Quatloos! > Investment
Fraud > HYIP & Bank
Debentures > HYIP > US
v Andrews
330 U.S.App.D.C. 420, 146 F.3d 933 (D.C.Cir. 06/26/1998)
U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
No. 97-3035 Consolidated with No. 97-3036
June 26, 1998
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE
v.
ARTHUR R. ANDREWS, APPELLANT
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
(No. 96cr00139-01) (No. 96cr00139-02)
L. Barrett Boss, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellants,
with whom A.j. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, and Joseph R. Conte, appointed
by the court, were on the briefs. Barbara J. Valliere, Assistant U.s. Attorney,
argued the cause for appellee, with whom Mary Lou Leary, U.s. Attorney, John
R. Fisher and Harry R. Benner, Assistant U.s. Attorneys, were on the brief.
Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.s. Attorney, entered an appearance.
Before: Williams, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland, Circuit Judge:
Argued October 23, 1997
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.
Appellants are the chief executive officer and president of a corporation
against which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) secured a civil
monetary penalty in 1995. In 1996, a grand jury indicted appellants for essentially
the same conduct. Appellants contend that the SEC penalty constitutes a punishment
that bars their subsequent criminal prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. We disagree. Whether or not such a penalty would implicate
the Clause if imposed on appellants, we hold that the penalty imposed on the
corporation constitutes neither a punishment of appellants, nor a sufficiently
choate "attempt to punish" the appellants, to implicate their constitutional
rights. Accordingly, we do not reach the question whether the SEC penalty would
constitute a criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes under the test
the Supreme Court recently announced in Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
488 (1997), which replaced the test previously employed in United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
I.
Appellant Arthur Andrews is the chief executive officer, and appellant Thomas
Green is the president, of Fulcrum Holding Co., Inc., a District of Columbia
corporation. Andrews is Fulcrum's sole shareholder. According to the SEC, in
1994 Fulcrum offered prospective investors an opportunity to purchase "prime
bank bills of exchange," which it promised would yield a return of at
least 50% by the end of one year.
One such investor was Bayport Holdings, Ltd., which in May 1994 wired Fulcrum
$1.5 million for the purchase of prime bank bills. Instead of using the money
to buy an investment for Bayport, however, the SEC contends that Fulcrum and
its principals used the money for a variety of unrelated purposes, including
the purchase of personal automobiles and jewelry, and the payment of personal
hotel bills. Moreover, Fulcrum allegedly sent Bayport back some of Bayport's
own money, misrepresenting it as profit on the trading of prime bank bills,
in order to lull Bayport into believing that Fulcrum had made the promised
investment.
On October 31, 1994, the SEC filed a civil complaint against Fulcrum and Andrews,
charging that the prime bank bills scheme violated the antifraud provisions
of the securities laws. The complaint did not name appellant Green. It sought
injunctive relief, disgorgement of the proceeds of the illegal conduct, and
civil penalties, against both Fulcrum and Andrews.*fn1
On February 10, 1995, the SEC moved for summary judgment solely against Fulcrum.
The district court granted the motion, and ordered Fulcrum to pay Bayport disgorgement
in the amount of $1.5 million and to pay the SEC a civil penalty in the amount
of $500,000. In response to Fulcrum's representation that it had filed for
protection under the Bankruptcy Code, the district court suspended Fulcrum's
obligation to pay the disgorgement and penalty amounts pending further order.
On June 1, 1995, the SEC moved for partial summary judgment against Andrews,
requesting injunctive relief and disgorgement, but expressly not seeking civil
penalties from him. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 1 n.1,
12. The district court's final judgment, entered on July 31, 1995, granted
the SEC's request for injunctive relief, and held Fulcrum and Andrews jointly
and severally liable for the payment of $1.5 million in disgorgement to Bayport
(plus preand post-judgment interest). The court noted that the SEC had filed
a status report indicating it no longer was seeking civil penalties from Andrews.
Accordingly, the court ordered Fulcrum alone to pay the $500,000 civil penalty
to the SEC.
On April 30, 1996, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted appellants
for essentially the same conduct at issue in the civil suit, charging criminal
violations of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering statutes.*fn2
Appellants moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing
that the $500,000 penalty imposed on Fulcrum constituted prior punishment under
the test employed in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); that the
punishment was imposed for the same offense as that charged in the indictment
under the test employed in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932);
and that the punishment imposed on Fulcrum was effectively a punishment of
its officers, Andrews and Green.
