Theresa Claeys: a 2nd Human Rights Defenders League failure

[Hilfskreuzer Möwe]

Time to add another one to the ash heap of history:

• Claeys v Her Majesty et al, 2013 MBQB 313: http://canlii.ca/t/g2gf8

Our subject this time is “Theresa-Marie Katherine Claeys, a human being”, who sues the Crown, the CRA, and a couple CRA employees. Why? Ms. Claeys has opted out of being a person, per international human rights treaties, and therefore has no obligation to pay tax. Her remedies?

“1. The Plaintiff claims:

a) The sum total of all taxes collected from the Plaintiff over the past 10 years; and

b) The sum of $100,000.00 for breach of fiduciary duty; and

c) The sum of $100,000.00 for conspiracy; and

d) The sum of $100,000.00 for conversion; and

e) The sum of $100,000.00 for general damages; and

f) The sum of $100,000.00 for punitive, aggravated, or exemplary damages; and

g) Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest in accordance with Queen’s Bench Act Part XIV of July 1, 2013; and

h) The costs of this claim on a substantial indemnity basis; and

i) Such other and further relief as this Honourable Court deems just; and

j) Order to remove Property Liens; and

k) Return of all monies from bank accounts as per Requirement To Pay Notices.”

Unsurprisingly, the defendants moved to strike out the action as fatally defective. Unsurprising, Master Harrison granted that order.

Much of the judgment recounts the argument advanced in Ms. Claey’s statement of claim:

[4] As noted from the above style of cause or title to proceedings, the plaintiff further states her status within paragraph two of her claim:

“The Plaintiff, at all material times, is a human being, and is to be so recognized, having waived her human right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law, pursuant to Article 6, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 16, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”

[5] Unfortunately, however, paragraph 3 causes some confusion by mixing terms commonly used in wills and estate matters with her current living state:

“3. The Plaintiff, at all material times, is also the Beneficiary of the Estate, known as Theresa Marie Katherine Claeys.”

[6] The statement continues in paragraph 4 to describe the defendants in rather conventional words with the exception of:

“4. ...Her Majesty The Queen, the monarch of Canada, (who has sworn an oath to uphold the Laws of God and who continues to breach Her oath with Her man made Laws and not Gods Laws)...”

[7] The statement of claim then proceeds in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 a), b), c), d), e) and f) to differentiate between a human being and a person “before the law”. In addition, the plaintiff states that the defendants were formally notified by letter on May 30th, 2013 that she has waived her human right to recognition as such a person. The plaintiff’s assertion is set forth in the above mentioned paragraphs and leads to the conclusion that the Income Tax Act (ITA) does not apply as a consequence to her, a human being. The plaintiff thus objects stating that its application is a “total violation of the Plaintiff’s human rights”.

And there are signs the document was a rather crude copy and paste assemblage (para. 8 ) but document does retain the same general theme:

“4. The fact that there is a Trust and the Defendants, Trustees under that Trust is irrefutable.

5. The Plaintiff was born free and equal in dignity and rights with a birthright, dominion over the earth and all the natural resources thereof.

6. Her Majesty the Queen, from whom the Defendants receive their authority, controls and manages the earth and the natural resources thereof, a portion of which comprises the Plaintiff’s Estate (birthright). This fact, makes out a Trust by definition.

7. The Plaintiff is, therefore, a Beneficiary of this Trust.

8. The Defendants are harming the Plaintiff (Beneficiary) which action makes out the crime of Breach of Trust.

9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) is generally agreed to be the foundation of international human rights law. Adopted in 1948, the UDHR has inspired a rich body of legally binding international human rights treaties. It continues to be an inspiration to us all whether addressing injustices, in times of conflicts, in societies suffering repression, and in our efforts towards achieving universal enjoyment of human rights.

