TP Tries Everything To Get Sanctions

[The Observer]

MARY LYNN COLLARD,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (IRS),
Defendant.

Release Date: AUGUST 12, 2010

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISI
ON

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

After reviewing Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and conducting a de novo review of those parts of the Findings and Conclusions to which objections have been made, I am of the opinion that the Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and they are accepted as the Findings and Conclusions of the Court.

For the reasons stated in the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation, Plaintiff Collard's Motion to Remand, filed May 11, 2010 (doc. 9), is DENIED and the United States' Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), filed May 20, 2010 (doc. 13), is GRANTED. Plaintiff is hereby SANCTIONED in the amount of $ 300 for filing frivolous motions and PROHIBITED from filing any future action in this Court until she pays the $ 300 monetary sanction previously imposed in this case. If she attempts to file another action in this Court without providing proof that she has paid the $ 300 sanction, the submission will be docketed for administrative purposes only and immediately closed after placing a copy of this order in the file. No other action will be taken on non-compliant submissions. If an action filed by Plaintiff is removed or transferred to this Court, she will have fourteen days from the opening of the case in this Court to submit the proof of payment. If she fails to timely provide proof of payment, the removed or transferred case will be summarily closed.

Plaintiff is also WARNED that she may be sanctioned further if she continues to pursue frivolous claims, contentions, and arguments, or to otherwise abuse the litigation process. Sanctions may include an order that she pay a monetary sanction to the clerk of court and/or restrictions on her ability to file actions or motions without first obtaining leave of court to do so. By separate judgment, this action will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED this 12 day of August, 2010.

Barbara M. G. Lynn
United States District Judge
Northern District of Texas

Pretrial Management

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to Special Order No. 3-251, this case has been referred for pretrial management, including the determination of non-dispositive motions and issuance of findings of fact and recommendations on dispositive issues. Before the Court are Plaintiff Collard's Motion to Remand ("Mot. Remand"), filed May 11, 2010 (doc. 9), and the United States' Motion to Dismiss, ("Def.'s Mot.") filed May 20, 2010 (doc. 13). Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the motion to remand should be DENIED, and the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction should be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

After action by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to collect her 2004 tax liability, Plaintiff requested a collection due process ("CDP") and/or equivalent hearing. (See Ex. D-104 attached to Verified Orig. Pet. ("Compl.").) On February 8, 2010, the IRS Appeals office sent her a letter asking her to amend her hearing request to provide a legitimate reason for the request and withdraw her frivolous reason or to withdraw her request entirely, but Plaintiff did not respond. See id. On March 6, 2010, the IRS sent her a letter stating that it was disregarding her request for a CDP hearing as permitted by IRC section 6330(g) because her reasons for the request were frivolous and/or reflective of a desire to delay or impede the administration of federal tax laws. Id. The March 6, 2010 letter expressly advised her that collection efforts could proceed as if she had not requested a hearing, and that she could either contact the Collection office with any legitimate issues or request an equivalent hearing within a year of her "CDP Lien and/or Levy Notice" to discuss legitimate issues. Id.

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an action in state court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief regarding her tax status and her tax liability for 2004. (See Compl. at 11-12.) She also appeared to challenge the government's refusal to terminate its "levy/lien process" in response to her requested CDP hearing. (See Ex. D-104; Mot. Remand at 2-3.) The United States removed the action on April 16, 2010, contending that this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331 and 1340. (See Notice of Removal paragraph 3.) Plaintiff thereafter moved to remand the action to state court, and Defendant moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2) and (6).

II. MOTION TO REMAND

Plaintiff urges the Court to remand this case to state court because it presents no federal question. (Mot. Remand at 2-6.) The United States contends that it properly removed the action under 28 U.S.C. section 1441 and 1442. (Resp. Opp'n Mot. Remand ("Def.'s Resp." at 1-2.)