The district court denied appellants' motion. The court did not consider whether
the civil penalty constituted punishment under Halper, or whether the offenses
were the same under Blockburger. Instead, the court held the Double Jeopardy
Clause inapplicable because "[t]he prohibition against multiple punishments
does not attach until a punishment is imposed," and because the Judge
in the SEC action had imposed the civil penalty only against Fulcrum and not
against Andrews or Green. Andrews and Green immediately appealed the denial
of their motion to dismiss.
II.
We must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory
appeal. Under the final-judgment rule, we ordinarily do not have jurisdiction
to hear a defendant's appeal in a criminal case prior to conviction and sentencing.
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In Abney v. United States, however, the
Supreme Court held that a pretrial denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment
on double jeopardy grounds was immediately appealable under the " 'collateral
order' exception to the final-judgment rule." 431 U.S. 651, 657, 659-62
(1977). Noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause "is a guarantee against
being twice put to trial for the same offense," the Court held that this
aspect "of the guarantee's protections would be lost if the accused were
forced to 'run the gauntlet' a second time before an appeal could be taken." Id.
at 661.
Abney involved the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against successive
prosecution. But the Supreme Court has held the Clause to have two prongs:
it protects not only against "successive prosecution," but also against "successive
punishment." Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1995). See
also United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2139 (1996) (quoting United
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993)).*fn3 Appellants here do not allege
a violation of the successive prosecution prong; instead they charge that the
government is seeking to impose a second punishment.
It might be argued that a claim brought under the successive punishment prong
does not require an interlocutory appeal for its vindication. If appellants
ultimately are acquitted, they will not have been punished twice; if they are
convicted, a court can vacate the second punishment on appeal. Abney itself
seemed to give support to such an argument, for it noted that the protection
against double punishments, unlike the guarantee against being twice put to
trial, "can be fully vindicated on an appeal following final judgment." 431
U.S. at 660.
This line of argument, however, was foreclosed by the Court's subsequent opinion
in Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995). There, the Court permitted
an interlocutory appeal alleging that a pending prosecution on cocaine charges
was barred by the successive punishment prong because the conduct at issue
had already been taken into account in defendant's sentencing for a prior marijuana
conviction. The Court held that the defendant's successive punishment claim
was ripe for review, although he had not yet been convicted or sentenced on
the cocaine charges, because the Clause protected not just against "more
than one punishment for the same offense" but also against "an attempt
to secure that punishment in more than one trial." 515 U.S. at 397 (emphasis
added). Accordingly, multiple punishment claims, like multiple prosecution
claims, are appropriate subjects for interlocutory appeal. See United States
v. Perez-Herrera, 86 F.3d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Baird,
63 F.3d 1213, 1215 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Woods, 949 F.2d
175, 177 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991).*fn4
But that does not end the matter. A defendant cannot obtain interlocutory
review of a motion to dismiss an indictment simply by characterizing his claim
as one involving double jeopardy. If that were the rule, defendants could disrupt
their trials at will, pending the resolution of appeals. Instead, the Supreme
Court held in Richardson v. United States that a claim of double jeopardy must
be at least "colorable" to confer interlocutory jurisdiction on an
appellate court. 468 U.S. 317, 322 (1984). The standard is a lenient one. Indeed,
the Court made clear just how lenient the standard was in Abney itself where,
although it found jurisdiction to hear the defendant's interlocutory appeal,
it disposed of defendant's argument on the merits in a single paragraph. See
431 U.S. at 664-65.
Even under this lenient standard, however, we cannot describe Green's claim
as colorable. He and Andrews contend that the civil penalty imposed on Fulcrum
was effectively a prior punishment imposed on Fulcrum's officers. They claim
that the district court in the SEC civil litigation found Fulcrum to be a mere
sham, that that finding makes Fulcrum's corporate form void, "not merely
voidable," and that as corporate officers they therefore are liable for
the judgment.
This novel claim must clear a number of logical hurdles before it can prevail-hurdles
which we explore in Part III below with respect to Andrews. But whatever this
argument's general difficulties, as applied to Green it fails at the start.
As the face of the pleadings makes clear, Green was never a party to the SEC
civil suit. The complaint did not name him as a defendant; indeed, it did not
mention him at all.
