TP Argues That You And I Never Earned Income

[The Observer]

JOHN HOBART ZENTMYER,
Petitioner
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

Filed October 4, 2017

John Hobart Zentmyer, pro se.

Monica I. Cendejas, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JACOBS, Judge: Petitioner failed to file a Federal income tax return or pay income tax for 1996. After petitioner was convicted of income tax evasion, among other things, and served time in prison, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)prepared a substitute for return. On December 12, 2016, the IRS mailed petitioner a notice of deficiency for 1996. On March 8, 2017, petitioner filed a petition in this Court, using the standard form provided by the Court. Petitioner filled in all of the lines on the form and attached a document as his petition.

On April 26, 2017, respondent filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (motion to dismiss) under Rule 40. On May 9, 2017, the Court ordered petitioner to state his objections to respondent's motion to dismiss or file an amended petition containing clear and concise assignments of each and every error that petitioner alleges to have been committed by respondent, by May 30, 2017.

On May 30, 2017, petitioner sent a document to the Court which incorporated his (1) amended petition; (2) reply to respondent's motion to dismiss; and (3) motion for partial summary judgment. The Court separated this document into its three component elements. The amended petition was filed as of May 30,2017; the reply to respondent's motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment were filed June 5, 2017. On July 7, 2017, respondent filed a first supplemental motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (supplemental motion to dismiss). On August 22, 2017, petitioner filed a response to respondent's supplemental motion to dismiss. Finally, on September5, 2017, petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

*3 For the reasons stated infra, we will grant respondent's motion to dismiss as supplemented by respondent's supplemental motion to dismiss and deny as moot petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment and his motion for judgment on the pleadings. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) as amended and in effect for the year at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Background

The following facts are not in dispute and are derived from the pleadings, the parties' motions, and supporting exhibits attached thereto. The facts are stated solely for purposes of deciding the motions before us. See Hahn v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 140, 141 (1998); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff'd, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). At the time petitioner filed his petition, he resided in California.

In the notice of deficiency respondent determined an income tax deficiency of $ 256,365, a section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax of $ 57,682, a section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax of $ 64,091, and a section 6654 addition to tax of $ 13,645. The deficiency in tax is related to petitioner's conviction in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on January 31, 2005.1Link to the text of the note Petitioner was convicted of one count of making a false statement to a financial institution in violation of title 18 U.S.C. sec. 1014; one count of income tax evasion in violation of section 7201; and multiple counts of structuring financial transactions in violation of title 31 U.S.C. sec. 5324(a)(3) and (d)(1). Petitioner was sentenced to 33 months in prison and, inter alia, ordered to pay tax restitution of $ 264,335 to the United States pursuant to the terms of 18 U.S.C. sec. 3612(f)(3)(A).

Petitioner makes his views clear on the first page of his petition, wherein he states:

this Notice of deficiency shows an adjustment to a conclusion of law predicated on what appears to be Respondent's implication that in 1996 Petitioner received a certain amount of something, and then claims that this adjustment resulted in a deficiency attributed to Petitioner.

One can only speculate about whether there might have been a worker bee in a particular federal office who led to this adjustment suddenly popping up after a period of more than 20 years had elapsed, but this revelation is of no consequence because Petitioner's instant challenge shifts the burden of proof to Respondent such that the Notice is void unless Respondent can validate the purported deficiency.

Thereafter, petitioner criticizes the notice of deficiency, asserting that it is inadequate as a matter of law.

"We determined that you owe" is not legal support for the imposition of the purported tax but merely shows that Respondent went through the motions to satisfy itself that Petitioner is in arrears. "How we figured the deficiency" is not legal support for the amount due but is merely a statement which implies that Respondent used certain statute(s) that set forth the various formulae used for its calculations. "Amount due" is not legal support for the exaction from Petitioner's personal property but is merely the amount determined by Respondent's unsupported calculations.

In elaborating his position, petitioner includes numerous arguments. First, petitioner asserts that the notice of deficiency is inadequate because "the laws that led to the IRS' conclusions are nowhere to be found in Respondent's Notice."

