R. v. Sands, 2013 SKQB 115
This is an April 2, 2013 decision of Justice Konkin of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench:
Tough times for the Sands brothers.1 Keith Sands, the brother of Randy Sands, brings this application for habeas corpus on behalf of his brother Randy. The Crown raised an initial point of whether or not Keith Sands is able to represent his brother on these criminal matters. I suggested that due to Rule 678(2) of The Queen's Bench Rules, Keith Sands was able to speak on behalf of his brother Randy on the habeas corpus application, but the issue of broader representation on other criminal matters would be addressed at any subsequent proceeding.
2 On a second preliminary matter, Mr. Cann explained that the federal Crown had not been served with these proceedings but that he had talked to the federal prosecutor who had allowed Mr. Cann to act as agent for the federal Crown on this habeas corpus hearing.
3 As there were no documents filed in this matter to inform the Court as to the state of the charges against Randy Sands, I asked the Crown as a preliminary matter to explain to the Court what had transpired to date. Mr. Cann stated:
4 When asked to identify the issues that he would be arguing for this habeas corpus application, Keith Sands stated that the sole issue was the jurisdiction of the Court. He stated that Randy Sands claims to be a person of a common law jurisdiction and yet he has been charged under statute law.
- (a) that there are two informations relating to charges in this matter, one from December 24, 2012, and one from January 15, 2013;
(b) that the charges include possession of controlled substances and possession for the purposes of trafficking, plus firearms and ammunition-related offences;
(c) that a show-cause hearing was held on January 17, 2013, after which Randy Sands was remanded; and
(d) that a preliminary inquiry was set for March 13, 2013, at which time Randy Sands waived his right to a preliminary inquiry and consented to committal for trial.
5 Keith Sands then read his affidavit and materials attached thereto as exhibits in their entirety.
6 In his affidavit, Keith Sands deposes a fair amount of information that he does not have personal knowledge of, but he "understands". This includes the information:
7 Keith Sands argues that statute law only applies to agents or employees of the Crown unless the individual enters in to a contract with the Crown to be bound by statute law.
- (a) that on December 24, 2012, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("RCMP") accepted that Randy Sands was a person of common law jurisdiction when Randy Sands presented them with his registration of live birth form from British Columbia;
(b) that on January 14, 2013, the RCMP "visited" Randy Sands' home, broke in and kidnapped Randy Sands;
(c) that Randy Sands informed the Court, presumably the Provincial Court at the time of the show-cause hearing, that he was of common law jurisdiction and that that was ignored by the Court. At the conclusion of the hearing, Randy Sands was remanded and remains on remand; and
(d) that the Crown has provided no proof/evidence of their authority to take these actions even though requested to do so pursuant to Randy Sands' "Notice of Understanding and Intent and a Claim of Right" document "Sworn By Randy Sands Before God Almighty on January 23, 2013". However, this appears to have been after the show-cause hearing, and there is no proof of service of this document on anyone.
8 Counsel for the provincial Crown, Dennis Cann, agrees that the issue to be decided as put forward by Keith Sands and Randy Sands is whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to hold Randy Sands on remand pursuant to statute law.
9 He argues that no issue has been raised by Keith Sands or Randy Sands about how this matter was handled in the court or the validity of the order remanding Randy Sands. The only argument raised is that the Court has no jurisdiction to make such order.
10 With regard to the exhibits attached to Keith Sands' affidavit, the Crown states that the "Registration of Live Birth" form shows when Randy Sands was born and has no impact on the outcome of any trial.
11 With regard to Exhibit "B", the Crown states that the contents of the unsworn statement of Randy Sands are different from what was said at the show-cause hearing. As there is no transcript available, it is impossible for the Court to determine what, if any, differences there are. The Crown confirms that Randy Sands has a right to have a bail review.
12 The Crown argues that a habeas corpus is no longer used in this country as a means of bail review and quoted from Roger E. Salhany, Canadian Criminal Procedure, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1978), and two cases canvassed therein, R. v. Smith (1960), 128 C.C.C. 407 (Ont. H.C.), and R. v. Collins (1962), 39 W.W.R. 32, 133 C.C.C. 51 (Man. C.A.), for that premise. He argues that on habeas corpus applications, the only question to be determined by the Court is whether or not the accused is being held under a valid order of a court of competent jurisdiction or not. He argues that this application should therefore be dismissed.
Analysis
13 No question was raised by the applicants about the validity of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, or the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, or the provisions of those Acts to govern the process that Randy Sands has been subjected to date. The sole issue is whether or not Randy Sands can, by claiming that he is of a common law jurisdiction, exempt himself from the provisions of these Acts. With regard to the argument in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, [2012] A.J. No. 980 (QL), Rooke A.C.J. stated at paragraphs 325 and 326:
14 Similarly, in R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510, [2001] B.C.J. No. 1761 (QL), Hollinrake J.A. states at paragraphs 12-14:
- [325] Another "immunity" "magic hat" is an argument that the litigant is only subject to a different form of law than that which would otherwise apply to the present action. This category is arguably a facet of the "restricted court authority" immunity group.
[326] It is helpful at this point to make a few comments on the manner in which OPCA [Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument] litigants often use the term "common law". OPCA litigants often draw an arbitrary line between "statutes" and "common law", and say they are subject to "common law", but not legislation. Of course, the opposite is in fact true, the "common law" is law developed incrementally by courts, and which is subordinate to legislation: statutes and regulations passed by the national and provincial governments. The Constitution Act provides the rules and principles that restrict the scope and nature of legislation, both by jurisdiction and on the basis of rights (ie. the Charter).
