Montreal:
- Bank of Montreal v Rubbert, 2013 SKQB 82: http://canlii.ca/t/fwn9j
The first step in a foreclosure is for the bank to make an application to the Farm Land Security Board, then mediation, and if mediation fails then the Board may allow or deny foreclosure (para. 4). Here the Board denied foreclosure. Another thing I was not aware of is that in Saskatchewan farm land foreclosure is only possible where there is no reasonable possibility of repayment.
Lorin’s situation was described in some detail:
That's a lot of debt.[10] The Report states that it was difficult to obtain a full understanding of the respondent’s situation, as telephone conversations were “impossible due to his hearing impairment”. It does, however, contain certain findings as to the respondent’s personal and financial circumstances. The respondent lives primarily on the farm, which is a zero till grain farm located near Oxbow, Saskatchewan. He has also worked as a consultant in the oil industry for eight years, and is the sole owner of an aerial spraying company. At the date of the Report, he was not spraying, but was working as much as possible in the oil patch. He estimated his off farm income would be in excess of $200,000 in the next 12 months. He had significant off farm employment in 2011, but the Report did not specify the amount of that income.
[11] Crop production from the farm was reduced in 2010, 2011 and 2012 by excess moisture. Capital expenditures, both personal and business, have been minimal in recent years. The Board’s analysis of income and expense records led it to conclude that the farm did not generate sufficient funds to meet all debt commitments of the past three years. It says that during the period the mortgage has been in default, the respondent’s resources have been used for taxes, living expenses, operating expenses and to pay out two equipment loans.
[12] The Report also lists other debt obligations that were disclosed to the Board by the respondent. They include a $5,000 writ in favor of Transport Canada and a $20,305 writ in favor of Canada Revenue Agency. They also include loans from the applicant in the amount of $17,959 of which $13,059 is in arrears, and $92,552 of which $42,453 is in arrears, as well as an operating loan which is due and payable in the amount of $267,488 and a line of credit with a balance of $54,376, of which $23,126 is in arrears. The Report does not list a judgment dated September 20, 2012 in the amount of $107,279.38 payable to the Bank of Nova Scotia. That judgment is disclosed in an affidavit of default.
I’m just a tad suspicious that Lorin’s alleged hearing impairment ebbs and flows from when it is convenient or not. Nevertheless, the Board thought Lorin could pull through:
Justice Barrington-Foote (how’s that for a name!) concluded he needed more information to determine whether the Board was or was not reasonable. He was troubled by the ‘can’t use a telephone’ explanation, and wanted more evidence from the Board and Lorin on his efforts to deal with this debt.[13] Notwithstanding the respondent’s significant debt load, the Report concludes that the respondent has a reasonable possibility of meeting the obligations of “an amortized mortgage”. In an attachment to the Report, the Board explains how it reached that conclusion. More specifically, it uses long-term average crop insurance yield data to estimate crop production, and considers the farm’s present debt structure and the impact of debt restructuring on the farm’s ability to meet its obligations. It says that the Board typically uses an amortization period of 20 years to estimate debt servicing obligations in relation to the mortgages which would be subject to foreclosure, and that it may also analyze the farm’s ability to pay its other debts based on a restructuring of those debts.
I have not located any further judgment that follows up on this.
Beyond that, I believe I identified Lorin’s Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/lorin.rubbert) and Google+ (https://plus.google.com/100110219866986479094) websites. Neither shows any obvious OPCA affiliation or elements.
Well Lorin, hope you pull through and get those debts under control. But in the meantime, please stop roleplaying the Queen. (She's a fraud you know - check out the Stone of Scone - it's a fake!)
Fussygus: does this chap ring a bell from your exposure to the Poriskyite circles?
SMS Möwe
