Mr. Justice's bad day in court began when the Illinois EPA came after his business in 2009:
The AG, unimpressed, moved for a summary judgment, and attached "over 300 pages of exhibits" such as the existing permits, results of emission tests, and other relevant documents. It also asked for Mr. Justice's jury demand to be stricken, on the grounds that a jury isn't available for a civil enforcement case like this. Mr. Justice was particularly pained at this:¶ 3 The record shows that defendant operates a business which manufactures adhesive labels and tapes. On August 21, 2009, plaintiff filed a six-count complaint against defendant for various violations of the [Environmental Protection Act]. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that parts of defendant's manufacturing process failed to meet minimum requirements established by the Illinois Pollution Control Board, and that he was operating without the necessary permits and in violation of others. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief, a civil penalty, and attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff amended that complaint on June 23, 2010, adding allegations of additional permit violations and defendant's failure to maintain required records.
¶ 4 On the same day, defendant filed a "reply" to the amended complaint, stating simply that he "neither admits nor denies the allegations of the complaint" and he "demands trial by a jury of twelve of his peers." Plaintiff moved to strike the "reply" on August 5, 2010, maintaining that it was "inaccurately designated" and that it did not contain an explicit admission or denial of each allegation. Plaintiff's motion was granted on August 24, 2010, and defendant was given 14 days to answer or otherwise plead to the amended complaint.
¶ 5 On September 14, 2010, defendant filed an "Answer to Amended Complaint." In it, defendant set out the allegations of the complaint, admitting and denying some allegations, while admitting and denying others "in part" without further specification.
Protestations notwithstanding, the court struck the jury demand and granted the summary judgment, an injunction, $50,000 in penalties (with an additional $50,000 if he violated the injunction), and $17,772.50 in attorney's fees.The bulk of defendant's response was composed of long quotations to cases involving the right to a jury trial. Defendant further alleged that a party "must be tried before a Jury if [he] demands it" and, "It is a right; something that cannot be denied." In concluding his response, defendant stated that he "will respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment only after the Plaintiff has presented its case to the Jury." He did not otherwise file a response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
So far, so what? Environmental case, happens all the time. Sure. But it was when the State came to collect that things got funky. In April, 2013, they got Mr. Justice's bank to turn over $27,432.19. They also, evidently, got Mr. Justice's attention, and he appealed the turnover and everything that led up to it. His first two grounds of appeal are not important (and the court threw them out because he'd waited too long to bring them up), but the others are more on topic:
As a preliminary matter, the court complained that Mr. Justice's briefs were too long, and that he tried to cover this up by being funny with the page numbering. Also, that he didn't argue most of his points at all, and that he only took one page to set out the factual history of the case (and that, for that matter, wasn't actually all that factual). But these were mere technicalities.3) the court erred by directing the funds in his bank account to be turned over to plaintiff when only "gold or silver Coin[,]" and not "paper money[,]" may be required to satisfy debts under the U.S. Constitution, and (4) the trial judge erred in continuing to preside over the case after he "removed" her from office.
Nevertheless, the court decided to tackle the case head-on.¶ 23 Most importantly, however, defendant has failed to articulate an organized and cohesive legal argument sufficient to allow meaningful review of his claims. He devotes large portions of his argument to extended quotations from various sources, including a 22-page quotation of the entire dissent in Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884). ... Defendant provides scant analysis of these sources, and does not indicate why or how they are applicable to his case. He also quotes a number of secondary sources at length, including "Charles Rappleye's Sons of Providence," "Lysander Spooner['s] Essay on the Trial by Jury," "Tupper Saussy's 1980 booklet Miracle of Main Street," "Robert Sherman['s] pamphlet, Caveat Against Injustice" and "Edwin Vieira Jr.'s Pieces Of Eight." These secondary sources, however, do not qualify as relevant authority in support of defendant's arguments on appeal. People v. Heaton, 266 Ill. App. 3d 469, 476-78 (1994).
¶ 24 Under Rule 341(h)(7) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)), a reviewing court is entitled to have all the issues clearly defined and be provided with meaningful argument. People ex rel. Illinois Department of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56. It "is not simply a depository into which a party may dump the burden of argument and research." E.R.H. Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56. Appellate briefs which do not satisfy Rule 341 "do not merit consideration on appeal and may be rejected for that reason alone." Housing Authority of Champaign County v. Lyles, 395 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1040 (2009).
As for the fourth ground of appeal: apparently, on April 13, 2013, Mr. Justice removed the court and the Attorney General from office. The court was not impressed by this move and declared that it had no effect, but Mr. Justice insisted that he had thereby annulled everything that happened in the case, and demanded sanctions of the judge and Attorney General. His explanation?¶ 26 Defendant contends that the court erred in "ignor[ing] [his] objection that the judgement [sic] debt was subject to the prohibition that 'No State shall... make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payments of Debts[.]'" He maintains that it was error to order "that paper money may be demanded and seized in payment of judgment debt." Congress, however, in accordance with its Constitutional authority, has established that Federal Reserve notes are legal tender. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5103 ("United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for debts"). Defendant's argument is therefore wholly without merit. Julliard v. Greenman (“The Legal-Tender Cases”), 110 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1884); Foret v. Wilson, 725 F.2d 254 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that the plaintiff's “argument, that only gold and silver coin may be constituted legal tender by the United States, is hopeless and frivolous[.]”).
Judgment affirmed. Though, as it happens, not quite on a unanimous court. Presiding Justice Delort didn't want Mr. Justice sent away a loser; instead, he wanted him sent away a poorer loser. Calling out his theories as "hallmarks of what is colloquially known as the 'sovereign citizen' movement," he goes on to point out that¶ 28 In this appeal, defendant asserts that he took an oath when he was appointed an officer in the Army, to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic[,]" and, under that authority, he "removed" the trial judge and Attorney General from office during the course of the proceedings. Defendant, however, provides no support for why the taking of this oath gives him the authority to "remove" officers of the court at his whim, and this claim necessitates no further review.
With respect to Mr. Justice Delort, I'm not sure that I've seen the notion that an Army officer can remove a judge from office listed among the sovereign citizen canon before. Maybe it's one of those more obscure things, or maybe it's more in how he presented it. Any ideas?It is clear that the purpose of asserting these theories is simply to harass the judges,
lawyers, and others involved in litigation against the defendant. The able judges in the trial court and the Attorney General have cited irrefutable authorities to Justice explaining why his theories are nothing but nonsense, but he nonetheless persists in presenting them. For the reasons I stated in Parkway Bank v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶ 92, I believe that whenever a party uses such tactics, we should impose substantial monetary sanctions to deter similar conduct in the future, and to compensate the taxpayers of this State for the costs incurred by the court system in having to address them.
