So, I saw Christopher Cannon's
appeal come up in the 7th Circuit's orders this week, and had a whole long thing written up explaining the history of the case, and never really realized that the case would take me full circle on the forum. I hope that's not a sign of some sort.
Cannon's appeal (actually, Cannon-Bey's appeal, depending on which documents you read) is actually of two cases: his counterfeiting case, and a later insurance fraud case in which he used a bogus lease to get replacement housing money from the insurance company after his house burned down. That case drew an indictment in January, 2012, after he'd been convicted in the first case, but before he'd been sentenced. More on that in a minute.
The transcripts are also posted in the district court case. A sample of the legal tactics that got him ejected from in front of MJ Andrew Rodovich:
MR. FLYNN [for the Defense]: Your Honor --
THE DEFENDANT: Objection.
THE COURT: I will speak to you if I want to. Mr. Flynn is your attorney.
THE DEFENDANT: No, he isn't. For the record, no, he isn't.
MR. FLYNN: Your Honor --
THE DEFENDANT: For the record, my name is Christopher H. Cannon-Bey.
MR. FLYNN: Your Honor, I have entered my appearance. (Inaudible.)
THE COURT: Mr. Flynn, I have attempted to explain to the defendant that he has the right to represent himself, but he has to answer some questions so that I am satisfied that it is a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. He has chosen not to answer my questions. He feels that he has a right to lecture me and ask me questions, and I have told him "no." So if he is willing to answer questions to determine whether or not it is a knowing and voluntary waiver, I will go through that dialogue. If he is not, I have appointed you. And you are his attorney until --
THE DEFENDANT: Objection. He's not my attorney. I'm in propria persona.
THE COURT: I told you I'm not listening to your dialogues, your monologues. Do you want to answer my questions concerning whether or not you are waiving your right to an attorney, or are you going to just --
THE DEFENDANT: I would like to place my name and status on the record.
THE COURT: I'm not interested in that. I asked you one simple question. Are you going to answer my questions, or are you going to carry on your own monologue?
THE DEFENDANT: I do not wish to contract with your corporation.
THE COURT: Okay. I know we've been through that before. Mr. Flynn, apparently your client does not want to answer my questions.
THE DEFENDANT: He cannot speak for me.
THE COURT: Do you want to proceed with the detention hearing and the arraignment today, or do you want to try one more time to talk to him?
MR. FLYNN: Your Honor, I think we're prepared to proceed. I don't anticipate he's going to be willing to converse with me. I will represent him zealously if I'm appointed as his attorney.
THE COURT: Is there any evidence that the Government is going to offer other than the indictment and the pre-bond report?
MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honor. By way of proffer, I would just like to advise the Court that in addition to the presentence report, which we ask you to take judicial notice of in the actual indictment, the Government has been given cases from numerous federal agencies; and by Government, I mean me. We are prepared to indict Mr. Cannon on numerous counts of fraud, both mail fraud, wire fraud, food stamp fraud. We have also been given a submission by the ATF to indict Mr. Cannon for being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition. We believe he is an armed career criminal based on his criminal history. The penalties for that indictment alone would be a mandatory minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life.
THE COURT: You have no standing to speak in this court. Any other evidence that the Government wants to offer?
MR. STEWART: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Flynn, anything that you want to say on behalf of Mr. Cannon?
MR. FLYNN: Yes, Your Honor. I would note that Mr. Cannon has very substantial --
THE COURT: I told you that I'm not listening to you. Be quiet. No, you cannot speak.
THE DEFENDANT: He cannot speak for me.
THE COURT: Mr. Flynn.
MR. FLYNN: Your Honor, I would note that Mr. Cannon has two parents who live in the Chicago area --
THE COURT: I'll remove you from the courtroom, and you could listen to these proceedings in the holding cell if you do not be quiet. Those are your options. Sit there quietly and listen to your attorney, or I will remove you.
THE DEFENDANT: He is not my attorney, sir.
THE COURT: Well, you won't answer my questions concerning waiving the right to have an attorney.
All right. Mr. Flynn, proceed.
MR. FLYNN: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Cannon --
THE COURT: Okay. Take him out. Put him in the holding cell so that he could listen to the proceedings there.
THE DEFENDANT: Under United States Code, Title --
THE COURT: Is the system on in there? I want to make sure he can hear it. It's on? Okay. Mr. Flynn.
