Nobody at losthorizons can answer a simple question

[stija]

Not really, because the Constitution itself didn't give the federal government any authority over any land. Whether any land was to be ceded to the federal government was to be decided later. The Constitution only established a legal framework for dealing with land that might be ceded.

But you're close, and that counts for something.

And what is that land that was given under 1:8:17 after the adoptions of the US Constitution?

What is confusing to self-taught theoreticians like stija is that the federal government has two kinds of legislative powers: specified (and limited) legislative powers throughout the states of the United States, and general (unlimited) legislative powers in certain areas (the District of Columbia and federal forts and territories).

Stija calls the former subject matter and the latter territorial. Was that so hard to comprehend from his posts. Otherwise stija could not agree more with your assessment of things. What shall we call the former and what the latter, so to avoid confusion from now on?

The initial question was: Where is the language in the Constitution or a statute that says that for income to be taxable, it must have "some nexus to the federal government's powers specified by the Constitution"?

Ok fair enough. Let's rephrase the question just a tad, based on which of the above mentioned specified (limited) legislative powers from the US Constitution does the legislative authority of Congress spew language in Title 26?

[LPC]

To define something is to limit it to the definition.

Wrong.

A statutory definition can:

1. Create a new meaning for a word;

2. Limit the existing meaning; or

3. Expand the existing meaning.

So 'trade or business' is not limited to public office but includes everything and public office as well?

Not "everything." Just what was understood to be a "trade or business" before, as well as "public office."

Your proposition:
1) that to define does not limit something is ridiculous

Sorry, but that's YOUR proposition.

2) that the defined term means everything plus what's included is utterly ridiculous too

That's also YOUR proposition.

Try again.

Why? Because you command it?

All these people who you talk about that argued about words of include and including probably:
a) appeared in statutory court under title 26 in a privileged capacity
b) probably claimed that their wages or salaries are not income because
i) they are sovereign
ii) their wages are earned through labor
iii) any other nonsense

Troll rationalizations for why this troll is "right" and all the other trolls lost.

[stija]

A statutory definition can:

1. Create a new meaning for a word;

2. Limit the existing meaning; or

3. Expand the existing meaning.

Ok, fair enough. So defining the word is not to limit it to the expanded, or created definition of it??

Not "everything." Just what was understood to be a "trade or business" before, as well as "public office."

Understood by whom? I understand it to mean a public right created by United States. You?

stija wrote:
All these people who you talk about that argued about words of include and including probably:
a) appeared in statutory court under title 26 in a privileged capacity
b) probably claimed that their wages or salaries are not income because
i) they are sovereign
ii) their wages are earned through labor
iii) any other nonsense

Troll rationalizations for why this troll is "right" and all the other trolls lost.

You're right. They must have lost on the word include only, no other arguments.

[Famspear]

Yep. However, the power to tax is the power to tax for the GENERAL WELFARE. U.S. Const., Article I, sec. 8, clause 1. By contrast, the power to regulate (to enact laws that regulate) is more limited. See generally clauses 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14, 16, and so forth of the same section 8.

First, I agree on 1:8:1. General welfare is irrelevant and your personal gibberish. Gibberish is defined to include personal religious beliefs. The power to tax is exercised to generate revenue for gov't operations, you can call it general welfare or gov't welfare, that is irrelevant.

Bullsh*t.

The power of Congress to tax is the power to tax for the GENERAL WELFARE. That's not "irrelevant," it's not "gibberish," and it's not "mine." Article I, section 8, clause 1 specifically states that Congress has the power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.....

From the United States Supreme Court:

The clause [the taxing and spending clause of Article I, section 8, clause 1] confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated [,] is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United States. … It results that the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.

--from United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).

Second, are you implying that to tax is not to enact laws and regulate? If so, gimme a reference to case law that says that.

No, I am saying that the Congress can validly TAX something that the Congress might not be able to validly REGULATE.

Good grief, have you been hiding under a rock?

