This thread is included on this board...

[Investor]

I just wanted to see if all the other threads disappeared.

[John J. Bulten]

Context, my good man.

[Investor]

Sorry Mr. Bulten I couldn't resist the opportunity for the joke. I really started this thread to replace the locked "New Arguments" thread.

[Cpt Banjo]

There are generally two planks of debate. The first is "my earnings are not statutory wages", which follows immediately upon adequate proof of two subpoints: that "includes" only adds items of the "same general class", and that the Constitution prohibits private pay-for-work from being classed carelessly with federal-nexus profits. (Right to pay for work was found by the USSC in Amendments 5 and 14, and was declared inalienable by the Declaration and USSC.)

Of course, Bulten can’t prove either of his subpoints. The first is explicitly contradicted by 7701(c), and the second is belied by his utter inability to produce any authority holding (a) that Congress’ constitutional authority to tax pay-for-work is any different from its power to tax “federal-nexus profits”, or (b) that the 5th or 14th Amendments or the Declaration limit in any way what Congress can or cannot tax.

Instead, he cuts and pastes dicta from cases having nothing to do with federal taxation in the deluded belief that by taking words out of context and recombining them by some feat of verbal alchemy he can produce binding precedent (previously unknown to any judge, lawyer, CPA, or law professor) that magically overrides all of the law to the contrary that he is otherwise unable to distinguish away.

[Disilloosianed]

Let me be the first to congratulate John for falling under admiralty law. (Maybe that's why we don't get too many tax protesters.....post enough and who knows what might happen to you.)

[webhick]

For purposes of this board, the term "thread" includes "topics".

The reason I say this, is because if you look at the board carefully, it does not refer to them as "threads" but "topics". One could easily argue that they are not threads - since most people relate the term "thread" to hierarchal threads (like Slashdot) and not flat threads like we have here.

[Demosthenes]

flat threads

aka unleavened threads?

[webhick]

flat threads

aka unleavened threads?

Threads before surgery

Hierarchal threads allow you to see who is replying to who because - for instance...my reply to your post would typically appear right under it (and usually indented) - even if seven people posted in between in reply to other posts.

In flat threads, all the replies get jumbled together. The only way you know if someone is replying to a particular post is if it is referenced within the reply.

[LPC]

In a locked thread, Bulten responded to my explanations of Montello Salt and Sims with the following utterances:

(I will merely remind LPC that Montello's explanation of "and including" naturally differed from its validly cited explanation of "including" alone;

Like most Bultenisms, the purpose of this utterance is so obscure as to make the utterance itself almost incoherent.

Bulten appears to be drawing a distinction between the wording at issue in Montello Salt ("and including") and the wording in the Internal Revenue Code ("includes" or "including," without the "and"). But why would he want to distinguish a decision with a holding ("including" was not used as a term of "enlargement") that (at least superficially) appears to be *favorable* to him?

If Bulten is arguing that the holding of Montello Salt is factually distinguishable because of the difference in wording, then all Bulten has left is the /dicta/ of the dictionary definitions quoted within the decision, *none* of which support the notion that using "includes" in a definition can exclude meanings otherwise within the ordinary meaning of the word (or term) being defined.

(Incidentally, although the Supreme Court noted the argument of one party that the word "and" was significant, the court itself never addressed that argument, and it appears to irrelevant to the court's conclusion.)

and that the inclusion principle in Sims was more broadly stated as "the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation, i.e., the legislative environment" and thus consistent with the Brigham summary.)

This is another very strange statement coming from someone who insists on analyzing statutes by picking out snippets and constructing purely textual arguments, completely ignoring the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation (i.e., IRS regulations and rulings).

And Bulten could have said the same thing about Montello Salt, because the Supreme Court there declared that its conclusion was "also sustained by the reports of the committees of the House and Senate."

Like other tax protesters, Bulten's arguments are all constructed out of snippets taken out of context from factually irrelevant court opinions. Confronted with court opinions which are factually indistinguishable or which contain declarations of law that clearly contradict them, tax protesters respond by: (a) finding some meaningless difference between the wording of court's opinion and the tax protester claim (if the case is factually indistinguishable), or (b) finding some meaningless difference between the facts of the case and the tax protester's situation (if the wording of the opinion directly contradicts the tax protester claim).

