Ken Smith: Rogue Judges Invite Their Own Demise

[bobhurt]

Ken Smith has formulated this certiorari draft for the US Supremes to review DCCA's ruling against him, reminding that, in effect, that they target themselves for assassination for going rogue. You can see his Colorado federal appeal brief at http://scribd.com/bobhurt.

Why do I bring this up? Quatloosian idiots know full well that they encourage the illegal collection of income tax from people who don't owe it, and that the chief culprits in the criminal enterprise wear black robes. By flouting the law and letting DOJ attorneys and IRS agents do the same, they invite their own demise by abuse victims who simply won't tolerate it any more. Ken Smith explains why, elegantly.



STATEMENT OF THE CASE
It simply stands to reason that, if neither the jud¬ges who commit them nor the government which employs them can be held accountable in tort for injuries resulting from willfully criminal acts, the Bill of Rights is by definition null and void, for to "take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself." Poindexter v. Green¬how, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884). Petitioner asks this Court to restore the Bill of Rights through appropri¬ate remedial action, or formally acknowledge its demise.
As the victim of a flagrantly lawless decision at the appellate level, Petitioner filed a timely action in federal district court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the Justices of this Court owed him a legal duty to review the decision, and that he was legally entitled to an order compelling them to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Read “literally, the language of § 1361 would allow a district court to issue man¬damus directly against the Justices of the Sup¬reme Court themselves," Panko v. Rodak, 606 F.2d 168, 171 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1979), but even the most pel¬lucid federal statute has become subject to “judi¬cial veto.”
The tribunals below declared that they did not have jurisdiction to compel this Court to consider Petitioner‘s claim, in blatant defiance of common sense and binding precedent holding the precise opposite. Ex parte Roe, 234 U.S. 70, 72 (1914) (writ of mandamus can "compel an exercise of existing jurisdiction, but not … control [that servant’s] deci¬sion”), Smith v. Thomas, 09¬1926¬JDB (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2010), aff’d., No. 10¬5041 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 1, 2010). In one¬sentence rulings, failing utterly to make any argument “that would justify a court in departing from the plain meaning of words ... in search of an intention which the words themselves did not sug¬gest," United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95¬96 (1820), the courts below did precisely that.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Certiorari is spectacularly unconstitutional, as it deprives Americans of the most basic warranty of a civil society: the right to equal justice under law. As the existence of jurisdiction "creates an impli¬cation of duty to exercise it," Mondou v. New York,
N.H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 58 (1912), and federal courts "are bound to proceed to judgment, and to afford redress to suitors before them, in every case to which their jurisdiction extends," Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. 170, 176 (1857), jurisdiction over a properly presented claim attempting to vindicate a citizen’s right to equal justice under law is man¬datory. As such, 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) is unconstitu¬tional.
Certiorari is by definition tyrannical, converting a legal duty into an act of simple discretion. Qui non prohibet cum potest, jubet (that man abets and evil who prevents it not, when it is in his power to do so). Under the current regime, any lower court decision, no matter how offensive to the Constitution, can be permitted to stand. And as Edward Gibbon observed in his magnum opus on the Roman Empire, "the discretion of the judge is the first engine of tyranny." 4 Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Part VII (ca. 1780).
Certiorari is a de facto declaration of war upon the American people. It renders the Bill of Rights nugatory, as a ‘right’ without the right to a remedy is a contradiction in terms, Ashby v. White [1703] 92 E.R. 126 (H.C.) and to take away all remedy for the unlawful invasion of a right is to take away the right itself. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884). As Judge Robert Bork observes:
The Justices are our masters in a way that no President, Congressman, governor, or other elected official is. They order our lives and we have no recourse, no means of resisting, no means of altering their ukases. They are indeed robed masters. But "band of outlaws"? An outlaw is a person who coerces others without warrant in law. . . .
That is, given the opportunity, what the Sup¬reme Court has always done.
Robert Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, 67 First Things 21, 24 (Nov. 1996) (emphasis added).
The default response to judicial tyranny is lethal force. Since the days of Cicero, the right to resort to violence in defense of our lives and liberties has been an integral part of black¬letter law. As the Article III judicial power entitles judges to interpret the law ¬-as opposed to rewriting it on an ad hoc, ex post facto basis ¬-our judiciary has become, in the parlance of Judge Bork, a “band of outlaws.” Moreover, as the source of the harm is public officials, acting outside of the scope of their lawful authority, assassination of these outlaws would not be an act of rebellion per se but rather, in support and defense of "the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic." 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (emphasis added).
Certiorari divests this Court of its constitutional authority to declare the law. It reduces the United States Reports to mere birdcage liner; every judge in the land knows that this Court is too busy writing books or rubbing elbows with the Queen to bother with enforcing their own dictates. As such, “law” in America has become little more than the often arbitrary and capricious declarations of constitu¬tionally unqualified law clerks.
Finally, it should be stated for the record that law clerks are not Article III judges. They do not possess even colorable constitutional authority to dispense justice on an arbitrary basis without even having to account for their decisions in an assay-able written decision. As every Justice is a part of the so¬called “cert pool,” and supervision by Arti¬cle III judges is noticeable only by its absence, the average man’s chance of receiving equal justice under law is roughly as remote as that of winning California’s SuperLotto jackpot.1
Thomas Jefferson observed that a constitution is supposed to provide remedies for all injuries accruing from unlawful invasions of rights, so people are never required to resort to rebellion in order to secure them. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 255 (1785) (Query 13). As the citizen has an absolute right to assassinate a tyrant, any public official who exercises tyrannical power over him ¬¬including judges ¬¬may lawfully be assassinated. And as assassination of a public official is undesirable, the law must be read as not bestowing tyrannical powers, providing remedies when an official abuses his or her lawful authority. Ergo, certiorari is unconstitutional.
1 According to California officials, your odds of winning are one in 41,416,353. http://www.calottery.com/Media/Facts¬/Descriptions/. Assuming that an appeal costs $10,000, the odds of winning the California lottery are actually better.
STATEMENT OF SALIENT FACTS
The First and Fourteenth Amendments guaran¬tee access to the courts that must be “adequate, effective, and meaningful.” Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817, 822 (1977). Petitioner has been systemat¬ically denied this right by lower court judges who, quite frankly, are trying to protect their colleagues and perquisites. This criminal conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 241, centers around the wrongful denial of juris-diction, in open and willful defiance of the Consti¬tution and settled precedent of this Court.
Although it is unnecessary to recount every act taken in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy as alleged herein, two incidents must be brought to the attention of this Court. The first occurred some seven years ago, wherein the Tenth Circuit admitted in black and white that Petitioner
filed a complaint in federal district court set¬ting forth twenty claims for relief for alleged violations of federal law and of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff sought decla¬rations that the Colorado bar admission process and certain admissions rules were unconstitutional…
Smith v. Mullarkey, 67 F. App’x 535, ___ (10th Cir. Jun. 11, 2003), slip op. at 4 (unpublished; empha¬sis added).
In this case, judicial analysis is so simple, a cave¬man could do it: If condition X (an applicant chal¬lenges the facial constitutionality of a bar admis¬sion rule) is true, then Y (a lower federal court must hear his claim. District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482¬83 (1983)). Condition X is true (a fact the Tenth Circuit panel openly admitted in the highlighted text). Therefore, Y (a lower federal court must hear that claim).
The second salient incident is even more egre¬gious. After having been wrongfully deprived of his day in federal court by a judge who was later forced from the bench for weekly dalliances with Elliot Spitzer¬class prostitutes (which he could not afford on a federal judge’s salary), Petitioner filed a pendent action in state court, naming justices of the Colorado Supreme Court as defendants in tort ¬¬alleging an array of due process and Americans With Disabilities Act violations in Denver District Court, under a theory of law which was successful under legally indistinguishable facts in the Second Circuit. Diblasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 2003). Despite the obvious and acknowledged fact that the Justices were named as defendants, Smith v. Mullarkey, 121 P.3d 890, 891 & n. 1 (Colo. 2005) (per curiam), and in the face of a state stat¬ute expressly depriving them of jurisdiction, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16¬6¬201(2), they decided the appeal, anyway.
It has been black¬letter law since the first Eng¬lish settlers arrived in Jamestown that a judge may not sit in judgment of his own cause. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, (C.P. 1610); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). In reliance on this Court’s clear and unequivocal declarations that the Four¬teenth Amendment does not permit state judges to decide matters in which they have a material financial interest2 Petitioner again filed suit in fede¬ral district court, styled Smith v. Bender, No. 07-cv¬1924¬MSK¬KMT.
Again, the legal analysis is so simple that even a caveman could do it. All Petitioner needed to do is prove that he had a federal right to have his grievances heard by a fair and independent tri¬
2 Judges of the Colorado Court of Appeals may "serve in any state court with full authority as provided by law, when called upon to do so by the chief justice of the supreme court." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13¬4-101. As the "Rule of Necessity" only applies in cases of actual necessity, see United States
v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 214 (1980) and sixteen non¬conflicted judges were available and authorized by statute to hear the appeal, there was no “necessity“: In every jurisdiction with a provision similar to Sec. 13¬4¬101, conflicted supreme court justices are required to recuse. E.g., Mosk v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 601 P.2d 1030 (Calif. 1979) (collecting cases); Sullivan v. McDonald, 913 A.2d 403 (Conn. 2007). Besides, as a matter of Colorado statutory law, Petitioner’s appeal should have been decided by the Colorado Court of Appeals, in any event. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13¬4¬102(1).
bunal, and that he was deprived of it by a person acting under the color of law. Carey v. Piphus, 435
247 (1978). But in what can only be described as a self-evident attempt to shelter their wayward colleagues from ruinous tort liability, see, Bradley
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 352¬53 (1871),3 ¬¬it cannot be “innocent error,” as federal judges are simply not that incompetent ¬¬the courts below found that they “didn’t have jurisdiction” over a federal civil rights claim. Smith v. Bender, No. 09¬1003 (10th Cir. Sept. 11, 2009) (unpublished).

