The IRS shows Ed the law

[Nikki]

The US Attorney for Mr. Bullshit's district is fully aware of all of these conversations.

Bulton doesn't have a snowball's chance at a Cheek defense -- he's been shown the law too many times.

[LPC]

It is perfectly reasonable that sometimes your particular state is excluded from the definition of "State". For purposes of 33 USC 2901-2909,

I will stop yawning as soon as you can find someone who cares about the definition of "states" in 33 USC 2901-2909.

I know people who are very concerned about estuary habitat, but even people who are concerned about estuary habitat have an almost uncanny ability to recognize that Oklahoma does not border on any ocean and so does not have any estuary habitat.

[Judge Roy Bean]

Ah, but then there are those who believe maritime law applies to lake Texoma.

To those with designs on making ludicrous arguments to divert the subject, any body of water will do.

[LPC]

In the absence of wording to the contrary, the legal meaning of "state" in Acts of Congress (when referring to the political entities making up the United States of America) is the same as the ordinary sense of the term "state" -- as in "one of the fifty states."

Exactly Pete's point. 26 USC 7701(a)(10) is language to the contrary (i.e. language that "State" does NOT have the ordinary meaning of "one of the union states", in that it "includes" DC),

The District of Columbia is composed of land that used to be part of Maryland.

Maryland was one of the original 13 colonies and one of the states that ratified the Constitution.

So the land that is now the District of Columbia is land that was part of "one of the union states" when the Constitution was ratified.

Do I really need to explicitly draw the obvious conclusions and pound this into the ground?

[grixit]

The District of Columbia is composed of land that used to be part of Maryland.

Maryland was one of the original 13 colonies and one of the states that ratified the Constitution.

So the land that is now the District of Columbia is land that was part of "one of the union states" when the Constitution was ratified.

Do I really need to explicitly draw the obvious conclusions and pound this into the ground?

You could stand Stevesy in a hole like a piller and swing Bulton like a sledgehammer head on head to pound him into the ground and you still wouldn't make an impression on either of them.

[John J. Bulten]

Wouldn't it be nice for you if (a)(10) said:"The term "State" shall mean the District of Columbia"? It does not.

Wouldn't it be nice for you if (a)(10) read like 26 USC 4612(a)(4)? It does not. In fact, there are large numbers of definitions of "State" and "US" in the Code which include the 50 states, and large numbers where no such inclusion is specified. And you think every one of these intentional differences in specification is insignificant?

Ward reaches this twisted conclusion [that the Internal Revenue Code only applies to individuals located within Washington, D.C., the federal enclaves within the states, and the territories and possessions of the United States] by misinterpreting a portion of the Income Tax Code. The 1913 Act defined the words ‘state’ or ‘United States” [sic] to ‘include’ United States territories and the District of Columbia; Ward asks this court to interpret the word ‘include’ as a term of limitation, rather than of definition. ... We find each of appellant’s contentions to be utterly without merit.

The argument rejected in Ward is that "include" is limiting rather than expansive. Your summary was inaccurate.

Defendants [Glen and Jeanette] Bell also argue the Secretary of Treasury's authority is limited by a definition of the "United States" that encompasses only territories and possessions such as the "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa" (Def. Brief, p. 6, 11) but not the contiguous 48 states, Hawaii and Alaska. Defendants Bell reach this outcome "by interpreting the term 'include' [as used in the tax code] as a term of limitation rather than of definition", United States v. Ward, 833 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987) "This claim . . . has no semblance of merit.""

The argument rejected in Bell is the same frivolous position as in Ward, that "include" is limiting.

The taxpayer's argument -- that Nebraska was "without" the United States and that as a Nebraska resident the taxpayer was "alien to the foreign Federal jurisdiction" and therefore not subject to income tax -- was rejected. Friesen v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1672, T.C. Memo 1996-2, CCH Dec. 51,103(M) (1996).

The argument rejected in Friesen requires the frivolous positions that federal jurisdiction is foreign to union-state residents and that they are therefore not subject to tax.

