Sentencing for Doreen Hendrickson

[notorial dissent]

But would it be an amended return. I was under the impression, perhaps mistaken, that Doreen had again filed a CTC return, which the IRS will and has already declared to be frivolous and non valid returns. So, I don't see that she is being forced to amend a return, she is being forced to make a legally valid one to begin with, something she has already been convicted of NOT doing. Am I wrong here?

[Judge Roy Bean]

But would it be an amended return. ...

Wouldn't it have to be? Can you "unfile" a return? If not, you have to amend an existing one.

[grixit]

Filing an accurate return after filing a sovcit one would be not so much amending the previous return as superceding it.

[noblepa]

But would it be an amended return. ...

Wouldn't it have to be? Can you "unfile" a return? If not, you have to amend an existing one.

Isn't it true that the IRS considers a frivolous, or otherwise invalid return, to be no return at all? I thought that, if you file a return that does not contain enough information to determine your tax liability, or is filled with TP nonsense, in the eyes of the IRS, you haven't filed a return at all and can be prosecuted for failure to file a return.

If my understanding is correct, then any return Doreen were to file now, for the tax years in question, would not be an amended return because, legally, she hadn't filed a return in the first place.

But, I've been wrong before.

[operabuff]

The IRS follows what it calls the Beard test in determining whether a document sent in by a taxpayer is a return.

“First, there must be sufficient data to calculate tax liability; second, the
document must purport to be a return; third, there must be an honest and reasonable
attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law; and fourth, the taxpayer must execute
the return under penalties of perjury.” Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 777
(1984), aff'd per curiam, 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986).

Doreen's "return" probably failed the third prong. I seem to recall that Justice filings in the case stated that her "return" was not valid. If so, it's as though no return had been filed and any return she now filed would be treated as an original return, not amended.

Superseding returns are those filed before the filing due date. So if you make a mistake on your first original return, and then send in another corrected one before April 15, it will be as though the first return was never filed. I believe there's case law that says that if a taxpayer files a timely correct superseding return following a fraudulent first return, the fraud is wiped out. This is not the case if you file an amended return after the due date attempting to correct a fraudulent original return. (That's not to say that you shouldn't bother correcting the original - the IRS may not even realize the original was fraudulent, and may treat you more leniently even if they do.) (The authority for the latter proposition is Badaracco v. Commissioner a 1984 Supreme Court opinion.

[Famspear]

To elaborate on what operabuff pointed out:

My take on Badarraco is that, in general, where a taxpayer files a false or fraudulent original income tax return (for which Internal Revenue Code section 6501 provides that the IRS may assess a related tax at any time) and the taxpayer later files a non-fraudulent amended return for the same period, a tax may be validly assessed at any time. In Badaracco, the Supreme Court stated that "§ 6501(c)(1) permits assessment at any time in fraud cases regardless of a taxpayer's later repentance. It is established that a taxpayer who submits a fraudulent return does not purge the fraud by subsequent voluntary disclosure; the fraud was committed, and the offense completed, when the original return was prepared and filed...." See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 394 (1984).

However, in Badarraco, the amended returns were filed long after the due date.

I didn't read the Supreme Court's opinion in Badaracco as necessarily differentiating between amended returns filed by the due date and amended returns filed late. However, as operabuff has explained, a different rule does appear to apply where the amended return is filed by the due date. In Service Center Advice (SCA) 1998-24 (dated May 12, 1998; released Sept. 9, 1998), the IRS Chief Counsel distinguished Badaracco and cited (among other cases) the case of Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389 (1940), for the conclusion that where a taxpayer files a fraudulent return, followed by a timely nonfraudulent amended return, the assessment period is 3 years under § 6501(a), and not the unlimited period under § 6501(c)(1).

As one commentator has stated:

Where the taxpayer files an amended return correcting a significant understatement on a fraudulent return and files it by the due date of the original return or a date permitted under an extension, the IRS takes the position that it has three years to assess, starting on the due date, or in the case of an extension, on the date the amended return is filed...."

---Theodore D. Peyser, LL.B., ''Limitations Periods, Interest on Underpayments and Overpayments, and Mitigation," U.S. Income Portfolios, Vol. 627 (4th ed. 2012), Bloomberg BNA, citing SCA 1998-24.

[grixit]

The IRS follows what it calls the Beard test in determining whether a document sent in by a taxpayer is a return.