Knowing the Tenth Circuit’s amply¬established penchant for flagrantly defying the dictates of this Court, and its reluctance to sully their hands with the task of error¬correction, Petitioner filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia for relief in the nature of mandamus to compel the Justices to do their constitutional duty.
3 Bradley establishes the outer bounds of judicial immunity, holding that it is only available to judges acting within the scope of their jurisdiction. In Smith v. Bender, the justices were not within this safe harbor: “Any judge who knows of circumstances which shall disqualify him in a case shall, on his own motion, disqualify himself." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16¬6¬201(2). Once a judge is obliged to recuse, he immediately loses all jurisdiction except to transfer the case, Erbaugh v. People, 140 P. 188, 190 (Colo. 1914)); a judgment rendered in the face of a jurisdictional defect is void as a matter of law. Davidson Chevrolet v. City and County of Denver, 330 P.2d 1116 (Colo. 1958).
REASON WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED
This is the most important petition this Court will see in our lifetimes, as it will establish whether we still live in a Republic governed by the rule of law, or a regime, governed by a "judicial oligarchy," Bork, Judicial Oligarchy at 21, imposed through a "judicial coup d’êtat." Id., Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges 13 (New York: AEI Press, 2003).
While still a civilian, Justice Kagan summarized the problem this action strives to address: Federal Judges have appointed themselves absolute dic¬tators,4 dispensing their own personal brand of ex post facto “justice” on an ad hoc basis ¬¬without respect for the Constitution, our law, or the prece¬dents of this Court. Pursuant to this usurpation of dictatorial power, our judiciary is, in the parlance of Justice Scalia, busily “designing a Constitution for a country I do not recognize." Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Framers did not intend to create a judicial dictatorship, and enacted the Second Amendment to effectuate just resistance.
4 Justice Kagan used the more euphemistic term “Platonic Guardians,” ignoring the fact that “benevolent dictators” exist only in Aristotlean theory. Sam Stein, Kagan: In Bush v. Gore, Court Was Affected By Politics and Policy, Huffington Post, May 19, 2010.
To our Founding Fathers, the equation was sim¬ple: the right to assassinate a tyrant was absolute. Thus, anyone who assumed dictatorial power over another could lawfully be met with lethal force:
If it was possible for men, who exercise their reason to believe, that the divine Author of our existence intended a part of the human race to hold an absolute property in, and an unbounded power over others, marked out by his infinite goodness and wisdom, as the objects of a legal domination never rightfully resistible, however severe and oppressive, the inhabitants of these colonies might at least require from the parliament of Great¬Britain some evidence, that this dreadful authority over them, has been granted to that body. …
We are reduced to the alternative of chusing an unconditional submission to the tyranny of irritated ministers, or resistance by force. ¬¬The latter is our choice. ¬¬We have counted the cost of this contest, and find nothing so dreadful as voluntary slavery.
Declaration of Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms, Continental Congress (U.S.), Jul. 6, 1775 (em¬phasis added).
Abraham Lincoln explains this concept ably: "no man is good enough to govern another man, without the other’s consent." Abraham Lincoln, Speech (on the Kansas¬Nebraska Act, Springfield, IL), Oct. 16, 1854. We have a document in hand [the Declaration of Independence] declaring our lack of consent, and two others [the Constitution and Bill of Rights] declaring emphatically that you were never given that “dreadful authority.” If you would not suffer my absolute rule (and I would not claim it!), by what right do YOU rule?
This is why certiorari review is repugnant to the Constitution: It permits federal judges to play God, dispensing ersatz ad hoc, ex post facto ‘justice’ in open defiance of the very Constitution that is the source of their power. Congress did not have col¬orable legal authority to enact 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), and this Court has a duty to regard it as void.
This issue is raised unavoidably in the context of this appeal, as it raises the question of whether judges of this or any other court have discretion to refuse to hear cases indisputably within the scope of their jurisdiction. The hidebound precedent of this Court (Mondou, Hyde v. Stone) declares that they certainly do not. Indeed, to hold otherwise defenestrates the very notion of rights under law, as our property interest in our “rights” becomes no more than a tenancy¬at¬will in mere liberties.
Certiorari is necessarily implicated in the case before this Court, on the grounds that the Justices owed Petitioner a duty to hear his Petition in Smith
v. Bender, supra, and did not have legal authority to dismiss his appeal without due consideration. Mandamus was the appropriate remedy, and this Court acted outside of the law in arbitrarily failing to discharge its duty to consider it. The decision to not review his original Petition should be vacated, and judgment should be rendered forthwith.
The proof of the pudding is that, under the law as it stands now, any America citizen would have an absolute right to assassinate a federal judge.5 As it almost goes without saying that the Framers never intended such a bizarre state of affairs, Jef¬ferson, Notes at 255, and the Constitution means “what it meant when it was adopted," Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, First Things 17 (May, 2002), certiorari is unconstitutional.
5 In theory, this would never happen, as agents of the Fede¬ral Bureau of Investigation and United States Marshals swear an oath “to support and defend the Constitution of the Uni¬ted States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” 5 U.S. § 3331; see Jonathan L. Rudd, Our Oath of Office: A Solemn Promise, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (Sept. 2009), reprinted at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/200 ... 9/oath.htm. But in theory, Congress would never stand for the kind of judicial usurpation recounted in this Petition; force is only prescribed when other constraints on the abuse of power are ineffectual, such as prior to the Revolution.
I. QUI NON PROHIBET CUM POTEST, JUBET6: WHAT WERE ONCE JUDGES ARE NOW TYRANTS.
“Tyranny” is "[a]rbitrary or despotic government; the severe and autocratic exercise of sovereign power, either vested constitutionally in one ruler, or usurped by him by breaking down the division and distribution of governmental powers." Black’s Law Dictionary 1519 (6th ed. 1990). Consequently, a tyrant is “a sovereign or ruler, legitimate or other¬wise, who uses his power unjustly and arbitrarily, to the oppression of his subjects." Id. But as Madison observed, the number of tyrants is unimportant: “One hundred and seventy¬three despots would surely be as oppressive as one.” The Federalist No. 48, 310 (J. Madison) (I. Kramnick ed. 1990).
Under the “law” as currently misinterpreted, we are ruled by a conclave of a thousand despots in black robes, who have systematically eviscerated every lawful challenge to their absolute rule. If this is not tyranny, what is?
A. The Framers Were Unwilling To Entrust Federal Judges With Any Real Power.
In his seminal treatise on Blackstone, the famed
6 The man who fails to prevent an evil when it is in his power to do so necessarily abets it.
Judge St. George Tucker observed that "a repre¬sentative democracy ceases to exist the moment that the public functionaries are by any means absolved from their responsibility to their consti¬tuents." 1 Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 297 (1803) (editor's appendix). The Framers took this principle to heart, taking care to ensure that every public servant was subject to effectual controls on his official conduct.
At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the American litigant had access to the greatest legal system ever devised by man. Every fact was assayed in open court by twelve independent jurors chosen specifically for that task. These jurors were held in check by a judge who advised them on the law, an appellate court system where judges read briefs, heard oral arguments, and wrote seriatim opinions, and in cases of potential prejudice, a right to waive a jury trial. Judges were held in check by jurors who were ultimate arbiters of both fact and law (and, were not shy about exercising that prerogative). Every citizen was entitled to review of his case by the United States Supreme Court, resulting in a published opinion establishing a controlling precedent. And even if those safeguards failed, the aggrieved citizen had right to remove judges from the bench for patent violations of their good behavior tenure pursuant to a writ of scire facias, to protect himself against judicial crimes by initiating private criminal prosecutions of federal judges, to sue both judges and the federal government for damages in tort, and simpler remedies such as mandamus.
More importantly, judges of the day understood and respected the limitations of their authority. Presided over by such notables as St. George Tucker, Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. 19 (Va. 1793), was the state¬law precursor to Marbury v. Madi¬son. It was Judge Tucker’s view that the judge may not stray beyond the narrowly-circumscribed bounds of his office:
