Santander wasn't happy about that and, notwithstanding the court judgment against them, proceeded with foreclosure by seeking an order for possession of 35 Forfar Street, Belfast. Not daring to face the rough justice administered by Parker's common law court they went to the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland and Parker was forced to fight his battle in this foreign court. It didn't work out well for him;"Since I am a living man, I operate under a foreign jurisdiction to the legal system. I already tried this case in my private foreign jurisdiction court, and find Santander in default judgment. Since Santander was found in default judgment in my private foreign jurisdiction court, Master Ellison, under the rules of the Hague Convention on foreign judgments and civil and commercial matters, should have respected that judgment."
http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/Ch/2012/6.html5] Mr Parker has advanced a whole range of arguments in a number of affidavits described sometimes as Affidavit one and sometimes as Sovereign Affirmations and Affidavit one begins as follows:
"As (there is a word in what may be Hebrew) the one and only God is my witness I the bond servant of the Messiah, Anthony of The Family Parker of 35 Forfar Street in the geographical area known as Belfast City in the County of Antrim and Northern Ireland aged 18 years and upwards make oath and says as follows."
[6] Mr Parker then sets out a whole range of points which I have considered and which he has touched upon in his oral submissions. I will just mention a couple of them expressly. He takes the point that this matter should be adjudicated on by Sir Christopher Geidt, Private Secretary to Her Majesty The Queen. He says that on foot of Clause 45 of the Magna Carta of 1215, which in the version advanced by him reads: "We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs or other officials only men that know the law of the realm and are minded to keep it well." Of course I have the privilege to serve as one of Her Majesty's justices and sit here to do justice as envisaged by Magna Carta rather than Sir Christopher whom, while I am sure a person of distinction, is not so far as I am aware a judge or lawyer.
[7] Another point raised by him at point 10 reads as follows:
"Since I am a living man, I operate under a foreign jurisdiction to the legal system. I already tried this case in my private foreign jurisdiction court, and find Santander in default judgment. Since Santander was found in default judgment in my private foreign jurisdiction court, Master Ellison, under the rules of the Hague Convention on foreign judgments and civil and commercial matters, should have respected that judgment."
That is a wholly misplaced submission without foundation. The Master's court and on appeal this court is the appropriate court for dealing with a matter of this kind. Further points were raised and were dealt with by Mr Keith Gibson in his helpful skeleton argument. They include the submission that the respondent, that is the bank, cannot execute a contract as it is not a living thing and of course that is complete, I think the appropriate word is, nonsense, as in law a corporate body is indeed a person entitled to pursue its contractual rights. Mr Parker complains that there is an absence of two "wet signatures". Whatever that means that is not right in law either. He objected to the solicitors acting and to counsel acting because counsel had not produced his "power of authority" or his law licence to practice in Northern Ireland. I reject those submissions. Needless to say no power of authority is required and counsel is well known to the court as a member, indeed a leading member of the Chancery junior bar.
[8] I think really time is not well served by setting out more of these points. There is in truth no substance for Mr Parker's allegations that there is some kind of fraud or perjury here. Any minor lacuna in the first affidavit of Mr Sinclair has been repaired for completeness in his second affidavit, permitted by Lord Justice Girvan. I can see no perjury, I can see no lies, I can see no fraud and I can see no prejudice to Mr Parker. He borrowed this money and sadly is unable to repay it and the bank is entitled to the order of possession. I reject the appeal.
The fighting Irish don't give up easily and he appealed this decision to Her Majesty's Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland but it ended up being bounced back to the original court to consider a new point brought up by the court of appeal;
Rather than accept this as a possible technical issue that might save his bacon Parker decided to act up again;At a hearing before that court Morgan LCJ, who was sitting with Higgins LJ and Stephens J, raised an issue as to whether the mortgage deed relied on by Santander was sealed and if it was not whether it was enforceable, but primarily the point is whether it was sealed so as to constitute a deed.