And if it fails the Beard test, it's a bald faced lie.

[Famspear]

And if it fails the Beard test, it's a bald faced lie.

[Famspear]

The government has filed a response:

The United States of America, by and through undersigned counsel, submits the following memorandum in opposition to Defendant Doreen Hendrickson’s Amended Motion for Modification of Release Conditions (Doc. # 130). The defendant implores the Court to vacate a condition of her continued liberty: the requirement that the defendant to finally comply with Judge Edmunds’ May 2, 2007 Amendment Judgment and Order of Permanent Injunction by filing amended tax returns for 2002 and 2003. The defendant argues that this bond condition is improper under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3143 because it violates her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. As set forth below, the requirement that the defendant comply with the law by filing true and correct amended tax returns is an appropriate condition of her continued release and would not place her in peril of incriminating herself. The Court should not alter its judgment. Instead, the Court should treat this motion as a violation of the defendant’s terms of release, or, in the alternative, as the defendant’s declaration of intent not to file amended returns as required by the Court’s judgment, and order her immediate incarceration.

[ . . .]

ISSUES

1. Whether the Court’s order that the defendant comply with Judge Edmunds’ May 2, 2007 Amendment Judgment and Order of Permanent Injunction by filing amended 2002 and 2003 tax returns is an appropriate condition of bond pending execution of sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3143.

2. Whether the Court’s order that the defendant file amended 2002 and 2003 tax returns violates her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

[ . . . ]

On April 9, 2015, the Court sentenced the defendant to an 18 month term of incarceration. Rather than detain the defendant, as permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 3142, the Court allowed the defendant to remain at liberty and self-surrender to the Bureau of Prisons within 60 days. However, as a condition of release, the Court’s Judgment required that, within the first 30 days of that period, the defendant “cooperate with the IRS and file amended tax returns for 2002 and 2003.” Judgment in a Criminal Case signed 4/14/15 (Doc. # 126). The Judgment further provided that, if the defendant does not intend to comply with this requirement, “she must file with the Court a letter saying so, and the Marshal Service is to immediately detain her for incarceration.” Id. In the instant motion to modify her bond conditions, the defendant objects to the requirement that the defendant file amended tax returns within 30 days or risk incarceration.

There is nothing controversial about the provision in the Court’s judgment that requires the defendant to file amended 2002 and 2003 tax returns as a condition of her release pending execution of her sentence. This requirement is merely a more particular application of the requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(A) that the defendant not violate the law. The defendant is still subject to the May 2, 2007 order issued by Judge Edmunds that required her to file these amended returns. Violation of that order constitutes the crime of contempt. If the defendant does not file amended returns, she is in violation of federal law and therefore in violation of her conditions of release.

[. . . ]

In the instant motion, the defendant argues that the condition of release that requires her to file amended 2002 and 2003 tax returns violates her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. For years, the defendant has resisted filing these tax returns. The laundry list of claims that she has raised to avoid complying with her obligations under the tax laws was well-documented in opinions issued by Judge Edmunds and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals during the civil injunction suit. In fact, the defendant previously relied on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and lost. On April 16, 2010, Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen issued a Report and Recommendation on the government’s motion to hold the defendant and her husband in contempt for their continued failure to file amended tax returns. In that Report and Recommendation, which was later adopted by Judge Edmunds, Magistrate Judge Whalen addressed the applicability of privilege against self-incrimination and concluded that “the Fifth Amendment does not shelter these Defendants from filing amended returns that report the income earned in 2002 and 2003.” [ . . .]

This Court should conclude, as Magistrate Judge Whalen and Judge Edmunds did, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not grant the defendant a license to engage in an ongoing violation of the law. The defendant has not demonstrated a “reasonable ground to apprehend danger” to her if she files amended tax returns. Instead, her self-incrimination claims are vague and illogical.

The defendant argues that if her criminal contempt conviction is vacated and a new trial is ordered, the government could use the amended returns that she is required to submit under the terms of the Court’s judgment as evidence that her violation of Judge Edmunds’ order was willful. The defendant also submits that the government could use these returns as evidence against her if she is prosecuted for other tax crimes. However, she fails to explain how tax returns filed under these circumstances would provide any evidence of her state of mind in any hypothetical future prosecution. Willfulness – the mental state for both tax crimes and criminal contempt – is defined as a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1991). A tax return submitted to comply with a court order is a far cry from the type of voluntary conduct that constitutes willfulness. Because she would be filing these amended returns to comply with the Court’s judgment, her conduct would lack the volitional element that is the cornerstone of willful conduct. Accordingly, the returns would not be evidence of her state of mind.