In an affidavit attached to his amended petition, petitioner sets forth numerous, tax-protester type legal arguments, including, in petitioner’s words, the following propositions:
That the Republic of Illinois is "without the United States" ....
That "U.S. Citizens" are those people that are citizens of the District of Columbia;
that U.S. citizens and/or inhabitants of the Territories, Possessions, or Federal States, may or may not be citizens of the United States (Union States);
That Congress excludes the 50 States from the definition of "United States", for the purposes of 26 U.S.C., Subtitle A ....
That Ralph Edward Nieman is not a "U.S. Citizen", for purposes of Subtitle A, 26 U.S.C.;
neither is he a resident, as that term is defined at 26 CFR 1.1-1, nor an inhabitant of the District of Columbia or any of the Territories, Possessions, or Federal States ....
Petitioner attempts to argue an absurd proposition, essentially that the States [sic, LPC] of Illinois is not part of the United States. His hope is that he will find some semantic technicality which will render him exempt from Federal income tax, which applies generally to all U.S. citizens and residents. Suffice it to say, we find no support in any of the authorities petitioner cites for his position that he is not subject to Federal income tax on income he earned in Illinois .... Petitioner’s arguments are no more than stale tax protester contentions long dismissed summarily by this Court and all other courts which have heard such contentions.

The arguments rejected in Nieman are (at least):
1. IL is outside the US ("essentially" or "generally"), with no comment as to the definition to "US" for tax purposes (as already indicated);
2. "US citizen" means DC citizen (no, it has wider meaning than that);
3. Some bizarre distinction between US citizen and citizen of US;
4. Congress excludes the 50 states (no, they neither include nor exclude);
5. Nieman is not a US citizen (because his definition is DC citizen);
6. Either Nieman is not a US resident (presumably defined similarly), or Nieman's IL residence is otherwise significant;
7. Tax does not apply to all US citizens and residents;
8. Income earned in IL is not subject to tax.
None of these addresses the definition of "State" (nor even directly the definition of "US").

Are you asking us to find a case where the court stated, in these exact words, "Oklahoma, a union state, is a section 7701(a)(10) state."???

Of course not. I am looking for a case where any union state was held to be a State for purposes of 7701(a)(10), or for that matter, purposes of 3121(e)(1). Each of these cases is distinguishable from such holding, as just demonstrated, and for the obvious reason that no judge has found any authority from which such holding can be derived. In each case, judges are compelled to find taxation authority upon some other nexus, which can be demonstrated to be federal and voluntary. No authority states that "includes" is expansive beyond the same general class of items enumerated.

And when someone finds a case that has exactly the wording you've constructed in your futile attempt to avoid the legal effect of the cases we have cited, do you really think that we don't know you would just reject that case -- and go on to another silly argument? More importantly, do you understand what will happen if you ever DO get to make your argument in open court in exactly the way you want to do it, couched in just the "right" words that you "believe" will somehow avoid all the holdings in all the cases?

These are the same question. First, what has already happened is much more likely to recur: that the judge will wilfully misrepresent the tax position in order to declare it frivolous, which is an appealable error. Second, if the argument is rejected all the way to the USSC, then the rights of the 5th, 9th, 10th, and 14th Amendments would be denied formally rather than defacto. As long as those rights are not denied formally, process (long and tedious) still exists to exert them. If, however, they were denied formally, then I would be in a position of negotiation between my conscience and the formal interpretation of the law.

And I disagree that the states and the District of Columbia are "of different classes." The District of Columbia used to be part of Maryland and the Supreme Court has held that the District is still part of the United States for purposes of the Constitution.

The key definitions we are focusing on now are 3401(c) employee, 3121(e)(1) State, and 3121(e)(2) United States (they have been repeated here many times and are available at uscode.house.gov) ....

DBE's third objection is immediate but becoming more strained. Though the dictionary definition cannot be smuggled in by its own right, or by reference to expansion of the meaning of the term in itself, DBE holds it can be inserted because it is, after all, of like kind and class of the things enumerated. That is, ... union states are in the same class as Columbia, because Columbia used to be part of Maryland and the Supreme Court has held that the District is still part of the United States for purposes of the Constitution. These rationales fall apart immediately upon logical analysis; that is, DBE's purported rules of construction are revealed merely as special pleading, while the correct rules of construction are vindicated by sharp contrast.

Specifically, .... if Congress intended all union states because Columbia used to be part of Maryland, Congress also intended all nations because Puerto Rico used to be part of Spain. If Congress intended the United States because Columbia is part of the United States, Congress also intended North America because Columbia is part of North America. Even if such wild rules of construction could be patched up, I don't think they would improve on the rule of determining the most notable shared characteristic: federal jurisdiction (whether district, possession, or territory). In sum, the dictionary definition is not of "like kind and class" because it does not share the most notable characteristic shared by the items listed.