State civil actions are generally removable when the federal court would have original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. section 1441(a). 1 A district court's original jurisdiction is of two types: federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. section 1331, 1332. Federal question jurisdiction exists in "all civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. section 1331. Diversity jurisdiction exists in all civil actions where there is complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000.00 exclusive of interests and costs. 28 U.S.C. section 1332. "The removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper." Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2003). Further, "any doubt about the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand." Gasch v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2007).

In this case, Plaintiff challenges her federal tax liability. Federal tax issues are properly removed under section 1441(a) even when the plaintiff pleads a claim under state law. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darve Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312-15 (2005). Because 28 U.S.C. section 1340 grants federal courts original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal tax laws, this Court has original jurisdiction over the action filed by Plaintiff. See Florance v. United States, No. 3:09CV-1732-B, 2009 WL 5173956, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2009). The case was therefore properly removed under section 1441(a). See id. (denying similar motion to remand in nearly identical case for same reasons). 2 Further, state actions against the United States or its agencies or officers for acts related to "the collection of revenue" may be removed under section 1442(a)(1). This action was also properly removed under section 1442(a) because Plaintiff "is simply attempting to thwart efforts of the United States, through the IRS, to collect revenue it believes is owed." See Flowers v. United States, No. G-06-484, 2006 WL 3147332, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2006) (recommendation of Mag. J.), accepted by 2006 WL 3479074 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2006). The United States has carried its burden to show that the action was properly removed.

Plaintiff argues that this action must be remanded to state court because she pursues state trust issues, tax issues are not federal questions, and the United States is the de facto plaintiff in the state action and therefore cannot remove the case. (See Mot. Remand at 3-6.) She argues that if the United States "wants to try 'federal income tax' matters in the federal court then [it] needs to file the lawsuits." (See id. at 5.) As the Fifth Circuit aptly stated in Collard's previous case:

Collard mounts an overall attack on the legitimacy
of the federal income tax system throughout her brief
. . . She presents this argument, apparently premised
on the law of trusts, under the rubric of "taxpayer
means fiduciary." Collard's argument consists of
baseless due process claims and frivolous attempts
to undermine the federal income tax. Where this is
the case, "[w]e perceive no need to refute these
arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation
of precedent; to do so might suggest that these arguments
have some colorable merit." Crain v. C.I.R., 737
F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984).

Collard v. C.I.R., 354 F. App'x 24, 26 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding Plaintiff's tax appeal frivolous and sanctioning her $ 8,000). Plaintiff's arguments for remand are frivolous and her motion should be DENIED.

III. RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION

The United States moves for dismissal of this action, in part, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Def.'s Mot. at 3-7.)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They "must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum." Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001).

"When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Considering Rule 12(b)(1) motions first "prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice." Id. When the court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that dismissal "is not a determination of the merits and does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction." Id.

The district court may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). A motion to dismiss based on the complaint alone presents a "facial attack" that requires the court to merely decide whether the allegations in the complaint, which are presumed to be true, sufficiently state a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F. 2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1998). "If sufficient, those allegations alone provide jurisdiction." Id. Facial attacks are usually made early in the proceedings. Id. When the defendant supports the motion with evidence, then the attack is "factual" and "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413. A factual attack may occur at any stage of the proceedings. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980). Regardless of the nature of attack, the party asserting jurisdiction constantly carries the burden of proof to establish that jurisdiction does exist. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.

In this case, Defendant presents a facial attack that does not require the Court to resolve matters outside the pleadings. See id.; Williamson, 645 F.2d at 412-13.

A. Federal Sovereign Immunity

The United States first argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. (Def's Mot. at 3.)

"The basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress." Block v. N.D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983). "Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Because federal sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature, the consent or waiver must be unequivocally expressed. Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2009). The terms of the consent/waiver define the jurisdictional boundaries to entertain the suit. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475. In general, the scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity is strictly construed "in favor of the sovereign." Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1942 (2008). The plaintiff has the burden to show an "unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity." St. Tammany Parish ex rel. Davis v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2009).