If the principles of our government have established the judiciary as a barrier against the possible usurpation, or abuse of power in the other departments, how easily may that principle be evaded by converting our courts into legislative, instead of constitu¬tional tribunals?
To preserve this principle in its full vigour, it is necessary that the constitutional courts should all be restrained within those limits which the constitution itself seems to have assigned to them respectively.
Id., 3 Va. at 88 (opinion of Tucker, J., seriatim). Judge Tyler apprehended the danger equally, in observing that "I will not in an extra¬judicial manner assume the right to negative a law, for this would be as dangerous as the example before us." Id. at 61 (opinion of Tyler, J., seriatim).
Even in the rarefied air of the United States Sup¬reme Court, the jury was the ultimate master of both fact and law. Speaking for the Court in a civil matter, Chief Justice Jay gave the following charge to a jury sitting in a case of original juris¬diction before this august body:
It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury; on questions of law it is the province of the court to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt you will pay that respect which is due to the opinion of the court: for, as on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts, it is, on the other hand, presumable that the court is the best judge of law. But still both objects are lawfully, within your power of decision.
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1793) (emphasis added).7 Courts of justice had a duty "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Con¬stitution void," The Federalist No. 78, at 438 (A. Hamilton), but whether their declarations were to be acted upon was the jury’s prerogative. Judges were merely advisors, trusted specifically because they had no power to speak of.
In the Framers’ considered view, handing any power to the judiciary was almost certain to result in tyranny. According to Senator Richard Henry Lee, fourth President of our Continental Congress, the singular virtue of the jury trial is that it offered the public protection from corrupt and aristocratic judges. 1 Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitu¬tion 505 (1836) (remarks of Mr. Lee, of Virginia). Jefferson concurred, writing that to anoint judges as ultimate arbiters of constitutional questions was "a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an Oligarchy." Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to William C. Jarvis), Sept. 28, 1820, at 1. Nobody was willing to entrusted judges with power, on either side of the Pond. E.g., John Hawles, The Englishman's Right: A Dialogue Between a Barrister At Law and a Juryman 72 (1680) (1844 ed.) (“less danger will
While the Marbury Court claimed a nominal right to judi¬cial review, in the first three¬score years of our Republic, it never once invalidated a federal statute, ending with Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (Missouri Compromise).
arise from the mistakes of jurymen, than from the corruption of judges”).
B. Federal Judges Have Systematically Disabled Every Structural Check Upon Their Power Built Into the Constitution.
As the late, great paleoconservative wordsmith Joe Sobran puts it, “the U.S. Constitution poses no serious threat to our form of government.” Joseph Sobran, How Tyranny Came to America, Sobran’s (newsletter) 1994. Tyranny came as it always does ¬¬with a whisper. Eternal vigilance “is the price of liberty,” Andrew Jackson, Farewell Address, Mar. 4, 1837; ‘Lady Liberty’ has been found comatose, if not yet as dead as Terri Schiavo. Generations of federal judges have systematically beaten, gang¬raped and sodomized her to the point where she was unrecognizable. "These suspects employed terrible wolf¬pack odds of nine¬against¬one, odds which revealed them as predators whose crimes were as cowardly as they were despicable." Col-leen Long, NYPD: 7 Gang Members Brutally Tor¬tured Gay Recruit, Associated Press, Oct. 9, 2010.
The initial mile¬marker on the road to perdition was an obscure case styled United States v. Cal¬lender, 25 F.Cas. 239 (D.Va. 1800), presided over by Justice Chase while riding circuit. The rationale Chase gave for taking the power to decide the constitutionality of a statute away from the jury is the very principle Petitioner wishes to vindicate in this Court:
It must be evident, that decisions in the district or circuit courts of the United States will be uniform, or they will become so by the revision and correction of the supreme court; and thereby the same principles will pervade all the Union; but the opinions of petit juries will very probably be different in different states.
Id., 25 F.Cas. at 257.
Justice Chase was never quite able to explain why unelected federal judges could be trusted to honor their oaths, whereas civil jurors who had no vested interest in the outcome of the case and took similar oaths could not. This was underscored by the historical irony that Chase was impeached for his conduct in that trial, described as "marked … by manifest injustice, partiality,8 and intemper¬ance." Articles of Impeachment Against Samuel Chase, Art. IV, as reprinted in, Charles Evans,
8 Justice Chase openly campaigned for the re¬election of John Adams in 1800, and aggressively intervened in criminal prosecutions brought under the Alien and Sedition Act from his seat on the bench. Bruce A. Ragsdale, The Sedition Act Trials 29¬30 (Federal Judicial Ctr. 2005). Suffice it to say that the charge of partiality was hardly insubstantial.
Report Of the Trial Of the Hon. Samuel Chase (1805), Appendix at 4 (emphasis added).
Though few realized it at the time, Chase dealt a mortal blow to the Constitution, by upsetting its delicate balance of powers. Judges were free to substitute the crooked cord of their own discretion for the golden mete¬wand of the law. And in a fit of irony, he delivered its epitaph:
Where law is uncertain, partial, or arbitrary; where justice is not impartially administered to all; where property is insecure, and the person is liable to insult and violence, with¬out redress by law, the people are not free, whatever may be their form of government.
Samuel Chase, Grand Jury Instructions (manu¬script), May 2, 1803, reprinted in Charles Evans, Report Of the Trial Of the Hon. Samuel Chase 60 (1805).
Once this mortal blow was struck, Lady Liberty’s death became inevitable. Having gotten the jury out of the way, Chief Justice Marshall established the doctrine of judicial supremacy in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Congress impeached Chase for his transgressions, but that body was just as feckless then as it is now; their failure to convict set the precedent that no judge would ever be impeached for his high¬handed decision-making
alone. Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Consti¬tutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 Ind. L.J. 153, 169 (2003). As Judge Bork avers, it was a bloodless coup.
Having seized dictatorial power, federal judges methodically went about the business of consoli¬dating it. Obviously, the first order of business was eliminating the traditional common law liability in tort for judges, Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 354 (1871); cf., Jay M. Feinman and Roy S. Cohn, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S. Car. L. Rev. 201, 201¬10 (1980) (default rule: judges could be sued for cause). Second was eradicating the right of a justly¬aggrieved citizen to sue the federal govern¬ment in respondeat superior for even criminal acts committed on the bench, Kawananakoa v. Poly¬blank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907); see, Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 411¬12 (1821) (dictum); as this removes any incentive other branches of government may feel to deter federal judges’ abuse of their Article III authority.9
9Albeit not speaking ex cathedra, Justice Scalia wrote that domestic sovereign immunity was not part of the English common law known to the Framers. He went on to observe that the rule was "unthinkingly" applied in Cohens, and particularly absurd when invoked in actions lying in mandamus or prohibition. Antonin Scalia, "Historical Anom¬alies in Administrative Law," Supreme Court Hist. Soc’y.
Not even the Constitution itself was safe from our judges’ depredations: They even re¬wrote the Eleventh Amendment to suit their liking. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (in effect, creation of a second Eleventh Amendment; see e.g., John Paul Stevens, "Two Questions About Justice," 2003 Ill. L. Rev. 821). Likewise, in declaring that the "any per¬son" of the ubiquitous Section 1983 really meant "any person but us judges," Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). the Court laid waste to a vast array of time¬honored canons of statutory construction, including the "plain meaning" rule, see, Connec¬ticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253¬54 (1992) (collecting cases), reliance on legislative history if the statute is unclear, and the principle that remedial statutes are liberally construed, a rule it relied upon literally one day earlier in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
Unsurprisingly, every constitutional constraint on arbitrary judicial action was interpreted into obliv¬ion. The Good Behavior Clause was denuded of