Additionally, the defendant does not explain how filing amended tax returns could incriminate her if all of the information on those returns is already a matter of public record. Fifth Amendment claims often arise in the context of a taxpayer who earns income from an illegal source and is concerned that reporting that income on a return might tend to incriminate him. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1976). However, the amounts and sources of the income earned by the defendant and her husband for 2002 and 2003 are well-documented throughout the record in the civil injunction suit. Additionally, the defendant submitted two sets of tax returns for those years in purported compliance with Judge Edmunds’ order on which she reported that income. However, as Department of Justice attorney Daniel Applegate testified at trial, these returns could not be processed by the IRS because the defendant altered the jurat on one set and attached an affidavit to another. All the current order requires of the defendant is to submit returns that contain the same information as her previous attempts, only without any alterations or extraneous information that would preclude the IRS from processing them. The release condition at issue does not require the defendant to add anything to the substance of her previous tax returns; it merely prescribes the proper form. Given that the amended returns would not include any information about which the government is not already aware, any risk of incrimination from filing these returns is “of an imaginary and unsubstantial character.”

[ . . .]

The defendant’s continued failure to file amended 2002 and 2003 tax returns is a violation of her terms of release. On June 7, 2013, at the defendant’s initial appearance on the indictment in this case, Magistrate Judge Whalen entered an Order Setting Conditions of Release that specified, among other things, that “[t]he defendant must not violate federal, state or local law while on release.” Doc. # 7. The Order Setting Conditions of Release further warned the defendant that violating any release condition could result in her detention. Id. As explained above, the defendant’s contempt is an ongoing violation of federal law. Accordingly, she is in violation of her terms of release and should be remanded to custody.

Alternatively, the Court should treat the defendant’s motion as an announcement of her intent not to comply with the Court’s requirement that she file amended tax returns within 30 days of the Court’s judgment and order her immediate incarceration. If the Court is not prepared to so order at this juncture, the Court should order the defendant to appear for a hearing at which time she can make her choice known to the Court.


CONCLUSION

The Court’s requirement that the defendant file amended 2002 and 2003 tax returns is a proper application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3143. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that this condition violates her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, she has only demonstrated that she intends to continue her criminally contumacious conduct. The Court should treat this motion as a violation of the defendant’s terms of release, or, in the alternative, as the defendant’s declaration of intent not to file amended returns, and order her immediate incarceration.

Respectfully submitted,
BARBARA L. McQUADE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
By: s/ Melissa S. Siskind [ . . .]

-from GOVERNMENT’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S AMENDED MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF RELEASE CONDITIONS, docket entry 131, April 28, 2015, United States v. Doreen Hendrickson, case no. 2:13-cr-20371-VAR-LJM, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

[Famspear]

Doreen’s attorney has filed a reply:

DOREEN HENDRICKSON’S REPLY TO THE GOVERNMENT’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S AMENDED MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF RELEASE CONDITIONS

Recently, the government filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Modify her Release Conditions. Mrs. Hendrickson, through her undersigned counsel, offers this short Reply.

As the Court knows, Mrs. Hendrickson argues the condition of her continued release pending execution of her sentence requiring that she file tax returns she believes to be untruthful, constitutes a violation of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and represents a condition of release well beyond that authorized by the Bail Reform Act and, specifically, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3143.

In its Opposition, the government asserts that Mrs. Hendrickson’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated by the condition of release in question. The government does not suggest the Court may impose a condition of release that violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege. Hence, the government at least tacitly agrees with the proposition that a condition of release which violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege would be inappropriate under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3143.

The government, however, does argue that the condition of release of concern, i.e., that Mrs. Hendrickson file amended tax returns for 2002 and 2003 as ostensibly directed by Judge Edmunds, does not violate her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The government’s position/argument, however, is nonsensical.

In arguing that compliance with this condition of release does not run afoul of Mrs. Hendrickson’s Fifth Amendment privilege, the government first suggests this Court rely upon the Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Whelan in 2010 when Judge Edmunds. However, since April 16, 2010 many things have happened, including the fact that Mrs. Hendrickson has been wrongfully convicted of criminal contempt and testified at least two times in a manner inconsistent with the now compelled sworn declaration.

