McLaughlin: CA2 Rules that courts DO have jurisdiction over TPs in criminal cases

[jcolvin2]

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/i ... /1/hilite/

19‐308‐cr     United States v. Raymond McLaughlin 

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit    
   
AUGUST TERM 2019    No. 19‐308‐cr   

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
RAYMOND MCLAUGHLIN, aka Shakir Ra‐Ade Bey, aka Shakir Ade  Bey,  Defendant‐Appellant.       

On Appeal from the United States District Court  for the District of Connecticut     

Before: CABRANES and DRONEY, Circuit Judges, and REISS, District  Judge. * 
   
Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the  District of Connecticut (Michael P. Shea, Judge), Defendant‐Appellant Raymond McLaughlin was convicted of obstruction of Government administration for making false statements to the Internal Revenue Service. He now challenges his conviction on the grounds that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment. 
   
Henry K. Kopel (Marc H. Silverman, on the  brief), for John H. Durham, United States  Attorney for the District of Connecticut,  New Haven, CT, for Appellee. 
Raymond McLaughlin, pro se, Brooklyn,  NY.  
 
SUBMITTED: DECEMBER 9, 2019   DECIDED: DECEMBER 30, 2019 

PER CURIAM: 
The  case  before  us  poses  a  simple  question:  when  does  a  Federal  court  have  personal  jurisdiction  over  a  defendant  in  a  criminal  proceeding?  We  hold  that  personal  jurisdiction  exists  whenever  an  individual,  charged  with  a  crime  over  which  the  Federal court has subject matter jurisdiction, is brought before that  court. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment that it  had  personal  jurisdiction  over  Defendant‐Appellant  Raymond  McLaughlin (“McLaughlin”). 

I. BACKGROUND 

  Defendant‐Appellant McLaughlin was convicted, following a  jury trial, of making false statements to the Internal Revenue Service  (“IRS”) in 2014, when he submitted documents purporting to show a  payment of more than $300,000 to a Connecticut state court judge  then presiding over a foreclosure action against him. The payment  was a fiction, but the documents submitted by McLaughlin were  designed to bait the IRS into penalizing and assessing additional tax  obligations on the state judge on the grounds that the judge never  reported such income. By submitting these false documents under  penalty of perjury, McLaughlin was in clear violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 

Before his conviction, McLaughlin filed multiple pro se motions  to dismiss the indictment, asserting that the District Court lacked  personal jurisdiction over him. The District Court denied the  motions. McLaughlin now appeals his conviction, proceeding pro se,    
and arguing again that the judgment lacks validity because the  District Court lacked personal jurisdiction. He frames the question on  appeal as whether a public officer can possess personal jurisdiction  over a criminal defendant, which we answer in the affirmative. 

Throughout, McLaughlin has made arguments that are  consistent with a “Sovereign Citizen” ideology. Proponents of that  ideology, like McLaughlin, believe that the Federal Government is  illegitimate, and therefore that its laws are not binding. 1 As the  District Court aptly noted, so‐called “Sovereign Citizens” seek to  “clog[] the wheels of justice” and “delay proceedings so justice won’t  ultimately be [d]one.” App. 78.  They do so by raising numerous— often frivolous—arguments, many alleging that the Courts or the  Constitution lack any authority whatsoever.  McLaughlin’s argument here goes to the very heart of our  authority to hear Federal criminal cases. It raises an issue that  warrants a clear statement from this Court, to deter future litigants  from making similar claims.  

II. DISCUSSION 
 
We construe McLaughlin’s appeal as a challenge to the denials  of his motions to dismiss the indictment. We review such denials de  novo. United States v. Scott, 394 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2005).     
 
