A Wingnut Returns (Jeffrey Maehr)

[wserra]

I would LOVE to see Quatloos readers take the stand and provide the evidence against his Petition where the courts obviously did NOT.

Perhaps you failed to notice that, as cited in the first two posts of this thread, first the Tax Court and then the Tenth Circuit did exactly that. Now you want us to do it again? That's like the inventor of the perpetual-motion machine, presented with the fact that his creation doesn't work, insisting on "evidence" that he's wrong.

Or perhaps you just can't read.

[Pottapaug1938]

Well... it amazes me that there is such a resistance to anyone challenging the IRS, especially where they have not provided any evidence that what this guy says is NOT true. Are all the commentators fearful that it might be true? Why would name-calling and sucking up to the courts ignorance be presented rather than the evidence? This really makes me wonder if Americans aren't really comfortable with their slavery. I'm willing to admit it isn't something most of us have ever faced, but do we condemn a guy for presenting a defense before the defense is even heard? Isn't that like fascism and tyranny being supported? Is this how we would want to be treated in defending ourselves? I would LOVE to see Quatloos readers take the stand and provide the evidence against his Petition where the courts obviously did NOT. I'm going to present it to our law club and we will be easily able to refute his claims if the law is there. Hope Quatloos readers are willing to do the same... and, by the way, using hearsay doesn't work. How about actual refutation of every claim made? Be honest, be sincere, and don't be a defrauding your readers.

You're not going to get what you want, countryguard, for the reasons set forth in the Crain v. Commissioner (737 F.2d 1417,1984) and (even more so) Wnuck v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (136 TC No. 24, 2011). Essentially, we have better things to do than try to respond to every attempt to use patently frivolous defenses in court, especially since those "defenses" have ALWAYS been rejected by all courts within the US.

[.]

I'm going to present it to our law club

I can't wait to hear what the results of that may be.

What will you do? File an amicus brief? Seems to be a little late for that.

Can anyone join your club? It sounds like lots of fun. Does having lost in court help on an application? How about multiple losses? How about multiple losses capped off by denial of cert by the Supreme Court? How about having been sanctioned by a court? Does a sanction of more than $10K count for more than a wrist-slap? Does being sanctioned by the Tax Court get extra credit? Do IRS frivolous filing penalties even count?

And since you mentioned it, there's something of an informal law club here. I'm not a lawyer, but I can think of at least a dozen lawyers who post here who have been practicing tax (and other) law for 20 or more years. As has been mentioned, they often represent clients against the evil IRS and they sometimes win.

You know, on cases that have merit. That aren't frivolous or ridiculous on their face. Unlike the junk you make silly noises about. Then, there's a bunch of CPAs involved in tax practice who post here, none of whom would agree with you.

Why is it that nobody who knows what they are doing wants to join your "law club"?

I realize that 11 questions is about 11 more than you wanted to hear, so I'll understand if you somehow never get around to answering any of them.

[fortinbras]

The May 17th 2012 decision reprinted in the initial message can be cited as:

Maehr v. CIR (10th Cir., May 17, 2012) 480 Fed.Appx. 921, 109 A.F.T.R.2d 2145, 2012 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50348, certiorari denied (March 18, 2013) _US_, 133 S.Ct 1579, 185 L.Ed.2d 583, rehearing denied (May 13, 2013) _US_, 133 S.Ct 2384, 185 L.Ed.2d 1098.


This was a Tenth Circuit decision. The comment in the initial message about Maehr being rejected by the "Seventh" circuit appears to be an error.

[LPC]

I got an email from Mr. Maehr (addressing me as "David") about the "incredibly distorting gymnastics" in my FAQ, which is a "confusing and convoluted bunch of crap."

He has provided me with a link to his U.S. Supreme Court petition, which listed 20 (twenty) issues for decision, and is a fairly good tax denial checklist.

But in the email, the only specific "evidence" he provided were citations to some treasury directives which he believes "cancelled" the IRS.

Which got me to thinking. If the IRS is not an agency of the federal government, then why does the US Treasury pay the salaries of the millions of people who work for the IRS (or at least think they're working for the IRS)? And why do those millions of people collect tax money that is then paid to the US Treasury?