I actually found a court opinion that is is both factually indistinguishable and worded correctly, and Bulten still hasn't figured out how to respond to it, except to say that it was *only* a District Court opinion. In Chamberlain v. Krysztof, 617 F.Supp. 491, KTC 1985-137 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), the plaintiff claimed that an "employee" for purposes of section 3401(c) was limited to corporate officers and government employees. The court rejected that claim, stating that

"The definition should not be read as exclusive, but rather as indicative of Congress' intent that those persons so designated in section 3401(c) would be subject to the income tax withholding provision in the same manner as all other employees. The definition of 'employee', contrary to the interpretation urged by plaintiff, is more properly read to include all those persons with the ‘status of employee under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship.’”

(Footnotes omitted.)

2. "Includes also" ("all inclusive"): dictionary meaning; recognized by American Surety v Marotta; but also fails if applied to IRC. (I have only provided one example so far, of course, but I believe further review of the three-million-word IRC will uncover more, equally clear-cut cases.)

What the Supreme Court wrote in American Surety Co. of New York v. Marotta, 287 U.S. 513 (1933), was:

“In definitive provisions of statutes and other writings, ‘include’ is frequently, if not generally, used as a word of extension or enlargement rather than as one of limitation or enumeration.”

Why Bulten thinks that "also fails" when applied to the IRC has never been explained as far as I have seen. His "one example" is (I think) IRC section 25(e)(10):

For purposes of this section, the term “single family residence” includes any manufactured home which has a minimum of 400 square feet of living space and a minimum width in excess of 102 inches and which is of a kind customarily used at a fixed location. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed as providing that such a home will be taken into account in making determinations under section 143.

The purpose of this definition is not clear, because the term being defined, "single family residence," does not appear anywhere in section 25 (or anywhere else in the IRC, for that matter). But there is no reason to believe that the definition does not mean what it says, which is that "single family residence" can mean what you would expect "single family residence" to means (i.e., a rancher in the suburbs) as well as a mobile home that exceeds a minimum size.

Do you also believe that other units, within the common meaning of the phrase "single family residences" but not within the general class specifically described by 26 USC 25(e)(10), are intended to be included in that definition, disagreeing with the USSC's doctrine in Jarecki?

A word is known by the company it keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a sociis). This rule we rely upon to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving "unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress."

A good example of the kind of "snippets taken out of context" that I referred to above.

The issue in Jarecki was the meaning of the word "discovery" in a provision for "Income resulting from exploration, discovery, or prospecting, or any combination of the foregoing, extending over a period of more than 12 months."

Notice the complete absence of the word "include"?

The Supreme Court held that the meaning of "discovery" (which it described as a word "usable in many contexts and with various shades of meaning") should be limited to discoveries of the type associated with "exploration" or "prospecting," and so limited the meaning of "discovery" to the discovery of mineral resources.

Bulten is pounding a square peg in a round hole to suggest that the "doctrine" of Jarecki could be applied to section 3401(c).

Do you also disagree with the USSC principle in Gould that expansion in tax cases does not extend beyond the named class, i.e., the regulatory "same general class" as the "things ... enumerated"?

In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen.

As noted in my Tax Protester FAQ, Gould v. Gould is a good all-purpose cite for anything a tax protester wants to believe. The issue in the case was whether alimony was income, and the court concluded it was not (the law was later amended to include alimony in gross income).

As many, many courts have had to explain, the "clear import" of the tax law is to impose a tax on ALL income. In that respect, Gould v. Gould (1917) was over-ruled by Glenshaw Glass (1954), which declared that the Supreme Court "has given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology [defining "gross income"] in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted.”

Do you also believe that the heavy additional verbiage in both cases (which you hold as synonymous with "'includes' is not limiting") is thereby extraneous and redundant, against the USSC doctrine of Menasche?

It is our duty "to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute," Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152, rather than to emasculate an entire section, as the Government's interpretation requires.

Another strange citation, given that the principle stated in Menasche undermines most of Bulten's arguments.

For example, if the definition of “State” in 7701(a)(10) equates “State” with “District of Columbia,” then the definition of “United States” in 7701(a)(10) becomes gibberish, because the definition then becomes a statement that “United States” “includes only the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia.” In order to give the words of 7701(a)(10), the word "State" must have a meaning that is not simply "District of Columbia."