Here, Plaintiff asserts no statutory basis for finding that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity. She instead argues that "those who assert immunity" for the United States in a tax case are "idiots", professionally incompetent, or "clinically insane." (Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Dismiss at 4.) This Court has previously rejected that same argument for overcoming an assertion of sovereign immunity. See Florance, 2009 WL 5173956, at *2. 3

B. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

The United States next argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to make declarations regarding any tax matters at issue in this case or to grant an injunction to preclude it from making future tax claims against Plaintiff. (See Def.'s Mot. at 4-5.)

With limited exceptions that do not apply in this case, Congress has excluded federal tax matters from the scope of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2201. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 732 n.7 (1974). The Court is therefore without jurisdiction to issue a declaration that Plaintiff is not a taxpayer and is not liable for taxes. See Walters v. United States, 287 F. App'x 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2008).

Similarly, the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. section 7421(a), provides that with exceptions not relevant here, "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court." Section 7421(a) "withdraw[s] jurisdiction from the state and federal courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the collection of federal taxes." Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nav. Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5 (1962); accord Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 749. However, "a pre-enforcement injunction against the assessment or collection of taxes may be granted" when two criteria are met: (1) "if it is clear that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail" and (2) "if equity jurisdiction otherwise exists". Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 758 (1974) (quoting Enochs, 370 U.S. at 7). The second criteria is met when irreparable injury will result in the absence of an issued injunction. Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 737.

Here, Plaintiff has alleged no irreparable injury and has made no argument that the government will be unable to assess or collect taxes from her in the future. The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant an injunction to the extent Plaintiff seeks to preclude the United States from making future tax claims against her.

C. Review CDP Determination

To the extent Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the government's refusal to terminate its "levy/lien process" in response to her requested CDP hearing, (see Ex. D-104; Mot. Remand at 2-3), the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction. See Smith v. United States, No. 08-10288, 2008 WL 5069783, at *1 (5th Cir. 2008). Moreover, when it has been determined that a portion of a hearing request is frivolous or shows a desire to delay or impede the administration of federal tax laws, that "portion shall not be subject to any further administrative or judicial review." See 26 U.S.C. section 6330(g), 6702(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the CDP determination.

Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action, Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) motion should be granted.

IV. SANCTIONS

Plaintiff has previously been sanctioned $ 8,000 for filing a frivolous tax appeal. See Collard v. C.I.R., 354 F. App'x 24, 26 (5th Cir. 2009). She then filed a request for CDP hearing that was disregarded because it was frivolous or showed a desire to delay or impede the administration of federal tax laws. (See Ex. D-104.) Soon after, she filed this action in state court asserting similar arguments to those that had resulted in sanctions by the Fifth Circuit. She has now been warned by this the Court that "filing frivolous motions may result in sanctions up to and including a monetary sanction payable to the Court." (See Order of May 25, 2010, doc. 16.) Notwithstanding this warning, she proceeded to file three frivolous motions to strike. (See docs. 17, 18, 21.)

The Court possesses the inherent power "to protect the efficient and orderly administration of justice and . . . to command respect for the court's orders, judgments, procedures, and authority." In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1993). Included in such inherent power is "the power to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices." Id. Sanctions may be appropriate when a pro se litigant has a history of submitting multiple frivolous claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195-97 (5th Cir. 1993). Pro se litigants have "no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets." Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff should be sanctioned $ 300 ($ 100 per motion) for filing frivolous motions to strike after being warned that she could be sanctioned for doing so, and she should be prohibited from filing any future action in this Court until she pays this monetary sanction. She should also be warned that she may be sanctioned for asserting frivolous claims, contentions, and arguments or otherwise abusing the litigation process. 4 If she continues to assert frivolous matters in this case or any other case, harsher sanctions should be imposed, including requiring her to pay a monetary sanction to the clerk of court and/or placing appropriate restrictions on her filing actions or motions.
V. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Collard's Motion to Remand, filed May 11, 2010, (doc. 9) should be DENIED, the United States' Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), filed May 20, 2010 (doc. 13), should be GRANTED, and this action should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff should also be sanctioned $ 300 for filing frivolous motions.