The more one reads the laws, the more one sees glaring omissions of expected subjects at exactly the point where Constitutional limits would otherwise impinge; and one also sees great stress laid upon the same expected subjects where Constitutional limits do not impinge .... In the previous post I quoted Groetzinger to the effect that none of the three branches of government cares to clarify these glaring omissions in the way they do when Constitutional limits are not at stake. None of these omissions can be explained by importing a dictionary definition without any statutory or case law authority. Rather, they each increase the confidence that these omissions (from all applicable laws, regulations, and dicta) are deliberate and connote limited applicability. I derive the conclusion of law that ... 3121 State and United States expand only to areas of federal jurisdiction like the listed territories. The contrary conclusion of law that .... 3121 State and United States expand to all union states, is without basis in statutory construction.

The key definitions we are focusing on now are 3401(c) employee, 3121(e)(1) State, and 3121(e)(2) United States (they have been repeated here many times and are available at uscode.house.gov).

I thought we were focusing on the meaning of "employee" in section 3401(c). The other definitions do not seem relevant.

[Famspear]

Dear John Bulten: You wrote:

In fact, there are large numbers of definitions of "State" and "US" in the Code which include the 50 states, and large numbers where no such inclusion is specified. And you think every one of these intentional differences in specification is insignificant?

Yes, John every one of these intentional differences in specification is insignificant. On the meaing of the terms "state" and "including" as used in 26 USC 7701, the only statute that matters is 26 USC 7701, and the only significant case law is the case law interpreting the tax law.

The Ward etc., cases are as I have described. You are delusional. --Famspear

[Famspear]

Dear John: In response to what LPC wrote, you said:

The argument rejected in Ward is that "include" is limiting rather than expansive. Your summary was inaccurate.

Do you know what the word "limiting" means?

As a tax protester, you would want to make the argument that the term "includes" in 7701(a) is a "limiting" term. Unfortunately, "includes" is not a limiting term. It's a term of expansion.

You are CORRECT that the court in Ward REJECTED the argument that the defined term was "limiting." The courts in all those cases essentially rejected the argument that the term was a "limiting" term. Perhaps your admission/concession was inadvertent.

Yours is not a happy lot. --Famspear

[Famspear]

John Bulten wrote:

I am looking for a case where any union state was held to be a State for purposes of 7701(a)(10), or for that matter, purposes of 3121(e)(1). Each of these cases is distinguishable from such holding, as just demonstrated, and for the obvious reason that no judge has found any authority from which such holding can be derived. In each case, judges are compelled to find taxation authority upon some other nexus, which can be demonstrated to be federal and voluntary. No authority states that "includes" is expansive beyond the same general class of items enumerated

I am getting the queasy feeling that John is starting to sound like the recently departed DMVP. Should a doctor be called?

[Imalawman]

Dear John: In response to what LPC wrote, you said:

The argument rejected in Ward is that "include" is limiting rather than expansive. Your summary was inaccurate.

Do you know what the word "limiting" means?

As a tax protester, you would want to make the argument that the term "includes" in 7701(a) is a "limiting" term. Unfortunately, "includes" is not a limiting term. It's a term of expansion.

You are CORRECT that the court in Ward REJECTED the argument that the defined term was "limiting." The courts in all those cases essentially rejected the argument that the term was a "limiting" term. Perhaps your admission/concession was inadvertent.

Yours is not a happy lot. --Famspear

Unfortunately, he won't admit he's wrong. He'll say that he too believes its expansive, but only for the terms already listed. For instance, anything that's already within the definition of a government employee. Of course this makes no sense, but when does he ever make sense.

He's a loon.