Bulten's misunderstanding stems in part from his acceptance of Hendrickson's baseless assumption that "includes" and any other word the meaning of which is clarified in 7701 can not have its normal meaning.

Quixote, do you disagree with the USSC axiom of Meese v Keene, or perhaps do you claim that "the terms 'includes' and 'including'" do not have "definitions"?

It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392, and n. 10 (1979).

More snippets taken out of context to support the claim that section 7701(c) does not mean it says.

In note 10 of Colautti v. Franklin, the court pointed out that the definition in question used the word "means" and *not* "includes" and that "[a] definition which declares what a term `means' . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated." So that opinion is by its express words irrelevant to section 7701(c) and 3401(c).

In Meese v. Keene, the issue was whether the phrase "political propaganda" defined by the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. 611(j), to cover any information, no matter how accurate, might nevertheless have a perjorative connotation (false, slanted, or biased representations) producing "reputational harm" violative of the First Amendment. The plaintiff was therefore arguing that the statute should be construed more narrowly than the broad statutory language would suggest. In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court held that the narrow meaning was "excluded" by the broad statutory definition. This is the exact opposite of what Bulten is claiming, which is that the broad meaning of "employee" should be rejected in favor of a narrow meaning.

[Nikki]

Dan:

Logic is irrelevant when the goal of arguments is to support tax evasion.

Remember: First shoot at the barn. Then paint the bullseyes around the holes.

[iplawyer]

Investor,

Nikki is right.

I gave up on posting at LH because John Bulton removed or edited my posts when he disagreed with what I wrote. He accused me of mis-quoting case law - which I have never done - and which he does all of the time. I'm going to have a very nice meal at a very nice place when PH loses his appeal and the SC does not grant cert. I'm sure JB will not shut up then, but at some point he will be in jail. I'm going to Australia first class when that happens.

As you will see, there really isn't any point in trying to show him why he's wrong. He doesn't want to pay taxes and so he is not going to believe you.

Cheers and welcome.

[Famspear]

On the frivolous "private sector employees are not employees" argument and section 3401(c), I assume the following cites are old news for Mr. Bulten, but I'll cite them anyway.

In Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9343 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam), taxpayer Grant W. Sullivan argued that he had not received “wages” and was not an “employee” under Internal Revenue Code section 3401(c). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled against Sullivan, stating:

To the extent Sullivan argues that he received no “wages” in 1983 because he was not an “employee” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §3401(c), that contention is meritless. Section 3401(c), which relates to income tax withholding, indicates that the definition of “employee” includes government officers and employees, elected officials, and corporate officers. The statute does not purport to limit withholding to the persons listed therein.

In United States v. Ferguson, 2007-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,461 (D. Nev. 2007), taxpayer Joy Ferguson argued that she was not an “employee” under section 3401(c), and that she therefore could not have “wages.” The court ruled against her, stating:

The core of the dispute before the court is Ferguson's assertion that she was not an “employee” as defined by §3401(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, and therefore did not earn any "wages." [footnote omitted] As such, she argues that her Form 1040 and Form 4862 accurately reported her wages as zero. As noted by the government, Ferguson's interpretation of §3401(c) has been considered and rejected numerous times by many courts. This Court would agree with the overwhelming precedent on this issue, Ferguson's argument that she is not an employee as defined by §3401(c) is frivolous.

In Luesse v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9389 (D. Minn. 1984), taxpayer Chell C. Luesse of St. Louis Park, Minnesota, argued that he received no “wages” because he was not an “employee” under section 3401(c). The court ruled against Mr. Luesse.

In Richey v. Stewart, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9642 (S.D. Ind. 1984), the court stated:

Another familiar argument from Mr. Richey [the taxpayer] is that he is not an employee under the terms of the Internal Revenue Code, citing Section 3401(c), which states that the term “employee” includes government employees. What Mr. Richey misapprises in his reading of the statute is the inclusionary nature of the language. The Code does not exclude all other persons from taxation who are not government employees.

