Anthony Williams - Private Attorney General

[Siegfried Shrink]

If this ever gets to an actual trial, the amount of paper will weigh more than Mr. Williams and surely the trial can only be an anticlimax after the wide variety of pseudo-legal foolery that has preceeded it.

There should be an offence called 'Taking the Piss' ideal penalty death, more moderate penalty a year in the can with no legal notice being taken of anything whatsoever the accused does.

By now this farce must have cost the state more than Williams stole.

[TheCount]

I am always amazed when I see these words:

Further declarant sayeth naught.

And yet, I do see them, even in papers written by actual lawyers. So pretty much some lawyers are still using form documents from what, 1655?

You'd be surprised what junk lurks in aging computer files that are routinely dredged up to use in boiler-plate filings. My experience tells me less than half of what is submitted in motions is original thought. Sometimes things can even be traced back to a specific shall we say, "eccentric" partner in a specific firm.

Hmmmmm, I wonder what that makes me, since I regularly (meaning all the time) see a BS “introduction to discovery responses” that I personally wrote about 25 years ago.

[ScottComstock]

I just took a look at PACER this morning, and it looks like ATW was found competent and will proceed to trial. I don’t have documents up yet but it appears the text of the order is on CourtListener (#407)

Trial is now set for 2/28/19.

[Siegfried Shrink]

Time for at least a dozen more nonsensical motions, then.

[ArthurWankspittle]

Is this going to be a competent to stand trial or competent to conduct a defense though?

[morrand]

Is this going to be a competent to stand trial or competent to conduct a defense though?

The order as docketed says he has been found competent to stand trial. He was found competent to represent himself all the way back in September, 2017 (dkt #35) and I don't think that finding has been reconsidered, much as the court may wish that it had been.

[fortinbras]

It is odd that he was held competent to represent himself months ago but until now it was doubted whether he was competent to stand trial. Playing one's own lawyer generally requires much more mental clarity and energy than conferring with a real lawyer.

i would have supposed that serious doubts about his ability to communicate with a lawyer on his side would be sufficient to deny him the option of representing himself. Going forward as his own lawyer, in the wake of such doubts, raises a distinct possibility for grounds for appeal after he is convicted.

[Chaos]

I would have to think his sovcit argle bargle would prevent him from representing himself which is what I think got him the psych eval to begin with.

[ArthurWankspittle]

i would have supposed that serious doubts about his ability to communicate with a lawyer on his side would be sufficient to deny him the option of representing himself. Going forward as his own lawyer, in the wake of such doubts, raises a distinct possibility for grounds for appeal after he is convicted.

Is there then going to be a fresh assessment once the trial starts to cover this point. He is competent to stand trial now, so he can defend himself. 90 seconds into his defense the judge will want an evaluation of his ability to defend himself. That delays trial again for a while but he will still be inside during that time. Evaluation concludes whatever and the judge has covered all possibilities for an appeal on this basis.

[morrand]

You'd think that Mr. Williams's shenanigans could disqualify him from representing himself, and yet, time after time, in case after case, they haven't been enough to do that for other defendants. But that's pretty much in accordance with the law:

Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of "that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 350-351 (BRENNAN, J., concurring).

Faretta v. California, 422 US 806, 834.

Paradoxically, as long as Mr. Williams has intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel—which he seems to have done here, and emphatically at that—his eventual conviction could be overturned for a Faretta violation if the judge forces counsel onto him. I want to say that this has happened before, but I can't remember when or to whom. (I'm also really, really hoping that Wes or someone else knowledgeable can chime in at this point and provide actual expertise, rather than the rattling of someone with access to Wikipedia and time to kill before his pizza arrives.)

Wikipedia also tells me of Indiana v. Edwards, 554 US 164, which held that competence to stand trial and competence to self-represent are two different things. I guess all that means is that if Mr. Williams had been found incompetent to stand trial, that finding would override his competence to represent himself, but he wasn't, so it doesn't.

The Supreme Court would seem to have it that a criminal defendant has a right to mount his own defense, no matter how wacky or ineffective that defense may be, right up until he honestly does not have the capacity to understand what a trial is or what is at stake. Mr. Williams does seem to have that capacity, based on what he's filed: it is foolish and relies on non-law and nonsense, but in the end he's filing it in a determined effort to prevent his conviction on the charges. He understands what he is doing, even if he doesn't seem to know what he's doing. In that light, it seems very doubtful that forcing counsel on him would be legally justified.

[Pottapaug1938]

I'm recalling the old saying: "a person who represents him/herself in court has a fool for a client and a scoundrel for an attorney." I also recall the time that Clarence Darrow -- possibly the greatest criminal defense lawyer in American history -- was accused of a crime. His first move was to look for a lawyer to handle his defense.

[fortinbras]

If we are prosecution-oriented (and I suppose we are), then the prosecutor should be insistent that Williams be represented by a real lawyer (and I would add "a very good criminal defense lawyer") so that the result (almost surely a conviction) would withstand an appeal based on competence or ineffective counsel.

If we are defense-oriented (and, since Williams is somewhat amusing, perhaps a few of us are) then let him be his own lawyer, and then he's got a fair chance of winning an appeal based on either competence or ineffective assistance, which would get him a new trial with a real lawyer.

[wserra]

If we are prosecution-oriented (and I suppose we are)

I'm not. I'm not defense-oriented, either. I'm non-bullshit-oriented.

[Pottapaug1938]

If Williams wins his fight to represent himself, I wonder if he'd appeal a guilty verdict on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel ("they should have MADE me have a lawyer!").

[ArthurWankspittle]

I'm thinking Alford variation. He can defend himself if he pleads guilty but we won't execute him.