Here is my summary of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, no. 11-393; no. 11-398; no. 11-400 (slip opinion, U.S. Supreme Court, June 28, 2012), interpreting Internal Revenue Code section 5000A as enacted by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 244 (March 23, 2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Public Law No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (March 30, 2010) (with paraphrases and quotes shown below):

1. The Affordable Care Act does not require that the penalty under Internal Revenue Code section 5000A be treated as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, and the Anti-Injunction Act does not prohibit this lawsuit by the National Federation of Independent Business et al. (page 15 of the slip opinion)

2. Although the statute uses the term “penalty” to describe the imposition under section 5000A, the “penalty” label does not determine whether the payment may be viewed as a constitutional exercise of the Congressional taxing power. (page 33)

3. The decision of Congress that the Anti-Injunction Act shall not apply to the section 5000A penalty does not determine whether the section 5000A penalty is within the constitutional power of Congress to impose a “tax.” (page 33)

4. Certain exactions that are not labeled as “taxes” nonetheless have been authorized under the power of Congress to “tax.” (page 34)

5. The section 5000A penalty or “shared responsibility payment” may, for constitutional purposes, be considered a tax, not a penalty. (page 35)

6. The section 5000A penalty or “shared responsibility payment” is merely the imposition of a tax that citizens may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying health insurance. (page 38)

7. Congress had the power to impose the section 5000A exaction under its taxing power, and section 5000A does not need to be read to do more than imposing a tax. (page 39)

8. Under the Constitution, the 5000A exaction is not a direct tax that must be apportioned among the several States. (page 41)

9. The Constitution does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation through inactivity. (page 41)

10. The Constitution protects us from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause so long as we abstain from the regulated activity. (pages 41-42) The Constitution makes no such promise with respect to taxes. (page 42)

11. Upholding the section 5000A individual mandate under the Taxing Clause does not recognize any new federal power; upholding the mandate determines that Congress has used an existing federal power. (page 42)

12. “The Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty [under section 5000A of the Internal Revenue Code] for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized [for purposes of determining the requirement’s constitutionality] as a tax. Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.” (page 44)

That's only one of the more recent decisions, bozo.

Ok, i can buy what you're selling. Now, what are the rules for deciding when to use which REGULATE and how many of them are there totally? Put them out all on the table now, so i can learn and ALSO so that you cannot flip flop later again. So far we've got two distinct terms 'regulate". One pertaining to 1:8:3-17 from the Black's and another one not from Black's right? How many more?

No, we haven't gotten into two distinct terms 'regulate'. YOU may have. I haven't even provided a definition of the term.

You don't need to worry about "flip flopping," Einstein. I haven't changed a position, and I don't see that anyone else has in this discussion either.

It is, you just don't get it. Your proposition holds true only for privileges that were taxable all along and Congress changed the laws retroactively. Read on Welch v. Henry at page 147-148...

No, I don't need to re-read the case. And no, the "proposition" is not limited to "privileges that were taxable all along."

Read what the Court stated. The Court said that ALL citizens must bear the burden of taxation. The Court referenced "privileges." The Court could have easily said that citizens must bear the burden of taxation only in some proportion to the privileges enjoyed by citizens -- if that were the law. That is not the law. The court said that ALL citizens must bear the burden of taxation.

NO FEDERAL COURT HAS EVER RULED THAT THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX IS TIED TO THE EXERCISE OF A PRIVILEGE - FEDERAL OR OTHERWISE. EVERY FEDERAL COURT THAT HAS DECIDED THE ISSUE HAS RULED THAT THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX IS NOT TIED TO THE EXERCISE OF A FEDERAL PRIVILEGE.

'''There is no constitutional impediment to levying an income tax on compensation for a taxpayer's labors'''. [ . . . ] --from Funk v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)

In United States v. Buras, the argument that the taxpayer can be subject to an excise tax (specifically, the federal income tax) only if he benefits from a "privilege extended by a government agency" was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See 633 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980), at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case? ... 81&scilh=0

See also Nichols v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 320 (D. Minn. 1983), at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case? ... 25&scilh=0

See also Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9208 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case? ... 63&scilh=0

See also Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1985) (''per curiam''), at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case? ... 91&scilh=0

See also May v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 1301, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9156 (8th Cir. 1985), at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case? ... 47&scilh=0

See also Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986), at http://scholar.google.ca/scholar_case?q ... 87&scilh=0

See also Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9343 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam), at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case? ... 47&scilh=0

See also Kelly v. United States, 789 F.2d 94, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9388 (1st Cir. 1986), at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case? ... 80&scilh=0

One version of the "government privilege" nonsense is the ''Cracking the Code'' tax evasion scam. Some of the tenets of the theory used in this scam are:

-----".....unprivileged, outside-of-federal-geographical-jurisdiction work cannot be taxed indirectly by the federal government." ---From p. 10, Peter E. Hendrickson, ''Cracking the Code: The Fascinating Truth About Taxation in America'' (12th Printing, Jan. 2010).

