The case continues to grind forward. Ms. Phillips's competency hearing has been put off for another month (not her doing, as evidently her physician is ill and has been working at about half power for a while). Latest minute entry says that:
The Court also discussed Pretrial Services Violation Report (Doc. No. 102). Government indicates it will seek no action beyond recommended by Pretrial Services. Defendant admonished on compliance with pretrial release conditions. Additionally, the Court discussed its position on Plaintiff's ability to represent herself and finds that the defendant Cherron Marie Phillips cannot appropriately represent herself in this matter. Therefore, the Court rules that attorney Laura Weil Solomon is not longer stand-by counsel and is appointed to represent the defendant in this matter. Defendant noted her objection to the Court's ruling. The Court will make a complete record on this issue during the next hearing (3/26/2014).
(emphasis mine)
It is not entirely clear from the public record, as it stands, just what exactly changed Judge Mihm's mind about Ms. Phillips's ability to represent herself. Possibly the yet-unexplained breach of her pretrial release was a factor; perhaps Judge Mihm sat down for coffee with Judge Shadur and they had a nice round of shop talk.
At any rate, trial's now set for June 23, at the odd hour of 8:45 am.
If ongoing contact with her, her antics, her general disregard for the court in particular and the entire process in general, and specifically the documents she keeps filing weren't sufficient to bring that obviousness home I'm not sure what would.
While I agree(whole heartedly I might add) that she has a right to defend herself, she isn't really competently doing that, she is making sure that the trial will not be fair to her, and there is really no need to add more of a slam dunk to the prosecution than they already have, they at least ought to have to put in a little effort rather than just have her hand the verdict to them.
The fact that you sincerely and wholeheartedly believe that the “Law of Gravity” is unconstitutional and a violation of your sovereign rights, does not absolve you of adherence to it.
On April 4, Judge Mihm released an order more fully explaining the reasons for appointing counsel over Ms. Phillips's objections, which pretty much confirms ND's take on it:
Based on the Defendant’s behavior in this matter, the Court is convinced that she cannot or will not represent herself without conducting herself in a manner that is unreasonably disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the Court. The Defendant has been given multiple opportunities to fashion her actions and conduct in a manner that would conform to that which would be minimally acceptable, and has utterly failed. Defendant was warned on several occasions by Judge Shadur about her conduct and he ultimately found it necessary to appoint counsel. This Court reluctantly reversed that decision based largely on the representation of Defendant that she would conform her conduct. That has not happened. Indeed, Defendant immediately continued to file her frivolous motions and also failed to appear at her initially scheduled competency examination. Finally, it should also be noted that Defendant often refuses to answer questions without attempting to advance her disruptive agenda by asking if “she can ask a question.” (See e.g. ECF No. 64 at 5 “THE DEFENDANT: May I ask a question? THE COURT: Sure. You know, I have got to tell you, however, it has never advanced us for you to respond to one of my questions by saying, "May I ask a question?" I always try to deal with those, but that is not going to deflect your having to answer the question I pose. So you tell me what your question is.”). Under these circumstances, the Court finds it necessary to appoint counsel to thwart the Defendant’s repeated efforts to disrupt and delay this proceeding.
In other news, the case has been reassigned again, this time to Judge Michael Reagan. Trial is still scheduled for June 16.
Ms. Phillips, evidently not content to let counsel handle her case (what else is new?), has taken a new tactic. And when I say, "new tactic," I mean one that's not new at all, but, hey, gotta work this time, right?
On May 27, 2014, the undersigned judge received a summons and complaint via certified mail, indicating that Phillips, by way of her “authorized agent” River Tali Bey, was suing the undersigned judge in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. However, as of May 27, 2014, no complaint had been received and filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Without commenting on the procedural posture or merits of the suit, Phillips’ action raises the issue of whether this judge must recuse himself under the dictates of 28 U.S.C. §455 (see also Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 2 (regarding the appearance of impropriety) and Canon 3(C) (regarding disqualification)). ...