The only possible answer is that what we know as the "US Treasury" is also not part of the United States government, but some sort of fraudulent criminal enterprise.

But if that's true, then why does the "US Treasury" keep paying for things like military salaries and Social Security benefits?

And how could a fraud like this go on for hundreds of years without anyone ever noticing? Even supposedly enlightened people like Joseph Banister and Sherry Jackson, who both worked for the IRS, both *thought* they were working for the US government.

It really gets very confusing. Easier to believe in shape-shifting reptiles as world leaders.

[Famspear]

I got an email from Mr. Maehr (addressing me as "David") about the "incredibly distorting gymnastics" in my FAQ, which is a "confusing and convoluted bunch of crap."

Based on what I see of Mr. Maehr's laughable ramblings about tax law, it would not surprise me if many of the things that make perfect sense to most people would appear, to Mr. Maehr, as being "gymnastics" or as being "confusing and convoluted." He appears to be hopelessly confused.

Mr. Maehr is an arrogant know-nothing. He should do himself and everyone else a favor: leave the analysis of the law -- especially something as complex as U.S. federal tax law -- to those individuals who are educationally and psychologically suited to the study of law.

[Pottapaug1938]

I have this mental image of Mr. Maehr sitting in his chair, stunned, while he rereads the papers informing him that certiorari was being denied in his case. I also picture his buddies standing over him and assuring him that this happened only because the Supreme Court is corrupt, and is afraid to rule against the IRS because the justices don't want to get called in for tax audits.

[Kestrel]

It is patently unjust, unconscionable and unfair to force people to offer up all their wages as pure “profit” when there are ample “costs” related to the production of labor.

I have to shake my head every time one of these fools goes off the deep end about Gross Income and says the IRS treats wages as "pure profit." If that was true, Taxable Income would equal Gross Income. There would be no deductions to arrive at Adjusted Gross Income, no standard deductions, and no itemized deductions before arriving at Taxable Income.

[operabuff]

Which got me to thinking. If the IRS is not an agency of the federal government, then why does the US Treasury pay the salaries of the millions of people who work for the IRS (or at least think they're working for the IRS)? And why do those millions of people collect tax money that is then paid to the US Treasury?

Only about 100,000 people work for the IRS. Those millions you're talking about must be the ones thinking they're working for the IRS.

[The Observer]

Which got me to thinking. If the IRS is not an agency of the federal government, then why does the US Treasury pay the salaries of the millions of people who work for the IRS (or at least think they're working for the IRS)? And why do those millions of people collect tax money that is then paid to the US Treasury?

Only about 100,000 people work for the IRS. Those millions you're talking about must be the ones thinking they're working for the IRS.

Shhhhhhh! That is part of the evil conspiracy. There are actually millions of people covertly working for the IRS. The other 100,000 really don't work for the IRS, they are just there to look good.

[The Observer]

JEFFREY T. MAEHR,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE; GINGER L. WRAY;
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Respondents - Appellees.

Release Date: FEBRUARY 08, 2016


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT/*/

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges./**/

Petitioner Jeffrey Thomas Maehr did not pay his federal income taxes from 2003 to 2006 and still owes the IRS the amount of his unpaid liabilities for these years. See Maehr v. C.I.R., 480 F. App'x 921 (10th Cir. 2012). This current lawsuit stems from the IRS's attempt to collect on these liabilities. Namely, Petitioner seeks to quash a summons the IRS issued to Wells Fargo Bank that would require it to hand over information relating to "any account [over which Petitioner] has check signing authority or right of withdrawal." But we are unable to reach the merits of Petitioner's motion because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this case.

Petitioner alleges in his Motion to Quash that he can bring such a motion because he "is the person[] who is identified in the description of the records contained in the [s]ummons," but he does not identify any authority to support this assertion. The only relevant authority that he can potentially rely on is 26 U.S.C. section 7609. Subject to certain exceptions, this statute mandates that when the IRS issues a summons to a third party to produce another person's records, the IRS must give notice to "any person (other than the person summoned) who is identified in the summons." 26 U.S.C. section 7609(a). The practical effect of this statute is to alert a taxpayer when the IRS is collecting his or her records from another source so that the taxpayer has an opportunity to challenge the summons. For this reason, section 7609 grants "the person entitled to notice of a summons" -- the taxpayer -- a limited "right to begin a proceeding to quash such summons." Id. section 7609(b)(2)(A).