After a very thorough analysis of the legal requirements for a valid seal the judge decided that the mortgage deed was valid but also stated that the issue was irrelevant because estoppel would apply in any event since Parker had not brought the issue up at the original hearing. So Parker lost round two.[3] When I sat in this matter initially today he showed an obstructive approach to the conduct of the hearing which was followed by a demand to see my oath of office as a judge which was unlikely to be appropriate in any event but utterly inappropriate when I was dealing with a matter remitted from the Court of Appeal and this was followed by direct defiance of the orders of the court constituting, subject to any submissions which I will hear after this judgment, a contempt in the face of the court. Following his removal he was given two opportunities by a senior chancery official to return if he would undertake to be of good behaviour when the hearing resumed but such assurance was not forthcoming. However, at the hearing of the matter before the luncheon interval I reread his written submissions and have taken them into account; those are his written submissions of 23 May 2012 in a document he entitles "Sovereign Affirmation" but which in effect are legal or quasi legal submissions.
http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/Ch/2012/20.html
At this point Parker became somewhat unhinged and sued the judge of the prior decision and the Master who heard his first decision.
After his lawsuit against the judges failed he faced enforcement of the court order allowing repossession. But, not downhearted, he sued the officer in charge of enforcing the court order;The plaintiff then brought an action against Master Ellison and Mr Justice Deeny in their personal capacities for "fair and just compensation for the trespass to his rights and wrong done by them" and seeking a declaration that their rulings were void. That action was struck out by Master McCorry on the grounds of the principle of general judicial immunity, no reasonable cause of action, and that it was scandalous, frivolous or was otherwise an abuse of the process of the court (The Man known as Anthony Parker v The Man known as Master Ellison and the Man known as Donnell Justin Patrick Deeny (Unreported, 16 April 2014)). The plaintiff then sought to sue Santander and the lawyers involved in the repossession proceedings. That action too was struck out by Master McCorry on the grounds of no reasonable cause of action, and that it was scandalous, frivolous or was otherwise an abuse of the process of the court (The Man Known as Anthony Parker v Santander (UK) PLC and the Man Known as Edmund Sinclair, The Man Known as Mark Orr and the Man Known as Keith Gibson (Unreported, 17 October 2014)).
This whole mess washed ashore into the hands of another Master, the judges being too busy with real cases of merit to bother with a nutcase.3] When the enforcement stage of the repossession proceedings arrived, this involved activity by the Enforcement of Judgments Office (hereafter "EJO"). An application for Enforcement of Master Ellison's order was made. At a hearing on 17 September 2013 Master Wells heard the parties, rejected the arguments advanced by the plaintiff, and granted an order for delivery of the possession of the property. In consequence various documents were then served on the plaintiff by Ian McKenna, an Enforcement Officer employed in the EJO. As a result the plaintiff issued a writ against "The Man Known as Ian McKenna" and "The Enforcement of Judgment Office". This writ carries the following endorsement :
"i a Man Known as Anthony : Parker under God claim the man Known as Ian McKenna and the Enforcement of Judgments Office trespassed on my right to own property : trespassed on my right to use property : trespassed on my right to be left alone and used forged instruments to do wrong to me.
i require fair and just compensation for the trespass of my rights and the wrong done to me.
The nature of the crime is trespass and fraud.
i require a court under Common Law with a jury of my peers."
http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/Master/2015/1.html
The defendants finally went the scandalous and vexatious route in their pleadings;
And the court was more than happy to accommodate them. But first the Master had to go through the usual rubbish. First a demand that the Master recuse himself because Parker was suing a member of the Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service and the master was employed by the same service. The Master responded that if that was grounds for recusal then the entire Irish judiciary would have to recuse itself.[4] Having received this writ, the defendants now make an application :
(i) To have the writ struck out under Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of the Court of Judicature and the inherent jurisdiction of the court on the basis that the action relates to the responsibilities of the defendants carried out in connection with the execution of the judicial process and is bound to fail by virtue of section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947.
(ii) To have the writ struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action and is scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
(iii) To have the writ struck out on the basis that the plaintiff's action against the defendants is bound to fail by virtue of the provisions of Article 134(1) of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981.
(iv) Staying the action pursuant to section 86(3) of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 on the grounds that it is an abuse of process and is bound to fail.
