In brief, Petrie ran a marijuana grow-op in a rented residence. He bypassed the utility meter and stole electricity. He ultimately pled guilty to that, but first ran a collection of Freeman-on-the-Land schemes to avoid court and state action. The court’s response to these make up the first two decisions in this trilogy.
R. v. Petrie, 2012 BCSC 2109: http://canlii.ca/t/fxn33
Petrie’s first attempted defence was that he was not the person named in the criminal indictment, and suggested (para 5):
Justice Ker responds to this argument in two ways. The first is simply slick – Petrie’s name, whatever it is, is irrelevant to a criminal proceeding. The Crown is obliged to identify the person, whatever he is called, who ran the grow-op, and nothing more: paras. 42-43, 47. If the Crown proves to the court’s satisfaction that Petrie is that person, he is guilty. I really like the way the Crown and Justice Ker neatly sidestepped this entire defence.… there is a distinction between Scott Petrie the living man, Scott Petrie the person, Scott Petrie the government agent, Scott Petrie the legal entity, Scott Petrie the father, and Scott Petrie the son.
Nevertheless Justice Ker goes on to review the many cases that have addressed the double/split person magic hat, notes that this defence is always ineffective, and concludes:
The next Petrie argument involves s. 32(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:[66] It is clear from these authorities and others that have had to grapple with the capacity in a name distinction advanced by individuals like the applicant, who suggest they are living persons or natural persons as distinct from a legal person, that there is no distinction in law in this respect.
[67] The applicant either is or is not Scott Douglas Petrie, the person charged with the offences contained in the Indictment. It matters not in what capacity his name is being used. The distinctions the applicant seeks to split his name and person into are irrelevant to the criminal proceedings at hand. There is no legal merit to the capacity in a name argument advanced by the applicant.
Petrie argues (paras. 70-71) that this provision means that the Charter, the Canadian Constitution, and all Canadian law only applies to the government and government functions. Justice Ker summarizes the argument at para. 73:32. (1) This Charter applies
- (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.
What s. 32 actually does is makes it a requirement for Canadian law, and government actors to follow and respect the rights provided to Canadian residents under the Charter. The court at paras. 74-84 explains how Petrie has literally got the law backwards in a simply excellent analysis on this point:The applicant appears to suggest the following on his reading of s. 32 of the Charter:
- (a) that the Constitution, and by extension the laws of Canada, only applies to government agents, and therefore not to private citizens;
(b) that as he is a private citizen and the name Scott Douglas Petrie in the Indictment is a government agent, the charges have nothing to do with the applicant and ought to be dismissed.
Petrie tries again a couple weeks later:[75] Section 32 of the Charter and the jurisprudence interpreting this section makes it clear that the Charter applies to all actions undertaken by state authorities and government agents when they interact with private citizens, meaning that private citizens who have an interaction with a government actor benefit from the rights afforded to them by the Charter during that interaction and have recourse to the courts if they believe that the government actor, and by extension the government, has breached one or more of their Charter rights. To give a concrete example: state conduct, i.e. government action, such as police investigating and arresting a private citizen must conform with Charter values and respect the Charter rights of the private citizen. Thus an individual private citizen, when investigated by the police, has the right to be secure from an unreasonable search and seizure by virtue of s. 8 of the Charter and has the right to retain counsel upon arrest or detention by virtue of s. 10(b) of the Charter.
[76] The jurisprudence interpreting s. 32 of the Charter also establishes that the Charter does not apply or govern activities between private citizens or between private citizens and corporations. Thus, where a legal dispute arises between private citizens, for example, in a divorce proceeding or interpreting the terms of a contract, the parties cannot invoke their respective Charter rights against one another.
…
[79] With respect, the applicant appears to be endeavouring to turn the jurisprudence pertaining to s. 32 of the Charter on its head. If he is arguing that because he is a private citizen the Constitution, and by extension the laws of this country, only apply to government actions and agents, he is mistaken. He, too, is subject to the laws of Canada, including the CDSA. He cannot pick and choose what laws apply to him, nor can he engage in what Myers J. characterized in Porisky at para. 67 as "legal numerology" by picking and choosing extracts from statutes and cases and weaving them together in an attempt to create logical links where none exist.
[80] Section 32 of the Charter mandates that the Charter applies to government actions such as the RCMP's investigation and arrest of the applicant in this case, which means that the applicant's Charter rights are to be observed and protected in the carrying out of such actions. The Charter does not, however, govern interactions between private citizens. Moreover, s. 32 of the Charter does not stand for the notion that as a private citizen the Constitution and the laws of Canada do not apply to the applicant and his actions.