Phillip’s action is brought against the undersigned judge, as well as others involved in this criminal case, including the prosecutor, various law enforcement agents, and judges previously assigned to the case. It is alleged that all defendants, individually or in conspiracy, intend to cause harm to Phillips for their own private gain by acting in contradiction of the law and without evidence, thereby denying Phillips of her liberty. Among other things, monetary damages are sought. ...
The complaint presents many of the same arguments for dismissal of the criminal indictment that have already been rejected in this case. Clearly, Phillips takes issue with the indictment and the Court’s refusal to dismiss the case. Given that the complaint was signed on May 21, 2014—one day after the case was reassigned—the undersigned judge had done little or nothing in the case. Phillips cites no extrajudicial basis for perceiving bias on the part of this judge. She has interjected the specter of bias in what this Court perceives is a blatant attempt to judge-shop. Based on the allegations in the complaint, it appears that Phillips perceive[s] that all federal judges are biased against her or without authority over her. Under these circumstances, it is unreasonable to perceive bias on the part of this judge or the appearance of partiality or impropriety.
(ECF #124)
And basically, no, Judge Reagan isn't going to recuse himself, and trial's still on for a couple of weeks from now.
In Phillips-talk, "the judge is biased against me" really means "the judge won't tell me that the poo I'm flinging around the courtroom smells like the finest perfume."
"We've been attacked by the intelligent, educated segment of the culture." -- Pastor Ray Mummert, Dover, PA, during an attempt to introduce creationism -- er, "intelligent design", into the Dover Public Schools
Or roll over and dismiss all the charges and let me go simply because I've been throwing temper tantrums. Surprise surprise, at least to/for her.
The fact that you sincerely and wholeheartedly believe that the “Law of Gravity” is unconstitutional and a violation of your sovereign rights, does not absolve you of adherence to it.
Pottapaug1938 wrote:In Phillips-talk, "the judge is biased against me" really means "the judge won't tell me that the poo I'm flinging around the courtroom smells like the finest perfume."
From the United States Supreme Court:
The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings..... As Judge Jerome Frank pithily put it: "Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence. If the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas called trials, he could never render decisions." In re J. P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F. 2d 650, 654 (CA2 1943). Also not subject to deprecatory characterization as "bias" or "prejudice" are opinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings.
--from Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-551 (1994).
Hint to Cherron Marie: If you don't want the judge to think you're a nut case, don't act like a nut case.
"My greatest fear is that the audience will beat me to the punch line." -- David Mamet
I had pretty much forgotten who this clown was, so I went back and looked over the thread from the beginning.
Did anyone else realize that this pre-trial nonsense has been going on for a year and a half?
And I suspect that, when it ends, it's going to end with a pretty impressive thud.
Dan Evans
Foreman of the Unified Citizens' Grand Jury for Pennsylvania
(And author of the Tax Protester FAQ: evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html)
"Nothing is more terrible than ignorance in action." Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.
As I recall, she has burned through two judges so far, has filed, literally, reams and reams of nonsense paper, has repeatedly lied about everything, as thumbing her nose at the judges and the court in general, and when any of them say or do anything they are abusing her and biased. IMHO this has drug on as long as it has because the judges have let her continue to get away with it all.
The fact that you sincerely and wholeheartedly believe that the “Law of Gravity” is unconstitutional and a violation of your sovereign rights, does not absolve you of adherence to it.
Boredom, frustration, gave up in disgust, wanted to have a life before he retired..... Who knows? At any rate the count stands at at least two judges so far, for something that should have long ago been over and done with. They did it/are doing it to themselves, so I feel no sympathy.
The fact that you sincerely and wholeheartedly believe that the “Law of Gravity” is unconstitutional and a violation of your sovereign rights, does not absolve you of adherence to it.
As we hurtle headlong toward trial time for Ms. Phillips, the haggling and compromises that usually accompany criminal cases have taken on a rather unusual aspect, as should be expected for such an unusual defendant.
Mr. Stump, the prosecuting attorney, has filed his motions in limine, and in one of these (ECF #127), he asks the court for
an order in limine that would prevent the defendant and her attorney from arguing to the jury that she should not be found guilty because she did not know her actions were unlawful.
