In the case Stevens has been ranting about, United States v. Marc Edwards, No. 2:05-cv-00141-WFD (D. Wyo.), aff'd, No. 05-8085 (10th Cir. 3/27/2006) ($6,000 in sanctions imposed for frivolous appea), cert. den., No. 06-917 (U.S.S.C. 2006), the United States had filed an action to enforce an administrative summons for tax records, as authorized by 20 U.S.C. §§ 7602 and 7604. The idea that the government might lack standing under §§ 7602 and 7604 is bizarre, given that (a) the government is trying to determine if taxes are owed, (b) if taxes are owed by not paid then the government has clearly suffered a loss of income, and (c) there is clearly a "case or controversy" is the government is seeking to obtain records to determine what taxes might be owed and the person in possession of the records refuses to provide them.
But I decided to see if I could find any cases that establish as a matter of law that a possible diminution of tax revenues is sufficient to give a government "standing" as a matter of constitutional law. And I thought it might be difficult to find legal support because things that are obvious are often difficult to prove.
But I did find a case.
In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992), the Supreme Court held that an allegation that Wyoming was suffering a loss of tax revenues as a result of legislation enacted in Oklahoma gave Wyoming standing to pursue a claim against Oklahoma in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Citing the Wyoming decision, a district court has stated that the District of Columbia had standing to contest the constitutionality of a statute that denied it the power to impose taxes on the wages of nonresident workers. Banner v. United States, 303 F.Supp.2d 1, n. 6 (D.C. 2004).
In order to forestall any equivocating (i.e., BS), it should be pointed out that the court must presume for purposes of standing analysis that plaintiffs have the right they claim. See, Adams v. Clinton, 90 F.Supp.2d 35, 41 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 531 U.S. 941 (2000) (presuming that District of Columbia residents are entitled to representation in the House and concluding that denial of such a voice "plainly constitutes an `injury in fact'"); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ("standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal ... ").
In other words, a state (or any other government) has standing to pursue a tax claim even if no tax is actually due. The lack of a valid tax claim will (should) result in a decision on the merits for the (alleged) taxpayer, but the lack of merit for the claim does not deny the court the jurisdiction to decide the claim.
Now let's look to see what Marc Stevens has said:
This complaint is incoherent. If the IRS filed a claim for "relief," then the IRS alleged that there were grounds for relief, meaning that there was a cause of action and standing.Marc Stevens wrote:The IRS filed a civil complaint asking a federal judge to enforce an IRS summons. The complaint was only a request for relief and did not allege any wrongdoing whatsoever. That should raise a red flag already.
The claim that the IRS "did not allege any wrongdoing" mis-states the legal standard. The constitutional requirement of a "case" does not require that there be "wrongdoing," because it is possible for there to be an injury, and a claim for relief, even if there has been no "wrongdoing." See, for example, the substantial body of case law on "strict liability" claims that do no require any showing of any negligence or other wrongdoing, but only an injury caused by a "defect."