[notorial dissent]

If Williams wins his fight to represent himself, I wonder if he'd appeal a guilty verdict on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel ("they should have MADE me have a lawyer!").

Pretty much what I would expect him to do.

[fortinbras]

I have encountered an ENORMOUS number of appeals predicated on the argument that "They should not have granted my request to represent myself; they should have known better than let me be my own advocate." Some of these appeals actually win.

The most important decision on this was that of Faretta v. California (1975) 422 US 806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct 2525 ...
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_ca ... dt=10006
... In which the Supreme Court prescribed that, in order for the court to allow a defendant to go bareback, first the judge had to have an interview - a colloquy - directly with the defendant, in which the defendant must clearly and unequivocally reject the offer of a lawyer, and then must (also clearly and unequivocally) request permission to represent himself. The judge is supposed to warm up to these questions by warning the defendant of how complicated and dangerous it is to handle his own case, and the limitations and inconveniences he will endure (e.g., he will have to behave as if he were a real lawyer, the judge cannot give him advice or even hints, he'll get no extra time in the prison law library, there are things a lawyer could say for him that wouldn't sound right coming from his own mouth, if he misbehaves in court he'll be removed and nobody will be left to defend his side, etc.). The judge is also supposed to make his own estimate of the mental abilities and clarity of the defendant. At the end, even after an unequivocal request to go pro se, it's up to the judge.

The number of times a judge has insisted that the defendant be represented by a lawyer and was overturned on appeal are close to zero (the exceptions usually involved a defense lawyer who was spectacularly bad at his job). Some of the attempted appeals show that the defendant, when being asked the Faretta questions, did not give responsive answers, talked off topic and generally babbled rather than paid attention to what the judge was saying; and the judge's refusal to allow pro se was upheld in such cases.

As a generality, judges tend to approve requests to go pro se when the defendant has some education (mostly at least high school grads), some significant business experience (making decisions, dealing with paperwork), and maybe previous litigation (having been allowed in a previous case to go pro se helps even if he lost that case). It's iffy if the defendant starts barking the usual Sovtard nonsense; judges have rejected requests just for that reason, others seem to figure the defendant should learn the hard way that it's unhelpful.

There are slightly better numbers on appeals based on the defendant being allowed to go pro se. No much better, assuming the judge went through the Faretta ritual. Sometimes the appeal required some expert psychiatrist explaining the defendant has this uncommon form of craziness that only kicks in midway in court sessions or something. Sometimes the transcript of the trial judge's Faretta interview shows the defendant giving evasive, ambiguous, or otherwise unclear answers - which should have been disqualifiers.

[ScottComstock]

Latest from PACER (links on my server). Notable among these is a motion by ATW's standby counsel to withdraw and ATW's motion opposing continuance.

• Motion In Opposition to Order Denying Motion to Sever Trial
• US' Response to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider (EO denying defendant's motion to sever trial and motions for contempt against Orange County DA, Broward County Sheriff's Office, and Illinois Anti-Predatory Lending Database) (with declarations of two USMS employees documenting ATW's refusal to go to court)
• Barbara Williams' motion to continue trial date (declaration of counsel)
• ATW's standby counsel's motion to withdraw (declaration of counsel)
• US' Response to ATW's motion for return of property (atch: 1 2)
• ATW's motion in opposition to continuance

[ScottComstock]

New this week (links to my server:)

• ATW files yet another seventh motion to show cause complaining about discovery access and accusing the court of being complicit in depriving him of his "basic constitutional rights"
• Anabel Cabebe joins ATW's mother's motion to continue the trial date
• William Wagener's "On Second Thought" files a request to film the trial, which was shot down by the judge

[ScottComstock]

Bad news, the trial's been pushed back again, and ATW's being an obstinate crybaby and still won't go to court:

EP : Defendant (03) Barbara Williams Motion 409 to Continue Trial Date; 419 MOTION for Joinder by Defendant (02) Anabel Cabebe re 409 MOTIONDefendant Barbara Williams' Motion to Continue Trial Date; 412 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Standby Counsel Lars Robert Isaacson as to all Defendants held on 2/1/2019.
Defendant (01) Anthony T. Williams not present.
Defendant (02) Anabel Cabebe, present, not in custody. Defendant (03) Barbara Williams, not present, presence waived.

Court received notification from the U.S. Marshals Office that Defendant (01) Anthony T. Williams refused to be transported to the U.S. Courthouse for the Hearings today.

Court construes that Defendant (01) Anthony T. Williams has voluntarily waived his presence for this hearing, Defendant has already filed an opposition 417 .

Defendant (03) Barbara Williams Motion 409 to Continue Trial Date and 419 MOTION for Joinder by Defendant (02) Anabel Cabebe re 409 Barbara Williams' Motion to Continue Trial Date are Granted and terminated.

Jury Selection/Trial and all Hearings and Deadlines are as to: Defendants (01) ANTHONY T. WILLIAMS, (02) ANABEL CABEBE and (03) BARBARA WILLIAMS:


Jury Selection/Trial is continued to Tuesday, 1/21/2020 at 09:00 AM before Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi.
Final Pretrial Conference is continued to 12/23/2019 at 02:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Richard L. Puglisi.
Defendant's Motions due 12/9/2019.
Government's Response due 12/23/2019.

The Court ORDERS that the period of time from 2/25/2019 up to and including 1/21/2020, be excluded from computation, pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7).
AUSA to prepare Order Re: Continuance and Excluding time.

412 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Standby Counsel Lars Robert Isaacson is terminated as being moot.

Counsel is informed that the new Trial Date is a firm Setting. Court will not be inclined to entertain any further continuance of trial.

Defendant (02) Anabel Cabebes current conditions of release to continue.
(Court Reporter Debi Read)
(JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI)
(cib)