(1985), at http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04_l ... c19_i.html.
22
meaning, the common law right to private prose¬cution of public officials who committed crimes against you was annulled, and relief in the nature of mandamus has been downgraded from a right to a privilege. United States ex rel. Smith v. Ander¬son, No. 10¬1012 (10th Cir. Jul. 27, 2010). According to Professors Richman and Reynolds, even in our lower appellate courts, for the average citizen, appellate review is certiorari review:
[T]he courts have abandoned the notion of one appellate method for all cases and all litigants. The significant cases, those brought by wealthy, powerful, or institutional litigants ¬¬receive the traditional approach model. The routine, trivial cases ¬¬usually the ones brought by poorer, weaker litigants ¬¬are relegated to two¬track appellate justice. For these cases (about half the total) the circuit courts have become certiorari courts, rather than courts of mandatory, appellate juris¬diction that Congress intended.
William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds, Elit¬ism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 273, ___ (1996) (emphasis added).
C. Cessant Ratione Legis, Cessat Lex10
“We would have chaos and not the rule of law if each judge in the land did simply what he or she thought was right instead of what the law requires.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Nick News, Nick-elodion (broadcast Dec. 27, 1997). Not only is it a recipe for chaos, it is often a felonious violation of federal civil rights law. 18 U.S.C. § 241¬42. The late Judge Richard Arnold explains:
Article III [judges] . . . can exercise no power that is not “judicial.” That is all the power that we have. When a governmental offi¬cial, judge or not, acts contrary to what was done on a previous day, without giving rea¬sons, and perhaps for no reason other than a change of mind, can the power that is being exercised properly be called “judi-cial”? Is it not more like legislative power, which can be exercised whenever the legislator thinks best, and without regard to prior decisions?
Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Com¬ment, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 219, 226 (1999).
This isn’t a tenet of radical Islam, or even radical
10 When the reason of the law ceases, the law Itself ceases.
jurisprudence. Justice Scalia is in complete agree¬ment with Judge Arnold’s sentiment:
“The judicial power of the United States” conferred upon this Court and such inferior courts as Congress may establish, Art. III, § 1, must be deemed to be the judicial power as understood by our common¬law tradi¬tion. That is the power “to say what the law is,” not the power to change it.
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring; citation omitted), accord, Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 378 (1833).
Technically, it still remains the Supreme Court’s "prerogative alone to overrule one of its prece¬dents," State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997), but as a practical matter, federal courts routinely use the United States Reports as a birdcage liner, as they know that they can disregard it with com¬plete impunity. The result is a form of constitutional triage, where the rule of law is supplanted by the arbitrary and capricious rule of vicious and arro¬gant men. Professor Penelope Pether writes:
Although litigants have appeals as of right to the federal courts of appeals, what hap¬pens in a wrongly or sloppily or unsafely or arbitrarily decided case is effectively a cer-tiorari decision masquerading as an appeal as of right based on the applicable stan¬dard of review. Many of these cases cluster in areas where deep¬seated sociolegal problems produce high rates of appeals, where the government is the target of the lawsuit, and the paradigmatic government¬tal response (often by more than one of the three—or four—branches) is to jurisdiction strip, to attempt to control decision making by non¬independent officers both by removing decisional responsibility from them and by employing disciplinary mechanisms to encourage them to decide against litigants, and to impose penalties that are designed to discourage appeals.
Penelope J. Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: To¬ward a Thick Doctrine of Article III Duty; or Why the Federal Circuits’ Nonprecedential Status Rules are (Profoundly) Unconstitutional, 17 W.&M. Bill Rts.
J. 955, 977 (2009).
A seriatim listing of judicial transgressions would readily consume this brief a dozen times over, but this will come as no surprise to Justice Scalia, who sees our courts as "designing a Constitution for a country I do not recognize." Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Petitioner feels his pain.
II. SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS11
Under the law as presently interpreted, Ameri¬can citizens possess both a legal right and solemn duty to remove our federal judges from office by any means necessary, up to and including assassi¬nation. As it almost goes without saying that the Framers never intended that remarkable but logically unassailable result, this Court is obliged to abandon the offending precedents, as the “obli¬gation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit.” Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
11 Thus always to tyrants.
A. “Il Est Dangereux D’avoir Raison Dans des Choses Où Des Hommes Accrédités Ont Tort."12
"it is dangerous,” intoned Voltaire, “to be right when those in authority are wrong." Despite the incorrigible nature of the reasoning employed, the law is not going to be a welcome sight to the typi¬cal judge. Like Nathan confronting David with his sins, 2 Sam. 12, Petitioner has both a right as a citi¬zen and a duty as an advocate and defender of the Constitution to confront the Court with its own dirty laundry.
At the risk of stating the obvious, a legal brief involves marshaling of authority: in essence, other people’s opinions. Whereas Petitioner’s opinion as to what the Constitution says carries no weight in a court, those of Thomas Jefferson, James Madi¬son, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and Eldridge Gerry should carry the collective weight of a sledgehammer. When it comes to defining what tyranny is and the right to use lethal force in opposition to it as necessary, the opinions of the Continental Congress, the people of Boston as expressed in the Suffolk Resolves, the Decla¬ration of Independence, and even the definition
12 François¬Marie Arouet (a.k.a., "Voltaire"), Siecles de Louis XIV et de Louis XV 309 (1820).
of the word in Black’s Law Dictionary should carry substantial weight. And as for the issue of whether you and your colleagues have exceeded your lawful authority under Article III ¬¬creating what Jefferson described as a “judicial oligarchy” ¬¬is concerned, the opinions of learned colleagues such as Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Robert Bork, Richard Posner, the late Richard Arnold, and Elena Kagan, et al., would appear persuasive.
Petitioner offers this analysis, taken directly from the pen of Thomas Jefferson, for the same reason Jefferson presented it: as a simple diagnostic tool. As Abraham Lincoln stated in his famous Lyceum address, “every American, every lover of liberty, every well wisher to his posterity, [should] swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to violate in the least particular, the laws of the country; and never to tolerate their violation by others.” Abraham Lin¬coln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Speech (before the Young Men's Lyceum, Spring-field, Ill.), Jan. 27, 1838. Twenty¬five thousand men ¬¬the functional equivalent of the modern city of Denver and its surrounds ¬¬to secure the blessings of liberty, and countless others have given the last measure of their devotion to preserve it. Petitioner would dishonor their memory and indeed, that of every man and woman who stands a post in the most godforsaken corners of this Earth to defend it, if he were to implicitly endorse our lawless judo¬cracy through silence.
That having said, as Petitioner and his family have already been criminally harassed by the courts’ Praetorian Guard owing to his discharge of this most solemn of duties, it is prudent for him to remind his audience of the established scope of the First Amendment.
The spirit of the First Amendment was captured succinctly by John F. Kennedy: "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable." John F. Kennedy, Address to the Diplomatic Corps of Latin American Republics, Mar. 13, 1962 (John F. Kennedy Presidential Lib¬rary, http://www.jfklibrary.org/White+House+D ... rch/13.htm). Conversely, where people are free to joust with tongues, they are generally disinclined to joust with lances. For this reason, for good or ill, our nation has zealously guarded our right "to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions." Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 270 (1941). This right is to be afforded for "vigorous advocacy" no less than "abstract discussion." NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429 (1963).
The borders of protected speech extend even to open advocacy of revolution. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (overturning Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927)). The line is drawn "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action," Brandenburg, 395