At first glance, section 7609 would seemingly allow Petitioner to bring a Motion to Quash the summons issued to Wells Fargo Bank. But this section specifically states that it does not apply to a summons "issued in aid of the collection of . . . an assessment made or judgment rendered against the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued." Id. section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). The summons the IRS issued to Wells Fargo Bank was clearly in aid of the collection of Petitioner's assessed tax liabilities. Thus, the IRS was not required to give notice to Petitioner pursuant to section 7609 that it had issued a summons to Wells Fargo Bank, and as a result Petitioner is not a "person who is entitled to notice of a summons." Id. section 7609(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). He therefore cannot invoke the protections of section 7609 to quash the summons.

Petitioner's inability to utilize section 7609 is fatal to his case, for we have held that the motion to quash provision of section 7609 is jurisdictional in nature as it represents a limited waiver of the government's sovereign immunity. Faber v. United States, 921 F.2d 1118, 1119 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that "jurisdiction ends" when "[t]he government's waiver of sovereign immunity [under section 7609(b)(2)] ends"); see also 26 U.S.C. section 7609(h)(1) ("The United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any proceeding [to quash a summons]." (emphasis added)). Put differently, because the government has specifically indicated that section 7609 does not apply to a taxpayer in Petitioner's situation -- that is, when a summons has been issued to collect on the taxpayer's assessed liabilities -- the government has not waived its sovereign immunity in a way that would allow Petitioner to bring a suit against it to quash a summons. And because the government has not waived its sovereign immunity, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying merits of Petitioner's motion. Faber, 921 F.2d at 1119 ("[A]ny exercise of a court's jurisdiction over the government depends on the government's consent.").

The magistrate judge initially assigned to this case also ruled that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking, albeit for a different reason. He noted that Petitioner had not brought his Motion to Quash within twenty days after he had received notice of the summons, which is a filing defect that precludes jurisdiction under section 7609. See 26 U.S.C. section 7609(b)(2)(A)-(B); Faber, 921 F.2d at 1120 ("Because Faber filed his motion to quash . . . more than twenty days after the IRS gave notice[,] the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his motion."). For this same reason, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction. 1 But because Petitioner was not even entitled to a notice of the summons in the first place, we need not worry about whether he satisfied the twenty-day filing requirement: he was not subject to the time constraints of section 7609 since he had no right to begin a proceeding to quash the summons. The mistaken reasoning of the magistrate judge and district court, however, is insignificant because "[w]e review the district court's order dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo." Grynberg v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 805 F.3d 901, 905 (10th Cir. 2015). We thus reach the same ultimate outcome and hold that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of Petitioner's Motion to Quash.

On a related note, Petitioner recently filed a document with this Court entitled "Notice of Additional Defendant and Motion for Equitable Estoppel." He submitted this motion after the IRS began levying six pieces of his property -- including his Wells Fargo Bank account -- in January 2016 while his current appeal seeking to quash the summons issued to Wells Fargo Bank was pending. From what we can make of this motion, he asks us to do three main things: (1) give him leave to assert claims for damages against the IRS so that he can be compensated for the levies the IRS issued on the six pieces of property, (2) add as defendants the IRS employee who issued the notices of levy and two of the banks that acquiesced to the levies, and (3) appoint him an attorney in this case since he is proceeding in forma pauperis.

We deny Petitioner's requests because these issues were not raised in the district court. Petitioner's sole reason for filing the initial lawsuit was to determine whether the summons the IRS issued to Wells Fargo Bank should be quashed. This issue is entirely distinct from whether the IRS could actually levy his property. And because these issues are distinct, it would be improper for us to adjudicate these new grievances even though they occurred just recently. As we have repeatedly stated, we are not a court of first review. E.g., Hinde v. Hot Sulphur Springs, Colo., 482 F.2d 829, 834 (10th Cir. 1973) ("[W]e are not a trial court and . . . a case cannot be presented de novo on appeal.").