[Famspear]

John Bulten wrote:

First, what has already happened is much more likely to recur: that the judge will wilfully misrepresent the tax position in order to declare it frivolous, which is an appealable error. Second, if the argument is rejected all the way to the USSC, then the rights of the 5th, 9th, 10th, and 14th Amendments would be denied formally rather than defacto. As long as those rights are not denied formally, process (long and tedious) still exists to exert them. If, however, they were denied formally, then I would be in a position of negotiation between my conscience and the formal interpretation of the law

Does anyone here remember the group "Firesign Theater"? Remember albums like "Don't Crush That Dwarf, Hand Me the Pliers"; "Waiting for the Electrician or Someone Like Him"; "I Think We're All Bozos on This Bus"? Is John's verbiage beginning approach that flavor - or is it just me? -Famspear

[Famspear]

John Bulten wrote:

First, what has already happened is much more likely to recur: that the judge will wilfully misrepresent the tax position in order to declare it frivolous, which is an appealable error

Oh, noowwwww I get it! The tax protesters all these years have been arguing some tax position OTHER than what was reported in the case reports as having been the tax position they took -- and the judges simply falsified the record by re-stating the tax protesters' positions, then ruled against the re-stated, mis-stated, falsified positions, ignoring the actual positions that the protesters made! Yeahh, that's the ticket!

[wserra]

Firesign Theater? How can Bulten be in two places at once when he's not anywhere at all?

[Famspear]

Ah yes...

How Can You Be in Two Places at Once When You're Not Anywhere At All....

That was a good n' too. --Famspear

[Dr. Caligari]

My Mom was a Bozoette at school.

[Famspear]

Dear John Bulten: Regarding this quote from the Nieman case:

we find no support in any of the authorities petitioner cites for his position that he is not subject to Federal income tax on income he earned in Illinois

So, no matter what the court ruled in Nieman the other cases, Oklahoma ain't a state, eh?

You know, I'm thinking that if you ever get into Federal court in a civil tax case and you raise your argument (using whatever formula of "magic words" you come up with at the time) that somehow some part of your gross compensation for personal services is not taxable because somehow Oklahoma is not a "union state" under section 7701, and the judge rules against you (as the judge inevitably will), and you end up having your property seized and your wages garnished, you will nevertheless be able to TAKE COMFORT in your "Bulten Belief" that the judge's ruling somehow wasn't worded in just the right way.

And if, heaven forbid, they eventually charge you with tax crimes and you're convicted and stuck in prison, you will nevertheless be able to TAKE COMFORT in your "Bulten Belief" that the jury was JUST MISTAKEN in concluding that your "Bulten Belief" did not qualify as an actual good faith belief based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. Yours, Famspear

[John J. Bulten]

Famspear, it's okay that you're new to understanding these laws. Yes, it is frivolous to hold that "includes" is limiting ("includes only"). It is also frivolous to hold that "includes" is expansive to everything in the ordinary meaning of the word ("includes also"), which would yield other contradictions. Rather, "includes" in IRC is a technical term and has neither of the common meanings ("includes only" and "includes also"); it indicates expansion only to items of the same general class as those listed, i.e., only items otherwise within the meaning of the term defined by those examples.

You seem to believe, uncritically, that an IRC definition such as "'employee' includes ...", in the absence of the word "means" or some other reference to base definition, automatically includes the ordinary meaning of the word being redefined (e.g. "employee"). This position is easily proven false. I have previously commented about other examples (like Railroad Retirement "employees"), but a more clear-cut example is:

For purposes of this section, the term "single family residence" includes any manufactured home which has a minimum of 400 square feet of living space and a minimum width in excess of 102 inches and which is of a kind customarily used at a fixed location. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed as providing that such a home will be taken into account in making determinations under section 143.

Apparently manufactured homes just under 400 square feet, apartments, and Dumpsters were not "single family residences" for purposes of section 25, even when they were single family residences in the ordinary meaning. If such were intended to be included, the carefully narrow specifications would become meaningless enactments. Therefore the term "includes" demonstrably does NOT mean "includes also".

This tertium-quid technical nature of "includes" is also demonstrated by an even more technical fourth definition of "includes" in FDIC legislation:

(1) In general. - The terms "includes" and "including" shall not be construed more restrictively than the ordinary usage of such terms so as to exclude any other thing not referred to or described. (2) Rule of construction. - Paragraph (1) shall not be construed as creating any inference that the term "includes" or "including" in any other provision of Federal law may be deemed to exclude any other thing not referred to or described.

While I decline to analyze this particular gorilla in detail, at minimum it is clear that (for FDIC purposes) "includes" has a careful technical meaning that is not either of the common meanings; which demonstrates that it is reasonable that "includes" does not have either of the common meanings for IRC purposes either.