10. It represents the universal recognition that basic rights and fundamental freedoms are inherent to all human beings, inalienable and equally applicable to everyone, and that every one of us is born free and equal in dignity and rights. Whatever our nationality, place of residence, gender, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status, the international community on December 10, 1948 made a commitment to uphold dignity and justice for all of us ...”

Of course, that trust flows from the Strawman attached to Ms. Claeys at birth:

[10] The claim continues in the same vein with basic, if there is such a thing, pontifical comments concerning international human rights. Paragraphs 17 through to 23 deal primarily with the plaintiff’s view of birth, the meaning and import of birth registrations.

But suddenly the theme changes from international human rights, and the proverbial Strawman to the first mention of which I am aware in Canadian jurisprudence of the R. v JAH Phoney Stone of Scone argument (see viewtopic.php?f=47&t=9476):

[11] Unfortunately paragraphs 24 and 25 state what the plaintiff regards as facts:

“24. Her Majesty the Queen is a fraud, having been Crowned on a fraudulent Stone and having violated her Coronation Oath by giving Royal Assent to laws that violate God’s Law (violating her promise to maintain the laws of God which forbids the making of laws that violate God’s Law).

25. Consequently, anyone who obtains authority for Her Majesty the Queen, cannot possibly have lawful authority, having receive such authority from someone who does not have authority to give.”

Master Harrison concludes the filed support materials in no way relate to the issue of whether or not Ms. Claeys ought to pay income tax: paras. 16-18.

… I remain at a loss as to how the plaintiff’s above-noted documents apply to the primary issue in the case at bar.

Yet another familiar theme appears in that Ms. Claeys invoked the Apostolic Letter that is all the rage in Sovereign/Freeman circles, causing confusion to the court.

Judicial Authorities Of Vatican City State In Criminal Matters” however does cause this court concern. This said document would appear to focus on a desire or aim to modernise the Vatican legal system. The point the plaintiff appears to be making is that even the Vatican now accepts the following:

“These laws, however, have a broader scope, since they incorporate into the Vatican legal system the provisions of numerous international conventions: the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, on the conduct of war and war crimes; the 1965 Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination; the 1984 Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the 1989 Convention on the rights of the child and its optional protocols of 2000.”

The action is struck out as being devoid of any legal or factual foundation:

[26] As stated above, it is incumbent upon this court to search the contents of the subject claim for a supported factual foundation justifying a remedy. Unfortunately for the plaintiff’s position, no such facts are set forth. The vast majority of the claim is opinion combined with argument.

[27] The plaintiff’s methodology in drafting the claim has been to cite international law which protects the rights of citizens regardless of their respective residencies. However, these laws do not provide a cause of action but rather a shield from oppression by any state. At the heart of her claim, the plaintiff believes that she has a God given right to elect exemption from the taxation provisions of Canada on the basis of international law. Many would agree that taxation is oppressive. However, it remains the price that our citizens collectively endure to support what we have as a nation. The right or position to utilize such a self-proclaimed legal exemption is not a cause of action known at law. In other words, a court could not grant the plaintiff the relief she seeks based upon this pleading. There is no connection drawn by the plaintiff between the defendants’ alleged actions and any potential or available judicial remedy.

[28] This court therefore is prepared to follow the Crown’s guidance. An order will go dismissing the statement of claim for failure to demonstrate a reasonable cause of action against any of the defendants. It is to be noted that this court has not in substance dealt with the plaintiff’s non-compliance with the statute permitting a proceeding to be taken against the Crown nor in detail with the perhaps statutorily protected role of the individual defendants. In addition, no time has been spent on the premise contained within paragraph 24 of the statement of claim concerning our Monarch. These latter matters have the potential to be rectified by amendment to the statement of claim. Overall however the claim is so flawed by its failure to set forth a reasonable cause of action that it is counterproductive to allow amendments to it.