----".....private-sector proceeds of work (in particular) cannot be taxed under an 'income' tax." ---Peter E. Hendrickson, from p. 25, ''Cracking the Code''.

-----".....'income', 'wages', 'self-employment income', 'employee', 'employer' and 'trade or business' – as these and certain other terms are used within, and in regard to, the tax law – have narrow legal meanings exclusively involving, and applying to, certain privileged activities, such as holding or administering a government office, or working in one." ---Peter E. Hendrickson, from introductory material, ''Cracking the Code''.

-----".....the law doesn't apply the income tax to his or her [an individual's] non-federally-connected earnings....." ---Peter E. Hendrickson, from his "Cracking the Code" web site forum.

All those tenets are false.

Joseph Alan Fennell was a follower of the ''Cracking the Code'' tax scam -- a scam which has as its basis the erroneous and frivolous contention that "income" for federal income tax purposes means only amounts received in an activity connected to the exercise of a federal privilege. Fennell's arguments — that the compensation he received in exchange for non-federally privileged private sector labor was not taxable, and that non-federally privileged private sector labor is not the subject of an excise (the U.S. federal income tax) — were rejected by the United States Tax Court. See Fennell v. Commissioner, Docket No. 26285-07L, United States Tax Court, Order of Dismissal and Decision (June 17, 2008).

In another ''Cracking the Code'' tax scam case, the individual argued that he was due a federal tax refund because his compensation constituted "earnings for private-sector, non-federally-privileged work" that he had performed as an engineer for his employer. The Tax Court ruled that the argument was "frivolous and groundless," and imposed a separate penalty of $5,000 under section 6673 for engaging in frivolous litigation. Ragan v. Commissioner, Docket No. 11966-08L, United States Tax Court, Order and Decision (Feb. 19, 2009).

In yet another ''Cracking the Code'' case involving an individual named David Nelson, the magistrate judge (and the U.S. district court) stated: "The fact that Northwest [Nelson's employer] is a 'private sector company, which is not owned or operated on behalf of the United States' [ . . . ] is immaterial to the question of whether the remuneration Northwest paid Nelson for his work was 'compensation for services' within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(1). It clearly was." Nelson v. United States, No. 3:08-cv-00508-MCR-EMT, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida (Dec. 7, 2009), aff'd, No. 10-10730, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Aug. 12, 2010) (unpublished) ("We have repeatedly rejected arguments, such as Nelson's, asserting that private sector employment income is not subject to federal taxation.").

The federal privilege argument also fails for the simple reason that the income tax can be imposed on illegal income. An illegal activity, a criminal activity, is not an activity involving a federal privilege. Under the James Doctrine, as explained in a U.S. Supreme Court decision over fifty years ago, the receipt of money by an embezzler is included in the income of that embezzler under the Internal Revenue Code, even though the money does not belong to the embezzler, and even though he is required to return the money to its rightful owner. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).

As noted above, the argument that the federal income tax can be imposed only on amounts received while the individual is engaged in an activity in connection with the exercise of a federal privilege is also incorrect for the simple reason that an indirect tax (an "excise") does not need to relate to an activity at all. For example, one of the points made by the Supreme Court in explaining its holdings in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, no. 11-393; no. 11-398; no. 11-400 (slip opinion, U.S. Supreme Court, June 28, 2012) is: The Constitution does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation through inactivity (page 41 of the slip opinion). The tax in that case is the "shared responsibility payment," the penalty under section 5000A of the Internal Revenue Code imposed on certain persons who do not purchase health insurance. That section 5000A tax is not an income tax but, like the federal income tax, it is generally considered to be an ''excise'' (an ''indirect tax'') for purposes of the U.S. Constitution. Not only is the section 5000A tax not connected to an activity involving a federal privilege, it is not connected to an activity at all. Indeed, the point that it is a tax on inactivity (a failure to purchase insurance) was one of the objections raised by those opposed to the tax in the ''National Federation'' case -- and the Supreme Court rejected that objection by noting that the Congress can indeed validly impose an excise -- an indirect tax (which of course does not have to be apportioned) -- on ''inactivity''.