Since the expression of one is the exclusion of another, when 7701(c) states the included objects as "other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined" (even when defined only by examples), it excludes things NOT otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

To determine what things are otherwise within the meaning, we may not (as just demonstrated) resort to dictionary definitions. Rather, we are constrained to make that determination within the scope of the operative regulation:

As used in this part, and unless the context otherwise requires, the following terms shall have the meanings set forth in this section .... The terms ``includes'' and ``including'' do not exclude things not enumerated which are in the same general class.

Regulations in this part relate to personal property seized by officers of the Internal Revenue Service as subject to forefeiture [sic] as being involved, used, or intended to be used, as the case may be in any violation of the internal revenue laws other than chapters 51 (distilled spirits), 52 (tobacco) and 53 (firearms), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (I.R.C.).

While this refers specifically to seizures, it is the only extant regulatory explanation of 7701(c), it applies to all but 3 IRC chapters, and, in fact, personal property may be subject to forfeiture as used in violation of Chapters 21-24 as defined by Chapter 79 anyway. So this regulation applies to define the expansion of the subject definitions in those chapters. And that regulation compels "other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined" to be "things ... in the same general class".

Now this is just the law itself. When we come to case law, of course there are at least 18 USSC cases and many circuit cases at losthorizons.com/Forum3/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=38 that affirm various parts of this exposition. The clearest is of course Brigham v US, 97-2436 (1st Cir 1998), where an elector was held to be included as a "beneficiary", applying 7701(c), because she was of "like kind and class" (citing the principle of Neal v Clark, 95 US 704 (1878), not to expand beyond the "class of things enumerated").

All this analysis would be perfectly at home in the mouth of any bar member, except for the fact that it unaccountably yields a conclusion which appears to be "TP rhetoric". If we judge the analysis on that basis, we are admitting being driven by results rather than law.

In short, when I look at "the case law interpreting the tax law" that actually describes 7701(c) inclusion (like Brigham), the principle which every tax beneficiary relies on is undone, and the proper interpretation of the law is upheld. But the cases you rely on always lean on some other nexus, and refuse to deal with 7701(c) or with the actual terms it regulates. (The difference of this view from Lawman's strawman should be obvious.) "The only statute that matters is 26 USC 7701", and your cases do not deal explicitly with 7701, and mine do. So I rest comfortably at night.

So, no matter what the court ruled in Nieman the other cases, Oklahoma ain't a state, eh?

Of course not. I am looking for a case where any union state was held to be a State for purposes of 7701(a)(10), or for that matter, purposes of 3121(e)(1). Each of these cases is distinguishable from such holding, as just demonstrated, and for the obvious reason that no judge has found any authority from which such holding can be derived.

[Famspear]

John Bulten wrote:

Famspear, it's okay that you're new to understanding these laws. Yes, it is frivolous to hold that "includes" is limiting ("includes only"). It is also frivolous to hold that "includes" is expansive to everything in the ordinary meaning of the word ("includes also"), which would yield other contradictions. Rather, "includes" in IRC is a technical term and has neither of the common meanings ("includes only" and "includes also"); it indicates expansion only to items of the same general class as those listed, i.e., only items otherwise within the meaning of the term defined by those examples.

Uh, thanks for clearing that up, John.

Seriously, you are quite wrong. The terms "includes" and "including" in 7701 mean what I say they mean. The terms "state" and "United States" in 7701 mean what I say they mean. And I am not "new to understanding these laws."

The gross amount of pay for personal services that you, John J. Bulten, perform in Oklahoma is compensation, and is taxable to you under IRC section 61.

You have my permission to save all the pointless verbiage you have posted above, and use it in the eventuality of a trial. I would, however, advise AGAINST doing that. --Famspear

[John J. Bulten]

In fact, there are large numbers of definitions of "State" and "US" in the Code which include the 50 states, and large numbers where no such inclusion is specified. And you think every one of these intentional differences in specification is insignificant?

Yes, John every one of these intentional differences in specification is insignificant.

I warned you. Here are the definitions for just one chapter of one title of the USC. Do you really believe every intentional difference in specification, where the 50 states are either included or omitted, is insignificant?

