Through a fog of legalese - One OPCA litigant's dismissal by the CFC

[jcolvin2]

In the Court of Federal Claims
FILED
No. 15-454 C
(Filed June 8, 2015)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
TERRENCE ALAN GROMAN *
Pro Se Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
ORDER
JUN - 8 2015
U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

The court has before it plaintiff s pro se complaint filed May 4, 2015.
Because the court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims, his suit must be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of
Federal Claims (RCFC). The reasons for dismissal are set forth below.

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Terrence Alan Groman failed to pay the court's filing fee when
submitting his complaint. He was notified that he must either pay the filing fee of four hundred dollars or submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis. On
May 18,2015, the Clerk's Office received a document which resembled a check in the amount of $400, although the document was not actually a check that could be cashed. It appears that plaintiff created the document. The pseudo-check has been rejected as a means of payment.

On May 18, 2015, the Clerk's Office also received a submission from
plaintiff which appears to have been an attempted filing of various documents
related to his claim. The submission was referred to the undersigned for a ruling because the documents submitted did not comply with this court's rules. The
attempted filing was defective because, among other reasons, it did not conform
with the required format for filings and no copies of the attempted filing were
submitted by plaintiff. The submission, which includes in the caption the words
"Affidavit of Acceptance & Offer" and "Certified Copies of the Maryland State
Constitution 1867 & Statutes at Large; Public Law 10, HJR 192:," despite its
defects, will be filed by leave of the court as an additional attachment to the
complaint.

II. Pro Se Litigants

The court acknowledges that Mr. Groman is proceeding pro se and is "not
expected to frame issues with the precision of a common law pleading." Roche v.
Us. Postal Serv., 828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Pro se plaintiffs are
entitled to a liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be
held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers").
Accordingly, the court has examined the complaint thoroughly and has attempted
to discern all of plaintiff's claims and legal arguments.

"A court may and should raise the question of its jurisdiction sua sponte at
any time it appears in doubt." Arctic Corner, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999,
1000 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Accordingly, it is appropriate for a judge
to review a pro se complaint to ascertain if, beyond peradventure, it cannot
support jurisdiction. Thus, the government is not taxed, in a case that
unquestionably does not belong in the Court of Federal Claims, with a wasteful
expenditure of its limited resources to establish that jurisdiction is lacking. In any
case exhibiting a jurisdictional basis "'so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be
absolutely devoid of merits,'" Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)), the court would
be remiss in allowing the action to proceed so pointlessly.

III. This Court's Jurisdiction

The Tucker Act delineates this court's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012). This statute "confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Federal Claims over the specified categories of actions brought against the United States .... " Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) (citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff may bring certain types of claims before this court, as permitted by the Tucker Act, but there are limits to the types of claims that may be reviewed by this court.

IV. Analysis

A. Plaintiff's Claim (or Claims)

The unpaginated, unbound complaint contains no clear or concise explanation of the basis for suit. l Much of the complaint references equity. See Compl. at I (captioning the claim as a "Bill in Equity"). Through a fog of legalese, it appears that Mr. Groman seeks funds from the United States Treasury because of his status as a citizen (or because of some other relationship to the United States, a relationship perhaps based upon the birth certificate and social security card copies attached to the complaint). At one point in the complaint Mr. Groman references a demand for "five hundred million dollars in LAWFUL MONEY, Silver to reduce the PUBLIC DEBT, in a treasury direct account as a private american national." Id. at 5.


It is difficult to understand the complaint. Various paragraphs suggest that Mr. Groman is invoking a variety of legal theories that might establish his right to funds currently managed by the United States Treasury or the Federal Reserve System. He is critical of these entities:

It has been long established that no loan nor exchange of true value has taken place between the PUBLIC Treasury Financial System and the "Person" Corporate Estate, TERRENCE ALAN GROMAN and any and all derivatives thereof; that in Federal bankruptcy, it is against public policy and unlawful for the Treasury and thus Federal Reserve Banks to loan money or credit; we know that the banks are the Trustees and have through deception and without full disclosure tricked the People into believing that the Estate/Trust "DEBTOR" TERRENCE ALAN GROMAN was the Grantor, or Party who provides the value; it was never made clear that the Federal Reserve System invested nothing in their loans; stood no chance of loss in the loans, provided no consideration and are therefore all void nunc pro tunc, imperfect assignments without standing; usury; nor does any title truly pass due to theft or fraud; it has been all smoke and mirrors[.]

Id. at 3. Mr. Groman asserts that "[t]he Defendants' failure to immediately settle the Estate returning it to honor shall constitute a Breach of Trust and Fiduciary Duty, as operation outside of their corporate charter-giving rise to immediate bankruptcy and liquidation." Id. at 4. Affording all reasonable inferences to the complaint, plaintiff appears to assert a claim for money damages against the United States, although the basis of such a claim is not stated with any clarity. The complaint could also be read, although the text is far from clear, to state a claim for funds administered by the Social Security Administration. Certain paragraphs reference retirement and the resources required for independent living.