U.S. at 447, as a principal "function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
By its very nature, a legal brief is "advocacy in this country directed to our government and its policies." Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561
U.S. at ___ (Breyer, J., dissenting; slip op., at 3). It is "[c]ore political speech," occupying "the highest, most protected position" in the hierarchy of First Amendment protections. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judg-ment). "If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech." Citizens United v. Federal Elec¬tion Comm’n, 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 33). Not "‘[e]ven the war power . . . remove[s] constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.’" United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 264 (1967) (quoting Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 426 (1934)).

Petitioner’s duty and intent is to educate and inform the Court; any discomfiture the Justices might experience may well be a function of guilt.
B. Rebellion against Tyrants Is Obedience to God
To our Founding Fathers, the right to kill a tyrant was absolute. Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin both recommended that the Great Seal of the United States be encircled by the phrase, "Rebellion against Tyrants Is Obedience to God." David Hall, Genevan Reform and the American Founding 8 (Lexington Books 2003). Their senti¬ment has been echoed by both a current and future saint, Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Princi¬pum, in St. Thomas Aquinas: Political Writings 15 (R. Dyson trans., Cambridge U. Press 2002) (1267); Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae § 55, Encycli¬cal Letter on the Value and Inviolability of Human Life (Mar. 25, 1995), and incorporated into state bills of rights. E.g., Mass. Const. Part I, Art. I; Va. Const. of 1776 (1830) §3.
The concurrences of our Founding Fathers read like a Brandeis brief. Judge Roger Sherman ¬¬the only man to sign all four of our nation’s founding documents ¬¬observed in the halls of Congress that it is "the privilege of every citizen, and one of his most essential rights, to bear arms, and to resist every attack upon his liberty or property, by whomsoever made." Roger Sherman, Speech, 14 Debates in the House of Representatives 92 (ed. Linda Grand De Pauw) (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1972). Thomas Jefferson notes that "[r]ightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our will within limits drawn around us by the equal rights of others. I do not add 'within the limits of the law,' because law is often but the tyrant's will, and always so when it violates the rights of the indi¬vidual." Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Isaac Tiffany), Apr. 4, 1819 at1. Patrick Henry adds, "nothing will preserve [the public liberty] but downright force." Patrick Henry, 3 Elliot, Debates at 45 (Virginia Convention, Jun. 5, 1788). Alexander Hamilton explains in the Federalist that if "persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers," the justly aggrieved citizens "must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their courage and despair." The Federalist No. 28, 206 (A. Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed. 1990). But their essence is perhaps best conveyed by the uncommon eloquence of Thomas Paine:
Not all the treasures of the world, so far as I believe, could have induced me to support an offensive war, for I think it murder; but if a thief breaks into my house, burns and destroys my property, and kills or threatens to kill me, or those that are in it, and to "bind me in all cases whatsoever" to his absolute will, am I to suffer it? What signifies it to me, whether he who does it is a king or a com¬mon man?
Thomas Paine, The American Crisis, No. 1 (Dec. 19, 1776), as reprinted in Paine: Collected Writings 97
(E. Foner, ed.) (Putnam, 1984).
The framers did not build on a blank slate. It is an incorrigible and foundational principle of law that oppressed citizens have a right to assassinate a tyrant in defense of one’s lives and liberties. E.g., Mass. Const. Part I, Art. 1 (1780); see also, John of Salisbury, Policraticus, bk. iii, ch. 15 (1159); Magna Carta [1215], Ch. 61 (King personally liable for not only his tortious acts, but those of his servants). It logically follows that, if our judges have become tyrants, they may be assassinated.13 And as the act would be in defense of the Constitution and our laws, it would not be so much of a legal right as a duty of citizenship. 8 C.F.R. § 337.1.
Abraham Lincoln summarizes the view: "no man is good enough to govern another man, without the other’s consent." Abraham Lincoln, Speech (on the Kansas¬Nebraska Act, Springfield, IL), Oct. 16, 1854. We have a document in hand [the Declaration of Independence] declaring our lack of consent. Prior to the Revolution, our Founding Fathers asked this direct question: If you would not
13 It is also, of course, the sworn duty of the other branches of government to use any and all means in opposing judi¬cial tyranny, including impeachment, criminal prosecution, and assassination where necessary.
willingly suffer absolute rule, by what right do you claim absolute rule over us? See, Declaration of Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms, Conti¬nental Congress (U.S.), Jul. 6, 1775.
And their answer? “Lock and load.”
C. The Federal Judge: Of Adam and Evil
So spake the Fiend, and with necessity, The Tyrant’s plea, excused his devilish deeds.
¬¬John Milton14
We all remember the tale of Adam and Eve in the Garden: They partook of the forbidden tree of knowledge ¬¬and learned that they were naked. And they were ashamed. So, what did they do? They instinctively reached for the primordial equiv¬alent of towels: a fig leaf.
Judge Richard Posner is a national treasure, if for nothing but his candor. He admits that there is "a pronounced political element in the decisions of American judges," and evidence of this fact is "overwhelming." Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 369 (Harv. U. Press 2008). He "parts the cur¬tain a bit," Id. at 2, asserting that judicial decisions
14 4 Paradise Lost, ln. 393¬94 (1667).
often have little to do with an honest and diligent application of the law: "Appellate judges in our system can often conceal the role of personal preferences in their decisions by stating the facts selectively, so that the outcome seems to follow from them inevitably, or by taking liberties with precedents." Id. at 144 (emphasis added). The predictable product is an unreasoned decision, usually "difficult or impossible to accept as an act reflecting systematic application of legal princi¬ples." Wisconsin v. Allen, No. 2010¬WI¬10 (Wis. 2010), slip op. at ¶ 79. Judges "are constantly dig¬ging for quotations from and citations to previous cases to create a sense of inevitability about posi¬tions that they are in fact adopting on grounds other than deference to precedent," a process he characterized as "fig¬leafing." Posner, How Judges Think at 350.
Justice Kagan lauded Posner as the "the most important legal thinker of our time," Elena Kagan, Richard Posner, the Judge, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1121 (2007), and not without cause.15 He might be the most prolific judicial author of our age; he is, without doubt, one of the most respected.