When a District Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal offenses charged, it has personal jurisdiction over the  individuals charged in the indictment and present before the court to answer those charges. See United States v. Alvarez‐Machain, 504 U.S.  655, 661-62, 670 (1992) (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952)); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 65 (1951) (“The District Court had jurisdiction of offenses against the laws of the United States. Hence, it had jurisdiction of the subject matter, to wit, an alleged violation of a federal conspiracy statute, and, of course, of the persons charged.” (internal citation and footnote omitted)); see also United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (“federal district court has personal jurisdiction to try any defendant brought before it on a federal indictment charging a violation of federal law.” (citing Alvarez‐Machain, 504 U.S. at 659–70)).  The  voluntariness of the defendant’s appearance in the District Court is  not relevant. See Alvarez‐Machain, 504 U.S. at 662 (citing Frisbie, 342  U.S. at 522); see also United States v. Pryor, 842 F.3d 441, 448 (6th Cir.  2016) (“Federal courts have personal jurisdiction over criminal defendants before them, whether or not they are forcibly brought into court.”); United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Personal jurisdiction is supplied by the fact that Burke is within the territory of the United States.”). A defendant need not acquiesce in or submit to the court’s jurisdiction or actually participate in the  proceedings in order for the court to have personal jurisdiction over  the defendant. 
 
Here, the District Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter  of the case: an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See 18 U.S.C.         § 3231 (“The district courts of the United States shall have original  jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses  against the laws of the United States.”). The indictment charged  McLaughlin and McLaughlin was present before the District Court.  Accordingly, the District Court had personal jurisdiction over  McLaughlin and the judgment is valid. See Williams, 341 U.S. at 65.   

III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the District Court’s  judgment from January 30, 2019. 


* Judge Christina Reiss, of the United States District Court for the  District of Vermont, sitting by designation.  

1 According to a 2011 article issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation  (“FBI”), sovereign citizens “follow their own set of laws” and, accordingly, “do  not recognize federal, state, or local laws, policies, or regulations” as legitimate.  Sovereign  Citizens:  A  Growing  Domestic  Threat  to  Law  Enforcement,  FBI  Law  Enforcement  Bulletin  (2011),  https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featuredar ... nforcement.  

[notorial dissent]

So did the good old tried and failed lien the judge you don't like routine, got caught, lied to the FBI, tried the "you ain't the boss of me" schtick which failed miserable, basically tried the same at appeal and lost there too. Real original-NOT. Just another Mooron fail. Did he get Federal or state time for the false lien I wonder?

[The Observer]

You failed to note the potential additional crunchy goodness of him trying all of this again with the Supreme Court.

[Arthur Rubin]

So did the good old tried and failed lien the judge you don't like routine, got caught, lied to the FBI, tried the "you ain't the boss of me" schtick which failed miserable, basically tried the same at appeal and lost there too. Real original-NOT. Just another Mooron fail. Did he get Federal or state time for the false lien I wonder?

I don't think it was a lien. It looks to be a 1099. Unless, of course, it was a 1099-C for releasing the lien.

[jcolvin2]

So did the good old tried and failed lien the judge you don't like routine, got caught, lied to the FBI, tried the "you ain't the boss of me" schtick which failed miserable, basically tried the same at appeal and lost there too. Real original-NOT. Just another Mooron fail. Did he get Federal or state time for the false lien I wonder?

McLaughlin was an ex-cop who appears to have initially gone "sovereign citizen" in response to a bank foreclosure of his home. After losing the foreclosure suit, McLaughlin filed a Form 1099-OIDD against the Connecticut judge who ruled against him the day after the last of his motions was denied. He was prosecuted in federal court and ultimately received a 2.5 year sentence for the 1099 shenanigans:
https://www.journalinquirer.com/crime_a ... a5224.html

[notorial dissent]

So did the good old tried and failed lien the judge you don't like routine, got caught, lied to the FBI, tried the "you ain't the boss of me" schtick which failed miserable, basically tried the same at appeal and lost there too. Real original-NOT. Just another Mooron fail. Did he get Federal or state time for the false lien I wonder?

I don't think it was a lien. It looks to be a 1099. Unless, of course, it was a 1099-C for releasing the lien.

Right, my bad wasn't thinking as I wrote. Actually would have been much worse and as I recall it should trigger a Federal charge, also under retaliation against judges laws.