One odd point on which I disagree with the Master: the conclusion at para. 20 that this action does not relate to subject matter addressed in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571. Ms. Claeys is quite obviously attempting to evade tax obligation via the double/split person concept discussed in that judgment. She is claiming that, as a human right, she may opt out from having status as a legal person, thus breaking the link between her and the proverbial Strawman, and as a result escape state authority and the obligation to pay income tax.

What the Master has here encountered is the scheme advanced by the Human Rights Defenders League in Canada – that international treaty law permits an individual to disassociate from the Strawman – a person with legal rights – and also obligations to the state (see viewtopic.php?f=47&t=9453). It is not clear from the quoted passages whether Ms. Claey’s is directly using HRDLC documents or simply adapting their themes. Other passages are clearly copy/pasted from various sources, such as this commentary on human rights (http://libguides.okanagan.bc.ca/content ... id=3408646).

The R. v. JAH argument appears to have thrown the Master for a loop, no real surprise there! This judgment suggests that argument was only included in a somewhat casual manner.

Ms. Claeys and her husband Darwin appear to be residents of Cypress River, Manitoba. Her Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/theresa.claeys.5) has very little public content, but her social connections show a broad affiliation with the Freeman-on-the-Land movement. She also sells free-range chickens and eggs.

SMS Möwe

[Jeffrey]

If only judges had some sort of resource they could use to cross reference OPCA things; are they allowed to do independent research or have some clerk research these things for them?

[grixit]

Hmm, a free range sovereign is obviously one who has uncontrolled access to the whole field of pseudolegal claims and can peck them up in any order. This is as opposed to a factory sovereign, such as the denizens of Lost Horizons, who are fed a carefully controlled diet of coordinated misinformation.

[Burnaby49]

Essentially very similar arguments to Charles Holmes. He also cited the UN Declaration of Human Rights and claimed it superceded Canadian law. Also very big on evading tax by being a human being rather than a person. Both also claim to be the beneficiary of a government trust. However, as Mowe pointed out, while Belanger and others promote the Stone of Scone argument, Claeys is the first reference to it in court (that we know of) as part of legal arguments. Holmes didn't use it or make any references to Christianity. One thing to be said in Claey's favour, she only wanted $500,000. Holmes demanded $100,000,000.

[Burnaby49]

OK, as a non-lawyer part of this decision has me baffled. The legal terminology is simply too abtruse for me so I need some guidance from you lawyers. Specifically:

[25] Leaving aside for the moment, the failure of the plaintiff to properly name certain defendants and the suspect logic in the plaintiff being a human being but not a legal person having waived her tights to be so recognized, this court is unable to find a sufficient factual foundation to fulfill the requirements of a cause of action.

Why would waving her undergarments around in court be recognized have any bearing on the matter?

[notorial dissent]

Depends on the judge one would assume. We've had a couple get in trouble for that over the last few years, never ends well.

The rest, well makes too little sense to try and pin an explanation on, so no cause of action does make sense.

[ArthurWankspittle]

Time to add another one to the ash heap of history

Given that I have sovereign citizens on my mind when I read here, I mis-read that as "the ash heap of victory".

Hmm, a free range sovereign is obviously one who has uncontrolled access to the whole field of pseudolegal claims and can peck them up in any order. This is as opposed to a factory sovereign, such as the denizens of Lost Horizons, who are fed a carefully controlled diet of coordinated misinformation.

Or battery sovereigns who can't think outside their little boxes?
Are free range sovereigns allowed to wander anywhere, like cows in India? Is there a hunting season? Do you need a permit?

[AndyK]

More importantly, is there a daily bag limit?

[Hilfskreuzer Möwe]

If only judges had some sort of resource they could use to cross reference OPCA things; are they allowed to do independent research or have some clerk research these things for them?

They are and they aren't. I would suggest Canadian law is at an in-between point in evolution between where the judges may only rule on material directly submitted by litigation parties (the classic rule) and a more flexible approach that allows judges to access a broader range of authorities (where we are heading).