In one such paragraph, Mr. Groman asserts that he will not be a burden on the
government:

Terrence-Alan: Groman releases, holds harmless and indemnifies any Justices and the UNITED STATES in the form of the commercial world against lost, damage and/or injury; is solvent, holding real value in the form of gold, silver, tools, equipment, knowledge and the experience necessary to provide for himself in the exchange; capable of providing for himself through the honorable expansion of his own life energy and owns a dwelling; was born on the land, has the love and support of his family and friends in the event of a disaster or emergency and shall not be a burden to the UNITED STATES, STATE, COUNTY or CHURCH; by his own free will, waives all benefits derived under the "paupers certificate," choosing 100% accountability, forever forsaking limited liability[.]

Id. at 5. In another such paragraph, plaintiff states that his "decision to retire is
final and [he] now expect[s] the UNITED STATES to immediately begin a forensic audit in order to achieve an equitable final settlement of all relative accounts." Id. at 4. Again, affording all reasonable inferences to the complaint, plaintiff appears to assert a claim for funds that would otherwise be reserved for his Social Security benefits.

B. Limits on this Court's Jurisdiction

None of the claims that the court can discern in the complaint are within this
court's jurisdiction. This court has no power to force an equitable accounting of
the Treasury in order to determine what sum, if any, is owed plaintiff. As is clear
from binding precedent, this court does not have general equitable jurisdiction.
E.g., Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en bane).
Nor does this court have any jurisdiction over claims related to Social Security
benefits. E.g., Marcus v. United States, 909 F.2d 1470, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Finally, although this court does have jurisdiction over contracts with the United
States, there is no jurisdiction in this court for claims based on alleged contracts
established by right of birth, birth certificate or social security number. See, e.g.,
Rivera v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 644,650 (2012) (dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction a contract claim founded on the plaintiffs birth certificate and social
security number); Twp. o/Saddle Brook v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 101, 110
(2012) (dismissing a contract claim for lack of jurisdiction where the allegations
of the existence of a contract were "patently insubstantial").

For a suit to proceed in this court, a plaintiff must make a "a nonfrivolous allegation that [he] is within the class of plaintiffs entitled to recover under the money-mandating source" of law underlying the claim. Jan's Helicopter Serv.,
Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299,1309 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Mr. Groman relies on an incoherent jumble of legal terms to assert, apparently, that he is owed $500 million by the federal government. This suit is frivolous. Because it is frivolous, it must be dismissed. Because it is frivolous, transfer to any other federal court is not in the interest of justice . No further filings will be accepted from plaintiff other than a notice of appeal.


V. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that

(1) The Clerk's Office shall FILE by leave of the court, as of the date of this order, the submission titled, in part, "Affidavit of Acceptance & Offer," received on May 18,2015 and serve this filing on defendant;

(2) The Clerk's Office is directed to ENTER final judgment in favor of defendant DISMISSING the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, without prejudice; and,

(3) The Clerk's Office is directed to RETURN UNFILED any future submissions from plaintiff other than a Notice of Appeal.



I. The court has supplied page numbers to the complaint, which includes several
documents which could probably be characterized as attachments.

[KickahaOta]

Fog is something that typically happens at sea. So the plaintiff clearly was tricked into being heard before a "judge" acting in admiralty, rather than a True De Jure Common Law Judge Under Whatever Sovereign Theory Is Popular This Month.

[Famspear]

Fog is something that typically happens at sea. So the plaintiff clearly was tricked into being heard before a "judge" acting in admiralty, rather than a True De Jure Common Law Judge Under Whatever Sovereign Theory Is Popular This Month.

This stuff shore duzz git tek-ni-kuhl.

[KickahaOta]

This stuff shore duzz git tek-ni-kuhl.

You fool! You said "shore"! Now we're stuck in admiralty law forever, and the dinar will never RV!

[LPC]

Through a fog of legalese,

As someone whose stock in trade is a "fog of legalese," I resent this comparison.

Later, in the same opinion:

Here, Mr. Groman relies on an incoherent jumble of legal terms to assert, apparently, that he is owed $500 million by the federal government. This suit is frivolous.

An "incoherent jumble of legal terms" is not the same as a "fog of legalese." One is incompetent, and the other is a tool of the trade. I resent the comparison.

[The Observer]

An "incoherent jumble of legal terms" is not the same as a "fog of legalese." One is incompetent, and the other is a tool of the trade. I resent the comparison.

Apparently, this is a recent addition to the hazards of litigation - the risk of being lumped in with the friv artists.