Much less than it used to - generally when the taxation discriminates against one sovereign, as I wrote above. Among the instances:
(1) When a state taxes recipients of its own payments at a lesser rate than it taxes recipients of federal payments. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
(2) When a state taxes military retirement benefits, but exempts the retirement benefits of its own employees. Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S. 594 (1992).
(3) And, of course, when a state attempts to tax the United States itself or "an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities". United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
Now is there a point to this?
Yes, there is a point.
(1) and (2) deal with discrimination, no one is claiming discrimination so lets take them out of view ok? (3) deals with taxation of state and federal agencies. We agreed, and LPC proved that federal corporations cannot be taxed by states, and viceversa.
But, and maybe i did not pose the question correctly, when does the IID extend to the office/officer of the states and not just the state agencies or instrumentalities thereof? The question is posed because I argued that when an essential governmental state function is performed, or when the burden of taxation falls directly on the agency as well as the officer, the IID applies and both are immune. And this is reciprocal.
LPC, which i did not confuse with you, (you agreed on something else) disagrees with my proposition in contrast to the clear language from Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 US 466 but does not offer an explanation of when it ACTUALLY does extend. He agrees that the IID exists, but not when it applies to both the officer and the agency.
I do work, just not today. From case referenced in (3):
(a) Federal immunity from state taxation cannot be conferred simply because the tax has an effect on the United States, or because the Federal Government shoulders the entire economic burden of the levy, or because the tax falls on the earnings of a contractor providing services to the Government. And where a use tax is involved, immunity cannot be conferred simply because the State levies the tax on the use of federal property in private hands, or, indeed, simply because the tax is paid with
Page 455 U. S. 721
Government funds. Tax immunity is appropriate only when the state levy falls on the United States itself, or on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as the activity being taxed is concerned. A finding of constitutional tax immunity therefore requires something more than the invocation of traditional agency notions. Pp. 455 U. S. 730-738.
Exactly what i argue. Title 26 would impose a levy directly on employers (state agencies) AND also pose an unconstitutional burden on the functions of the agency in complying with administering and reporting requirements as well.
So having said all of this, do you think that Title 26 taxation of lets say Alabama Atty Gen Officer is constitutional and would not impose a burden while also directly taxing the state, or do you think IID applies in this case?