403(k): An individual shall be considered to be engaged in noncovered remunerative activity outside the United States if he performs services outside the United States as an employee and such services do not constitute employment as defined in section 410 of this title and are not performed in the active military or naval service of the United States, or if he carries on a trade or business outside the United States (other than the performance of service as an employee) the net income or loss of which (1) is not includible in computing his net earnings from self-employment for a taxable year and (2) would not be excluded from net earnings from self-employment, if carried on in the United States, by any of the numbered paragraphs of section 411(a) of this title. When used in the preceding sentence with respect to a trade or business (other than the performance of service as an employee), the term "United States" does not include the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa in the case of an alien who is not a resident of the United States (including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa); and the term "trade or business" shall have the same meaning as when used in section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
405(c)(2)(C)(vii): For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
405(c)(2)(D)(iii)(II): The term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
405(c)(2)(E)(iv): For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "State" has the meaning such term has in subparagraph (D).
410(h): The term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.
410(i): The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense means the States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.
410(p)(2): As used in this paragraph, the terms "State" and "political subdivision" have the meanings given those terms in section 418(b) of this title.
418(b)(1): The term "State" does not include the District of Columbia, Guam, or American Samoa.
428(e): The benefit to which any individual is entitled under this section for any month shall not be paid if, during such month, such individual is not a resident of the United States. For purposes of this subsection, the term "United States" means the 50 States and the District of Columbia.
603(a)(3)(D)(iii): The term "State" means each of the 50 States of the United States and the District of Columbia.
603(b)(7): As used in this subsection, the term "State" means each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia.
618(d): As used in this section, the term "State" means each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia.
619(5): Except as otherwise specifically provided, the term "State" means the 50 States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.
621(d): For purposes of this section, the term "United States" means the fifty States and the District of Columbia.
629a(a)(4): The term "State" includes an Indian tribe or tribal organization, in addition to the meaning given such term for purposes of subpart 1.
659(i)(1): The term "United States" includes any department, agency, or instrumentality of the legislative, judicial, or executive branch of the Federal Government, the United States Postal Service, the Postal Rate Commission, any Federal corporation created by an Act of Congress that is wholly owned by the Federal Government, and the governments of the territories and possessions of the United States.
1012(5): The term "United States" means, notwithstanding section 1301(a)(1) of this title, only the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
1301(a)(1): The term "State", except where otherwise provided, includes the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and when used in subchapters IV, V, VII, XI, XIX, and XXI of this chapter includes the Virgin Islands and Guam. Such term when used in subchapters III, IX, and XII of this chapter also includes the Virgin Islands. Such term when used in subchapter V and in part B of this subchapter of this chapter also includes American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Such term when used in subchapters XIX and XXI of this chapter also includes the Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa. In the case of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam, subchapters I, X, and XIV, and subchapter XVI of this chapter (as in effect without regard to the amendment made by section 301 of the Social Security Amendments of 1972) shall continue to apply, and the term "State" when used in such subchapters (but not in subchapter XVI of this chapter as in effect pursuant to such amendment after December 31, 1973) includes Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam. Such term when used in subchapter XX of this chapter also includes the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Such term when used in subchapter IV of this chapter also includes American Samoa.
1301(a)(2): The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense means, except where otherwise provided, the States.
1301(a)(8)(C): The term "United States" means (but only for purposes of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph) the fifty States and the District of Columbia.
1301(a)(8)(D): Promulgations made before satisfactory data are available from the Department of Commerce for a full year on the per capita income of Alaska shall prescribe a Federal percentage for Alaska of 50 per centum and, for purposes of such promulgations, Alaska shall not be included as part of the "United States". Promulgations made thereafter but before per capita income data for Alaska for a full three-year period are available from the Department of Commerce shall be based on satisfactory data available therefrom for Alaska for such one full year or, when such data are available for a two-year period, for such two years.
1320b-11(h)(3): The term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
1320b-22(a)(3): In this section, the term "State" means each of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
1382c(e): For purposes of this subchapter, the term "United States", when used in a geographical sense, means the 50 States and the District of Columbia.
1395w-141(a)(4)(F): The term "State" has the meaning given such term for purposes of subchapter XIX of this chapter.
1395x(x): The terms "State" and "United States" have the meaning given to them by subsections (h) and (i), respectively, of section 410 of this title.
1396b(w)(7)(d): The term "State" means only the 50 States and the District of Columbia but does not include any State whose entire program under this subchapter is operated under a waiver granted under section 1315 of this title.
1396r-4(f)(7): In this subsection, the term "State" means the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

[Duke2Earl]

Yes...so far as whether or not you owe taxes on what your employer pays you....the differences between those definitions are totally insignificant and meaningless.