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is "intrinsically
personal." Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994)
(quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 447). A defendant cannot invoke it to prevent
his punishment on the ground that another already has been punished. See United
States v. Louisville Edible Oil Prods., Inc., 926 F.2d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting claim that punishment of Subchapter S corporation constituted punishment
of employees paid on the basis of the corporation's profits); Woods, 949 F.2d
at 177 & n.3 (action against corporation does not constitute punishment
of its sole shareholder). As the Supreme Court said in United States v. MacDonald, "a
double jeopardy claim ... requires at least a colorable showing that a defendant
once before has been in jeopardy...." 435 U.S. 850, 862 (1978). Moreover, "[w]ithout
risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach...." Serfass
v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1975).
Green has never been in that position. He owns no stock in Fulcrum. He neither
has been held liable for any monetary penalty, nor has he ever been party to
a proceeding in which he was at risk of being held liable for the penalty imposed
on Fulcrum. Indeed, defense counsel conceded at oral argument, and the government
did not dispute, that Green was not and cannot be bound by the judgment in
the SEC action against Fulcrum.*fn5 At a minimum, some additional proceeding
will be necessary before the corporation's penalty can be imposed on Green-assuming,
without deciding, that such a penalty could be imposed on him at all. He thus
is in no more difficult a position than that of a yet-unindicted grand jury
subject who watches his confederate proceed to trial. He may be apprehensive
about his own fate, but until he himself goes to trial he cannot claim to have
been placed in jeopardy. See generally United States v. Gartner, 93 F.3d 633,
635 (9th Cir. 1996) (no double jeopardy where defendant was not jointly and
severally liable for civil penalty assessed in prior proceeding); Baird, 63
F.3d at 1219 (because defendant never became a party to forfeiture proceeding,
he never was placed in jeopardy); United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465
(7th Cir. 1994) (same).
It is a "fundamental principle that an accused must suffer jeopardy before
he can suffer double jeopardy." Serfass, 420 U.S. at 393. Because Green
never has "suffered jeopardy," his claim of double jeopardy is not
colorable. Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Andrews presents a more complicated story. Unlike Green, the SEC did file
a civil complaint against him and did, at least initially, seek the imposition
of a civil penalty against him. Moreover, as the sole shareholder and chief
executive officer of Fulcrum, he is not an unlikely target for liability through
piercing of the corporate veil, and the SEC action has at least increased the
chance that one day he will be held liable. Hence, even if punishment has not
yet been imposed, we cannot dismiss as non-colorable the possibility that it
has been attempted in the Witte sense. Given the lenient standard employed
by the Supreme Court for finding interlocutory jurisdiction, we must proceed
to the merits of Andrews' claims.
III.
As already noted, the Supreme Court has held the Double Jeopardy Clause to
possess two prongs, protecting against both multiple prosecutions and multiple
punishments. In Halper, the Supreme Court held that the protection against
multiple punishments was triggered where a civil sanction was so "overwhelmingly
disproportionate" to the damages the defendant caused that it could not "fairly
be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." 490
U.S. at 449.
Invoking Halper's formulation of the protection against multiple punishments,
Andrews argues that the civil money penalty imposed on Fulcrum constituted
punishment for his allegedly fraudulent activities relating to Bayport and
that the Double Jeopardy Clause therefore bars his criminal prosecution. Apparently
because of our decision in SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
holding that under Halper disgorgement of ill-gotten gains in an action brought
by the SEC is remedial rather than punitive, Andrews does not argue that the
disgorgement remedy here was punitive. Instead, he argues that because the
money penalty was exacted on top of disgorgement, the punitive nature of that
penalty is manifest.
Like the district court, we do not determine whether the SEC civil money penalty
constituted a prior criminal punishment, or whether under Blockburger it covered
the same offenses as the indictment. Our consideration of the prior punishment
issue would be particularly problematic at this stage, since after this court
heard oral argument, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hudson v. United
States, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997). There, the Court disavowed Halper's conclusion
that punishment, rather than criminal punishment, could trigger the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 118 S.Ct. at 493-94. To determine whether criminal punishment
was at issue, the Court focused not just on whether a prior penalty was proportional
to a victim's injury, but rather on the multi-factor test it previously had
employed in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963). See 118 S.Ct. at 491, 49396. Although there are striking
similarities between the sanctions the Office of Comptroller of the Currency
imposed in Hudson, which the Court declined to characterize as criminal, and
the SEC civil money penalty sought in this case,*fn6 that issue was never briefed
in this court and we are loath to proceed without the views of the parties.