At present there is a sort of informal rule that a judge may always search for, make reference to, and apply these sources:

• 1. any reported case law from any jurisdiction,
  
  2. any legal text intended for reference and use by lawyers,
  
  3. any academic commentary - refereed publications or otherwise - by law professors, and
  
  4. a kind of ill-defined collection of semi-professional materials, including papers produced by legal research institutes, judicial associations, law societies, and so on.

Generally a judge can be fairly confident he or she will not be spanked by an appellate court if they stick to those resources. That said, in Canada a further category of academic/technical material is leaking into the pool of material from which a judge can freely scrounge. Courts, and particularly the appellate courts, are using what they classify as social sciences materials to assist in determining appropriate policy choices when interpreting and applying the law. Perhaps the most notorious example of this occurred in R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 SCR 852, where Justice Bertha Wilson made extensive reference to a range of sources to provide a foundation for a defence based on "battered wife syndrome".

In my opinion the line on what is acceptable 'judge-found' information is somewhat hazy. For example, some categories of academic writing are more acceptable than others. As I noted, any "law" academic publication, even something as informal as a blog, is fair game. However, finding and citing a refereed paper from an authoritative technical journal, such as the sciences journals Nature or Science, is absolutely forbidden. This leads to what I would suggest are bizarre results. A judge, for example, is not allowed to look for and find information on basic questions of statistics, accounting, and science. That is 'too technical'. However, a judge can probably get away with going to philosophy texts and engaging in wildly exploratory discussion of the concepts of good and evil. That is sufficiently 'legal'.

However, if a judge can find a "legal" resource that makes reference to technical/scientific concepts, then that's entirely fine - you can 'piggyback' technical knowledge into the evidence pool in that way, no problem at all. A judge cannot cite a basic biology textbook for the fact that identical twins share the same DNA and therefore are predisposed to the same genetic disorders. However, if the judge can find that same authority and fact quoted in a journal article by a law professor? It's kosher.

Why? I dunno. It's tradition. It reflects the stereotypical 'non-law' background of persons in the legal professions and the courts. It's kind of stupid. But that is where we stand.

As I said, I think this process is in flux. There is talk from the Supreme Court and other appellate judges that there needs to be a better way for courts to access expert information and knowledge - going so far as to suggest perhaps that courts should have their own pool of specialist expertise. Mechanisms exist for a court to appoint experts to provide evidence, but those procedures are almost never used. It's a recognized issue and perhaps something will come of that.

Ok - enough of that rambling - back to your actual question Jeffrey. Could a judge engage in a personal investigation of the background of OPCA materials that lands on his or her desk? Yes. They could also assign that to court articling students or in-house lawyers, what in Canada are usually called court legal counsel. Not all courts have those support personnel, but they do exist in some jurisdictions/courts.

So let's say that our hypothetical judge Googles up a storm and finds the website of the relevant guru, other form documents, come online commentary on this guru and his scheme, and an academic article discussing the guru/scam. What can the judge disclose as a source of information in a judgment? The last item, nothing else. Is it legit for the judge or his/her minions to make a broader search? Arguably it's problematic.

Do I think the courts have additional in-house expertise or institutional knowledge of the OPCA phenomena? Yup. If you keep an eye on the jurisprudence from the B.C., Alberta, Ontario, and Federal courts it is clear that judges in those jurisdictions have (or have access to) a broad-based understanding on the OPCA phenomena, its concepts, and the manner in which those concepts are employed.

I think it is very telling that the leading case on the subject, Meads v. Meads, at para. 649-655 suggests that it may be helpful for lawyers facing an OPCA litigant do a little hunting for additional information that may be relevant to help provide background and context for the OPCA schemes in play. Quatloos is specifically identified as a source (para. 655). I think this is an indirect statement by the courts that they are very well aware that there is additional information out there that may be highly relevant in a particular litigation scenario, but that the usual rules of evidence do not allow the court itself to 'dig that up'.