The most palatable manifestation of a violation of Mrs. Hendrickson’s Fifth Amendment privilege manifest itself in the prospect that Mrs. Hendrickson will seek, and hopefully secure, a new trial through the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any tax return which she is compelled to now file consistent with the directive of Judge Edmunds – and now this Court – would be a compelled statement of the accuracy of that return and, hence, a compelled statement as to the inaccuracy of any contrary position which Mrs. Hendrickson has taken in connection with the criminal case, and will take in connection with her expected retrial. Hence, there can be no question that compelling Mrs. Hendrickson to file tax returns as a condition of release implicates her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Mrs. Hendrickson firmly believes in the accuracy of her original tax filings for 2002 and 2003. In essence, Judge Edmunds (and now this Court) has ordered Mrs. Hendrickson to authoritatively declare that she previously lied under oath. [Footnote 1: Actually, unlike this Court, Judge Edmunds at least suggested Mrs. Hendrickson could qualify her compelled filings.] Such a declaration contradicts not only her trial testimony in the two trials before this Court, but also her general theory of defense against the charges at issue in this case.

In its Reply, the government states:

Because [Mrs. Hendrickson] would be filing [the required returns] to comply with the Court’s judgment, her conduct would lack the volitional element that is the cornerstone of willful conduct. Accordingly, the returns would not be evidence of her state and mind.

Government’s Opposition, p. 8. However, to comply with the Court’s Order, Mrs. Hendrickson is not permitted to qualify her statements in any way, shape or form. Therefore, absent immunity for the filing of these returns (something which the government could offer, but has not (which in and of itself suggests some likely future prosecution as outlined in Mrs. Hendrickon’s initial Motion)) [Footnote 2: The government, interestingly, has not suggested that Mrs. Hendrickson’s concerns about future prosecution are unfounded.], there are no limits on the evidentiary use that can be made of Mrs. Hendrickson’s filing of tax returns in compliance with this condition of release – a condition which, in and of itself is not an appropriate under the Bail Reform Act.

The government suggests there exists no peril to Mrs. Hendrickson in filing the compelled returns and that the directive to do so falls within the Court’s discretion. This is simply not the case. Judicial discretion as to the peril of testimony occurs when someone is simply being told to testify and suspects that what she feels she might say puts her in legal jeopardy, a situation in which it may be appropriate for an impartial judge to consider whether the fear is unfounded and the protection of the Fifth Amendment is needed. Here, Mrs. Hendrickson is being commanded – not simply to speak – but to declare herself to have previously committed perjury, not only when she filed her original returns, but when she testified before this Court at two separate trials. Clearly, the Court is directing Mrs. Hendrickson to place herself in legal jeopardy. This legal peril is inherent in the command that she testify, and is more than simply a possibility depending on what might or might not be said by some other witness in response to the normal testimonial command. Here, the Fifth Amendment protection arises automatically from the nature of the testimony that is being compelled.

A tax return is a report of the signers belief in the veracity of what is sworn to under penalties of perjury. Making one declare a belief that is contrary to one previously declared (especially a previously declared belief which the declarant believes to be truthful) makes that person declare herself to have committed perjury previously.

The government suggests that Mrs. Hendrickon’s compelled filing of returns could not later be said to have been willful, yet she is not permitted to modify or qualify her statements in any way, shape, form. However, the government’s argument misses the point. The compelled nature of the filing which might implicate whether it is filed willfully is only one variable in the Fifth Amendment equation. The more important variable is the statement of inaccuracy of prior sworn testimony contained in the compelled return. It is not only the act of filing the return that is testimonial. Here, the content contained in the compelled return is testimonial.

The government suggests that the Court has discretion to compel Mrs. Hendrickson, as a condition of release, to declare her multiple prior statement to have been perjurious. Yet, the government cites no case for this proposition, for it cannot. This is no different than if the Court were to say it would allow continued release provided Mrs. Hendrickson confessed to the crimes with which she was charged. There is no support for such a proposition.

For all of the above reasons, as well as those articulated in Mrs. Hendrickson’s original Motion, this Court must modify the conditions of release imposed on Mrs. Hendrickson to the extent such conditions run afoul of her Fifth Amendment rights.