In any event, we find no need to consider the Hudson/Halper or Blockburger
issues because we find that Andrews-like Green-suffered no prior jeopardy,
and hence could not have suffered double jeopardy. The district court reached
this conclusion by finding that no punishment had yet been imposed on Andrews.
We agree that no punishment has yet been imposed although, as noted in Part
IV infra, we are not certain that necessarily disposes of the issue.
Andrews has two arguments in support of the claim that he already has been
punished. His first requires three steps: (1) the district court in the SEC
litigation "has already" found Fulcrum "to be merely a cloak
for fraud"; (2) therefore, the corporate form is void, "not merely
voidable"; and (3) therefore, the judgment imposed on Fulcrum "immediately
became a liability of the defendants." See Appellants' Br. at 6, 10, 12.*fn7
We need not examine the validity of the second and third steps, because the
premise is factually incorrect. The district court did not find that Fulcrum
was a sham. To the contrary, the court paid obeisance to the corporate form,
accepting Fulcrum's representation that it had filed for bankruptcy protection
and suspending payment of the judgment pending further proceedings. Indeed,
the court made virtually no findings at all. Because Fulcrum refused to answer
the complaint, citing purported Fifth Amendment concerns, the district court
treated the SEC's allegations as conceded and entered judgment accordingly.
But, Andrews contends, because the SEC had alleged that Fulcrum was merely
a cloak for the fraudulent activities of its officers, the court effectively
adopted that allegation by treating it as conceded. Again, Andrews' problem
is with his factual premise. The SEC did not allege, as Andrews asserts, that
Fulcrum was merely a "fraudulent enterprise aimed at wealthy investors." Appellants'
Br. at 12. That quotation leaves out some important words from the SEC's original
sentence-which is found not in the complaint but in an SEC memorandum in support
of temporary relief. The full sentence alleges that Fulcrum "embarked
on a fraudulent enterprise aimed at wealthy investors." Pl. Mem. in Supp.
of Temp. Relief at 2 (emphasis added). That plainly is not an allegation about
what Fulcrum was, but about what it did. The difference between being a fraud
and conducting one is important. Even a fully-capitalized, Fortune 500 corporation
can embark on a fraud, but that would not make its corporate form a sham or
its shareholders personally liable.
Andrews' second argument in support of the notion that he has been punished
is that even if the government has never sought to pierce the corporate veil, "in
this jurisdiction" he has as much right to pierce it as the government
does. For this proposition, Andrews cites our opinion in Quinn v. Butz, 510
F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
This argument suffers from a number of significant flaws. Although Quinn does
hold that penetration of the corporate veil can be urged against as well as
by the government, we emphasized there that "the ultimate principle is
one permitting its use to avoid inJustice." 510 F.2d at 759. Avoiding "inJustice" is
not the same as avoiding indictment. The inJustice Andrews claims here is that,
unless the veil is pierced, he will be subject to double jeopardy. In fact,
Andrews has the point backwards. Even on his own theory, he will confront the
possibility of double jeopardy only if the veil is pierced. If it is not, he
will not be liable for Fulcrum's penalty and hence will not have been subjected
to prior jeopardy.
Moreover, Andrews' asserted right to pierce the veil runs counter to the rule
that piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy, whose exercise is
subject to the sound discretion of the trial Judge. See Valley Fin., Inc. v.
United States, 629 F.2d 162, 171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Kinney Shoe
Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1991). In Quinn, for example, the
court entertained the possibility of piercing against the government only because
it feared the corporate form may have operated at an "innocent party's
expense." 510 F.2d at 758. But if Fulcrum is a sham, it is because Andrews,
as its sole shareholder and chief executive officer, made it one in order to
facilitate his fraudulent scheme. Under such circumstances, Andrews cannot
don the mantle of an innocent party in order to pierce the cloak of his own
fraud.
Finally, even if Quinn applied here, the veil would at best be "pierce-able";
it has not yet been "pierced." See Quinn, 510 F.2d at 760 (petitioner
entitled "to an opportunity to show that the company was not in truth
a corporation"). Nor is Andrews quite so eager to pierce the veil as his
briefs would suggest. At oral argument, the court asked Andrews' counsel whether
his client actually concedes that Fulcrum was a sham. Counsel demurred. He
was not, he said, authorized to make such a concession. But in the context
of Andrews' argument, this is not a concession-it is a cornerstone. Andrews,
apparently, would like to have his cake and eat it too: he would like to pierce
the veil for the purpose of dismissing the present indictment, but preserve
it as a defense in case the SEC ever does try to collect. We reject this argument
and conclude that no criminal punishment has yet been imposed on appellant
Andrews.*fn8
IV.