We also deny Petitioner's request for appointment of counsel for another reason. Namely, giving him a lawyer would do him no good because he filed this case frivolously. See 28 U.S.C. section 1915(e)(1) ("The court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel." (emphasis added)). Petitioner has continuously utilized the judicial system (he claims he "has now been in at least [twelve] courts") to try to avoid paying his underlying tax liabilities even though the courts have repeatedly concluded that his claims are without merit. See, e.g., Maehr v. United States, No. 8:08CV190, 2009 WL 2507457, at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 13, 2009) (concluding that Petitioner's "arguments are without merit and the court will not waste time addressing these frivolous claims"); Maehr v. United States, No. 3:08-MC-00067-W, 2008 WL 2705605, at *2 (W.D.N.C. July 10, 2008) (concluding that Petitioner's arguments are "wholly without merit"). This pattern remains true in this current lawsuit: Petitioner has presented no issue that would have a genuine chance of succeeding on the merits and is simply wasting judicial resources. And even if we were to give counsel to Petitioner, the district court still lacks the necessary subject matter jurisdiction to consider his Motion to Quash. Appointing counsel to represent Petitioner would thus be useless, and we deny his "Notice of Additional Defendant and Motion for Equitable Estoppel" in its entirety.

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge

/*/ This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

/**/ After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument.

FOOTNOTES:

/1/ The district court originally referred Petitioner's case to the magistrate judge "for all purposes[,] . . . including rulings on the Motion to Quash," and the magistrate judge thus issued an apparent "final" order dismissing the case. The district court only came into the picture afterward when Petitioner, instead of appealing directly to this Court, filed a motion in the district court challenging the magistrate judge's ruling and asking that the district court recuse the magistrate judge. We note that the magistrate judge had no authority to issue a final order dismissing this proceeding -- he had only the authority to propose to the district court that it should dismiss the case. United States v. Jones, 581 F.2d 816, 817-18 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Strong v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913-14 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that a magistrate judge should issue a report and recommendation when ruling on a motion to quash an IRS summons). Nonetheless, because the district court ultimately reviewed the magistrate judge's decision anyway in response to Petitioner's motion and held that the magistrate judge was correct, we choose to treat the magistrate judge's order as a proposed disposition and the district court's orders as final, appealable orders. See United States v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]e think it within our discretion to construe the magistrate's order as a proposed disposition and the district court order as an adoption of the magistrate's proposal.").

[The Observer]

In a shocking development, Maehr won in his appeal to the 10th Circuit. Of course, the reason he won was because he had uncharacteristically included a valid argument along with his frivolous gibberish. I am sure this was a result of him failing to review his appeal carefully for valid arguments. The question now is how Maehr will be viewed by other TPs. Will they recoil in vile disgust because he compromised on his principles and submitted a valid argument? Will Maehr's website be shunned and hacked? And will he get hauled into a Denny's Common Law Court for contempt and be forced to watch as his Grand Slam breakfast gets tossed into the parking lot?


JEFFREY T. MAEHR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JOHN KOSKINEN, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE;
JOHN VENCATO, REVENUE AGENT; GINGER WRAY,
REVENUE AGENT; JEREMY WOODS, DISCLOSURE SPECIALIST;
WILLIAM SOTHEN, REVENUE AGENT; GARY MURPHY, REVENUE AGENT;
THERESA GATES, PROGRAM MANAGER; SHARISSE TOMPKINS,
DISCLOSURE MANAGER; CAROLYN W. COLVIN, SSA ACTING ADMINISTRATOR;
WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-100,
Defendants - Appellees.

Release Date: OCTOBER 20, 2016


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-00512-LTB)
(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT/*/

Before KELLY, McKAY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

Appellant Jeffrey Maehr appeals the district court's dismissal of his pro se complaint as legally frivolous.

In his complaint, Appellant challenges both the assessment of unpaid income tax liabilities against him and the manner in which the government is seeking to collect these unpaid liabilities.