In support of this Motion, the United States avers as follows:
........
2. One of the exhibits the United States intends to offer during the trial is a letter entitled “Forgive Me,” that Phillips purportedly addressed and mailed to five victim-witnesses after the liens were filed. In her letter, Phillips wrote, “I had no intentions on causing harm and thought I was following the law. I simply thought at that time I was doing the right thing.”
3. The apology letter is relevant evidence of the defendant’s guilt and should be admitted without redaction. However, the assertion that Phillips did not know her actions were unlawful is irrelevant and should not be argued to the jury.
4. “(i)t is hornbook law that ignorance of the law is generally no defense.” United States v. Kilgore, 591 F.3d 890, 894 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (“The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.”); United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Courts like to say that knowledge of the law is presumed. But what they mean is that ignorance of the law, though common, is not a defense to a criminal prosecution.”).
The "Forgive Me" letter was quoted in full in this thread a little more than a year ago (post #30), and is perhaps going to become a very good example of why defendants generally need to shut up and let counsel speak for them, although Ms. Phillips clearly has not learned this. More in a moment. Continuing on:
6. This case involves numerous legal-sounding documents that the defendant filed, recorded, and mailed to various government officials. By necessity – like the apology letter – these documents must be admitted and shown to the jury as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. At the same time, there is a risk that the jury will be confused by them and wonder if the defendant truly believed she was acting lawfully. Such confusion is unwarranted; the defendant’s own views of the law and what it should be has no bearing on her guilt or innocence. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to predict that the jury’s confusion would be magnified exponentially if the defendant were allowed to argue her own views of the law during the trial.
This last sentence puts the matter mildly, I think.
For the defense, Ms. Solomon has moved to exclude much of the Government’s other-crimes evidence—no surprise there—and to prevent the witnesses for the prosecution from using the term, “domestic terrorist.” The Government apparently has no objection to that. Furthermore:
The government and defendant further agree that they will try to work out a Stipulation regarding the sovereign citizen and patriot movements to reduce the risk of undue prejudice to the defendant.
(ECF #128)
This all seems quite reasonable, to my inexpert eye, anyway. It really should figure that Ms. Phillips wants none of it. She has appealed the order of May 21 to the 7th Circuit, saying:
I River Tali:Bey, am appealing the administrative orders entered on May 21st, 2014 and want the appellate court to rule on the law. On May 21st, 2014 petitioner demanded a jurisdictional hearing by the district court. The district court failed to afford the relief requested which is an admission that they don’t have jurisdiction or else it would have been placed on the record.
As usual, it doesn’t get much better from there. Anyway, this is a very strange order to appeal from: it’s just the final details of the trial, mostly: side bars discouraged, motion to exclude witnesses granted, anticipated trial time four days, and so on. I assume that what Ms. Phillips has an issue with is the final line of that order (ECF #125):
For reasons stated on the record during the final pretrial conference, Documents 122 and 123 are DENIED. The court will not permit pro se filings or hybrid representation since the defendant is represented by able counsel. Moreover, the issues raised in these motions have been previously considered and rejected.
Document 122 is Ms. Phillips’s “Notice and Demand Jurisdictional Hearing.” In it, she places her “NOTICE before the court to make [her] record of objection to the current orders now before the court under the 1818 constitution of Illinois and its common law jurisdiction that granted all federal powers.” Et cetera, et cetera. I can post this up if anyone wants to see it, but it’s the same thing she’s argued and lost before. (Anyway, the state constitution dates to 1970.)
As this was only filed on Friday (June 5), it remains to be seen whether this will cause a delay in trial (not being an appeal from a final order, wouldn't it get bounced almost automatically?), but so far it doesn't seem that Judge Reagan is in a mood to allow this case to be delayed any further if he can help it.
morrand wrote:Mr. Stump, the prosecuting attorney, has filed his motions in limine, and in one of these (ECF #127), he asks the court for
an order in limine that would prevent the defendant and her attorney from arguing to the jury that she should not be found guilty because she did not know her actions were unlawful.