Next, petitioner asserts that the IRS failed to define the adjustments determined in the notice of deficiency.

These adjustments appear to be the result of Respondent's belief that Petitioner is somehow culpable because he had received 738,690.20 un-denominated things. (Id.) Nowhere in this form 4549-A is there any definitive statement as to what these things might be, but whatever they are, the end result is that purportedly Petitioner is supposed to supply 1,137,309.17 of them to the government.

In the temporal realm (the real world), one cannot receive an abstraction. One can only receive actual physical objects, all of which are classified as personal property and further denominated by name, such as tennis ball or dollar bill. Respondent's Notice appears to imply that Petitioner received a certain number of un-denominated physical items, as can be inferred from the numbers therein alleging various amounts. If this assumption is accurate, it forms the only antecedent fact in the entire instant matter: sic According to Respondent, Petitioner received 738,690.20 items of un-denominated personal property (the "total adjustments"). This implication and all other assertions in Respondent's Notice are conclusions of law, not stipulations of fact, which appear to have been derived from the application of undisclosed law to the singular factual implication that Petitioner received a certain amount of personal property.

Third, petitioner asserts that in the notice of deficiency the IRS failed to define the tax determined.

There are only three logical options for creating an arrearage traceable to the receipt of personal property: (1) a tax on the value of the property received, (2) an excise on the event of the receipt, or (3) a tax on the increase in net worth of the recipient. Respondent's Notice does not disclose which of these three options is the basis for the purported "amount due" from Petitioner or whether Respondent chose another option based on logic, but Regardless sic of what Respondent believes is being taxed, the Notice does not disclose the specific statutes that purportedly support the tax itself or the amount Respondent claims is due.

Fourth, petitioner asserts that the IRS' aforementioned failures signify that the IRS is taxing only an undefined abstraction.

Without specifically defining, as opposed to merely labeling sic, what is being taxed, Respondent is claiming that an undefined abstraction is taxable and asking Petitioner and this Court to assume without that it truly is taxable. Therefore, to satisfy Respondent's burden of proof by at least attempting to legitimize the amount due, and regardless of the legal basis Respondent believes supports this amount or what Respondent believes is being taxed, Respondent must disclose (1) the statute or case law that defines legally, rather than merely labels, what Respondent claims is being taxed, and (2) the statute that imposes a tax on what has just been defined.

*7 Fifth, petitioner asserts that the statutes "disclosed" in the notice of deficiency involve only penalties and interest. "There are no statutes disclosed that support Respondent's legal conclusions about what Respondent is purporting to tax, why Respondent believes that whatever is being taxed is taxable, or that require Petitioner to supply any of his personal property to the government." Petitioner further asserts that the penalties imposed would apply only if petitioner were required to file a tax return and that respondent has failed to make such a showing.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the Form 4549-A, Income Tax Examination Changes, attached to the notice of deficiency is in error because his last name was misspelled as "Zentmeyer" and, consequently he, John Zentmyer, was never a party to the examination.

Respondent did not file an answer to the petition. Rather, as stated supra p. 2, respondent filed a motion to dismiss. In his motion respondent asserts that the petition does not meet the requirements of Rule 34(b) and that "petitioner's disjointed filing raises several frivolous arguments" and that his contentions "bear no merit with regard to whether the determinations set forth in the notice of deficiency are erroneous." Thus, respondent concludes, "the document filed as the Petition does not comply with the Rules of the Tax Court as to the form and content of the Petition and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

In his amended petition, petitioner states:

B. In accordance with T.C. rule 34(b), Petitioner assigns the following single dispositive error to Respondent's notice: Respondent has already admitted in error his belief that Petitioner received income. In his answering MTD, Respondent states:

"Nowhere in the petition does Petitioner state any facts indicating that he did not receive the income that is the subject of the notice of deficiency." (MTD at 4.)