[81] If the applicant is trying to assert the Court has no jurisdiction over him to try the offences because, by virtue of s. 32 of the Charter, the Constitution and the laws under which he is charged only applies to government agents, and he is not a government agent, he has fundamentally misconceived what s. 32 of the Charter means and what the jurisprudence has interpreted its purpose to be.
[82] If the applicant is trying to advance the argument that the laws under which he is charged do not apply to him because he is not a government agent, again he is mistaken.
[83] If the applicant is suggesting the Court has no jurisdiction over him to try the offences because he is a private citizen and thus outside of the Court’s jurisdiction, then, as Mr. Justice Hollinrake noted in R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 (CanLII), 2001 BCCA 510 at para. 13 [Warman], his argument would be "a complete denial of the constitutional history of this country as it applies to the rights and obligations of its people before the law." Arguments of this kind must be and are "rejected as being without any legal, historical or constitutional foundation whatsoever": Warman, at para. 14.
[84] There is no legal merit in the point the applicant advances under s. 32 of the Charter. …
R. v. Petrie, 2012 BCSC 2110: http://canlii.ca/t/fxn34
Now Petrie goes for a collection of standard Freeman-on-the-Land strategies, with a batch of documents which are described in detail:
Armed with these materials Petrie advances three arguments, but one is a repeat of the name strategy in the previous hearing and is summarily rejected:[3] Exhibit A is the affidavit of Scott Petrie sworn before a notary public on February 8, 2012 and attached to it is a certificate of his registration of live birth in Vancouver, British Columbia, on December 22, 1962. That document establishes he was the first of twins born to his mother. His father is also named in the document. Both parents are Canadian citizens and by virtue of his birth in Canada, so too is the applicant. The registration of live birth establishes that the applicant's parents named him Scott Douglas Petrie. This is his legal name and how he is legally recognized before and under the law.
[4] Exhibit B is an "affidavit of truth" prepared by Scott Douglas Petrie and witnessed by two named males with verification signatures witnessing the applicant's signature on May 12, 2011. The exhibits attached to the document are attested by Scott Douglas Petrie. This document is not a proper affidavit as accepted by the courts as it fails to conform to the rules that describe the contents and format of a valid affidavit. It has not been properly commissioned by a lawyer or a notary public and the exhibits are not properly witnessed by a commissioning officer. Instead, they are attested to by Scott Douglas Petrie.
[5] This document was originally filed in the Provincial Court of British Columbia in Port Coquitlam on May 13, 2011. Attached to this affidavit of truth are a number of documents including something described as an "appendage to the claim of right" dated April 11, 2011, wherein Mr. Petrie claims the right to produce cannabis marihuana and to possess it for the purpose of trafficking, notwithstanding the provisions of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 [Controlled Drugs and Substances Act]. The remaining documents are notices sent by the applicant to the federal and provincial Attorneys General and postal tracking records. The notices to the Attorneys General contain warnings as to the above appendage to Mr. Petrie's claim of right.
[6] Exhibit C is another affidavit of truth that contains no identification as to who the affiant is. Rather, it states in the preamble and paragraph 1 the following:
[7] The document is signed as follows: in the area where an affiant would sign an affidavit, it states in typewritten form, "A Living man, by," and then there is a line with a signature purporting to be Scott Petrie's signature. Underneath that signature line is the following: "Authorized Representative for SCOTT DOUGLAS PETRIE."
- I, a living sovereign man and as authorized representative for SCOTT DOUGLAS PETRIE, of the geographical region publicly known as Maple Ridge, British Columbia, MAKE OATH AND SAY AS FOLLOWS:
1. I am the living man and authorized representative for, SCOTT DOUGLAS PETRIE, the legal entity created by the governments of Canada, and have such personal knowledge of the facts and matters hereinafter disposed (sic) to save and except where so stated to be on information and belief and where so stated I verily believe the same to be true.
The other two arguments are both based on foisted unilateral agreements.It should be clear to the applicant that the Crown does not have to prove that he claims legal ownership of his name. Nor does the Crown have to prove that the applicant is a surety for the legal name and/or entity Scott Douglas Petrie. The Crown simply has to prove that the accused before the court is the person who committed the offences charged in the Indictment. Capacity as a living sovereign man, a common-law man, or any other sort of entity, is irrelevant. There is no legal merit to the capacity argument or the argument that the applicant is not surety for the legal name and/or entity Scott Douglas Petrie.
