I am new here, although I have nearly every thread regarding TP assertions about the IRC.
I have also thoroughly studied Daniel Evans' FAQ, as well as Hendrickson's CtC.
Finally, I have read nearly every District and Circuit court decision regarding TP defenses.
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Evans complains that "tax protesters often claim that tax laws are written in 'legalese' that does not mean the same as normal, every-day English, but the opposite is true, as many Supreme Court decisions will affirm":
Certainly, . . . unless and until the Act defines a word and thereafter uses it as a "term".In interpreting the meaning of the words in a revenue Act, we look to the ‘ordinary, everyday senses’ of the words.
— Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174 (1993)
Once so defined, the prior common meaning of a word has been stripped away.
Such is the entire point of code defining a word -- so that it cannot be construed commonly:
As judges, it is our duty to construe legislation as it is written, not as it might be read by a layman, or as it might be understood by someone who has not even read it.
— Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480-481 (1987)
When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning.
— Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 998 (2000)
(Gee, Dan, if the IRC does not rely upon "legalese", then nothing does.)
Now, let's revisit IRC section 3401(c):
"Employee" has been a code defined term since the Revenue Act of 1942, Section 465(d).. . . the term "employee" includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term 'employee' also includes an officer of a corporation.
— IRC section 3401(c)
There is no "employee means _____" anywhere in the IRC.
Thus, the use of "includes" 3401(c) does not amplify any previous "means".
Therein, "includes" is synonomous with a restrictive "means" (see Helvering V. Morgan's).
One may reasonably conclude that the 3401(c) "includes" definition is the sole definition.
If "includes" of 26 USC 3401(c) is merely an amplifying term (as is vigorously asserted by
most on this forum), why has Congress never explicitly declared so since 1942 when "includes" was first used as the code definition of an "employee"?
Congress could have easily clarified 26 USC's rules of construction, as they did in
11 USC 102 and 28 USC 3003:
That Congress sometimes (and sometimes not) includes something in their definitions is evidence of intentionality:11 USC 102 - Rules of Construction
In this title -
(3) "includes" and "including" are not limiting.
28 USC 3003 - Rules of Construction
(a) For purposes of this chapter
(1) the terms "includes" and "including" are not limiting.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~This fact only underscores our duty to refrain from reading a phrase into the statute when
Congress has left it out.
. . . [W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.
— Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 and 78 (1983)
Evans asserts that no court has or will ever rule for a federally restrictive definition of
IRC 3401(c) "employee". I have to agree with him on that. Yet, I am not persuaded
that the courts have ruled correctly on this matter. Lower and circuit courts are often
wrong, and even occasionally deemed so by SCOTUS. (Look no further than the 2008
decision in D.C. v. Heller, which affirmed an individual right to keep and bear arms -- overturning decades of "collective right" silliness.)
So, given the above evidence for a restrictive interpretation of 3401(c) "includes",
coupled with nearly 70 years of congressional silence on clarifying rules of construction,
I would like to read any civil, reasoned, and issue-constrained replies.
Regards,
Non Mens Rea