Respectfully submitted,
CEDRONE & MANCANO, LLC
Dated: April 30, 2015 By: /s Mark E. Cedrone [ . . ]

--Filed April 30, 2015; see docket entry 134 (the occasional mis-spellings of "Hendrickson" as "Hendrickon" are in the original).

[Famspear]

....In arguing that compliance with this condition of release does not run afoul of Mrs. Hendrickson’s Fifth Amendment privilege, the government first suggests this Court rely upon the Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Whelan in 2010 when Judge Edmunds. However, since April 16, 2010 ....

Wait a minute: "....when Judge Edmunds" ..... what?? When Judge Edmunds did what? Some verbiage is missing.

However, I have to say that Mr. Cedrone is doing his job here, under some time restrictions, and is definitely providing Doreen with some value.

[LPC]

In fact, the defendant previously relied on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and lost. On April 16, 2010, Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen issued a Report and Recommendation on the government’s motion to hold the defendant and her husband in contempt for their continued failure to file amended tax returns. In that Report and Recommendation, which was later adopted by Judge Edmunds, Magistrate Judge Whalen addressed the applicability of privilege against self-incrimination and concluded that “the Fifth Amendment does not shelter these Defendants from filing amended returns that report the income earned in 2002 and 2003.”

I had wondered about that.

Requiring Doreen to file correct returns now can't be any more incriminating than it would have been when Judge Edmunds issued the original order back in 2007. (And has it really been 8 years that we've been dinking around with this nonsense?) If the 5th Amendment claim wasn't raised in the appeal from the original order (which was affirmed by the 6th Circuit), has it been waived?

Is Doreen really free to keep raising the same issue over and over and over again, ad infinitum?

[Famspear]

On Monday, May 4, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan handed Doreen yet another defeat:

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DOREEN HENDRICKSON’S AMENDED MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF RELEASE CONDITIONS (DOC. # 130).

Defendant Doreen Hendrickson (“Hendrickson”) filed an amended motion for Modification of Release Conditions (Doc. # 130). Hendrickson says the Court’s bond condition that she file amended tax returns for years 2002 and 2003 in compliance with Judge Edmunds’ Order is a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3143 and violates her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

The Motion is fully briefed and DENIED.

Hendrickson was tried and convicted of criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) for failing to comply with an injunctive court order entered by Judge Edmunds in a 2007 civil action (“Edmunds’ Order”). Edmunds’ Order required Hendrickson to file corrected tax returns for years 2002 and 2003, and refrain from filing false tax returns in the future.

Hendrickson was sentenced on April 9, 2015 to 18 months in prison. In its Judgment, the Court delayed execution of Hendrickson’s sentence and gave her 60 days to self-report to the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). The Court instructed Hendrickson to properly file amended tax returns for years 2002 and 2003 30 days after sentencing. The Judgment stated that if Hendrickson did not intend to file the corrected tax returns within the 30 days, she needed to inform the Court in writing, and the Court would direct the United States Marshal Service to immediately detain her so she can begin serving her sentence.

Hendrickson says requiring her to file 2002 and 2003 amended tax returns is an improper bond condition. She says the requirement has nothing to do with ensuring she will report to the BOP, or protecting the safety of the community.

18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3143 govern the release or detention of convicted defendants pending execution of their sentence. Under § 3143, a judicial officer shall order a person who has been found guilty of an offense detained, unless the officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person will not flee or pose a danger to the safety of another or the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a). Upon such a finding, the judicial officer shall order the release of the person in accordance with § 3142(b) or (c). Id. 18 U.S.C. Sections 3142(b) and 3142(c) require, among other things, that the person not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during the period of release. Thus, ensuring the appearance of a defendant and protecting the safety of a community are not the only “sole issue[s] of concern” in granting a defendant bond; the court must direct the person to follow the law.

The Court’s requirement that Hendrickson file the amended returns is the equivalent of the Court requiring Hendrickson to obey the law. The language of the Court’s bond condition was directly from Judge Edmunds’ Order that required Hendrickson to file amended 2002 and 2003 tax returns. An “order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.” United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947). Edmunds’ Order is valid; it has not been reversed or deemed unlawful. Despite Hendrickson’s wishes, she still has a duty to abide by Edmunds’ Order, even if she disagrees with its contents and plans to appeal her conviction. Requiring Hendrickson to follow the law - Judge Edmunds’ Order - is not an improper bond condition; it is a required condition.