SO RECOMMENDED on this 29th day of July, 2010.

Irma Carrillo Ramirez
United States Magistrate Judge

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

Irma Carrillo Ramirez
United States Magistrate Judge

FOOTNOTES:


/1/ Section 1441(a) provides in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.

/2/ Plaintiff concedes that the Florance case is substantively identical to her case. (See Mot. Remand at 2-3.)

/3/ Even though an action is properly removed to federal court, it may be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See Florance, 2009 WL 5173956, at *2; Morse v. United States, No. 2:07-CV-249-FtM-34DNF, 2007 WL 4287535, at *2-5 & n.4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2007).

/4/ Plaintiff relies on some of the same arguments, contentions, and claims raised by Richard Florance. Notably, substantial sanctions have been entered against him for some of these arguments. See Florance v. C.I.R., T.C.M. (RIA) 2005-060 (2005) ($ 10,000.00 sanction), aff'd, 174 F. App'x 200 (5th Cir. 2006); Florance v. C.I.R., T.C.M. (RIA) 2005061 (2005) ($ 12,500.00 sanction), aff'd, 174 F. App'x 200 (5th Cir. 2006); Florance v. C.I.R., 174 F. App'x 200, 201 (5th Cir. 2006) (filing restriction imposed); In re: Florance, No. 07-40129, unpub. ord. at 2, 4-5 (5th Cir. June 5, 2007) (sanction warning regarding inappropriate and abusive language); Florance v. Buchmeyer, 258 F. App'x 702, 702 (5th Cir. 2007) (warning about monetary sanctions and appeal struck as sanction for inappropriate comments); Florance v. Buchmeyer, 500 F. Supp. 2d 618, 628 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (sanction warning for inappropriate language); Texas v. Florance, No. 4:06-CV-510, 2008 WL 839736, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2008) (same).

[Nikki]

Mary L. Collard vs. Commissioner

USTC 22683-08

Order of Decision and Dismissal entered 1/15/09

Ignoring the usual TP blather, her Tax Court case is interesting because:

deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax for 2004, together with additions to tax for failure to file and for failure to pay . The deficiency is based on respondent's determination that petitioner failed to report on an income tax return for 2004 income of $15,794

ORDERED AND DECIDED that there is a deficiency in, and additions to, petitioner's Federal income tax as follows :

............................................................... Additions to tax, I .R .C .
Year ... Deficiency .................................. Sec . 6651(a)(1) Sec . 6651(a)(2)
2004 .... $818 .00 ....................................... $184 .05 .............. $147 .24

Deficiency + additions = $1,149.29

Another case where the amount at issue is less than the sanctions AND, had she filed, would have owed a great deal less in the first place.

[Cathulhu]

If she had a dependent kid, she would have had a refund via earned income credit. Sad, how stupid proliferates.

[Gregg]

If she had a dependent kid, she would have had a refund via earned income credit. Sad, how stupid proliferates.

The really sad part is if SHE DOES have kids, we're subsidizing stupid.

[.]

What I find problematic here was that she was whacked previously for an $8K sanction, and then went on to the horrific punishment for further, non-stop frivolity of $100 per motion, total $300.

What's next? $5 or $10 per? Party on, dude. Victory!

This was a clear case where the whack needed to be $25K. What planet are these judges on?

[Gregg]

I dunno. We're talking about someone here who $25K or even $8K is money they don't comprehend, might as well be $25 Million. But $300, and at that $300 she must pay to file any more nonsense is a number she can feel and if she does pay it will affect her lifestyle. There is a certain realness to it, and may actually lead her to at least shut up and behave.