C. With this statement Respondent admits that he has not alleged facts in his form 4549-A because he knows, or certainly should know, that Petitioner could not have received income because as a matter of law no one has ever received income.
Continuing, petitioner states:

Respondent appears to believe that the legal definition of income is "everything that comes in," but the U.S. Supreme Court put this definition on the ash heap of mistaken beliefs many years ago with the definition of income that remains legally valid today and that is binding precedent for the instant case:

"‘Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor the work of a company's employees, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets." - Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).

In his supplemental motion to dismiss respondent asserts that "similar to the original petition, petitioner fails to state any facts indicating that he did not receive the income that is the subject of the notice of deficiency" and indeed that the amended petition surpasses the original petition in raising frivolous arguments.


In his response to respondent's supplemental motion to dismiss, petitioner asserts that "respondent admitted that Petitioner received income in his original Motion to Dismiss (MTD. at 4), which satisfies the rule 34(b) format. However, the legal reasoning behind this conclusion appears to have escaped Respondent's attention; therefore, Petitioner will again explain it but with more detail and legal authority." Petitioner argues:

Although Respondent is attempting to collect an un-apportioned direct tax by re-naming Petitioner's personal property "income" and then taxing this purported income rather than the underlying property, his form 4549-A contains no facts or law with which to support either his methodology or his calculations. Therefore, as Petitioner stated in his earlier submissions and re-states here, with no facts or law to support Respondent's calculations, they cannot be correct as a matter of law.

Petitioner maintains that "income" is "classified as an abstractions sic because it has no mass, shape or color, which means that income is incapable of being received." And he concludes:

Respondent's all-encompassing claim that wages are income may be true for some recipients under some circumstances, but lower court decisions that ignore the Supreme Court's binding definition of the generic term "income" do not have the force of law except for the cases in which they were issued.

Discussion

The Commissioner's determinations in the notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving error. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). In challenging the Commissioner's determination, a petition filed by a taxpayer should be simple, concise, and direct. Rule 31(b). The petition must provide the basis on which the taxpayer disagrees with the determinations, supporting facts, and a prayer setting forth the relief sought. Rule 34(b). Specifically, Rule 34(b)(4) requires that the petition provide "clear and concise assignments of each and every error which the petitioner alleges to have been committed by the Commissioner in the determination of the deficiency or liability. * * * Any issue not raised in the assignments of error shall be deemed to be conceded." While we construe all pleadings to do substantial justice, Rule 31(d), we may dismiss a petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 40. Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate where, even if all of the allegations contained in a pleading are true, a claim fails as a matter of law. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008); Cohen v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 299 (2012), aff'd, 550 F. App'x 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Upon review of petitioner's petition and his amended petition, we find that no justiciable issue has been raised. Consequently, we will grant respondent's motion to dismiss, as supplemented.

Petitioner has failed to assert any error in the notice of deficiency. Instead, he has drafted a rambling collection of tax-protester arguments. As has been said on many occasions by many courts: "We perceive no need to refute these arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these arguments have some colorable merit." Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984); see Rapp v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 1985). Nonetheless, in the hope that this opinion may deter individuals from raising these "points" in the future, we will briefly address petitioner's assertions.

Most of petitioner's assertions may be grouped into two categories: (1) the notice of deficiency did not spell out the laws under which the determinations were made and (2) the IRS' determinations were undefined abstractions and petitioner was unable to determine whether he owed a "dollar" or a "tennis ball". With respect to the first group of assertions, we have held that it is not necessary to include a statutory citation for each adjustment. Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 200, 205 (2006) (citing Jarvis v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 646, 655-656 (1982)), aff'd, 521 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2008). With respect to the second group of assertions, we cannot help but observe that these are quintessential examples of frivolous arguments. The Form 886-A, Explanation of Items, attached to the notice of deficiency clearly includes U.S. dollar symbols, i.e. "$ ", and it is obvious to any reasonable person what the IRS' deficiency determination is. Income is not an abstraction. Were we to accept petitioner's position, the 16th Amendment, authorizing the income tax, would be meaningless.