I should have included the USSC attempt, since with this crowd it is almost a given, and would definitely be more crunchy goodness as they try to relitigate the case.

[daddy]

So [he] tried the "you ain't the boss of me" schtick which failed miserable,

Except, that's not what personal jurisdiction is about ... Oh no, now I said too much for the learned here, the esoteric hush-hush

[notorial dissent]

So [he] tried the "you ain't the boss of me" schtick which failed miserable,

Except, that's not what personal jurisdiction is about ... Oh no, now I said too much for the learned here, the esoteric hush-hush

Pray, elucidate.

[Dr. Caligari]

So [he] tried the "you ain't the boss of me" schtick which failed miserable,

Except, that's not what personal jurisdiction is about ... Oh no, now I said too much for the learned here, the esoteric hush-hush

In a criminal case, as this decision and the ones it cites [especially Frisbie v. Collins ] make clear, personal jurisdiction is about one thing, and one thing only: was the defendant physically present in the courtroom at the start of the trial? How the defendant got there is irrelevant (very different from the rule in civil cases).

[daddy]

In a criminal case, as this decision and the ones it cites [especially Frisbie v. Collins ] make clear, personal jurisdiction is about one thing, and one thing only: was the defendant physically present in the courtroom at the start of the trial?

Short answer: NO. Long answer: your answer is not really part of the concept of personal jurisdiction, but of its implementation. And physical presence in the courtroom is not the determining factor. Please re-read Frisbie v. Collins and Ker v. Illinois

How the defendant got there is irrelevant (very different from the rule in civil cases).

Correct! How the defendant got there is irrelevant to the concept of personal jurisdiction.

[AnOwlCalledSage]

Oh dear. We appear to have some live bait.

[wserra]

Respondent and his amici may be correct that respondent's abduction was "shocking," Tr. of Oral Arg. 40, and that it may be in violation of general international law principles. Mexico has protested the abduction of respondent through diplomatic notes . . . The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not therefore prohibit his trial in a court in the United States for violations of the criminal laws of the United States.

United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).

Go troll somewhere else.

[notorial dissent]

Pickled bait, as I suspected. Sigh!

Should that not have been "however" rather than "therefore" as a better expression of the court's view?

Since it didn't matter how the defendant got to the court, just that he was there.

[Arthur Rubin]

There is a concept of personal jurisdiction in US law. If neither served nor present within US-controlled territory, criminal prosecution usually cannot proceed.

Doesn't help either the defendant in this case, or the troll.

[daddy]

Personal jurisdiction = power granted by the state to bind certain persons in judgement.
Is this power abrogated just because an individual was brought into the courtroom against his will?
Is a baker's ability to bake bread lessened just because a customer says he doesn't consent to the prices?

[Pottapaug1938]

Personal jurisdiction = power granted by the state to bind certain persons in judgement.
Is this power abrogated just because an individual was brought into the courtroom against his will?
Is a baker's ability to bake bread lessened just because a customer says he doesn't consent to the prices?

Hey, Troll -- read wserra's post. Personal jurisdiction has nothing to do with a person's voluntary or involuntary presence in court. If you are within the boundaries, you are within the jurisdiction of the court, except perhaps if you have diplomatic immunity.

[AnOwlCalledSage]

...except perhaps if you have diplomatic immunity.

Those of us still in the motherland are now recognising that diplomatic immunity also applies even if you are not a diplomat.

[notorial dissent]

Note to troll, "personal jurisdiction" "ad personem" has to do with the court(judge), not the defendant. If your sorry ass is in the court room then the judge has "personal jurisdiction" whether or not actual jurisdiction exists is a whole other matter, but usually isn't an issue, see above point. The power to bind comes from the law.

[Gregg]

The internet is making the imbeciles easier to spot.

[Resume]

Hmmm, I wonder it it's this daddy.

https://youtu.be/lCEbYH1LNQA
Creepy Sovereign Citizen Arrested, Right To Travel