MR. FLYNN: Yes, Your Honor.
He fared no better in front of Judge Van Bokkelen, who eventually wound up hearing both sets of charged against him, and who wound up striking many of his sovrun-flavored documents. Whether it was this, or the very rapid pace of the trial (he was arrested on the first set of charges on April Fool's Day, 2011, and convicted on December 8 of that year), he did not manage to get as many gibberish documents into the record as you may have seen elsewhere. Of particular interest, he did file a letter from Drew Ali and Marul A. Zvalton-El (or something; the judge could not make out the signature clearly) at the Moorish Consulate Post, which naturally had no effect on anything other than to make Judge Van Bokkelen strike it out.
The 7th Circuit summarized events in the first trial thus:
Cannon did his best to avoid making a choice. He said repeatedly that he did not want any help from his appointed lawyer, yet he also insisted that he was unwilling to represent himself. At a status hearing a few weeks before trial, the district judge had understood Cannon to be asking that his appointed lawyer be discharged and that he be allowed to represent himself. When the judge acceded but appointed the same lawyer as standby counsel, Cannon responded,“Well, I still must object because I’m not representing myself here today.” That comment prompted the judge to reconsider, and when Cannon next appeared before him a few weeks later, the judge once more asked if he wanted to represent himself. Cannon replied, “I do not wish to contract with your corporation at all,” and the judge, seeking clarification, asked, “That means you don’t want to represent yourself, correct?” Cannon answered: “I do not wish to contract with your corporation. I give you a better answer. I do not consent waiver of benefit.” When the judge probed further, Cannon continued, “Well, what I prefer to do here, sir, is formally request and demand my diplomatic immunity under my treaty and enforce my treaty here today with the United States and ask—and formally request and demand that the United States honor and request my treaty.” That was enough for the judge, who reappointed Cannon’s lawyer.
And,
Throughout the pretrial proceedings Cannon had voiced his frivolous legal theories in countless statements made in open court. He often refused to answer the district court’s questions, treating those inquiries as invitations to lodge an objection or pose his own question to the court, and he had no qualms about interrupting the court or counsel during the proceedings. Because of this history, Cannon’s own lawyer proposed immediately before jury selection that he be excluded from the courtroom during trial. Cannon responded with more of the same frivolous objections and statements. The district judge tried reasoning with him and asked multiple times if he would allow his lawyer to represent him without interruption. Cannon would not answer and continued his spiel, even after the judge twice warned that further interruptions would lead to exclusion from the courtroom. Cannon’s disruptive behavior justified removing him, and that misconduct did not abate when, at each break in the trial, the judge had Cannon returned to the courtroom to see if he was willing to control himself.
This is all in discussion of Cannon:Bey's
pro se appeal of the counterfeiting charge, which went about as well as you'd expect. While he was represented by counsel in his appeal from the insurance fraud conviction, counsel filed an
Anders motion, trying to get out of it. About the strongest point that counsel raised was that the prosecution had recommended a 20-year sentence, even though the Guidelines range for fraud was 18 to 24 months, raising a specter of vindictive prosecution. Agreeing with counsel that the disparity was not relevant, the Court then went on to point out that:
we would not even find error because the recommended sentence could well have been justified. The prosecutor argued that the district judge should exercise his discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to impose the statutory maximum sentence. According to the prosecutor, a 20-year sentence is justified by evidence submitted at the sentencing hearing that Cannon had committed other uncharged crimes, including attempting to commit more insurance fraud after a fire in another residence he owned, defrauding the food stamp program of $600,000, and unlawfully possessing six guns, including a semi-automatic rifle with an obliterated serial number. Cannon’s criminal history includes a burglary conviction and a serious drug felony conviction, so the gun possession by itself could have led to a guidelines range as high as 168 to 210 months.
The appeal ended on one note of hope, though:
We acknowledge, however, that the circuits are divided over whether restitution is a civil or criminal penalty, see [United States v.] Wolfe, 701 F.3d at 1217 (noting circuit split), and Cannon may petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari if he so desires. See Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5, 5–6 (1994).
Which makes me wonder what the clerks at the Supreme Court have done to the 7th Circuit to draw that kind of abuse, but then, maybe an appeal would have been inevitable anyway.