Petitioner's final assertion - that the Form 4549-A attached to the notice of deficiency is addressed to "John Zentmeyer" rather than petitioner, John Zentmyer - is also frivolous. The spelling of petitioner's surname on the form is obviously a typographical error.

Petitioner's amended petition is no better than the original petition. Petitioner asserts that not only did he not receive income, but "as a matter of law no one has ever received income", citing the Supreme Court's holding in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). In Macomber the Supreme Court decided that a shareholder-taxpayer did not realize gain on the receipt of a stock dividend. The Court did not hold that no one has ever received income. Indeed, in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-431 (1955), the Supreme Court emphatically held that the definition of income in Macomber "was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions." In other words, the Supreme Court said that Macomber does not hold what petitioner claims it holds. The Code provides that gross income includes all income from whatever source derived unless excluded by law. Sec. 61; Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1977); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 430.

To conclude, we find that petitioner has failed to raise a justiciable issue in his petition. We therefore will grant respondent's motion to dismiss filed April 26, 2017, as supplemented by respondent's supplemental motion to dismiss filed July 7, 2017, and dismiss petitioner's petition. Finally, we will deny as moot petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment as well as petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

We caution petitioner that raising frivolous arguments similar to the ones herein in the future may subject him to penalties imposed by the Court. See sec. 6673.

In the light of the foregoing,

An appropriate order and order of dismissal will be entered.

[Burnaby49]

He has one point. After battling with the guy for almost 20 years the IRS should have been able to spell his name correctly.

[wserra]

Gotta give Zentmyer something else as well. Not just anyone can drag out a criminal evasion case for fourteen years.

[Famspear]

He has one point. After battling with the guy for almost 20 years the IRS should have been able to spell his name correctly.

Although, considering his behavior, maybe he doesn't deserve to have his name spelled correctly.

[countyguard]

OK guys... you have things all wrong... on http://www.quatloos.com/hereisthelaw.htm, there are presumptions being made, and your offer is misleading. This will likely fall on deaf ears, but here goes...

First, the 16th Amendment does NOT define "income" nor does the IR Code... "The general term 'income' is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code . . . US. v. Ballard, 535, 575 F. 2D 400 (1976); (see also Oliver v. Halstead, 196 VA 992; 86 S.E. Rep. 2D 858).

Your offer for 10M is based on a challenge that is not what "tax protestors," who understand the law, are lawfully claiming. The "income" tax is a lawful, constitutional tax, PERIOD. The problem is that you don't understand the lawful definition of "income" and it does NOT include wages, salary or compensation for services" of private Americans. Merchan ts Loan & Tru st Co. v. Smietanka, 225 U'.S. 509, 518, 519. (1923) "Income, as defined by the Supreme Court means , 'gains and profits' as a result of corp orate activity and 'profit gained through t he sale or conversion of capital assets.'''

us. v. Balsrd, 535, 575 F. 2D 400 (1976); (see also Oliver v. Halstead, 196 VA 992; 86 S.E. Rep. 2D 858)"There is a clear distinction between 'profit' and 'wages' or 'compensation for labor.' Compensation for labor cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law .. . The word profit is a different thing altogether from mere compensation for labor .. .

Income is 'NOT ALL THAT COMES IN..." Southern Pacific v. Lowe, U.S. 247 F. 330 . (1918) [Ilncome: as used in the statute should be given a meaning so as not to include everything that comes in . The true function of the words 'gains' and 'profits' is to limit t he meaning of the word 'income .' "

Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) It has to be note d that, by the language of the Act, it is not salaries, wa ges or compensation for personal services that are to be included in gross income. That which is to be included is gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for
personal services ."

Conner v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 1187 (1969) P. 1191: 47 C.J .S. Internal Revenue 98, P. 226 "[2] Whatever may constitute income, therefore, must have t he essential feature of gain to the re cipient. This was true when the 16th amendment became effect ive, it was true at the time of the decis ion in Eisner v. Macomber, it was true under section 22(a) of t he Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and it is true under section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. If there is no gain, there is no income." "[1] .. . It [income] is not synonymous with receipts. Simply put , pay from a job is a 'wage,' and wages are not taxable. Congress has taxed income, not compensation."

