http://www.losthorizons.com/phpBB/viewt ... 452#p29537I lost a case in Tax Court, and will be appealing to the 9th Circuit, due Dec. 25.
I claimed the definition of "compensation" was provided by the Classification Act of 1923; neither the TC nor the IRS at any point in the entire case even mentioned this Act, only stating that my arguments were frivolous....
Yeah, well maybe your arguments were not mentioned for the simple reason that your arguments were not worthy of serious attention, Einstein. By definition:
--American Heritage Dictionary, p. 535, Houghton Mifflin Co. (2d Coll. Ed. 1985).Frivolous. Unworthy of serious attention [ . . .]
"Legaltender" continues:
And thank you for playing!....The IRS acquired invoices from my employer's accounting manager showing the pay I received, which validated the 1099-MISC. I acquired from the very same accounting manager, an email letter stating that, pursuant to the definition of compensation provided by the Classification Act of 1923 (which I provided her), I did not receive compensation, and the company did not do any federal work at that location. I therefore have a factual letter contradicting the 1099-MISC assertion that I received compensation.
The IRS invoices were allowed into evidence under FRE 803(6) hearsay exemption. My letter contradicting that evidence should have been allowed into evidence under FRE 106 related writings, since my document was related to and part of the IRS's invoice documents, and should share the same hearsay exemption. The court did not allow my letter into evidence, affirming IRS's objection that it was hearsay (which it was, but it had an exemption as did the IRS's documents). This is an error for the Appellate Court to consider.
I said in my brief:
The payment and invoice information reported pay; it was not classified as "compensation" until the moment it was entered on the Form 1099-MISC which reported "compensation", not wages, not pay, not income, at which moment the statutory definition of "compensation" also attached. The Court does not have discretion to use the ordinary meaning of "compensation", but must use the statutory definition because that is what the Form 1099-MISC asks for. The Court erred by not addressing the definition of "compensation" in its opinion since this definition determines whether or not petitioner's pay was "compensation" as statutorily defined.
I think I have a strong case, but the main weakness in my argument is that the Classification Act of 1923 was repealed, replaced by the Act of 1949, and later 5 USC 5102. In the process, the definition of "compensation" was removed. The question is: Does the definition of "compensation" continue on in spite of the repeal of the 1923 Act? The argument I provided in my brief is this:
Regarding repeal by implication: “the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue to speak, so far as the two acts are the same, from the time of the first enactment.” Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 US 497, 503 (1936).
CtC only covers this issue briefly on p. 53. I need some authority that confirms that the proper construction is that "compensation" does continue its existence since it was not mentioned in later versions.
We need to win the argument on the definition of "compensation", otherwise the whole theory will be dismantled. Pete please check in on this one.
Thanks for your help.