Andrews' brief states his agreement with the "undisputed proposition,
that a punishment must be imposed in the first proceeding before jeopardy can
attach." Appellants' Br. at 13. As discussed in Part III, if Andrews is
correct about this proposition, then his appeal must fail because no punishment
has yet been imposed upon him.
We are not certain, however, that Andrews is correct. After all, we have Witte's
admonition that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects not just against multiple
punishments, but against multiple attempts to punish. See Witte, 515 U.S. at
396; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (1997) (citing Witte
). Indeed, in Hudson, the Court not only repeated this admonition, it used
it to support its Conclusion that Halper had applied the wrong analysis. Halper
had directed courts to look at the "sanction actually imposed" in
order to determine whether it was so disproportionate as to be punitive. The
consequence of this direction, the Hudson Court said, was that it would "not
be possible to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated until
a defendant has proceeded through a trial to judgment." 118 S. Ct. at
495. But that, the Court charged, "flies in the face of the notion that
the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the government from even attempting a second
time to punish criminally." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
We need not linger over this problem because not only was no punishment imposed
upon Andrews, none was attempted-at least not in any constitutional sense.
For purposes of the multiple prosecutions prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause,
an attempt does not attain constitutional significance until jeopardy has attached.
See Serfass, 420 U.S. at 390-92. This accords with the language of the Clause
itself, which bars neither "attempts" nor "prosecutions," but
rather prohibits being "twice put in jeopardy" for the same offense.
In a criminal trial, jeopardy does not attach until a jury is empaneled and
sworn or, in a non-jury trial, until the court begins to hear evidence. See
id. at 388. The underlying principle is that "jeopardy does not attach,
and the constitutional prohibition can have no application, until a defendant
is 'put to trial before the trier of facts, whether the trier be a jury or
a Judge.' " Id. (citation omitted).
Although the Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider when jeopardy
might attach outside the context of a criminal trial, or whether the timing
of attachment is different for the multiple punishments prong as compared to
the multiple prosecutions prong, no court has concluded that attachment in
such circumstances should come any earlier than it would in a criminal trial.
To the contrary, some courts have held it to come at an analogous time,*fn9
while others have found it to come considerably later.*fn10
There are two stages of the civil SEC proceedings that one might loosely characterize
as "attempts" to impose punishment here. But even if we were to apply
an analogy to the attachment of jeopardy in a criminal trial, neither was sufficiently
advanced to constitute attachment.
The first possible "attempt" was the filing of the SEC's complaint,
which named Andrews and sought penalties from him. The closest criminal trial
analogy would be to an indictment. But the filing of an indictment does not
create jeopardy. As we have noted, a jury must be empaneled or a judge must
begin to hear evidence on the charge before attachment occurs. See Serfass,
420 U.S. at 388-89. Neither happened here. Evidently awakening-somewhat belatedly,
but still in time-to the possibility that it was creating a "Halper " problem
for future criminal prosecutors, the SEC withdrew its request for civil penalties
against Andrews before it ever presented evidence in support of that request.
Alternatively, one might characterize the judgment against Fulcrum as an initial
step in an "attempt" to hold Andrews personally responsible for the
monetary penalty. But this step has not put Andrews at personal risk of paying
that penalty. Because the SEC civil action ended in a final judgment that did
not include a penalty against Andrews, a new proceeding would still be required
before the SEC could collect anything from him. A complaint in that new proceeding,
and further action on that complaint, would thus be the earliest stage at which
jeopardy could attach. Cf. United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193,
203 (5th Cir. 1991) (although defendants executed promissory notes in acknowledgment
of punitive civil fines, jeopardy would not attach until government tried to
collect on notes and "court begins to hear evidence in that action").
In sum, we conclude that even were an "attempts" analysis appropriate
here, the SEC action simply did not progress sufficiently against Andrews to
constitute an attempt to impose criminal punishment for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
V.
We dismiss Green's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it does not present
a colorable claim of double jeopardy.
Andrews' appeal, while colorable, fails on the merits, and we therefore affirm
the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.
Opinion Footnotes
*fn1 The complaint charged violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
It sought civil penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77t(d), and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3).
*fn2 The indictment charged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341,
1343, 1956, 1957.