We agree with the district court that Appellant's challenges to his underlying tax liabilities are frivolous. Appellant has raised these same arguments before, and we have rejected them before. See, e.g., Maehr v. IRS, 480 F. App'x 921, 923 (10th Cir. 2012). The cases and statutes cited by Appellant do not change this analysis. We thus affirm the dismissal of all of Appellant's challenges to the validity of the previously adjudicated determination that he is liable for unpaid income taxes.

Most of Appellant's challenges to the government's collection efforts are also legally frivolous. For instance, this court has previously rejected as frivolous the argument that the IRS is only authorized to levy the property of government employees, see James v. United States, 970 F.2d 750, 755 n.9 (10th Cir. 1992), and Appellant's argument that his Social Security retirement benefits cannot be levied under 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) ignores the fact that this provision is expressly superseded by 26 U.S.C. section 6334(c) in the tax-collection context. Appellant's reliance on 26 U.S.C. section 6331(h) is also misplaced. This statute permits a levy of up to fifteen percent on certain payments listed in section 6334(a) that would otherwise be completely exempt from levy; it places no limitations on the government's authority to levy property that falls outside the express protections of section 6334(a), including Social Security retirement benefits. The allegations in Appellant's complaint are also insufficient to establish a meritorious legal claim for relief against Wells Fargo based on its role in the levies placed on Appellant's accounts.

However, we are persuaded that Appellant's complaint raises one potentially meritorious claim for relief relating to the manner in which the government is seeking to collect his unpaid tax liabilities. Appellant alleges that the government has placed two levies on the bank account where he receives his disability payments from the Veterans' Administration, seeking seizure of all funds from this account despite the fact that the money in this account comes almost entirely from VA disability payments that are statutorily exempt from levy. See 26 U.S.C. section 6334(a)(10).

In their brief on appeal, Appellees argue there are two reasons why we can affirm the dismissal of this claim as frivolous: (1) the IRS did not place a direct levy on any exempt VA disability payments; and (2) even if the IRS is improperly levying exempt disability payments, "'the only remedy available to the taxpayer would be full payment of the assessment of his tax liability followed by a suit for refund in district court.'" (Br. at 13 (quoting Marvel v. United States, 548 F.2d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1977)) (brackets omitted).)

We address the second of these arguments first. In Marvel, we considered a business's request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the IRS from levying on the business's assets during the pendency of a district court lawsuit for refund of a partial payment of employment taxes. We noted that the Anti-Injunction Act appears on its face to prevent any such injunctive relief: "Except as provided in sections 6121(a) and (c), 6213(a), and 7426(a) and (b)(1), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person. . . ." 26 U.S.C. section 7421(a). We then noted that this provision had been subject to "a long and variable history of judicial construction ranging from strict enforcement to equation with the ordinary judicial standard for equitable relief." Marvel, 548 F.2d at 297. Most recently, however, the Supreme Court had employed a strict construction of this Act, recognizing only a narrow exception applicable where the taxpayer demonstrates "'that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail' and that 'equity jurisdiction otherwise exists.'" Id. (quoting Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)). Given "the literal wording of the Act, the strict pattern of construction adopted by the Supreme Court, and the great deference afforded by the Supreme Court to the government's interest in the prompt collection and enforcement of taxes," we refused to recognize any other exception to the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 300. We then held that the business had failed to satisfy the demanding requirements of the Williams Packing exception to the Act, and we thus held that the district court had properly denied the requested injunctive relief. Id. at 300-01.

As for the language from Marvel that Appellees quote in their brief, this language relates to the jurisdiction of the tax court in refund cases involving the partial payment of employment or excise taxes, and it has no clear applicability here. We also note that Appellees' brief ignores the fact that Appellant's complaint sought relief other than injunctive relief, and they have not addressed whether Appellant could potentially obtain other relief for the allegedly illegal levying of the bank account where Appellant's VA disability benefits are deposited.

However, Marvel's broader holding -- that the Anti-Injunction Act prevents injunctive relief unless the plaintiff can satisfy the demanding Williams Packing exception -- is still at issue in determining whether or not Appellant can obtain injunctive relief for this claim. And on this point, there is an unresolved question regarding the possible distinction between directly levying exempt funds and placing a levy on the bank account where such funds are deposited.