15 Petitioner would grant that moniker to Justice Scalia for his work on originalism, even though he is about as faithful to his originalism as Tiger Woods was to his former wife Elin. See, Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of Faint¬Hearted Originalism, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 7, 13 (2006),
Posner is blunt in his scorched¬earth assessment of judicial behavior. He candidly admits that jud¬ges are liars, "parrot[ing] an official line about the judicial process (how rule¬bound it is) … though it does not describe their actual practice." Id. at 2. Judges "are not moral or intellectual giants," id. at 3, but all too human. And they do what humans do: act in their own self¬interest.
To not put too fine a spin on it, judges like play¬ing God, which is why they took such drastic pay cuts to ascend to the bench. And that is why they are so protective of our current system of certiorari review ¬¬both at the intermediate and ultimate appellate levels. As a rule, judges bury their most toxic decisions in the juridicial Yucca Mountain of “unpublished” opinions, far from the pure stream of common law precedent. This graveyard holds their dirtiest secrets: not just slipshod decisions, but willful and felonious acts.
Like all tyrants, federal judges invoke the man¬tra of “necessity.” Justice Kennedy is reported to have responded angrily to a vigorous critic of institutionalized unpublication that “f you guys want us to do it right, we’d need 1,000 more jud-ges.” Frank J. Murray, Justices to Review Access to Opinions: Appellate Courts Vary Widely on Issue, Wash. Times, Oct. 27, 2000, at A8, available at http://www.Nonpublication.com/MURRAY.html.
The decisions issued by the lower courts in this matter are pristine examples of why such slipshod excuses for judicial opinions are intolerable. The Court of Appeals gave no identifiable reason for their affirmance at all: “The district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to order the Sup¬reme Court to take any action.” Smith v. Thomas, No. 10¬5041 (D.C.Cir. Jul 1, 2010) (unpublished). A hundred hours, 20,000 words of prose, and over a hundred authorities to the contrary, assiduously ignored. Due process demands that a tribunal present a coherent explanation of why a decision came out as it did. See e.g., Ponte v. Real, 471
U.S. 491, 497 (1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974). By this metric, the decision below is an egregious violation of due process, depriving Petitioner of his right to meaningful access to the courts. We don’t need appellate judges any more, as monkeys throwing darts at a dartboard could have done a better job.
As Chief Justice Marshall said more than a cen¬tury and a half prior, "the intention of the legisla¬ture is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing from the plain meaning of words . . . in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest." United States
v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95¬96 (1820) (emphasis added). This has been black¬letter law ever since there was a black¬letter law. See e.g., United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805) (application of plain meaning rule); 1 William Blackstone, Com-mentaries on the Laws of England §§ 68¬72 (1765) (precis on statutory interpretation).
The trial court’s reasoning was equally opaque: "t seems axiomatic that a lower court may not order the judges or officers of a higher court to take an action." Smith v. Thomas, No. 09¬cv-01926
(D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2010) (quoting dictum in Panko v. Rodak, 606 F.2d 168, 171 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979).
If you possess the intelligence of a potted plant and zero knowledge of law, that argument might carry the day, but this form of sophistry elides the fundamental distinction between the office itself and the officer exercising the powers of an office. Mandamus can "compel an exercise of existing jurisdiction, but not … control [that servant’s] decision." Ex parte Roe, 234 U.S. 70, 72 (1914). Whereas a lower court must follow the binding precedent of its jurisdiction and thus, may be controlled by a mandamus, the Supreme Court has the sole prerogative "to overrule one of its precedents." State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997). Or to put it another way, whereas the Supreme Court is the highest court in the land and cannot be “controlled” by any other court, the power of the office of Justice must be exercised by an officer of the law, who is a creature of the law, and bound to obey it. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). Mandamus controls those who hold public office, as opposed to the offices themselves.
The problem with the status quo is self¬evident: If the Justices of this Court cannot be compelled to obey the law via the orderly mechanism of law, they are, by definition, dictators and tyrants. And, as a corollary, as former federal prosecutor Paul Butler asserts, lethal force may lawfully be used against judges who have appointed themselves our tyrants. Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 721 (2003) (invoking inter-national law principle of "just war" to justify tar¬geted assassinations of public officials, including federal judges).
Again, we return to the wisdom of Thomas Jef¬ferson: As assassination of officials is undesirable, the law must be read as not bestowing tyrannical powers, and providing remedies when an official abuses his or her lawful authority. The lower court decisions are plain error, and must be overturned.
D. We’re Paying You To Do Your Job Right.
Yes, Justice Kennedy, we really do want you to finally do it right for a change. Justice Scalia is, in Petitioner’s admittedly personal estimation, one of the ten brightest men to ever grace this Court. But what earthly good is all that intellectual firepower, when 99.44% of this Court’s decisions are made by a single 25-year¬old law clerk? And what is left of the reason of the law, when the only “answer” this Court has to give is “You lose!”
If a thousand or even ten thousand new federal judges are needed to get the job done right, then we need them. Of course, it means that the next Clarence Thomas won’t be offered a seven¬figure advance for vapid and embarrassing acts of liter¬ary masturbation like My Grandfather’s Son, and Justice Kennedy would no longer be the de facto Supreme Court. But the American people would be the real winners: they could once again say, as Patrick Henry once proclaimed, that we have no king but the law.
CONCLUSION
At the risk of stating the painfully obvious, there is one and only one correct way to interpret the Constitution, and the most effective summation of this principle comes (as it always appears to) from the pen of Thomas Jefferson:
Our peculiar security is in possession of a written constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction. If [our public officials’ powers are boundless] then we have no constitution. If it has bounds, they can be no other than the definition of the powers which that instrument gives.
Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Wilson Nicholas), Sept. 7, 1803 at 2.
It is logically impossible for a judicial system to deliver equal justice under law if judges are free to substitute the crooked cord of discretion for the golden mete¬wand of the law. Therefore, error¬correction is an unavoidable aspect of this Court’s duties. If it takes a thousand Justices to do the job right, it does, but there can be no substitute for doing it right. This Court cannot responsibly avoid this golden opportunity to address the issue raised in this appeal.
For this reason, this Petition must be GRANTED.