What kind of "scienter" is required for a particular crime, or relevant to a crime, depends on the definition of the crime, so I went to see what crime she has been charged with.
That answer is that she's been charged with numerous counts of 18 U.S.C. 1521, which provides as follows:
Whoever files, attempts to file, or conspires to file, in any public record or in any private record which is generally available to the public, any false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property of an individual described in section 1114, on account of the performance of official duties by that individual, knowing or having reason to know that such lien or encumbrance is false or contains any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
The language I've highlighted provides (I think) that it's not necessary for the defendant to know that what she did was "unlawful," and so it's not relevant whether or not she knew what she was doing was a crime. What the government has to show is that knew, or had reason to know, that what she was filing was "false" or contained any (material) false statement or representation.
As we've seen in the past, these "scienter" issues can be tricky, and I have to admit I don't understand the government's position as stated in the following:
In support of this Motion, the United States avers as follows:
........
2. One of the exhibits the United States intends to offer during the trial is a letter entitled “Forgive Me,” that Phillips purportedly addressed and mailed to five victim-witnesses after the liens were filed. In her letter, Phillips wrote, “I had no intentions on causing harm and thought I was following the law. I simply thought at that time I was doing the right thing.”
3. The apology letter is relevant evidence of the defendant’s guilt and should be admitted without redaction. However, the assertion that Phillips did not know her actions were unlawful is irrelevant and should not be argued to the jury.
How is the quoted language from the "apology letter" relevant evidence of the defendant's guilt? The only grounds I can think of is that it is an admission against interest. But what did Phillips admit to? That she was sorry? An assertion that "“I had no intentions on causing harm and thought I was following the law. I simply thought at that time I was doing the right thing," doesn't seem like an admission to any element of the crime.
I went back and found the text of the letter, and there's a different sentence that does seem relevant: "Forgive me for my failure to do the proper study on learning how to come to my brother and properly resolve matters instead of filing liens on persons." That seems like an admission that the liens were filed "on account of the performance of official duties by that individual," which is one element of the crime. The rest of the letter talks about "mistake," which is at best irrelevant because it sheds no light at all on whether Phillips knew (or had reason) to know that the statements in the filings were false. It *might* be an admission that she "had reason to know" that the statements were false, but that's somewhat speculative.
The prosecutor seems to want to have it both ways, allowing the introduction of admissions that Phillips might have been wrong but not allowing Phillips to explain or argue why (at the time) she thought she was right. Putting it differently, the prosecutor wants Phillips's legal opinions to be admissible when they favor the prosecution but not when her legal opinions favor the defense.
Maybe I don't really understand the law (or the rules of evidence), but right now I'm thinking that if I were the judge I'd exclude the "apology letter" (or allow only the part about "failure to ... properly resolve matters" and exclude the rest) on the grounds that the letter was more likely to be prejudicial or confusing than helpful in establishing any element of the crime.
Dan Evans
Foreman of the Unified Citizens' Grand Jury for Pennsylvania
(And author of the Tax Protester FAQ: evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html)
"Nothing is more terrible than ignorance in action." Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.
IANAL, and I certainly don't know anything about the American system, but it strikes me that the letters , if nothing else, are an admission that she was the person who filed the liens. Sometimes in Canadian courts the defence will obligingly admit "identity" (e.g. "The accused was the person in the confrontation with the victim") if their real defence is that what the accused did wasn't a crime (e.g. "It was a consensual fight") . Maybe the prosecutor just wants to win the narrow victory of proving that she did the act, before fighting over the complex issues you discuss?
I find it interesting the government seems to be willing to negotiate on its use of bringing up the sovereign citizen angle here. Clearly, Phillips is a sovereign through and through. That belief system is the entire basis of her actions. It is why - despite the fact that shes been told by the court that her filings are so crazy they have to evaluate her mental capacity - she keeps at it. Isn't motivation and important part of a trial? Why wouldn't the government be doing everything it can make the sov'run angle central?