If the IRS had placed a direct levy on Appellant's VA disability benefits, we have little doubt that Appellant would have been able to satisfy the Williams Packing test and obtain injunctive relief. We see no possibility of the government prevailing on the merits in such a case, and a disabled veteran will likely be able to show that he will suffer irreparable injury if the government is not enjoined from illegally levying the VA benefits on which he relies for his maintenance and survival. See Comm'r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 627 (1976) (stating that the second prong of the Williams Packing test is satisfied if "the taxpayer shows that he would otherwise suffer irreparable injury"). However, here the government has not directly levied Appellant's VA benefits, and it suggests that it may do indirectly what it may not do directly -- that it may wait until exempt VA disability benefits have been directly deposited into Appellant's bank account and then promptly obtain them through a levy on all funds in the bank account, despite their previously exempt status. The government cites no authority to support this argument, and the few cases we have found adopting such a rule, see, e.g., Calhoun v. United States, 61 F.3d 918 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision); United States v. Coker, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1301-02 (S.D. Ala. 2014); Hughes v. IRS, 62 F. Supp. 2d 796, 800-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), have not considered whether this result is consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Porter Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962), or with 38 U.S.C. section 5301's prohibition against the levy of veterans' benefit payments either before or after receipt by a beneficiary.

We REVERSE AND REMAND for the district court to consider Appellant's non-frivolous legal claim that the IRS has improperly levied exempt VA disability benefits by placing a levy on all funds in the bank account where Appellant's disability benefits are deposited. In so doing, we express no opinion on the ultimate resolution of this claim or on the unresolved questions regarding the availability of the types of relief Appellant has sought or may seek in an amended complaint addressing only this claim. We AFFIRM the dismissal of all other claims and arguments as legally frivolous. Appellant's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is GRANTED. All other pending motions are DENIED.

Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge

//*// This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

[Jamie0331]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Maehr, Jeffrey Thomas, Pro se, |
|
Petitioner |
|
vs. | Case No: 12-6169
| Praecipe to the Clerk
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, |
|
Respondent |
YOU WILL: Explain to the Justices and to Petitioner why the office of the Clerk made the
assumption that the United States was a party to this action. And, place on the record the Clerk’s
office’s authority to bring an unnamed party into this action, practice of law, causing trespass
upon Petitioner’s rights.
Motion for ORDER to Intervener the United States Government Solicitor General,
Counsel of Record, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.
BACKGROUND
2. Petitioner was granted Certiorari on or about September 6, 2012, with action number docketed
on first entry, and response opportunity offered to Respondent.
3. On October 29, 2012, the Court’s Clerk sent Orders requiring alterations in Petitioner’s action
due to denial of in Forma Pauperis application. Petitioner sent Motion for Reconsideration of in
Forma Pauperis, Application for extended time, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 55
a. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees the Internal Revenue Service is
taxing Petitioner, and all Americans so taxed, outside lawful constitutional taxation
means, that of direct or indirect taxes, and is unlawful and illegal.
b. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees Internal Revenue Service is
unlawfully taxing wages, salary and compensation of private individuals as “income,”
when such wages, salary and compensation, in fact, are not lawful income.
c. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees that lawful “income” includes a
corporate profit, and unearned wealth.
d. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees that any such lawful “income”
must be taxed either directly (apportioned) or indirectly (uniformly) according to
constitutional parameters for taxation.
e. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees Internal Revenue Service has
been unlawfully coercing Petitioner and all private Americans to file a bootleg 1040 form,
not required to be filed by Internal Revenue Code.
f. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees Internal Revenue Service has
unlawfully been using the name “Internal Revenue Service,” or “IRS” to represent itself to
sovereign state citizens.
Who is the wingnut?

[Famspear]

Who is the wingnut?

Who is which wingnut?

The wingnut who is the main subject of this thread is Jeffrey Thomas Maehr.

If you're asking for the name of the wingnut who wrote the gibberish in the immediately preceding post, the answer is: I don't know.

PS: It's unclear whether the above-posted gibberish was ever filed in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Maehr v. Commissioner, case no. 12-6169. The most recent entry on the docket in that case is dated May 13, 2013 (where Maehr's petition for rehearing was denied).