Second, the 16th Amendment did NOT institute the "income" tax, as this was alread a tax, even bact to 1863, and certainly didn't put a "new" tax on American's wages. 1913 Congressional Record, P. 3843, 3844; Senator Albert B. Cummins. "The word 'income' has a well defined meaning before the amendment of the Constitution was adopted."

Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1917), Brieffor the Appellant at 11, 14' 15. "The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constit ution has not enlarged the taxing
power of Congress...It was further held that the effect of the Sixteenth Amendment was not to change the nature of this tax or to take it out of the
class of excises to which it belonged, but merely to make it impossible by any sort of reasoning thereafter to treat it as a direct tax because of the sources from which the income was derived ."

Evans vs. Gore, 253 US 245 , 263 (1920). ". . . It manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation." See also Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., b) Eisner v Ma comber; c) Evans vs. Gore; d)Peck & Co. v. Lowe.

If you want to prove the actual laws and case precedent, do so, but don't make statements regarding the "income" tax that are patently false, PLEASE??? DO YOUR HOMEWORK... http://foundationfortruthinlaw.org/File ... 2-17-2.pdf AND http://foundationfortruthinlaw.org/File ... tamped.pdf.

[noblepa]

Geez, here we go again.

Countyguard, first of all, the two links you provided prove absolutely nothing. The first one is a REQUEST to the Supreme Court that it issue a Writ of Certeriari. Did the court issue the requested writ? What is the case number that it became. The second one is a complaint in the Court of Claims. Again, it proves nothing. What was the outcome of the case?

The other arguments have all been tried many times, in many courts, all with a resounding lack of success. No court, ever, anywhere, has ruled that the income tax, as constituted in the US, is invalid because neither the 16th amendment nor the IRC define the word "income".

IANAL, but (lawyers, correct me if I'm wrong) it is a fundamental concept of law that a statute need not define terms unless the statute uses them in a manner other than their generally accepted meaning.

Civics 101 lesson: In the US, the law is what the Supreme Court says it is. The SC has ruled that the IRC, as currently written is constitutional and enforceable. They have also declined to hear many cases appealed from lower courts that ruled that way, as well. In our system, that means that the lower court ruling stands as law.

Show us one single case (that was not overruled on appeal), in any Federal court, that supports any part of any of your claims. If you attempt to cite a case, be careful to quote the RULING of the court, and not DICTA.

[NYGman]

OK guys... you have things all wrong... on http://www.quatloos.com/hereisthelaw.htm, there are presumptions being made, and your offer is misleading. This will likely fall on deaf ears, but here goes...

First, the 16th Amendment ...

Let me grab my popcorn...

[Famspear]

OK guys... you have things all wrong... on http://www.quatloos.com/hereisthelaw.htm, there are presumptions being made, and your offer is misleading. This will likely fall on deaf ears, but here goes...

No, we have it all right.

First, the 16th Amendment does NOT define "income" nor does the IR Code... "The general term 'income' is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code . . . US. v. Ballard, 535, 575 F. 2D 400 (1976); (see also Oliver v. Halstead, 196 VA 992; 86 S.E. Rep. 2D 858).

That is an old tax protester argument. Everyone knows that the Sixteenth Amendment does not define the term "income".

Your offer for 10M is based on a challenge that is not what "tax protestors," who understand the law, are lawfully claiming. The "income" tax is a lawful, constitutional tax, PERIOD. The problem is that you don't understand the lawful definition of "income" and it does NOT include wages, salary or compensation for services" of private Americans. Merchan ts Loan & Tru st Co. v. Smietanka, 225 U'.S. 509, 518, 519. (1923) "Income, as defined by the Supreme Court means , 'gains and profits' as a result of corp orate activity and 'profit gained through t he sale or conversion of capital assets.'''

No. Completely wrong. You fell for the Merchants' Loan tax protester argument.