Judge Michael Reagan wrote:(T)he Court concludes and CERTIFIES pursuant to Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989), that Defendant Phillips‘ interlocutory appeal and petition to stay the proceedings in the district court pending appeal (Doc. 131) are FRIVOLOUS. Accordingly, the district court concludes that it has not been divested of jurisdiction to proceed in this case by the filing of Defendant Phillips‘ notice of appeal and petition to stay the proceedings. This matter will proceed to trial, as currently scheduled, at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, June 16, 2014. Counsel and Defendant Phillips shall appear by 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2125, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604. All deadlines previously set remain in force. A separate notice regarding the trial setting and trial procedures will issue.
(Doc. 139)
And furthermore, Judge Reagan seems to think Ms. Phillips could be trouble in court:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the following reasons, Defendant Phillips is ADVISED that she will lose her right to be present in the courtroom during trial if she is so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the Court that her trial cannot be carried on with her in the courtroom.
(Doc. 140)
The "following reasons" being basically a replay of what was given Ms. Phillips previously on that topic: that the court is not constitutionally bound to tolerate disruption and disrespectful conduct.
In other news, the Government's motion in limine was granted, prohibiting Ms. Phillips from arguing ignorance of the law. In particular:
Furthermore, allowing Phillips to interject her personal legal theories would certainly confuse the jury, contrary to Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Let there be no doubt, it is the Court that will provide the jury with the relevant law by way of the jury instructions. (See Government’s Jury Instruction No. 1 (7th Cir. Pattern Jury Instruction 1.01), to which Defendant did not object during the jury instruction conference).
The 404(b) evidence is in, too, although the term, "domestic terrorist," is out. Weirdly, the Court's read of the defense motion on that subject is that "there is no objection to the terms 'sover[e]ign citizen' and 'patriot movement.' " I don't know where this leaves the suggested stipulation between the prosecution and defense; I would suggest, however, that the sovereign citizen movement isn't really well known in the Chicago area, so that term might not be helpful to the prosecution (much less prejudicial to the defense) without a lot of extraneous explanation. Reference to the "patriot movement" might get more of a reaction, but not by much. So there might not be much to be gained or lost either way by ruling those terms in or out at this point.
The trial of a follower of the so-called sovereign citizen movement is set to begin today in federal court in Chicago on charges she slapped huge liens on then-U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald and other top federal court officials.
It would be easy to dismiss Cherron Phillips, the “sovereign citizen” on trial for harassing federal judges and prosecutors with $100 billion liens, as just another kook.
Indeed, I have little doubt she has issues.
But what may surprise you is that the sovereign citizen movement that spawned her alleged tactics is believed to have attracted tens of thousands of adherents in the U.S. in recent years — all of them sharing a common belief that the government has no authority over them.
Judge Reagan's inquiry to defense counsel wasn't really an auspicious start, as you would expect. Ms. Cherron Phillips, a.k.a. River Tali-El Bey and many other names, had been ordered to appear in court, personally, at nine o'clock on Monday morning. It was now twelve minutes past that point, and Ms. Solomon wasn't sure of the answer to Judge Reagan's question, having not spoken to her client.
By twenty-two past, counsel for both sides were getting worried. Neither were sure if Ms. Phillips was even in the building, and though the US Attorney's office said that they'd secured her passport, it was also true that her last attempt to delay trial had failed decisively. Judge Reagan had made it abundantly clear that trial was going to start today, barring a major disaster. If ever there was reason for her to abscond, she certainly had it now.
Nevertheless, ten minutes later, the door to courtroom 2125 opened, and in walked the defendant, clad in a blue blouse and shawl, walking slowly, tentatively, into the well of the court. She took a seat at the defense table, not greeting the defense counsel, not even looking at her. The judge finally donned his robes. It was time to bring eighteen months of prep work to a close, and get this trial under way.
The first task was to address a pro se filing that Ms. Phillips had made, immediately prior to trial. This was announced to be a notice of appeal, one awfully similar to the one that had been rejected (with the concurrence of the Court of Appeals) just last week. (There was some mention of a Writ of Mandamus, but only briefly.) The prosecution repeated its objection to this, and asked for the stay of trial to be denied, again, as frivolous. Ms. Phillips asked to plead her case directly; the judge refused this as well, directing her to speak through her counsel, who had not seen this filing at all. In fact, Ms. Solomon pointed out, for the record, that she had not been in contact with her client at all since the pretrial proceedings, despite multiple attempts.