15 The Courts in both cases addressed the argument raised by Mr. Sands in this case: that the court that has dealt with Mr. Sands to date had no jurisdiction to deal with him because he had declared himself to be of a common law jurisdiction and, therefore, statute law could not apply to him unless he had agreed to accept that statute law by contract with the Crown. This notion is completely untenable. Mr. Sands admitted in the hearing that he is a citizen of Canada and, at the time, was resident in the Province of Saskatchewan. If he had breached the provisions of the Criminal Code, he is liable to prosecution under the Criminal Code. Likewise for the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. He cannot simply opt out.
- [12] The Crown says in its submissions, "Put simply, the appellant does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Canadian Courts to try him."
[13] The submissions of the appellant on the issue of jurisdiction are, as I see them, a complete denial of the constitutional history of this country as it applies to the rights and obligations of its people before the law.
[14] The submissions of the appellant must be and are rejected as being without any legal, historical or constitutional foundation whatsoever.
16 I find that the Court had and has jurisdiction to preside over these matters with Mr. Sands and, as such, there is a valid existing order of that Court remanding Mr. Sands on his criminal charges.
17 As stated before, Mr. Sands has the right to have the decision of the Provincial Court judge in the show-cause hearing reviewed under ss. 520 and/or 525 of the Criminal Code depending on when this application is brought. Mr. Sands has a remedy to have his remand order reviewed, immediately under s. 520, or after 90 days under s. 525. Additionally, Mr. Sands has a remedy if, in fact, the search warrant was not legally obtained or if the RCMP exceeded their authority when executing such warrant. Additionally, there appear to be remedies for other allegations that Mr. Sands makes in his written material or when he orally addressed the Court. As the Court has jurisdiction and as there is a valid existing order, the application for habeas corpus is dismissed.
18 As stated in chambers, I caution both Mr. Keith Sands and Mr. Randy Sands in the use of the document attached to the affidavit as Exhibit "C" which had been referred to as his "Notice of Understanding and Intent and a Claim of Right" document. That document purports that service on any person in a listed category is service on all persons in all categories listed at the heading of that document. This is not necessarily so. As was raised in chambers, the federal Crown, who has carriage of the charges under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, was not served with this habeas corpus application. Through discussions between provincial and federal Crowns, the provincial Crown appeared as agent for the federal Crown on this matter. There was no necessity that they do so, and this document has no impact on effecting service on parties who otherwise must be served with an application. In addition, this document purports to set out a fee schedule for damages against different parties who contravene the rights of Mr. Sands or fail to demonstrate within a period of time a lawful authority to act over him. As stated by Rooke A.C.J. in Meads, supra, documents such as this can be construed as threatening and/or intimidating to some of the recipients (see paragraphs 522 and 523). I note that on the file, there was a document entitled "Requisition for Default Judgment" purporting to seek a default judgment against Mr. Piché on the ground that he had not rebutted the claim of common law jurisdiction made verbally by Randy Sands in the courtroom on January 21, 2013. The requisition for default judgment claims an amount of $520 million. It is easy to see how one might consider this to be threatening and/or intimidating.
19 Finally, the document referred to as "Notice of Understanding and Intent and a Claim of Right" purports to be an affidavit of Randy Sands, and that document tendered before the Court as Exhibit "C" to Mr. Keith Sands affidavit is not signed or commissioned. Additionally, the previous form of that document, which appears to have been filed at an earlier date and which was signed by Randy Sands was not notarized or commissioned in the appropriate form as an affidavit for this Court must be and, therefore, would not be an acceptable document in any event.
20 Persons appearing for and applying to this Court must follow this Court's rules as to the form and content of their applications.
21 Finally, Keith Sands delivered a number of documents to the Court, shortly before the hearing time. These documents were addressed to me as a judge, and a quick perusal of these documents showed that they were related to Keith Sands and his personal status, and not to Randy Sands. In court, I had these documents returned to Keith Sands as he could not or would not show me how these documents related to the Randy Sands matter.
D.B. KONKIN J.
A little bit about the procedural aspects here; in Canada where a person is detained pre-trial there is a requirement for first a bail hearing where the Crown proves there is a basis to deny bail. If bail is denied, then every three months there is a further hearing where the detainee has the onus to prove that he or she should be granted bail. That's what's being discussed in para. 17. The threshold to deny bail is pretty high, so Randy was either really up to no good, has a significant prior criminal history, or both.
Another sign that this is a serious offender is found in para. 3, where it is indicated Randy has waived a preliminary inquiry. Many Canadian criminal offences are called 'hybrid' offences, which means they can be tried in a lower 'provincial' court, or a higher 'superior inherent jurisdiction' court. The fact Randy had a preliminary hearing option indicates the Crown has elected to have Randy tried in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench, which is a 'superior inherent jurisdiction' court. That automatically means the sentence ranges for Randy's offences will be substantially longer.
Paragraph 18 is interesting. The Meads v. Meads decision includes an obiter comment that advancing pseudolegal documentation that purports to create fines is a basis for criminal charges. Justice Konkin obviously agrees, and is firing a warning shot across the S.S. Sands bow. I am not aware to date of a prosecution or conviction on this basis, but it looks like Canadian judges are willing to take that step.
Digging around the Internet found out nothing more about either Randy or Keith. I suppose that a drug dealer might choose to present that kind of profile.
SMS Möwe
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