Then he got down to business and determined that the defendant had statutory immunity from a lawsuit just for doing his court appointed duty. Having disposed of the case the Master also noted that Parker's action was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court because it was just relitigation after relitigation of an action that had been decided in 2011.[11] When taken to its logical conclusion, the impact of the plaintiff's submission, if his application was granted, would be that no judge in Northern Ireland could hear the action which he has commenced by issuing his writ. All of the judges would suffer from the same difficulty. Indeed logic takes the impact further. If the plaintiff's submission was soundly based there could be no court exercising judicial review over administrative acts or decisions made by any government minister because both the judges and the courts are emanations of the state. For the plaintiff this does not present a problem and indeed he welcomes this conclusion. In his affirmation he states :
"I require a court under common law with a jury of my peers."
[12] Under section 67 of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 trials by jury are restricted to very limited categories of action (and even then only when in the opinion of a judge certain statutory conditions are met). Having the plaintiff's action tried by a jury is therefore not an option which the legislation allows for.
The next step was to determine, in the quaint phrase of the court, whether to bring this plaintiff to the attention of the Attorney General for Northern Ireland. This is the equivalent of declaring an individual a vexatious litigant. In Canada the court decides that. In Ireland apparently it is the responsibility of the Attorney-General on the recommendation of the court.
So what did the Master use as a guide in this endeavour? Our old friend Meads v Meads!
Basing his decision almost entirely on the teachings of Meads the master had no problem deciding to recommend that Parker be declared a vexatious litigant. Ball's in your court Attorney General![36] However I have concerns with the manner in which this particular plaintiff conducts his litigation which go beyond the difficulties experienced by all legally unqualified personal litigants. While listening to his submissions I was reminded of Chief Justice Rooke's judgment in the Canadian case of Meads v Meads [2012] ABQB 571. In his extensive and detailed written judgment the Chief Justice explains that the court has developed a new awareness and understanding of a particular category of vexatious litigant. They describe themselves in a variety of ways, sometimes, for example, as "Freemen" or "Freemen-on-the-Land". The Chief Justice, in the absence of what he considers to be a better description, terms them "Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants" or "OPCA litigants". He explains that these persons employ a collection of techniques and arguments promoted and sold by others to disrupt court operations and to attempt to frustrate the legal rights of governments, corporations, and individuals. He notes that in Canada over a decade of reported cases have proven that the individual concepts advanced by such litigants are invalid. In his judgment he then goes on to categorize these schemes and concepts, identify defects to simplify future response to variations of identified and invalid OPCA themes, and develop court procedures and sanctions for persons who adopt and advance these vexatious litigation strategies.
[37] According to Meads v Meads this category of Canadian litigation traces back to the late 1990's, representing the spread of concepts that emerged much earlier in the United States. Although the judgment identifies reported caselaw that comments on OPCA litigants, OPCA gurus, and their misconduct, Chief Justice Rooke observes that the reported caselaw is the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The vast majority of encounters between the courts and OPCA litigants are not reported. Such litigants and their schemes have been encountered in almost all areas of law. They appear in chambers, in criminal proceedings, initiate civil litigation based on illusionary rights, and attempt to evade court and state authority with procedural and defence-based schemes.
[38] Meads v Meads states that the strategies of these litigants as brought before the Canadian courts have proven disruptive, inflict unnecessary expense on other parties, and are ultimately harmful to the persons who appear in court and attempt to invoke these vexatious strategies. Because of the nonsense they argue, such litigants are invariably unsuccessful and their positions dismissed, typically without written reasons. Nevertheless, their litigation abuse continues.