[morrand]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Maehr, Jeffrey Thomas, Pro se, Petitioner
vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent

Case No: 12-6169

Praecipe to the Clerk
[...]
2. Petitioner was granted Certiorari on or about September 6, 2012, with action number docketed
on first entry, and response opportunity offered to Respondent. ...

Who is the wingnut?

No. 12-6169
Title:
Jeffrey Thomas Maehr, Petitioner
v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Docketed: September 11, 2012
Linked with 12A489
Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Case Nos.: (11-9019)
Decision Date: May 17, 2012
Rehearing Denied: June 8, 2012

~~~Date~~~ ~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Sep 6 2012 Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due October 11, 2012)
Sep 26 2012 Waiver of right of respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to respond filed.
Oct 4 2012 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of October 26, 2012.
Oct 29 2012 The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is denied. Petitioner is allowed until November 19, 2012, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
Nov 6 2012 Motion for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by petitioner.
[...]
Dec 10 2012 Motion for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by petitioner DENIED.
Feb 14 2013 Petitioner complied with order of October 29, 2012.
Feb 28 2013 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of March 15, 2013.
Mar 18 2013 Petition DENIED.
Apr 11 2013 Petition for Rehearing filed.
Apr 23 2013 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of May 9, 2013.
May 13 2013 Rehearing DENIED.

Gee, I wonder.

[notorial dissent]

Kind of really really old news at this point. He lost at trial level, mostly, he lost at appeals, and it doesn't sound like he ever tried beyond that. I wonder if he prevailed on the issue?

[Jamie0331]

a. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees the Internal Revenue Service is
taxing Petitioner, and all Americans so taxed, outside lawful constitutional taxation
means, that of direct or indirect taxes, and is unlawful and illegal.
b. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees Internal Revenue Service is
unlawfully taxing wages, salary and compensation of private individuals as “income,”
when such wages, salary and compensation, in fact, are not lawful income.
c. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees that lawful “income” includes a
corporate profit, and unearned wealth.
d. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees that any such lawful “income”
must be taxed either directly (apportioned) or indirectly (uniformly) according to
constitutional parameters for taxation.
e. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees Internal Revenue Service has
been unlawfully coercing Petitioner and all private Americans to file a bootleg 1040 form,
not required to be filed by Internal Revenue Code.
f. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees Internal Revenue Service has
unlawfully been using the name “Internal Revenue Service,” or “IRS” to represent itself to
sovereign state citizens.
g. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees Internal Revenue Service has
been acting as an “agency” of the United States when it is not such an agency.
h. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees it has unlawfully assessed
Petitioner (and any American so “assessed” to date), outside 26 CFR § 301.6203-1.3.
Page 5 of 9

[Famspear]

a. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees the Internal Revenue Service is
taxing Petitioner, and all Americans so taxed, outside lawful constitutional taxation
means, that of direct or indirect taxes, and is unlawful and illegal.
b. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees Internal Revenue Service is
unlawfully taxing wages, salary and compensation of private individuals as “income,”
when such wages, salary and compensation, in fact, are not lawful income.
c. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees that lawful “income” includes a
corporate profit, and unearned wealth.
d. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees that any such lawful “income”
must be taxed either directly (apportioned) or indirectly (uniformly) according to
constitutional parameters for taxation.
e. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees Internal Revenue Service has
been unlawfully coercing Petitioner and all private Americans to file a bootleg 1040 form,
not required to be filed by Internal Revenue Code.
f. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees Internal Revenue Service has
unlawfully been using the name “Internal Revenue Service,” or “IRS” to represent itself to
sovereign state citizens.
g. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees Internal Revenue Service has
been acting as an “agency” of the United States when it is not such an agency.
h. Intervener, Solicitor General of the United States, agrees it has unlawfully assessed
Petitioner (and any American so “assessed” to date), outside 26 CFR § 301.6203-1.3.
Page 5 of 9

Baloney. The Solicitor General of the United States agrees to no such things.

[Judge Roy Bean]

Ah, yes. This one smells of a multi-page 'unrebutted affidavit stands as true' garbage.

[Jamie0331]

Really! Prove not? Are really sure?