In the Merchants' Loan case, the income that was ruled to be income in that case was not corporate gain or corporate income of any kind. It was income of the estate of a dead person. The estate of a dead person is not a corporation, and the income of the estate of a dead person is not corporate income, corporate profit or corporate gain.

us. v. Balsrd, 535, 575 F. 2D 400 (1976); (see also Oliver v. Halstead, 196 VA 992; 86 S.E. Rep. 2D 858)"There is a clear distinction between 'profit' and 'wages' or 'compensation for labor.' Compensation for labor cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law .. . The word profit is a different thing altogether from mere compensation for labor .. .

Wrong. We have already been through "Balsrd" (as you put it) and Oliver V. Halstead. You're just copying and pasting crap you found on the internet.

Income is 'NOT ALL THAT COMES IN..." Southern Pacific v. Lowe, U.S. 247 F. 330 . (1918) [Ilncome: as used in the statute should be given a meaning so as not to include everything that comes in . The true function of the words 'gains' and 'profits' is to limit t he meaning of the word 'income .' "

You're missing the point. The Internal Revenue Code does not say that income is "all that comes in." That's a quote taken out of context from an old court case.

Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) It has to be note d that, by the language of the Act, it is not salaries, wa ges or compensation for personal services that are to be included in gross income. That which is to be included is gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for
personal services ."

Wrong. That verbiage is not from the Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Earl. That is from the HEADNOTE printed above the text of the Court's decision. It's a paraphrase from the TAXPAYER'S BRIEF THAT WAS FILED WITH THE COURT. The taxpayer LOST the case, and the Supreme Court REJECTED the very argument you just quoted.

Conner v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 1187 (1969) P. 1191: 47 C.J .S. Internal Revenue 98, P. 226 "[2] Whatever may constitute income, therefore, must have t he essential feature of gain to the re cipient. This was true when the 16th amendment became effect ive, it was true at the time of the decis ion in Eisner v. Macomber, it was true under section 22(a) of t he Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and it is true under section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. If there is no gain, there is no income." "[1] .. . It [income] is not synonymous with receipts. Simply put , pay from a job is a 'wage,' and wages are not taxable. Congress has taxed income, not compensation."

Wrong. That's a fake quote. It is not found in the text of the Conner case, nor is it found in the text of Eisner v. Macomber. And no Federal court has ever ruled that wages are not taxable.

Second, the 16th Amendment did NOT institute the "income" tax, as this was alread a tax, even bact to 1863, and certainly didn't put a "new" tax on American's wages. 1913 Congressional Record, P. 3843, 3844; Senator Albert B. Cummins. "The word 'income' has a well defined meaning before the amendment of the Constitution was adopted."

That's pretty much correct -- and beside the point. You're trying to use an argument that actually negates your own position.

Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1917), Brieffor the Appellant at 11, 14' 15. "The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constit ution has not enlarged the taxing
power of Congress...It was further held that the effect of the Sixteenth Amendment was not to change the nature of this tax or to take it out of the
class of excises to which it belonged, but merely to make it impossible by any sort of reasoning thereafter to treat it as a direct tax because of the sources from which the income was derived ."

Again, you're missing the point. Wages are income -- and nothing in the Peck case or any other case you've cited says otherwise.

Evans vs. Gore, 253 US 245 , 263 (1920). ". . . It manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation." See also Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., b) Eisner v Ma comber; c) Evans vs. Gore; d)Peck & Co. v. Lowe.

Evans v. Gore was later overruled on another point. And you are CORRECT that the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation. Congress always had that power to tax incomes. What the Amendment did was to overrule a case called Pollock.

If you want to prove the actual laws and case precedent, do so, but don't make statements regarding the "income" tax that are patently false, PLEASE??? DO YOUR HOMEWORK... http://foundationfortruthinlaw.org/File ... 2-17-2.pdf AND http://foundationfortruthinlaw.org/File ... tamped.pdf.

NO, YOU DO YOUR HOMEWORK!!!!! You've fallen for several tax protester scams.

We have seen every single one of these arguments a thousand times.

You are the latest victim.