The Court is not persuaded by Hendrickson’s long colloquy that requiring her to abide by the law violates her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In sum, Hendrickson says she fears prosecution, and if “compelled” by the Court to file the amended returns, the Government could use the filing against her.

The Fifth Amendment says no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, U.S. Const. amend. V. “The central standard for the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination is whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and ‘real,’ and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.” United States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir.1991). The Fifth Amendment protects a taxpayer from disclosing the source of his income, but it does not protect her from disclosing the amount of her income. Aune v. United States, 582 F.Supp. 1132, 1134 (D.C.Ariz. 1984). The privilege does not justify an outright refusal to file an income tax return. United States v. Heise, 709 F.2d 449, 450 (6th Cir. 1983).

Edmunds’ Order directs Hendrickson to report her income for 2002 and 2003. The Fifth Amendment does not prevent disclosure of that information. Hendrickson’s fear of prosecution or other collateral consequences as a result of filing the returns is misguided. She was already prosecuted and convicted for failure to file. Thus, Hendrickson should really fear prosecution or other collateral consequences as a result of failing to file the returns - the same conduct that formed the basis for her current conviction - rather than fear reprisal for actually filing them.

Hendrickson also argues that filing the amended tax returns may impact her appeal because the filings could be used as evidence of wilfulness for criminal contempt. She says:

The nature of the contempt charges that resulted in Mrs. Hendrickson's conviction - at least with respect to the allegation that she was in contempt for failing to file 2002 and 2003 returns as directed by Judge Edmunds' Order - hinge on the argument that in filing the amended returns in the manner that she did in 2010 and 2011, Mrs. Hendrickson willfully violated the Court's Order. Were Mrs. Hendrickson now to file amended returns as directed by the court, this filing could be introduced at a later proceeding as evidence proving that her amended returns filed in 2010 and 2011 were, in fact, knowingly and willfully submitted in violation of Judge Edmunds' Order, and/or were perjurious.

This argument is unpersuasive. Hendrickson’s conviction - at least with respect to the allegation that she was in contempt for failing to file 2002 and 2003 returns in accordance with Edmunds’ Order - does not hinge on her 2010 and 2011 filings. It hinges on the fact that by June 1, 2007, Hendrickson did not file the amended tax returns as directed by Judge Edmunds, and she has yet to file these returns. The Court finds it odd that Hendrickson would argue that filing the returns and actually complying with Edmunds’ Order could be used as evidence of wilfulness.

Hendrickson’s motion reveals that she believes she has a right to remain out on bond. But, “Bail after conviction is not a matter of constitutional right. It is a matter of judicial grace.” Green v. State of Me., 113 F. Supp. 253, 256 (D. Me. 1953). The Court was not required to grant Hendrickson the privilege of self-reporting in 60 days. Whether Hendrickson wants to comply with the condition that would allow her to remain on bond for 60 days rather than 30 is really up to her. She can choose to comply or not. The bottom line is this: Hendrickson has until May 9, 2015 to file her amended taxes in accordance with the Court’s Judgment.

IT IS ORDERED.

Victoria A. Roberts
United States District Judge
Dated: May 4, 2015

Oh well.

See ya later, Doreen.

[.]

4 days.

Tick, tick, tick...

[Famspear]

Maybe they'll send her to the Federal prison facility at Milan, Michigan, where Her Haughty Husband spent his most recent prison term.

[notorial dissent]

Ouch!!!! The court didn't seem to be impressed with the verbose pleading. So wonder what Doreen will do, decisions, decisions, decisions, prison time!!!!!

[ArthurWankspittle]

Saturday? Are all IRS offices open on Saturdays? I have visions of Doreen turning up at the local office on Saturday only to find it is closed.

[notorial dissent]

I think I have visions of Doreen going to prison 30 days early. I don't know if she'll blink or not, but the stupid runs wide and deep in that pair.

[noblepa]

I've got five quatloos that say that she will file the returns, but will modify the jurat to indicate that they are being filed under duress. IANAL, but I believe that such a modification renders the return invalid, so she STILL won't be in compliance with the judge's order.

Any takers?

BTW, a little off-topic, but last weekend, the ME-TV cable channel aired the Star Trek episode, "The Gamesters of Triskellion".

[NYGman]

Another win for CtC! Wonder how Pete will spin this one.