PH is starting to really lose it. Check out the Response to the 2d Motion for Contempt.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION·
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §
Plaintiff,
v.
PETER ERIC HENDRICKSON and
DOREEN M. HENDRICKSON,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:06-CV-11753
Judge Nancy G. Edmunds
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CONTEMPT [DOCKET #60]
We respond in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion. The discovery order involved was issued pursuant to a judgment that we have demonstrated to have been induced by false representations to the Court in our recent Motion to Vacate [Docket #58]. Further, we have demonstrated that the Court lacked jurisdiction in the matter ab initio, and the judgment suffers from numerous additional flaws also rendering it void. As such, it grounds no claims for Plaintiff of any kind, including that with which Plaintiff's Motion is concerned:
"A "void" judgment, as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken thereunder, ... " Fritts v. Krugh, Supreme Court of Michigan, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich.
97 (1958).
"But if [a court] act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a remedy sought in opposition to them, even prior to a reversal. They constitute no justification, and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered in law as trespassers." Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328,340,26 U.S. 328, 340, 7 L. Ed. 164 (1828)
Plaintiff has argued in response to our Motion with such absurdities as that the vacating of a void judgment is time-barred, and by suggesting that if once a Court has been induced to issue a judgment not actually supported by evidence, and in favor of a party that has engaged in misrepresentations in inducing the judgment, and in violation of due process, well, that's that,
and too bad. This is entirely in keeping with the character of its behavior throughout its vexatious assault upon us-- that is, it is flatly and knowingly defiant of the law:
"Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the
subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process."
Klugh v. U.S., 620 F.Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985). Also see FRCP Rule 60(b)(4).
"A "void" judgment... . .. is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack. No statute of
limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not
res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights long
been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen old wound and once more
probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had never been." Fritts
v. Krugh, Supreme Court of Michigan, 92 N.W.2d 604,354 Mich. 97 (1958).
"[Jurisdiction] must be considered and decided, before any court can move one further
step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." State of
Rhode Island v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 37 US 657, (1838). (Emphasis added.)
"This Court holds that 26 U.S.C. § 7401 requirements constitute facts essential to jurisdiction. The failure to prove jurisdictional facts when specifically denied is fatal to the maintenance of this action." United States v. One 1972 Cadillac, 355 F.Supp. 513, 514-15 (E.D.Ky.1973). See also United States v. Isaac, 968 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1992)
"[O]ne cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court to enforce private rights, or
maintain a civil action for the enforcement of such rights, unless one has in an individual or representative capacity some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. This interest is generally spoken of as 'standing' ... " Bowie v. Arder, 441 Mich 23,42-43; 490 NW2d 568 (1992)
(See also Solomon v. Lewis, 184 Mich App 819, 822; 459 NW2d 505 (1989), Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 (1992). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3):
Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. (Emphasis added.)
"A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking. Bradbury v. DenniS, 310 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 US. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963). The party invoking the jurisdiction of the court has the duty to establish that federal jurisdiction does exist, Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969), but, since the courts of the United States are courts of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against its existence. City of Lawton, Okla. v. Chapman, 257 F.2d 601 (lOth Cir. 1958). Thus, the party invoking the federal court's jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. Becker v. Angle, 165 F.2d 140 (10th cir. 1947).
"If the parties do not raise the question of lack of jurisdiction, it is the duty of the federal
court to determine the matter sua sponte. Atlas Lifo Insurance Co. v. W. 1. Southern Inc.,
306 US. 563, 59 S.Ct. 657, 83 L.Ed. 987 (1939); Continental Mining and Milling Co. v. Migliaccio, 16 F.R.D. 217 (D.C. Utah 1954). Therefore, lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived and jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a federal court by consent, inaction or stipulation. California v. LaRue, 409 US. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Riverview State Bank, 217 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1955)." Basso v. Utah Power and Light, 495 F.2d 906 (10th Circuit, 1974).
As noted, Plaintiff has never produced a scintilla of evidence of any debt owed by us to it, and this is plainly the foundational requirement of its entire Complaint. The several pieces of paper produced by others, on which it is purported that payments in certain amounts were made to us, and on which it is purported that these payments were of a peculiar variety which possibly
give rise to a claim by Plaintiff to a "piece of the action" do not qualify as evidence. This is explicitly so by statutory provision (26 USC §§6201(d) and 7401), as well as by simple common
sense and the federal rules of evidence concerning hearsay. Further, all were explicitly rebutted.
These pieces of paper are of no more significance than would be those we persuaded our
neighbor to produce listing all payments he had made to Plaintiff last year and declaring them to
have been payments of "Hendrickson-bucks". Could we sue for our "piece of the action" based
on that declaration?
If that neighbor had withheld part of a payment he owed to Plaintiff and sent it to us instead, as a deposit in escrow against what Plaintiff would owe us if our neighbor's payments to it were, in fact, "Hendrickson-bucks", and Plaintiff had rebutted the characterization of our neighbor's payments as "Hendrickson-bucks", demanded that withheld property from us, and been given it, would we have standing to bring a subsequent suit against Plaintiff to force it to
return that money to us, on the grounds that we made a mistake in sending it to Plaintiff, and
based on the "evidence" of our neighbor's "Hendrickson-bucks" declarations?
Would we be entitled to summary judgment in our favor in the face of Plaintiff's rebuttal of those declarations? Would we have grounds based on that "evidence" to have Plaintiff enjoined to declare over its own signature that our neighbor's payments to it were, in fact, "Hendrickson-bucks", and to reveal to us the details of its finances so as to better enable us to collect its "debt" to us, so established?
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing points of law, fact and reasoning, Plaintiffs Motion should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of June, 2010.