First Petrie argues that law can only sanction physical harm to others, their property, or fraudulent contracts, and that he has ‘opted out’ of state and legislation authority via his “Claim of Right” document: para. 12. Justice Ker has a bit of fun with this argument, and observes that the ‘opting out’ documentation was actually sent after he had been arrested and charged for marijuana offences. So even if he is right, and this is a contractual matter, his “agreement” would be a retroactive attempt to contract. But in any case, it’s nonsense:
Sure enough, Petrie has claimed that Black’s Law Dictionary contains a definition of “tacit consent”. Justice Ker notes that the current version does not, but perhaps he meant “implied consent”, which is defined (para. 46). The response is, in my mind, worth quoting in full:[43] The thrust of the documents appears to be a contractual offer to the federal and provincial Attorneys General that Mr. Petrie was contracting out of the statutory laws of the country, and specifically claiming a right to produce marihuana and possess marihuana for the purpose of trafficking, notwithstanding the provisions of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. The applicant says these contracts were tacitly consented to because the parties served failed to dispute his claim of right.
[44] I will begin first by noting that even if the applicant could do such a thing, which he cannot, he could not retroactively contract out of the application of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. His appendage to his claim of right in which he claims the right to produce and possess marihuana for the purpose of trafficking is dated April 11, 2011, approximately seven months after the charges before the Court were laid. His notices and warnings about disputing his claim of right were sent in April and May 2011. It is clear from the charges before the Court and the continued prosecution of these offences that the Attorney General of Canada disputes Mr. Petrie's claim of right with respect to producing marihuana and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking.
[45] More significantly, though, there is no contract between Mr. Petrie and the government of Canada or British Columbia or the respective Attorneys General. Mr. Petrie seems to believe he can simply send out a claim of right and offer a "commercial contract" entitled "appendage to claim of right" to the federal and provincial Attorneys General, and that their failure to dispute its contents, as evidenced by their silence and non-response, results in a binding contract through tacit consent or implied consent.
The second new argument is that Petrie’s documents attempt:[47] That definition is of no assistance to the applicant. The basis of contractual obligations is an agreement between the parties, often referred to as consensus ad idem or agreement of the parties to the same thing. However, the jurisprudence or common law does not support the applicant's argument.
[48] In Resource Realty Ltd. v. Swiftsure Developments Ltd., 2005 BCSC 229 (CanLII), 2005 BCSC 229, Mr. Justice Owen-Flood held the following at paragraphs 23 and 24:
[49] And in Gellen v. Public Guardian and Trustee of British Columbia et al, 2005 BCSC 1615 (CanLII), 2005 BCSC 1615, Mr. Justice Cole considered the issue of silence equalling implied consent to remove a person's beneficial interest in a trust, and rejected the argument. At paragraph 16 and 17 of Gellen, Cole J. stated:
- [23] Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff's offer was accepted through the defendant's silence. Mr. Braithwaite communicated his terms to the defendants orally and in various faxed documents. Because there is no concrete evidence that the defendants specifically rejected these offers, the plaintiff submits that their silence constituted acceptance. However, as held by the Supreme Court of Canada in Schiller v. Fisher, 1981 CanLII 49 (SCC), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 593, acceptance must be communicated to the offeror before a contract can be found to exist:
[24] As stated by Professor Waddams in The Law of Contracts, Fourth Edition (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1999) at p. 67,
- [g]enerally, the fact of acceptance of an offer must be communicated to the offeror before acceptance is complete and a binding contract is created.
- Ordinarily, therefore, silence will not operate as an acceptance even through the offeree should prove an intention to accept. This is not a technicality but part of the requirement of a bargain. No reasonable person, on receiving a proposal that looks for a reply, considers the bargain concluded until the manifestation of assent. Nor will a reasonable offeror ordinarily consider that silence on the part of the offeree manifests the latter's acceptance (references omitted).
[50] The same can be said for Mr. Petrie's argument that silence on the part of the federal and provincial Attorneys General constitutes consent to or acceptance of his contractual offer to exempt him from the obligation to adhere to all the laws of Canada, meaning statutes, regulations and the like, or to remove their application to him.
- [16] The petitioner argues, alternatively, that the silence of Ms. Fitzgibbons must be taken to imply consent on her behalf to the order sought. He relies on Black's Law Dictionary which defines implied consent as:
[17] The principle that silence does not denote consent or acceptance without something more was first raised in Felthouse v. Bindley (1863), 11 W.R. 429. This principle continues to be followed in contract law (Schiller v. Fisher, 1981 CanLII 49 (SCC), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 593 at para.
- That manifested by signs, actions or facts or by inaction or silence which raise a presumption that the consent has been given.
