United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).The clause thought to authorize the legislation, the first, confers upon the Congress power 'to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States. ...' It is not contended that this provision grants power to regulate agricultural production upon the theory that such legislation would promote the general welfare. The government concedes that the phrase 'to provide for the general welfare' qualifies the power 'to lay and collect taxes.' The view that the clause grants power to provide for the general welfare, independently of the taxing power, has never been authoritatively accepted. Mr. Justice Story points out that, if it were adopted, 'it is obvious that under color of the generality of the words, to 'provide for the common defence and general welfare', the government of the United States is, in reality, a government of general and unlimited powers, notwithstanding the subsequent enumeration of specific powers.' [footnote omitted] The true construction undoubtedly is that the only thing granted is the power to tax for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the nation's debts and making provision for the general welfare.
There is actually some grammatical support for your argument that the power to tax and the power to spend are not separate. What I am saying, however, is that (1) the power to tax, (2) the power to spend, and (3) the power to regulate, are three separate powers under Article I, section 8. They are three separate functions of government. Taxing (collecting money) and spending (disbursing money) are two opposite FUNCTIONS.
I believe you are saying the power to tax and the power to spend are one and the same, based at least in part, apparently, on this verbiage in Butler:
I think you may be reading this as though the phrase "independently of" were substituted with the phrase "separately from" like this: "The view that the clause grants power to provide [i.e., the power to spend . . . ] SEPARATELY FROM the taxing power, has never been authoritatively accepted."The view that the clause grants power to provide [i.e., to spend] for the general welfare, independently of the taxing power, has never been authoritatively accepted.
What the Court was saying in Butler is that BOTH the power to tax AND the power to spend have a limit -- and that the limit is the same for both. The taxing and spending must be done for "the general welfare." The two powers (the two FUNCTIONS, if you will) are "not independent" of one another. That's what the Court means when it says in effect that "the power" (rather than "the powers") to tax and spend must both be for the "general welfare." The power to spend is dependent on the power to tax in the sense that both are limited by the "general welfare" verbiage.
I think you and I are not really disagreeing on the substance of this particular point; we are using terms differently.
At any rate, the issue in Butler was not whether the taxing power and the spending power are one and the same. The issue was whether the "tax" discussed in that case was really a permissible tax or, alternatively, a disguised regulatory power and, if so, a regulatory power not granted to Congress by the Constitution.
Along the way to reaching its conclusion (briefly discussed below), the Court in Butler adopted the Hamilton-Story view that the power to tax is indeed limited by the "general welfare" language in the first enumeration of section 8 (see Article I, section 8, clause 1). The Court thereby rejected the Madison view that the power to tax is limited by the subsequently enumerated legislative fields (see clauses 2 through 18). That means that the power to tax is not limited just to things like interstate commerce (clause 3), post offices (clause 7), science and arts (clause , and so on.
Because the "general welfare" language is so, uh, vague and "general," the power to tax and the power to spend are sort of vague and general. I guess that's part of the reason why you and your fellow posters are now engaged in such a vigorous debate.
Interestingly, the Court in Butler ruled that even under the broad, vague "general welfare" limitation, the "tax" provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 -- which imposed a so-called "processing tax" when the Secretary of Agriculture determined that rental or benefit payments should be made with respect to any basic commodity -- were really blatantly regulatory provisions, and that the Constitution simply did not give Congress that regulatory power.
But, can you clarify something? Here, you wrote, in response to something Judge Roy Bean wrote:
What does "it" refer to, as in "it is the 'proper' interpretation"? In other words, can you summarize your view about what the "general welfare" limitation SHOULD mean, in terms of the power to tax and the power to spend? I'm not asking you to say what the law actually is, but rather what you think the law should be......unfortunately even the Supreme Court has declared the "general welfare" clause does not include the "local" welfare. [ . . . ] So yes it is the "proper" interpretation of the general welfare provision in the constitution.
Maybe it's related to this. You are quoted earlier as saying:
After that post, the thread went on, but after reading it I'm still unclear on why you believe an income tax on working man's non-interstate activity should be unconstitutional (if that's what you're saying). Are you also saying that if the man's earnings are strictly interstate, then the income tax should be OK? The "interstate" issue presumably has to do with "interstate commerce," which in turn has to do with regulation power, not limits on taxing or spending. Since the Butler court specifically adopted the Hamilton-Story view about the power of taxation (which means the power of taxation is limited by the "general welfare clause," but not by the "commerce clause"), and specifically rejected the Madison view, what does an "interstate activity" have to do with the power to tax the working man's non-interstate wages?All you need to be concerned with is a tax on a working man's earnings from working not engaged in interstate activity. That is about the only thing I believe will not be taxable with an "income tax".
A separate question is: Does (or should) the "general welfare" limitation ITSELF somehow make the Federal income tax on a "working man's earnings from work not engaged in interstate activity" unconstitutional?
Still another question: In your view, is there some other constitutional limitation that should also make that tax unconstitutional?
--Famspear