[39] The decision in Meads v Meads is worthy of mention because the litigation involving the plaintiff in this case possesses a number of features which caused concern to Chief Justice Rooke :
Names
[40] Chief Justice Rooke observes that the vast majority of such litigants use highly stereotypic formats to name and identify themselves. The most common form adds atypical punctuation, usually colons and dashes, into a name. Any litigant who uses this dash/colon motif almost certainly, in the view of Chief Justice Rooke, has some kind of OPCA background. Such litigants have argued that a person is immune from court action if that person identifies himself by an entirely different name; that structuring a name in a format which includes a colon between the first name and surname means that one is a separate person from the person whose name is similar but does not have the insertion of a colon; that structuring a name in the format for example [John] of the [family] of [Sargent] means that he is a separate person from "John Sargent". Further, a capital letter version of the name is some kind of non-human thing, while the lower case name is the "flesh and blood" aspect of the litigant. It appears that the use of duplicate names is usually an indication that the OPCA litigant has adopted a "double/split person" strategy.
[41] I have already referred to the fact that the plaintiff refers to himself in the writ before me as "The Man Known as Anthony : Parker". He also refers to himself as "a living man known as Anthony of the family parker". In addition his writ refers to himself in three places by a lower case "i". The same features are also present in the writ against Master Ellison and Mr Justice Deeny.
Oaths and qualifications
[42] Chief Justice Rooke notes that Freemen litigants will typically make certain demands including demands to see the oath of office of a judge, lawyer, or court official; that a judge prove his or her appointment; that the judge make certain oaths or statements, such as that the judge is a public servant; that an opposing party provide proof that it has authority to proceed against the OPCA litigant; or for a certified copy of a document or legislation.
[43] In the current application before me the plaintiff challenged Mr Cush's right to appear on behalf of the defendants. He wanted proof that he was entitled to do so. In a previous application before me, the plaintiff requested that I state whether or not I was acting under my judicial oath.
[44] I note that in his judgment in Santander (UK) PLC v Anthony Parker [2012] NICh 6 Deeny J stated :
"He objected to the solicitors acting and to counsel acting because counsel had not produced his "power of authority" or his law licence to practice in Northern Ireland. I reject those submissions. Needless to say no power of authority is required and counsel is well known to the court as a member, indeed a leading member of the Chancery junior bar."
[45] I also note that in his judgment in Santander (UK) PLC v Anthony Parker (No 2) [2012] NICh 20 Deeny J stated :
"When I sat in this matter initially today he showed an obstructive approach to the conduct of the hearing which was followed by a demand to see my oath of office as a judge which was unlikely to be appropriate in any event but utterly inappropriate when I was dealing with a matter remitted from the Court of Appeal and this was followed by direct defiance of the orders of the court constituting, subject to any submissions which I will hear after this judgment, a contempt in the face of the court."
Consent to Obligations
[46] In Meads v Meads Chief Justice Rooke stated that a common belief expressed by Freemen litigants is that all legally enforceable rights require that a person agree to be subject to those obligations. This strategy takes two closely related forms. Firstly, every binding legal obligation emerges from a contract and, secondly, consent is required before an obligation can be enforced. Litigants who advance this concept extend it to interactions between state actors, including Canada and the provinces, and individual persons. This is what Chief Justice Rooke describes as a kind of "magic hat". The OPCA litigant says he or she has not agreed to be governed or subject to court authority, and the OPCA litigant is therefore allegedly immune.
[47] A necessary first step in any "everything is a contract" or "consent is required" scheme is that the OPCA litigant develops a mechanism that denies a unilateral obligation can arise from legislation. Some OPCA litigants argue they have opted out of legislated obligations. Others simply claim consent is required, otherwise legislation is a set of optional guidelines.
[48] In his affirmation before me in these proceedings the affirmation sworn by the plaintiff contains the following :
"18. Legislative Acts confer how duties and obligations are applied to Government Officers, legal fictions and persons.
19. I do not consent to legislative Acts."
Jurisdiction
[49] Chief Justice Rooke observes that OPCA litigants frequently deny that a court has jurisdiction or authority over them and this emerges in a number of ways including in a statement or declaration that the litigant is only subject to a specific category of law, most often expressed as "natural law" or "the common law". I observe that the plaintiff's affirmation before me included the statements :
"I claim that I have not had a jury of my peers under common law.
I claim that any instruments that the man known as Ian McKenna, here after referred to a Ian used on behave of and THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS OFFICE, hereafter referred to as EJO, did not come from a common law court."