[The Operative]

Translation:
Even though the judicial system is working exactly as it was intended to, it doesn't fit in with Bob's and Ken's delusions so they will b**ch and moan like little children.

[wserra]

It takes a truly arrogant wacko to believe that prolix gibberish interspersed with gratuitous insults and the occasional threat actually constitutes prose worthy of Learned Hand.

[jg]

From the Scib'd document page 10 linked in the original post:

"PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS (What constitutes a “prior or related appeal” in this case depends on degrees of consanguinity. The pertinent cases all fit together in a seamless web, culminating in a direct assault on the most sacred of judicial cows: absolute judicial immunity.) The lawsuits and their relational significance are:
Smith v. Mullarkey, 67 F.App’x. 535 (10th Cir. Jun. 11, 2003). . . . . . . . . . . 12, 60
Smith v. Mullarkey, 121 P.3d 890 (Colo. 2005) (per curiam)............ 13, 60
Smith v. Arguello, No. 09-cv-2589-PAB (D.Colo. filed Nov. 3, 2009)
(mandamus action against federal judges). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N/A
Smith v. Bender, No. 09-1003 (10th Cir. Sept. 11, 2009) (unpublished) (appeal docketed Feb. 4, 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 60
Smith v. Thomas, No. 09-cv-1926-JDB (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2010) (Supreme Court review on writ of error is a right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 "

Mr. Smith seems to have spent considerable time with similar tilting in the last few years.