For her part, Ms. Phillips refused to consent to the proceedings. This had no effect, but it was followed by the judge repeating his warning to Ms. Phillips that she had better behave. Ms. Phillips asked if the judge would accept liability for something (I couldn't hear what), and the judge repeated his order that she speak only through her counsel. She quieted down after that, and sat sullenly at one corner of the defense table, while her purported counsel sat on the opposite corner, as far apart as they could get. The microphones, for what it is worth, were both at counsel's end of the table.
Courtroom security went down to fetch the panel, which took a while. By and by, Ms. Phillips passed a paper to her attorney, who looked it over, and announced that it had been rejected that morning. Still, she took it and dropped it into her file, unceremoniously. Not long after, Ms. Solomon passed a paper back to Ms. Phillips. "Is this for me?" she asked. Ms. Solomon replied that it wasn't, but she could look at it. (Presumably this was the jury list: counsel had been instructed not to let her take a copy or any notes from that.) Ms. Phillips shook her head and turned away.
I should mention at this juncture that Judge Reagan is on assignment from the Southern District of Illinois, and while that helps to reduce any concerns about conflicts of interest or ex parte communications, it also means that he is not familiar with the mechanics of jury selection in the Northern District, and in particular with how to seat the venire. This had two results: the first was a certain amount of confusion during voir dire, when the Judge had to address the jurors by number, and they were not seated in the order to which he was accustomed and not seated closely enough for him to read their numbers directly. The other is that I was asked to move, twice, as they worked out where everyone would sit.
The questioning of the panel was probably fairly typical. The judge did define the term, "sovereign citizen," and asked if anyone was one. Juror #16, a TSA worker, had heard of them, but the matter wasn't explored further. The prosecution's questioning was also fairly routine, mostly just an inquiry into whether anyone had heard of anyone on the witness list. The defense, on the other hand, was quite wide-ranging: any bad experiences with government? Sympathetic to the Tea Party, or the Occupy movement? how do you feel about cheating? do you feel like you should be more patient? Where did you spend your last vacation? In the end, the result was a jury of six men and eight women.
Meanwhile, during the lunch break, the witnesses began arriving. One greeted a court staffer warmly, and they began chatting in the hallway about what brings him back, and how is he doing, and, geez, can you believe this sort of thing can happen? It took a moment or two for them to realize that the jury panel (which is also filtering back from lunch) is hanging around in the hallway too, and that they probably shouldn't be chatting within earshot. They retired into an empty office nearby, and soon after, the panel was called back in to be sworn.
The prosecution opened by telling the story of Michael Dobbins (whose story is told below). It was mentioned that the defendant had been disruptive of his brother's case, to the point that the courts had to restrict Ms. Phillips's access to them. The defense statement, on the other hand, was much broader: that, though the defendant might have acted out in a misguided way, the jury should keep an open mind and hear all the evidence before coming to judgment.
Mr. Dobbins was the first witness to the stand. He was the clerk of the US District Court of the Northern District of Illinois from 1997 to 2011, and described the duties of the clerk briefly. He found out his lien while attempting to sell the parking space to his condominium unit: it was a maritime lien for $100 billion, which obviously presented a hiccup to selling the parking space. On cross-examination, it was pointed out that the court clerk doesn't handle every document personally, and that (with the advent of electronic filing) there is now little paper filing, anyway. So, he couldn't say that Ms. Phillips had actually filed anything. He also was not sure of how long the lien was on file, or whether it had been revoked. He did say, however, that the title company determined the lien was bogus, and it didn't actually stop the sale from going through.