In United States v. Charboneau, 2006-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,507 (M.D. Fla. 2006), the court stated:

[ . . . ] Ms. Charboneau contends that the Code's definitions of "wage income" and "self employment income" only include income derived from individuals who work for the federal government, or whose work involves that of "the performance of the functions of a public office." Because Ms. Charboneau never worked for any federal or state government during the tax years in question, she claims that the IRS cannot make any tax assessments against her.

This nonsensical argument is belied by the plain language of the Internal Revenue Code itself. For example, 26 U.S.C. §3401 defines wages as "all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer...." 26 U.S.C. §3401(a) (emphasis added). The statute then goes on to define various exceptions to this broad definition of wages in certain categories of private employment, such as in the agricultural and domestic service fields, newspaper delivery, the clergy, and for wages incurred by individuals working for employers "other than the United States or an agency therof" within Puerto Rico or a possession of the United States. There is nothing in the statute limiting "wages" to solely publicly-derived income. [footnotes omitted]

Ms. Charboneau, however, focuses on §3401(c), which states that:

the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.

26 U.S.C. §3401(c). Setting aside the last sentence of this provision, which clearly states that officers of private corporations are considered employees for purposes of determining wages, it is obvious that within the context of this statute that the word "includes" is a term of enlargement, not of limitation, and the reference to certain public officers and employees was not intended to exclude all others. See also Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 112-13 (1959) (finding that similar provision in 26 U.S.C. §6331 dealing with levies on salaries and wages does not exclude wages of private citizens); Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813,815 ("[Section 3401(c)] does not purport to limit withholding to persons listed therein"); United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir, 1985) (the Internal Revenue Code definition of “employee” in 26 U.S.C. §3401 does not exclude privately employed wage earners);. In addition, 26 U.S.C. §7701, which provides the definitions of terms used throughout the Internal Revenue Code, states that the "terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." 26 U.S.C. §7701(c).

In McCoy v. United States, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18986, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,787 (N.D. Tex. 2001), the court stated:

McCoy argues she should not have to pay taxes for 1996-98 because under Code Section 3401 she was not an “employee” which she contends is defined as an elected or appointed employee or official of the federal government. McCoy clearly misconstrues Section 3401(c). The definition of “employee” includes private-sector employees, employees of the federal government, as well as elected and appointed officials. The very language of the Code is inclusive, not limited to the examples of included persons. [footnotes omitted]

In each of the above-quoted cases, the court ruled against arguments that the taxpayer, as a private sector employee, was not a section 3401(c) "employee."

Of course, as has already been pointed out over and over, section 3401 deals with withholding. The gross amount of compensation for personal services (whether deemed wages, salary, or ping pong balls) is includible in gross income under section 61 - and (Mr. John Bulten's idiosyncratic fantasy to the contrary notwithstanding) there is no difference under the law between "compensation for personal services" and "income from compensation for personal services."

--Famspear

[Duke2Earl]

To me what is endlessly entertaining is to watch the wackos trying to use snippets, misquotes, and irrelevancies from court cases to prove that the courts are wrong. Their whole stick is to go to court to prove that the courts are wrong. Logic is not high on their to-do list.

[Judge Roy Bean]

It's nothing more than ego gratification. The idea that a fool can keep dozens of professional and legal experts dancing around his every post must be enormously satisfying to the Van Pelts and Bultens of the fringe crowd.

What they fail to realize is the average person visits the site without signing up and can quckly discern how far off into the weeds TP's really are. There are probably hundreds if not thousands who read and learn and get a few laughs, while a small handful of sycophants keep prodding the nutballs to keep at it.

[webhick]

It's nothing more than ego gratification. The idea that a fool can keep dozens of professional and legal experts dancing around his every post must be enormously satisfying to the Van Pelts and Bultens of the fringe crowd.

It's so satisfying for John that he's updated his troll post to include a list of Quatloos threads that talks about LH. I suppose he wants all the LHers to witness his antics here.

[Doktor Avalanche]

It's nothing more than ego gratification. The idea that a fool can keep dozens of professional and legal experts dancing around his every post must be enormously satisfying to the Van Pelts and Bultens of the fringe crowd.

It's so satisfying for John that he's updated his troll post to include a list of Quatloos threads that talks about LH. I suppose he wants all the LHers to witness his antics here.

I wonder why they don't just simply come on over and play in the reindeer games.