[.]

So, the huffing and puffing was clear:

Plaintiff has previously been sanctioned $8,000 for filing a frivolous tax appeal. See Collard v. C.I.R., 354 F. App'x 24, 26 (5th Cir. 2009). She then filed a request for CDP hearing that was disregarded because it was frivolous or showed a desire to delay or impede the administration of federal tax laws. (See Ex. D-104.) Soon after, she filed this action in state court asserting similar arguments to those that had resulted in sanctions by the Fifth Circuit. She has now been warned by this the Court that "filing frivolous motions may result in sanctions up to and including a monetary sanction payable to the Court." (See Order of May 25, 2010, doc. 16.) Notwithstanding this warning, she proceeded to file three frivolous motions to strike. (See docs. 17, 18, 21.)

And, then, horror of horrors, oh, my goodness, after having been explicitly and repeatedly warned in no uncertain terms, the court just pounds her right into the ground with this:

Plaintiff should be sanctioned $ 300 ($ 100 per motion) for filing frivolous motions to strike after being warned that she could be sanctioned for doing so, and she should be prohibited from filing any future action in this Court until she pays this monetary sanction.

LOL. $300. No more filings. Excuse me. Could it be more lame?

You can just as easily make it $25K and no more filings. Either way, the court isn't gonna collect a dime.

Slice it any way you want, she's still an idiot and she's not gonna stop behaving like it. But everyone reading the decision is gonna come away with a conclusion, and it will be widely disseminated. The TPs are gonna think, hey, that wasn't so bad. 300 bucks. I could do that to make my all-important, over-arching point that is going to save all of humanity from ruin.

This toothless approach is not a good idea. I'll guess this particular District Court hasn't yet had its fill of TP nonsense, even though this particular case happened largely at the Magistrate level, but they soon will. Within a year or two or three we may be reading about $25K sanctions from the Northern District of Texas.

I hope so.

[Gregg]

Not to contradict myself, but in all honesty some of the blame for if not this, at least the CTC cases is partially the fault of the courts for failing to address why these nutcases are wrong in clear and concise language. I can't count how many times decisions fall right into the trap that Pete and various other gurus set for them. I believe in one of Pete's decisions it says something to the effect that Pete believes only "government employees" are subject to taxation. Well, then Pete turns around (and as far as what he says he does have a point) and says "I didn't say that, I said that only "income" is taxable, and as it's defined, MOST of the people with income are government employees but there are also people engaged in Federally Privileged Activity who also have income, as defined". Understand, Pete is still full of it, but the sloppy way he's been prosecuted and sentenced, he always seems to have an out, a way of saying "They didn't listen to me because I'm right so they're covering it up". How I long to see a decision on some CTC filing where the prosecutor takes the time to thoroughly dissect the entire body of Pete's work and get a decision that finally says "This guy is full of crap, every word he has written is wrong as presented and if you insist, we're gonna put you in the same prison he's in to discuss it with him, cause we're done arguing with you".

So yeah, in that respect, I'm with Famspear, burn them to the ground, make examples of them until the rest get the hint.

[.]

Wait a minute. How did this devolve into CtC?

In any case, this woman is an idiot. This type of silly case has been addressed in clear, explicit language by many courts at all levels, repeatedly.

I'll leave it to Famspear or Dan or any other lawyer to provide the gory details if they think it necessary, which I doubt.

My point regarding the pusillanimousness of the Texas court remains.