The ''Cracking the Code'' theory -- that all federal excises must involve an activity connected to the exercise of a federal privilege -- is frivolous. Peter Hendrickson, the promoter of the scam, is under a federal court order never to use the scam again on his own tax returns. See United States v. Hendrickson, 2007 WL 2385071, at *3, 100 A.F.T.R.2nd 2007-5395, No. 06-11753, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Feb. 26, 2007, amended May 2, 2007), ''aff'd'', No. 07-1510, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (June 11, 2008) (sanctions of $4,000 imposed for frivolous appeal), ''reh'g en banc denied'' (Dec. 16, 2008), ''cert. denied'', U.S. Supreme Court, No. 08-1399 (June 15, 2009), ''reh'g denied'', U.S. Supreme Court (August 17, 2009). Indeed, he spent time in federal prison (from June 29, 2010 to June 13, 2012) for using the scam on his own tax returns. See generally ''United States v. Hendrickson'', 2010 TNT 81-15, n. 5, No. 2:08-cr-20585-DML-DAS, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (April 26, 2010), ''aff'd in part and rev'd in part'', No. 10-1726, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Feb. 8, 2012) (conviction affirmed; sentencing vacated and remanded for re-sentencing), ''cert. denied'', U.S. Supreme Court, No. 11-1345 (June 11, 2012).

More to come.....

[LPC]

Therefore, if 'employee' includes US public officials, you cannot include things that are not in the same general class.

Nonsense.

If an employee is an employee, then it is within the same "general class." Declaring that "public officials" should be treated in the same way as employees does not necessarily (or by implication) declare that employees should not be treated in the same way as employees.

It's kind of a reverse boot-strap argument.

[stija]

Famspear, please don't i wont read and respond to you more.

That may depend on how the courts interpret the law. The question, more properly phrased, however, would be something like: Could such a cigarette tax be upheld as a valid exercise of the Congressional power to tax even though a major effect -- or even a major purpose -- of the law would be to REGULATE?

And the definition of "regulate" for this purpose may or may not be one of the definitions in Black's Law Dictionary

.

Don't post again, as i may or may not respond to your post. May or may not really means not.

[stija]

Nonsense.

If an employee is an employee, then it is within the same "general class." Declaring that "public officials" should be treated in the same way as employees does not necessarily (or by implication) declare that employees should not be treated in the same way as employees.

It's kind of a reverse boot-strap argument.

So Congress in their 3401 definition of 'employee' includes Arizona public employees? The character of the public employee does not matter? Private employees too right?

So, let me get this straight, you are suggesting that US public employees need to be explicitly included in US definition of their employees, while all the other employees are implicitly included right?

Do you consider US employees, Arizona employees and private employees to be all of the same character? And i am not talking about the character of the term employee but the terms used to enlarge the term employee in its definition. You missed the point.

If an employee is an employee, then no need to include or define anyone. Just use the common meaning of the term employee. But if you define the term and start enlarging it by listing things of US public character, then you are limiting such definition of 'employee' to the general class of things used to define it and not its definition.

[LPC]

Taxation and regulation are separate constitutional concepts.

So to tax is not to regulate??

Yep. Pretty much. (And only one question mark is needed.)

You should read some SCOTUS case law that proves otherwise.

Name one (that hasn't been over-ruled in a later opinion.)

In fact, to tax is the ultimate power of regulation my friend.

McCullough v. Maryland? Different context, and different meaning.

There is a statute requiring Americans -- and others -- to file federal income tax returns. Statutes don't have to mention the specific form number. Your understanding of how law works is flawed.

Oh ya? Americans? Which one?

All of them. (All of one?)

I do not argue that there is no requirement for anyone to file anything. I argue that one, usually an American citizen, who works for USPS or Microsoft does not have to do anything. Legislative recourse in 26 USC 6331. What about that confuses you?

Logic. Literacy. Jurisprudence. Legislative history. Common sense. Reality.

[LPC]

So Congress in their 3401 definition of 'employee' includes Arizona public employees? The character of the public employee does not matter? Private employees too right?

Right.

So, let me get this straight, you are suggesting that US public employees need to be explicitly included in US definition of their employees, while all the other employees are implicitly included right?

Right

Do you consider US employees, Arizona employees and private employees to be all of the same character?

I don't. But Congress does. And Congress is the one that gets to set the rules when it comes to how the tax laws apply.

And i am not talking about the character of the term employee but the terms used to enlarge the term employee in its definition.

Gibberish.

You missed the point.

That's what the losers always say.

[stija]

I don't. But Congress does. And Congress is the one that gets to set the rules when it comes to how the tax laws apply.

Congress follows rules of taxation first, then legislates accordingly. You should too.