*fn3 The Court has described the successive prosecution prong as protecting
against two more distinct abuses: "a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal [and] a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction." North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). The prohibition against successive
prosecution protects against a third distinct abuse as well: even without acquittal
or conviction, this prong bars a second prosecution for the same offense if
the first prosecution is dismissed after jeopardy has attached, see Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978), where the dismissal was not caused by "manifest
necessity," see United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980).
*fn4 Many other courts have assumed without Discussion that multiple punishment
claims may be appealed before final judgment. See United States v. Reyes, 87
F.3d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir.
1995); United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Louisville Edible Oil Prods., Inc., 926 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1991).
But cf. United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 714-15 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting
that, prior to Witte, the First Circuit had held Abney inapplicable to multiple
punishment claims).
*fn5 As the Supreme Court stated in Martin v. Wilks, "[i]t is a principle
of general application ... that one is not bound by a judgment in personam
in litigation in which he is not designated as a party." 490 U.S. 755,
761 (1989) (internal citation and quotations omitted), superseded by statute
on other grounds. See 18 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449,
at 411 (1981). Appellants do not suggest that any of the limited exceptions
to this general rule would apply here. See Martin, 490 U.S. at 761 n.2.
*fn6 See SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying Hudson's
analysis to hold that SEC civil monetary penalties are not criminally punitive).
*fn7 Andrews does not argue that a sole or controlling shareholder of a
bona fide corporation would be punished for double jeopardy purposes if punishment
were imposed upon his corporation. Such an argument was rejected by the
Fifth
Circuit in Woods, on the ground that "[a]bsent individual liability, there
[is] no claim for double jeopardy." 949 F.2d at 177 n.3. A similar argument
made on behalf of employees of a Subchapter S (26 U.S.C. § 1361 et
seq.) corporation was rejected by the Sixth Circuit in Louisville Edible
Oil Products,
on the ground that the theory would extend protection from prosecution
to any individual who receives income on a percentage-of-profit basis from
any entity
if the entity were punished. See 926 F.2d at 586.
*fn8 Because Andrews cannot even establish that the civil judgment imposed
any obligation upon him, we need not consider whether a judgment alone would
have been enough to constitute the imposition of punishment where the penalty
has not only not yet been paid, but has been suspended pending bankruptcy proceedings.
Cf. United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 201 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that an unpaid judgment does not constitute punishment, even where the defendant
executes a promissory note to pay it).
*fn9 See Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465 (jeopardy attaches in civil forfeiture
hearing when evidence is first presented to trier of fact); cf. Sanchez-Escareno,
950
F.2d at 201 (jeopardy attaches in action to collect on notes when court
begins to hear evidence). After Hudson there is further reason to conclude
that courts
should treat criminal trials and other proceedings that may lead to double
jeopardy in a similar way. The holding of Hudson, after all, was not that
the sanction imposed was civil rather than criminal, but that the prior "administrative
proceedings were civil, not criminal." 118 S. Ct. at 491 (emphasis added).
See also id. at 496 n.6 (favorably citing Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781, for
focusing on whether the alleged punishment was "the functional equivalent
of a successive criminal prosecution"). Hence, the "attempting a
second time to punish criminally" proscription may not be a subsidiary
element of the multiple punishments prong, but rather a more generalized restatement
of the multiple prosecutions prong: that is, double jeopardy protects against
multiple punishments, and against multiple attempts to impose criminal punishments-regardless
whether such attempts occur in the form of criminal trials or other kinds of
proceedings. See also Witte, 515 U.S. at 396 (appearing to equate "attempting
a second time to punish criminally" with "being twice put in jeopardy
for such punishment"). If the "attempts" proscription is just
a restatement of the multiple prosecutions prong, then there would be good
reason to apply as similar as possible "attachment" rules regardless
whether the attempt occurs in a criminal trial or otherwise.
*fn10 See, e.g., United States v. Tamez, 881 F. Supp. 460, 465-66 (E.D. Wash.
1995) (jeopardy does not attach in civil forfeiture proceedings until final
judgment is entered), aff'd, 95 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1996) (table); United States
v. Polichemi, 1995 WL 387833 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (prohibition against multiple
punishments does not attach in SEC civil action until civil penalty is imposed);
cf. United States v. Von Moos, 660 F.2d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1981) (jeopardy
on multiple punishments claim involving multiple sentences does not attach
until defendant begins serving sentence).