[Famspear]

Not to contradict myself, but in all honesty some of the blame for if not this, at least the CTC cases is partially the fault of the courts for failing to address why these nutcases are wrong in clear and concise language. I can't count how many times decisions fall right into the trap that Pete and various other gurus set for them. I believe in one of Pete's decisions it says something to the effect that Pete believes only "government employees" are subject to taxation. Well, then Pete turns around (and as far as what he says he does have a point) and says "I didn't say that, I said that only "income" is taxable, and as it's defined, MOST of the people with income are government employees but there are also people engaged in Federally Privileged Activity who also have income, as defined". Understand, Pete is still full of it, but the sloppy way he's been prosecuted and sentenced, he always seems to have an out, a way of saying "They didn't listen to me because I'm right so they're covering it up". How I long to see a decision on some CTC filing where the prosecutor takes the time to thoroughly dissect the entire body of Pete's work and get a decision that finally says "This guy is full of crap, every word he has written is wrong as presented and if you insist, we're gonna put you in the same prison he's in to discuss it with him, cause we're done arguing with you".

Perhaps we should remind ourselves of some of the dictionary definitions describing the Pontificating Prisoner's Prevarications:

Frivolous. of little weight or importance [ . . . ] lacking in seriousness [ . . . ]

--Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 461, G. & C. Merriam Co. (8th Ed. 1976).

Frivolous. Unworthy of serious attention; trivial [ . . .]

--American Heritage Dictionary, p. 535, Houghton Mifflin Co. (2d Coll. Ed. 1985).

Nevertheless, it would indeed be fun to read case after case where the courts explain Blowhard Hendrickson's nonsense just as precisely as the Quatloos regulars have done. Personally, I wish each and every judge would take the time to really rip the Big Peter apart -- word by word -- in every single case where the scam is found to have been used -- using precisely the language the Blowhard uses, mentioning him by name, and then explaining exactly why the Blowhard's statements are incorrect as a matter of law. A few courts have done some of this, but not to the level I would personally like to see done.

EDIT: One of my personal favorites is the Andrew D. Scott case in the United States Tax Court. As explained at Dan Evans' Tax Protester Dossiers web site, the Court in that case mentioned Hendrickson by name, mentioned the "book" Cracking the Code, and specifically identified Scott as someone who had used that scam. The Tax Court found Scott’s arguments — that he was not an “employee,” and that he did not earn “wages” — to be “frivolous and false.” The Court concluded that Scott was liable for (1) a $10,031 deficiency in tax, (2) an accuracy-related penalty of $2,941 under Internal Revenue Code section 6662(a), and (3) a $20,000 penalty under Internal Revenue Code section 6673 for presenting a frivolous argument. Andrew D. Scott v. Commissioner, Docket No. 26392-06, United States Tax Court, Bench Op. (June 4, 2008), aff'd, 2009 TNT 213-10, No. 08-4766 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 2009).

http://tpgurus.wikidot.com/peter-hendrickson

[LPC]

Not to contradict myself, but in all honesty some of the blame for if not this, at least the CTC cases is partially the fault of the courts for failing to address why these nutcases are wrong in clear and concise language.

What I believe is most effect is for courts (and the IRS) to contradict tax deniers using the terminology that the tax deniers themselves are using, rather than language that is "clear and concise" to the rest of the world.

Tax deniers lack reasoning skills. That's why they're tax deniers. Most of their "arguments" are based on word patterns and semantic manipulations rather than actual logic or reason. So you need to contradict them using the same word patterns that they have used, because otherwise it's not going to sink in.

In this case, Collard argued that "taxpayer means fiduciary" under the law of trusts. The court should have simply and plainly declared that a taxpayer is NOT a fiduciary, and the collection of federal income tax is NOT governed by the law of trusts. That is the only way that the court has any chance of getting Collard (and others who might follow her) to understand that the court did not evade the issue or misunderstand the issue but squarely ruled against her.

[Nikki]

It doesn't matter what any court says or how much is imposed in sanctions.

The Internet is a huge bowl of primordial soup, creating a new mutation of some old denier theory every second.

Just look at LoserHeads and track what they're comng up with.

Of course they're going to lose and as soon as one has lost enough times (unless he's a total moron like Schiff), he'll drop from view only to be replaced by a dozen others.