And that is one reason why I post information here - I can be quite confident that at least some aspects of the judicial apparatus knows Quatloos exists and monitor its activities. I can only hope the same is true for lawyers and government actors who find themselves involved in OPCA matters.

So would a judge accept and consider the Youtube video rants of one of our menagerie of Canadian eccentrics? Absolutely - if the material was submitted by a party to the action. That could be powerful evidence, particularly in a sentencing procedure. The problem, again, is that the rules under which the courts operate restrict the mechanisms to obtain that data - but that has no effect on the relevance of that information once it is through the door.

So that takes us back to the list of sources to which a judge may make free reference. What would probably be ideal is if the legal academic community in Canada were to engage in the kind of investigation and commentary that occurs on this website. If that were the case then our hypothetical judge could look up what professor X said about Dean Clifford, and that would be fine. The professor is permitted under the rules to view Dean Clifford's website and videos, attend his seminars, talk to his followers - and then draw conclusions. Those conclusions may then be referenced by the courts. In our imaginary world of make believe where that had occurred judges would have the outside expert to whom they could make free reference and use that to provide more context and tools to respond to OPCA litigation.

The problem is, that hasn't happened. Instead, to date legal academic commentary in Canada has been, to be polite, miserable. There are a number of professors who have made comments, restricted to blogs, which demonstrate a number of disturbing points as these academics:

• 1. have very obviously made no independent investigation of the OPCA community and its ideas,
  
  2. instead rely solely only upon:
  • a) reported judgments for which they have little, if any, contextual background,
    b) each other's often very ill-grounded commentary,
  3. have no 'in the trenches' experience with OPCA litigation and in-court conduct, and
  
  4. have developed their mental constructs of the OPCA community from their own pre-conceived notions of the kinds of persons involved.

The net result is that to date any academic commentary I have encountered has been either effectively worthless - adding no new context or understanding to the OPCA community and phenomenon - or positively harmful as it mischaracterizes what is actually going on.

I am not entirely surprised by this fact as in Canada legal academic commentary leaves, in my opinion, much to be desired. A chief objection I have is that legal subjects are addressed in isolation - the professors restrict their investigation to case law, other (almost almost legal) academic writing, and so on. That's fine for certain subjects, but others require raw data and field investigation, and that kind of investigation almost never occurs, and when it does, that investigation is often marred by what would be questionable methodology in other academic divisions. I go on at some length in this post (viewtopic.php?f=47&t=9526#p160831) on that issue, if you are curious.

All in all, quite discouraging. I take a very dim view of persons who assert expertise without a foundation, and that is exactly the state at present with legal academics who have commented on the subject.

Oh, and if you interested academics happen across this post? Start participating here. Learn. The data exists - it is accessible; this website and its collected information makes that obvious. I am also open to direct discussion on the subject via private channels.

I imagine at some point an expert source will emerge which actually does have an understanding of the subject, and to whom the judiciary can make more direct reference. However, at the moment I suspect the judiciary is stuck relying on whatever information is in the case law, or is presented in evidence. The good news is that Meads v. Meads is pretty comprehensive and accessible, and that provides a solid foundation. There is also an developing pool of excellent case law by judges who clearly are very informed on the subject matter.

Even if they can't talk about it directly.

SMS Möwe

[Jeffrey]

Well from a "meme hunting" perspective I'm surprised at how success the tracking of the R. v. JAH argument was. You caught it all the way back in August, making the jump from the UK to Canada, then emerged again in Moorish groups in September with a woman saying she would use it in a foreclosure proceeding, and now in December we have it show up in a court decision with the judge baffled by something you saw coming down the pipeline months in advance.

[Arthur Rubin]

Aside: I'm reading "The Adventures of a Free-Range Aspergian". I'm sure it's much more coherent than "The Adventures of a Free-Range Sovereign" would be.