I disagree with the proposition that Congress can either legislate, regulate or tax states or their instrumentalities:

"We pass to the more difficult question whether Congress had the constitutional power to impose the tax in question, and this must be answered by ascertaining whether its effect is such as to bring it within the purview of those decisions holding that the very nature of our constitutional system of dual sovereign governments is such as impliedly to prohibit the federal government from taxing the instrumentalities of a state government, and in a similar manner to limit the power of the states to tax the instrumentalities of the federal government. See, as to federal taxation on state instrumentalities, Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113; United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 157 U. S. 585-586; Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U. S. 1; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107. See cases holding that the Sixteenth Amendment did not extend the taxing power to any new class of subjects, Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1; Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165, 247 U. S. 172; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189; Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 253 U. S. 259. And, as to state taxation on federal instrumentalities, See McCulloch v. Maryland,
Page 269 U. S. 522
4 Wheat. 316; Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435; The Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16; Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 27 U. S. 467; Farmers' Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516; Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292; Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501."

Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell - 269 U.S. 514

They kind of agree with me. Ever heard of dual sovereignty? Separation of powers? Federalism?

I don't know about where you live, but when i worked for an executive agency of my state, my state income was not federally taxable. But hey, maybe they made a mistake, three years in a row...

[LPC]

Not "everything." Just what was understood to be a "trade or business" before, as well as "public office."

Understood by whom? I understand it to mean a public right created by United States. You?

You don't get to self-decide what words mean.

The meaning of a word has to be determined by the language of a statute, or by generally accepted meanings determined by common usage, such as is seen in dictionaries.

[stija]

You don't get to self-decide what words mean.

You should really take some of your own medicine.

[Famspear]

Famspear, please don't i wont read and respond to you more.

That may depend on how the courts interpret the law. The question, more properly phrased, however, would be something like: Could such a cigarette tax be upheld as a valid exercise of the Congressional power to tax even though a major effect -- or even a major purpose -- of the law would be to REGULATE?

And the definition of "regulate" for this purpose may or may not be one of the definitions in Black's Law Dictionary

.

Don't post again, as i may or may not respond to your post. May or may not really means not.

You brought it on yourself. Next time, do your homework.

[stija]

You brought it on yourself. Next time, do your homework.

Shhh. Stop embarassing yourself please.

[LPC]

I don't know about where you live, but when i worked for an executive agency of my state, my state income was not federally taxable. But hey, maybe they made a mistake, three years in a row...

Yep, they did.

See Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939), (“we perceive no basis for a difference in result whether the taxed income be salary or some other form of compensation, or whether the taxpayer be an employee or an officer of either a state or the national government, or of its instrumentalities”).

[stija]

1. The receipt of salary by a resident of New York as an examining attorney for the Federal Home Owners' Loan Corporation, is constitutionally subject to nondiscriminatory taxation by a State. P. 306 U. S. 475.
2. For the purposes of this case, it is assumed that the creation of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation was a constitutional exercise of the powers of the Federal Government, and that all activities of the Government constitutionally authorized by Congress are governmental, and stand on a parity with respect to immunity from state taxation. P. 306 U. S. 477

.

The federal corporation was not a part of the executive, legislative or judicial part of US gov't and simply a federally chartered corporation involved in commercial purposes of common right.

[LPC]

You don't get to self-decide what words mean.

You should really take some of your own medicine.

Really? You're going to go Humpty-Dumpty on us? There's "glory" for you. (See "Alice Through the Looking-Glass," by Lewis Carroll, if you don't get the reference.)

[Famspear]

If an employee is an employee, then no need to include or define anyone. Just use the common meaning of the term employee.

You are wrong yet again. Section 6331(a) is an example to illustrate why you are wrong.

(a)If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax. Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee, or elected official, of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of the United States or the District of Columbia, by serving a notice of levy [. . . .]

Adapted from something I wrote in this forum a while back:

Tax protesters sometimes argue (incorrectly) that section 6331(a), empowering the Internal Revenue Service to administratively levy (that is, to seize or distrain) the assets of a taxpayer, applies only to the assets of "federal workers." The genesis of all this argument about the "federal worker" language in section 6331(a) is a case -- decided over ninety years ago -- that had nothing to do with taxation.

Back in 1912, Congress enacted a law providing for a U.S. District Court in what was then the U.S. territory of the Canal Zone (the Panama Canal Zone). The law provided for a federal judge -- and a salary for that federal judge.

