Some people, however, apparently just don't quite want to believe it, and so our story starts in Champaign County:
Mr. Sellers's jaunt through the traffic courts of Champaign County began on September 15, 2013, when he was ticketed for DUI and for being over the legal limit. (There is, apparently, a difference: the latter, if I understand correctly, often being the cause of the former.) Consequently, the state notified him that his license was being automatically suspended for six months. This is a summary process, no court time involved, unless the accused asks for review.In September 2013, defendant, Philip L. Sellers, received two traffic citations for the offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. In May 2014, a jury found defendant guilty. In June 2014, the trial court sentenced him to 24 months' probation.
On appeal, defendant raises issues regarding (1) subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) party identification, (3) pretrial motions, (4), subpoenas, and (5) "the constitution." We affirm.
It will come as no surprise that Mr. Sellers acted pro se in this case. As such, he filed a "request for records and agreement of the parties," asking for various video and audio recordings. (Given the name, I assume he also asked for proof that he agreed to be arrested, or however they describe that in Freemania, but the appellate court doesn't mention it.) The court didn't allow this, so Mr. Sellers then moved for reconsideration, without success. Having thus gone nowhere, and taken most of a month to get there, he took a different tack:In December 2013, defendant filed a petition for judicial review, arguing he had been unlawfully placed under arrest. Thereafter, he filed an "objection to defects in arraignment and process," arguing inter alia, that "a 'peace officer's' sworn complaint to a transportation code violation does not present a justiciable issue; does not give standing to a third party prosecutor; and does not establish subject matter jurisdiction for the court." In a docket entry, the trial court agreed with the State that defendant's position was "intended to stand as a Petition to Rescind Statutory Summary Suspension."
And so on; you know the drill by now.On February 10, 2014, defendant filed an entry of appearance "to enter his appearance as a soul endowed living man, imago dei, injured party, and third party of interest." Defendant claimed "the correct identification of the presumed Person PHILLIP [sic] L. SELLERS is now a question of law before this court." On February 19, 2014, defendant filed an "affidavit of non-driver status," wherein he claimed he "is not a driver of a motor vehicle; nor was he a driver of a motor vehicle when he was mistaken for one, arrested, and unjustly dragged before this court." On February 25, 2014, defendant filed a notice of default, arguing the prosecutor failed to rebut his affidavit of nondriver status.
In March 2014, defendant sent a subpoena to the Illinois Attorney General's office, commanding the Attorney General to identify and forward relevant sections of acts of Congress and state law that grant "the department of transportation, and the Secretary of State, exclusive and total control of the common ways (streets and highways)," grant "law enforcement the right to arrest and courts to prosecute the general population under transportation codes even when those people are not engaged in the business of transportation," ...
There's that apology thing again. Cherron Phillips filed one of those in her federal trial last year, claiming that "sovereign people led me astray," or something to that effect, much to her detriment. And now Mr. Sellers files one in his case. I'm not sure that I've seen a good explanation yet of how formally apologizing to the court is supposed to help things; is the idea that the court is obligated to accept the apology in lieu of a penalty? No idea.The April 21, 2014, docket entry indicates subpoenas to the Illinois Attorney General and the court administrator, Roger Holland, had been issued without leave of court. The trial court ordered those subpoenas be quashed.
On April 22, 2014, the Attorney General filed a motion to quash the subpoena, stating the subpoena purports to require the Attorney General to conduct legal research for defendant. The Attorney General noted defendant did not supply any legal support for the proposition that the Attorney General may be compelled to provide laws and statutes that are a matter of public record to a criminal defendant.
On April 23, 2014, defendant filed an "apology to the court." Therein, defendant indicated he did not understand what a subpoena was and wished to thank the Attorney General for explaining the subpoena to him. Defendant also indicated two other subpoenas were sent and needed to be quashed.
At this point, the case went to jury trial, and the jury (as indicated) didn't find in favor of Mr. Sellers, whereupon he appealed.
The appellate court does seem to fall into the snare of relying on well reasoned argument and copious citation to authority in refuting sovrun claptrap, but it also seems to have taken a very practical route to answering his claims of error. His first point of appeal was that the court didn't have subject matter jurisdiction. The appellate court says that it did: he was charged with violating the law in Champaign County, and a traffic ticket was sufficient to charge him. This is fairly routine stuff that the court dispatches in short order. The fun stuff begins in claim B:
Now, you can see that Mr. Sellers is kind of on the ropes here: the script would have him point out that the law defines "person" as "including partnerships, corporations," etc., and since he's none of those, he's off scot-free. But since the Illinois General Assembly apparently had the foresight to list out "natural person" in there, he's hard-pressed to make that argument work. Fortunately, the State threw him a lifeline on this point; unfortunately, it had a noose on the end:Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to properly identify the parties, claiming it is "a substantive failure of the proceedings." Defendant states he filed an entry of appearance "not as a 'pro se defendant' but as a third party of interest and injured party, and demand[ed] the State establish what kind of person PHILLIP [sic] L SELLERS is alleged to be." Defendant cites to section 1-159 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which defines "person" as "[e]very natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation." 625 ILCS 5/1-159 (West 2012). Defendant states he is "not knowingly a firm, co-partnership, association or corporation," and asserts the State must be alleging he is a "natural person." Defendant cites federal law defining "person" and states "none of those options apply to Philip L. Sellers as an unenfranchised one, singular instance of the people, flesh and blood imago dei."
Nor several of the other issues that Mr. Sellers raised, for similar reasons. End result: convictions upheld, plus an assessment of $50 for costs.In its brief, the State agrees with the defendant's claim that it was alleging he is a "natural person." Moreover, the State contends the trial court could take judicial notice of this fact. Our supreme court has noted "courts may take judicial notice of matters which are commonly known or, if not commonly known, are readily verifiable from sources of indisputable accuracy." People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 134, 662 N.E.2d 1287, 1293 (1996). Here, the court, as well as the jury, as trier of fact, could reasonably conclude defendant is a person, as he appeared in the courtroom throughout the proceedings. Moreover, as the trial transcripts do not appear in the record, we must assume defendant is a person and was the person alleged to have committed the charged offenses. ...
Defendant makes other arguments that are either without merit or fail to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb 6, 2013). By failing to put forth an argument in compliance with the Supreme Court Rules, we need not address them.
Two comments here. First, kudos to the Fourth District for having cut directly through the strawman nonsense, and saved a lot of resources without actually mocking a very silly defense. Second, I wish dearly that it were Peter and not Philip appearing before the court. There is a definite Goon Show feel about someone claiming to the court that he is not a person and should therefore be set free.
The case itself is unpublished, and cited as People v. Philip L. Sellers, 2015 IL App (4th) 140604-U.