That definition from Black's Law Dictionary, in my view, is not helpful.as well as insurance law. E. MacGillivray's MacGillivray on insurance law relating to all risks other than marine (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 2-16 states that "[s]ilence does not denote consent and therefore no binding contract arises until the person to whom an offer is made says or does something to signify its acceptance." If silence cannot bestow rights or responsibilities in contract on a party who has participated in negotiations, then it does not seem appropriate that silence would constitute consent so as to remove Ms. Fitzgibbon's beneficial interest in the petitioner's trust, if it is a separate trust.
[51] The notion that Mr. Petrie's various claims of right and affidavits of truth purporting to exempt him from the application of statutory law have been tacitly consented to through the silence of the federal and provincial Attorneys General is not supported in the jurisprudence. Moreover, there is no such contract recognized in the jurisprudence or the law; one cannot enter into a contract to exempt oneself from the application of the statutory laws of the country or a province.
Again, the court clearly rejects this proposition:... to split himself into separate persons: a common-law man, a living sovereign man, or a flesh, blood and bone living soul in the capacity of a sovereign man, as distinct from the person named in the Indictment.
Justice Ker concludes:[38] It is clear from the authorities that it is legally irrelevant and a complete fiction advanced by the applicant that there must be some proof or evidence that he is the surety for the legal name as contained in the Indictment. The applicant has signed all his documents as Scott Petrie or Scott Douglas Petrie. His adding a description as to in what capacity he is doing so is irrelevant. He cannot insulate himself from these charges and this proceeding by trying to establish an artificial construct of different capacities of his identity. He either is Scott Douglas Petrie, the person charged with the offences, or he is not.
[39] His certificate of registration of live birth, attached to Exhibit A on this application, concretely establishes that his parents gave him the legal name Scott Douglas Petrie. As Brown J. noted in Kovacevic, once a person is born alive, the law accords recognition to and imposes legal obligations on the person by reference to the legal name the parents give to the person or by reference to any change of name the person makes in accordance with the law.
[40] The applicant’s attempt to divide himself into Scott Douglas Petrie, the person before the Court, and Scott Douglas Petrie, the living sovereign man, common-law man or any other fiction advanced, is not a distinction recognized in law. The flesh and blood person is one and the same as the legally recognized person. There is no legal merit in this argument advanced by the applicant.
In my opinion these two decision of Justice Ker represent a simply exceptional standard for analysis and clarity. They neatly and carefully respond to a standard suite of Freeman-on-the-Land arguments, which as readers of the Nanaimo Five thread will recognize, are the very ones that were advanced by Mr. Ream. Wonderful work – I hope these cases are cited and quoted aggressively in other Canadian litigation.[55] In the current application, Mr. Petrie submits, through his documents, that the statutory law of the country does not apply to him because he has opted out or contracted out through his claim of right. However, he cannot opt out of, contract out of, or ignore the law, statutory or otherwise, that all members of Canadian society, be they citizens, visitors or aliens, must adhere to and follow. To suggest otherwise is to invite dissent into a nihilist state or state or anarchy.
[56] Canada is a country founded on the rule of law and a constitutional democracy in which all are equal before the law, under the law, and all are bound by the law, including constitutional law, common law, statutory law and regulatory law. The argument of the applicant that suggests the laws of Canada, particularly the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, do not apply to him is, to adopt the ruling of Hollinrake J.A. at para. 13 in Warman:
[57] The argument of the applicant before the Court in the current case must be and is rejected as being without any legal, historical or constitutional foundation whatsoever.
- ... a complete denial of the constitutional history of this country as it applies to the rights and obligations of its people before the law.
[58] The application for an order granting the discharge of the matter in whole is dismissed. It is devoid of any legal merit.
I noted above that these two decisions pre-date Meads v. Meads, but are not cited in that decision. I think I know why, and it does not appear to be an oversight by A.C.J. Rooke. Both Petrie decisions are oral judgments, and date from early in 2012. But if you look at their neutral citation numbers, 2109 and 2110, these are completely out of sequence for the British Columbia Supreme Court, and instead those numbers imply that these two judgments were instead issued after the year ended. My suspicion – and it is only that – is that the British Columbia Supreme Court is now transcribing and placing online a certain number of its oral judgments for future reference.
And if so, I'm very glad these two decisions were captured by that process. Again, this is simply first-rate work by Justice Ker. I am simply delighted that her judgments are now publically available.
As for Petrie, he pleads guilty and was sentenced in May of 2013:
- R. v. Petrie, 2013 BCSC 1185: http://canlii.ca/t/fzhvx
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