[Famspear]

Dear "countyguard":

It might help you if you would stop copying and pasting crap from a tax protester web site and actually learn to read and analyze legal materials.

For example, the Merchants' Loan case.

The Lucas v. Earl case.

Did you not realize that these are famous cases? Did you not believe that other people might have actually read and analyzed materials like these long ago?

Do you understand the meaning of the verb "to arrogate"? To arrogate means to claim something without justification. You are falsely claiming to have knowledge -- knowledge of U.S. Federal tax law -- that you obviously do not have.

You are arrogant.

[Famspear]

Note: Not only is Oliver v. Halstead not a Federal tax case, it's not a tax case at all. This is a Virginia Supreme Court case, and no issues of taxation were presented to or decided by the court.

The word "tax" does not even appear in the text.

[Famspear]

Regarding U.S. v. Ballard, 535 F2d 400, cert denied, 429 U.S. 918, 50 L.Ed.2d 283, 97 S.Ct. 310 (1976), the statement that "income" (for purposes of the Federal income tax) is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code is correct.

Income is not defined in the Constitution either.

In fact, most words in statutes, etc., are not defined in those statutes.

Under the U.S. legal system, there is no law requiring that all words in statutes be defined in the statutes, although some are. For example, "gross income," "adjusted gross income" and "taxable income" are defined in the Internal Revenue Code. Another red herring used impotently by tax protesters.

[Famspear]

Regarding Conner:

The correct citation is Conner v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 439 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1971).

This is an old, old tax protester's attempt to create the false impression that this case was about taxability of wages as compensation. This case had nothing to do with wages or the taxability of wages.

This case was about the taxability of compensation paid by an insurance company to a policy holder whose house had burned down. The insurance company was reimbursing the homeowner for the costs of renting a place to stay after the home burned down -- under the terms of the insurance policy. The insurance company was not paying "wages." The compensation was for the loss of a home by fire.

[Famspear]

The above verbiage regarding the case of William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918), is basically accurate.

This is another case that tax protesters cite -- apparently because they do not understand what they are reading!

Particularly devastating for tax protesters is the statement that the Sixteenth Amendment "does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects, but merely removes all occasion, which otherwise might exist, for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income, whether it be derived from one source or another." Also, the constitutionality of the tax in this case was upheld. Another dead end for tax protesters!

Earth calling "countyguard"! Wake up!

[Famspear]

Evans v. Gore was indeed overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court -- in O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939), where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Federal income tax.

In O'Malley the Court said:

[ . . . ] the question immediately before us is whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power in providing that United States judges appointed after the Revenue Act of 1932 shall not enjoy immunity from the incidences of taxation to which everyone else within the defined classes of income is subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has committed itself to the position that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not, when applied to the income of a federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the prohibition of Article III, 1 of the Constitution. To suggest that it makes inroads upon the independence of judges who took office after Congress had thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great historic experience on which the framers based the safeguards of Article III, 1.9 To subject them [i.e., U.S. judges] to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering.

The "bottom line" of O'Malley v. Woodrough is essentially that the Constitution does not exempt Federal judges from liability for Federal income tax.

Wake up, "countyguard"!

[Famspear]

Now, regarding Lucas v. Earl: This is a FAMOUS case. Did you really think, "countyguard" that you knew what the Supreme Court ruled in this case?

Here is what the Court actually said:

There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.

The U.S. Supreme Court UPHELD the Federal income tax in Lucas v. Earl.

Look, this is a case that every American law student who takes a tax law course STUDIES.

Are you really so naïve to think you actually knew what the Court ruled in this case?

[Famspear]

Now, back to Merchants' Loan. This is one of my favorites. People like the late Irwin Schiff used to cited the case, illustrating their total cluelessness.

To show how bizarre the tax protesters' argument about the Merchants' Loan case really is, consider the following. Aside from the fact that the Court ruled in Merchants' Loan that the estate's gain on the sale of stock was income under the Sixteenth Amendment and the 1916 Act, and was taxable under the Amendment and the Act, the tax protesters also conveniently ignore the plain text of the 1916 Act that the Court was interpreting.

