searcher wrote:The mistake I made was having cases that said one thing mixed in with cases that said the opposite & sent some in by a BIG TIME GOOF.
You're making progress if you recognize that there are cases that say the opposite of what you believe.
The next step is to recognize that the cases you think agree with what you believe are actually irrelevant.
searcher wrote:The following case was the first case I mentioned, & it says, in pertinent part: "The use of the Public streets IS NOT a privilege, BUT A RIGHT. It is a RIGHT or LIBERTY, the enjoyment of which is PROTECTED by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. A license, therefore, implying a privilege cannot possibly exist with reference to something which is a right, free and open to all, AS IS the RIGHT of the citizen to ride and drive over the streets of the city without charge and without toll, provided he does so in a reasonable manner.” City of Chicago v. Collins 175 ILL. 445, Pgs. 456, 457.
I can't get hold of a complete copy of the decision, so I don't know why the Illinois Supreme Court wrote those words (assuming it did write those words), but I can find later decisions by the same court that talk about the Collins decision and what it means (and doesn't mean):
From an analysis of the cases of City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, and Harder's Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 235 Ill. 58, it is further apparent that lawful conduct which had been regarded as a common right without previous legal authority could become a privilege by legislative action, and be exercised thereafter only upon payment of the tax.
In City of Chicago v. Collins, the court held that a city wheel tax ordinance was unconstitutional, and the use of the streets was a "right" and not a "privilege." The court stated: "A license, therefore, implying a privilege, cannot possibly exist with reference to something which is a right, free and open to all, as is the right of the citizen to ride and drive over the streets of the city without charge and without toll, provided he does so in a reasonable manner." In Harder's Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, however, the court redefined the "use of the streets," as a "privilege" on the ground that the legislature had acted on the subject by authorizing municipalities to exact a tax for the use of the streets. It was urged therein, on the basis of the Collins case, that the use of the streets was a right rather than a taxable privilege, hence, a statute empowering the municipality to exact a fee for revenue purposes was unconstitutional. This contention was similar to that urged by plaintiff herein with reference to the use of cigarettes. The court rejected that argument and distinguished the Collins case on the ground that it was decided before there was a statute authorizing the city to impose the license tax. The court stated: "the use of the streets was a common right, which was free and open to all without charge and without toll, and upon this right the city had no power to impose a license tax; but by the enactment of clause 96 [of the Cities and Villages Act,] the use of the public streets, which before its enactment was a common right, became, by virtue of the legislative act, a privilege, and subject to a license tax * * *." In reinterpreting the concept of privilege as applied in the Collins case, the court further stated: "Clearly, therefore, the court, in the Collins case, did not mean to say that nothing can be subject to license if it be lawful to do the thing without legal authority. There are a great many things which had been done or enjoyed as a matter of right, and which later, by legislative act, were properly made the subject of license taxation." (Emphasis added.)
Johnson v. Halpin, 413 Ill. 257, 267-268, 108 NE 2d 429 (1952) (Illinois Cigarette Use Tax held constitutional; bolding added but italics in original).
Also:
In the case of City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, an attempt was made to exact a wheel tax on all vehicles using the streets. In each of the foregoing cases the ordinance was held void. Language in those decisions when taken out of context may seem to support plaintiff's position, but the rationale of the holdings is that there was an unreasonable exercise of regulatory power under the circumstances there prevailing.
Chicago Nat. Bank v. City of Chicago Heights, 14 Ill.2d 135, 140-141, 150 NE 2d 827 (1958) (Chicago ordinance closing a part of a street is a valid regulation; bolding added).
The Collins case was decided in 1898, when there were few automobiles on the streets of Chicago. As circumstances changed, the courts recognized that constitutional regulatory powers also changed.
In other words, cases decided in the horse-and-buggy days that refer to a "right to travel" are not necessarily going to be applied to automobiles driven at 65 miles per hour on busy highways.