Each of the new ones will find a new, non-apposite case to generate a theory, will analyze the predecessor and locate the CRUCIAL missing comma in the court filings, or invent a totally new theory such as convening a Common Law Court to try the Secretary of the Treasury.

The TDs don't think rationally. They just KNOW that the income tax desn't apply to them and they just have to find the double-secret words to prove it.

Sanctions and precise language don't work. There are enough multiple sanction recipients to prove that.

The TDs will continue to stubbornly bang their heads against the wall. They, collectively, are unstoppable.

[.]

The Court concluded that Scott was liable for (1) a $10,031 deficiency in tax, (2) an accuracy-related penalty of $2,941 under Internal Revenue Code section 6662(a), and (3) a $20,000 penalty under Internal Revenue Code section 6673 for presenting a frivolous argument. Andrew D. Scott v. Commissioner, Docket No. 26392-06, United States Tax Court, Bench Op. (June 4, 2008), aff'd, 2009 TNT 213-10, No. 08-4766 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 2009).

Now, THAT'S what I'm talking about.

[Nikki]

Petitioner informed Respondent that he is a follower of a book entitled Cracking the Code : The Fascinating Truth about Taxation in America by Peter Eric Hendrickson , in which the author takes the position that "income " is not defined in the Code and that wages earned by non-federal employees are not subject to federal income tax .

Petitioner also stated , in a letter , dated November 8, 2007, to Respondent , that his earnings are his property , not that of the State of Vermont or the Department of Treasury .
He is not an employee , as defined BY LAW in the Code .

Courts consistently have upheld that taxpayers like Hendrickson , the author of the book, was an employee within the meaning of Section 3401(c) . United States v . Hendrickson , 2007 WL 238501 ( E .D . Mich .), 100 A .F .T .R .2d 2007-5395 .

More specifically , with respect to Petitioner's arguments gained from Mr . Hendrickson and his book, we find, as do other courts, where taxpayers like Petitioner argue that earnings are not taxable, he is not an "employee," and that he did not earn " wages," as defined in the Code are all frivolous and false .

Specific statement that the HeadLoserHead's arguments are frivolous in a 2008 Tax Court opinion (affirmed by the 2nd Circuit in 2009).

And how much of an impact has that had on ANY of the CtC disciples?

[Pottapaug1938]

Petitioner informed Respondent that he is a follower of a book entitled Cracking the Code : The Fascinating Truth about Taxation in America by Peter Eric Hendrickson , in which the author takes the position that "income " is not defined in the Code and that wages earned by non-federal employees are not subject to federal income tax .

Petitioner also stated , in a letter , dated November 8, 2007, to Respondent , that his earnings are his property , not that of the State of Vermont or the Department of Treasury .
He is not an employee , as defined BY LAW in the Code .

Courts consistently have upheld that taxpayers like Hendrickson , the author of the book, was an employee within the meaning of Section 3401(c) . United States v . Hendrickson , 2007 WL 238501 ( E .D . Mich .), 100 A .F .T .R .2d 2007-5395 .

More specifically , with respect to Petitioner's arguments gained from Mr . Hendrickson and his book, we find, as do other courts, where taxpayers like Petitioner argue that earnings are not taxable, he is not an "employee," and that he did not earn " wages," as defined in the Code are all frivolous and false .

Specific statement that the HeadLoserHead's arguments are frivolous in a 2008 Tax Court opinion (affirmed by the 2nd Circuit in 2009).

And how much of an impact has that had on ANY of the CtC disciples?

None -- and it never will. Petey's delusions are too politically pleasing and comforting to them; and in their (small) minds, it is only the stubbornness of corrupted courts who are beholden to The System which prevents them from realizing that Petey has set forth The Revealed Truth, and invokes all sort of Magic Words found in Real Court Decisions, Real Laws and Real Legal Dictionaries to arm his Warriors as they set forth to slay the Evil IRS Beast.