Forget about "estates" for a minute. With respect to individuals (not corporations), section 1(a) of the 1916 Act specifically imposes the income tax on "the entire net income received [ . . . ] from all sources by every individual, a citizen or resident of the United States [ . . . ]."

Further, Section 2(a) of the Act specifically states that "the net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, [ . . . ] from interest, rent, dividends, securities [ . . . ] or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever [ . . . ]."

The 1916 Act tax on the income of corporations, by the way, was imposed under section 10 of the Act -- so there is no point in trying to argue that the term "taxable person" under the 1916 Act meant only a "corporation."

The Congress specifically imposed the tax on both individuals (section 1) and corporations (section 10) under that Act.

DO YOUR HOMEWORK, "COUNTYGUARD"!!

[Cpt Banjo]

PLEASE??? DO YOUR HOMEWORK... http://foundationfortruthinlaw.org/File ... 2-17-2.pdf AND http://foundationfortruthinlaw.org/File ... tamped.pdf.

Son, you have swallowed way too much Kool-Aid from Mr. Maehr's idiotic arguments. Given that this has been explained to you before, (see http://quatloos.com/Q-Forum/viewtopic.php?f=51&t=8434), why do you continue to post such imbecility here? Are you some kind of masochist who likes to demonstrate his idiocy for all to see and then get cut to pieces by those who know tax law better than you ever will?

Get a hobby, son. Try stamp collecting. Tax law's way over your head.

[Burnaby49]

Apparently there is no valid income tax in Canada either based on countryguard's devastating argument. The word 'income' is not defined anywhere in the Income Tax Act! A smoking gun if ever I saw one.

Why isn't it there? Way, way back, a century ago, when Canada first imposed an income tax (it was called the Income War Tax Act and was supposed to end with WWI) the word 'income' was actually defined. However as soon as a word is defined it becomes a target and tax practitioners soon found ways for their clients to receive money that used to be income but now wasn't because the method of getting it did not fall within the definition. So the definition was expanded to cover these new ways of avoiding tax. And the practitioners went back to their desks and found yet more new ways to earn income but not have it fall within the definition of income for the purpose of the Act. The government pursued this rinse and wash madness for a few cycles then realized they were playing a fool's game. There was no way 'income' could be defined that practitioners couldn't completely dance around. So the definition was taken out of the Act. There are only some specific definitions of income within the Act relating to specific sections of the Act but no general definition. For example capital gains, after adjustments, are income but they were not income prior to 1972. In order to include them the Act was revised to define capital gains as income.

So income, for Income Tax Act definition purposes, now falls squarely within the same definition analysis as the definition of poronography given by Justice Stewart of the Supreme Court of the United States in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US 184;

I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.

But, notwithstanding countryguard's unchallengeable logic, Canada somehow imposes income tax on Canadian residents.

[Famspear]

I especially love it when tax protesters copy and past the citation to Oliver v. Halstead. This was a Virginia Supreme Court case. Here is what the Court actually said:

The single question presented is whether Halstead [James W. Halstead], a director of the Association [the Norfolk Cooperative Milk Producers Association], may during his term of office receive compensation for services as a business manager.

The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the answer was "yes." Halstead could legally receive compensation for his services.

This case did not involve Federal taxes.

This case did not involve Virginia taxes.

This case did not involve any kind of tax.

The Virginia Supreme Court issued no ruling on the taxability of wages -- or of anything else -- under Federal law, under state law, or under any other law.

The word "tax" is not even found in the text of the Court's decision.

[Famspear]

I love fake quotes. The Lucas v. Earl fakery is one of the best. The use of fake quotes by tax protesters is one of those things that rings my bell.

In one of Maehr's documents linked by "countyguard," Maehr repeats the now-famous fake quote he claims is from Staples v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1937): "Income is not a wage or compensation for any type of labor."

Of course, that "quote" is a complete fake. It does not appear in the text of Staples.

Did God create these liars just to provide us with entertainment?