At some point, the judge was provided with living quarters owned by the U.S. government. An officer called the Auditor of the Canal Zone decided -- apparently on his own, as it turns out -- that he had the legal duty or right to withhold, from the judge’s pay checks, an amount to cover the rent for the government-owned living quarters provided to the judge.

The Auditor's action raised some eyebrows. In 1915, the Secretary of War (now, we would say the Secretary of Defense) asked for a legal opinion from the Attorney General as to whether the Auditor was legally entitled to do this.

The Attorney General rendered a legal opinion that the Auditor was not authorized to withhold from the judge’s pay unless a law allowed the withholding. Essentially, the Auditor was engaging in a “setoff” (or “offset”) – offsetting the amount the Auditor claimed was due by the judge to the U.S. government for rent against the salary due by the government to the judge. The Attorney General found no law allowing that offset.

The Auditor was not satisfied with the Attorney General’s opinion, and apparently continued to make the offsets for the rent.

The judge understandably filed a lawsuit to compel the Auditor to stop withholding the rent from the judge’s paychecks.

The Auditor lost the lawsuit -- both at the trial court, and on appeal at the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Finally, the case went to the U.S. Supreme Court.

In April 1918, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the judge and against the Auditor. In the absence of a law allowing the Auditor to make the offset, the Auditor would not be allowed to make the offset. The case is Smith v. Jackson, 246 U.S. 388 (1918).

According to the text of the United States Supreme Court decision in Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108 (1959), the language of what is now section 6331 regarding an officer, employee, or elected official, of the United States, etc., etc., (I’ll abbreviate this to the “federal worker language”) was added to the tax statutes many years ago because of the decision in Smith v. Jackson. This is another example of emphatic redundancy (or intensive redundancy) on the part of Congress –- purposefully adding what might be considered redundant language to a statute in response to prior court decisions, in this case to make absolutely crystal clear that it is the intent of Congress that the law allow an administrative levy against federal workers, etc. Had the Auditor in the Canal Zone never withheld the pay of that judge, the case of Smith v. Jackson would have never been brought, and it is entirely possible that the “federal worker language” of section 6331 would not be there today.

Congress was concerned because the Supreme Court, back in 1918, had ruled that an offset against a judge's pay was invalid -- in a case where the word “tax” is not even mentioned -- that an administrative levy for a federal tax on the income of a federal worker might be deemed to be an invalid offset covered by the doctrine of Smith v. Jackson. Now, in the absence of the "federal worker" language in 6331, maybe some court or another might view a tax levy as being covered by Smith v. Jackson, or maybe that court might not view it that way. Either way, the Congress simply wanted to avoid the problem and to make clear that federal administrative tax levies are not impaired by the Smith v. Jackson doctrine. Hence, the arguably redundant (i.e., partially redundant) language of what is now section 6331(a).

This illustrates the tendency of many tax protesters to take unfamiliar language in a statute or other legal text and go wild with conjectures and phony, pseudo-legal theories, straining for an argument against the validity of the tax law, etc., etc., without actually sitting down and doing cold, unemotional formal legal research needed to determine why the language is there in the first place and how the language has been interpreted in actual court decisions.

[Famspear]

In section 6331(a), the operative word was "person." Whether it's "person" or "employee" or "employer" or some other term, Congress sometimes does expand the term from its common meaning, or Congress provides extra emphasis (as was the case for the word "person" in section 6331(a)).

[LPC]

1. The receipt of salary by a resident of New York as an examining attorney for the Federal Home Owners' Loan Corporation, is constitutionally subject to nondiscriminatory taxation by a State. P. 306 U. S. 475.
2. For the purposes of this case, it is assumed that the creation of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation was a constitutional exercise of the powers of the Federal Government, and that all activities of the Government constitutionally authorized by Congress are governmental, and stand on a parity with respect to immunity from state taxation. P. 306 U. S. 477

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The federal corporation was not a part of the executive, legislative or judicial part of US gov't and simply a federally chartered corporation involved in commercial purposes of common right.

Congratulations on reading the syllabus. But you should have read further:

"7. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, are overruled insofar as they recognize an implied constitutional immunity from nondiscriminating income taxation of the salaries of officers or employees of the national or state governments or their instrumentalities. Id."

If you think that the syllabus is wrong, all you need to do is find a contrary Supreme Court decision, holding that the federal taxation of the salaries of state employees is unconstitutional.

I don't think you're going to find one.