[notorial dissent]

So what, he's getting paid by the word??? As near as I can decipher from that frothing of gibberish, Smith lost at trial and didn't agree with the verdict, big surprise there, and then the appeals court either couldn't make anything out of the gibberish he self filed, or else, could and laughed and tossed it or refused the appeal, obviously not seeing how he was somehow smarter and righter than the trial court, so now he is demanding that some Federal court order the local court to accept the appeal and grant it??? After having read that mishmosh I'm just not sure exactly what he does want, or if he even knows for that matter. What is obvious is that he has no understanding of how the court system works, and since it disagrees with his august opinion, it is obviously gone rogue or some such. Makes my head hurt to read it one way or the other.

I tried going to scribd, and all i got was a blank screen for the file pages, so have no idea what he was really ranting about, but I think ranting is probably a good enough start.

[Thule]

As the citizen has an absolute right to assassinate a tyrant, any public official who exercises tyrannical power over him ¬¬including judges ¬¬may lawfully be assassinated. And as assassination of a public official is undesirable, the law must be read as not bestowing tyrannical powers, providing remedies when an official abuses his or her lawful authority. Ergo, certiorari is unconstitutional.

Ahhh, the old "Agree, or I will shoot"-defense. A classic. But not much used lately, since judges (and other officials) have this tendency to get snippy whenever they hear this.

Actually, in keeping with the also-classic sov'run theme, it's more like "Agree, or I will hope some of my followers or some other half-baked moron will shoot".

[notorial dissent]

Yeah, I just can't imagine why a judge would ever take offense at such a sound and reasoned discourse. Or maybe why the men in ill fitting suits would come calling after something like this.

(edited for typo error)

[notorial dissent]

I would say got it in one!!

I seem to remember his name coming up before in connection with something else, but can't remember what at the moment, but fairly sure it was of the same level of nonsense.

[bmielke]

I would say got it in one!!

I seem to remember his name coming up before in connection with something else, but can't remember what at the moment, but fairly sure it was of the same level of nonsense.

maybe Quatloos thread on "Secret Government Bribes"

[notorial dissent]

Thanks, that may well have been it, but I also thought there was something else having to do with removing judges.

Either way, still a prime loon, and card carrying member of the tinfoil hat brigade.

[notorial dissent]

Ken Smith's apparent problem is that he applied to practice law in the State of Colorado and the licensing entity there thought better of it and denied his application, when he refused to take a mental evaluation-and one can only wonder what brought that on, and has since been suing everyone in sight, unsuccessfully it would seem, and would appear to have worn out his welcome at the Federal level as well.

[bmielke]

Ken Smith's apparent problem is that he applied to practice law in the State of Colorado and the licensing entity there thought better of it and denied his application, when he refused to take a mental evaluation-and one can only wonder what brought that on, and has since been suing everyone in sight, unsuccessfully it would seem, and would appear to have worn out his welcome at the Federal level as well.

Were you looking for Ken Smith or Bobhurt? The link is for Bobhurt.

[notorial dissent]

I just tripped over the Smith stuff while I was looking since he has been so prolific, haven't found anything further on Hurt, haven't looked much either. His sribd page won't work for me so I haven't done much else.

[Joey Smith]

whether a citizen and co-sovereign has a right pursuant
to the Tenth Amendment to seek relief in the nature of a writ of scire facias and to
initiate criminal prosecution of public officials, in the way that the English subject
was permitted to act at common law on behalf of the Crown.

No. Another case of "The judge didn't find in my favor; ergo, the judge is corrupt." Otherwise, the legal basis for this is about as poorly researched and ill-grounded as somebody would expect from somebody involved with Bob Hurt, i.e., good ole' fashioned strung-together gibberish attempting to masquerade as a legal argument.

[JamesVincent]

Kinda reminds me of my ex. When the judge granted me sole custody of the kids and ordered her to pay child support, including back child support since she hadnt paid none since the day I took the kids away from her, she swore up and down in the court and to my kids that the judge was a male chauvinist pig and was an a@@hole who hated women.

[Cathulhu]

Don't know if you could ever find it, but local Seattle band The Jitters had a classic song in the 80's, "You Didn't Walk Out on Me, You Just Beat Me to the Door". Sorry, don't know if was ever recorded, I heard it live.

[Duke2Earl]

Anyone who would voluntary read more than a couple of paragraphs into that nonsense has too much time on their hands... either than or a morbid sense of humor.

[Famspear]

There have been several interactions and "discussions" with Bob Hurt here in Quatloos. Here are some examples:

viewtopic.php?f=8&t=6159

viewtopic.php?f=8&t=5231

viewtopic.php?f=27&t=2243

Check out the last link, especially.

[Famspear]

Here is one of my favorite passages from Bob Hurt:

Frankly, until you are willing honestly to face the reality that Blacks are relatively stupid, as are Mexicans and certain groups of Caucasians, and that their low-IQ natures are neither needed nor wanted in future generations of humans, you will not be qualified to participate in the planning for such a program. Why? Because getting rid of the stupid is one of Adam and Eve's purposes for coming to this world.
It is only a coincidence that the vast majority Blacks and Mexicans have relatively low IQs, but it is a reality. It is true that, out of 45 million Blacks, a good 6 to 7 million have IQs higher than the average Caucasian IQ of 100. I do not think such people should be excluded from a biological upliftment program. But I do think all of those Blacks and Mexicans and Caucasians with IQs lower than 90 should be prohibited from procreating, as should all welfare recipients, criminals, crazy people, and children under 21. If such a law were implemented, our nation's genetic, family, and crime problems would diminish dramatically and within 3 generations.
That is only half of a good gene-pool enrichment program, for the other half would encourage smart people to meet and procreate a lot of children, rather than 1.7 per family as they are doing now. 3 per family is required to sustain a race or gene group. The stupid generally procreate at greater than 3 children per family.
Why is there no decent and benign eugenics program in America? For one reason: people like you, Cheryl, say it is stupid to call people stupid. It has become politically incorrect to tell the truth about IQ and genetics because that might offend someone. I think it is far more important to be loyal to truth than to be concerned over offending someone with the truth.

from:

http://bobhurt.blogspot.com/2005_09_01_archive.html

as quoted at:

viewtopic.php?f=27&t=2243

[grixit]

Heh. It's great to make such grand perscriptions, since you can define `undesirables' so as to exclude yourself. Of course someone else might come up with a different catagorization.