Next up was Wendy Holderman (no relation to Judge Holderman), staff attorney and document examiner for the Cook County Recorder of Deeds. She testified, animatedly, about the process of recording documents in Cook County, and authenticated copies of the maritime liens in issue, as taken from the Recorder's files. She would have no idea what to do with a maritime lien, but it wouldn't be rejected: people record all kinds of things, such as poetry or artwork, and, not being a conventional real estate document, this would be handled like that and not reviewed. She also identified the cashier's receipts that corresponded to these twelve liens. Cross examination brought out that the records are permanent, but though the files are permanent, the effects might not be, and the Recorder's office can't speak to those. The Recorder's office probably has a few hundred maritime liens, out of tens of millions of documents in total. On redirect, the prosecution pointed out that one receipt showed it was issued to "River," at a PO box in Chicago. Recross brought out one of the first laugh lines (the laughter coming mainly from the students in the back row) with a minor slip-up by defense counsel:
Counsel: She identified herself as River?
Witness: How do you know it was a she? It could be River, it could be Mountain, it could be Stream...
The point is finally made that the identifier on the receipt is volunteered by the customer and is not verified.
By now, the courtroom artists have shown up and are hard at work. Ms. Phillips's bright blue scarf is perfect in this regard, standing out sharply against the dark gray suits of the attorneys and court staff and the dark wood paneling of the courtroom. The reporters are there, too, more or less. The mechanics of deed recording aren't compelling news, and as Ms. Phillips seems to be behaving herself, many of the reporters are stuck browsing their phones, stopping now and then to scribble a note or two when things get interesting.
We go to a break, and the law students gather around outside. "The prosecutor," says one, "says this is the stupidest case he's ever done." The others nod agreement: two hours into the evidence against Ms. Phillips, and they already can see the basis for that assessment.
Witness #3 was Tom Bruton, the current clerk of the court. He identified the docket for case 06-cr-778, USA v. Devon Phillips (Devon being Cherron Phillips's brother). He also identified the "Administrative Note and Demand" signed by Cherron Phillips that had been filed (at #136) in her brother's case. There was a little back-and-forth between direct and cross examination regarding filing policies in the district: the net seems to be that, though unaffiliated parties aren't supposed to file in the docket, it does happen sometimes, and those filings stay unless stricken by a judge.
Witness #4 was Thomas Shakeshaft, Assistant US Attorney for the district. He was the prosecutor on Devon Phillips's drug case. A maritime lien against him for $100B was brought to him by a colleague, which is how he learned it had been filed. He explained briefly how criminal discovery works, and how this could result in his name and address becoming known to the defendant in this case. He also testified, over objection, to Ms. Phillips's behavior in court during her brother's case: she would bring a crowd with her, instruct him on what to say in response to questioning, and would prepare and file papers saying he is not subject to US laws.
Cross-examination focused on whether it would be appropriate for a pro se defendant to file his own papers (yes), whether a defendant could file under a different name (yes, generally), and whether it would be OK to file even if advised by someone who was not an attorney (yes, as long as it wasn't frivolous). It was also pointed out that Mr. Shakeshaft didn't find out about his lien on his own, and that it didn't have any practical effect on his life or his affairs beyond the nuisance value. It also came out that Ms. Phillips's Mercedes had been forfeited to the government in her brother's drug case: this because Devon Phillips had been driving it during one of the drug deals for which he was charged. This last point drove a couple of cycles of re-direct and re-cross examination, which mainly concluded that the forfeiture was not done in retaliation for the lien, though it was done after the lien had been recorded.
Witness number 5 was our first real star: Judge James Holderman, former chief judge of the Northern District. Judge Holderman had received a letter that he eventually put into Devon Phillips's case file, since it seemed to relate to his case. Judge Holderman also described his involvement with the Executive Committee of the District, including its decision to restrict Ms. Phillips from filing documents in her brother's case, and eventually to bar her from the courthouse. Judge Holderman also identified a "Summons to Appear" before the Common Law Sovereign Consulate that he had received. (Side note: the return location for the Summons, if it can be called that, was at a branch of the Chicago Public Library. Evidently, Moors don't do Denny's for this sort of thing.) He referred this to the US Marshals, along with the "Common Law Bill of Indictment" which followed soon after. He also commented on the "Forgive Me" letter (mentioned in prior posts), which was admitted without objection.
Cross examination focused on damage control around the "Forgive Me" letter. It disclosed that Judge Holderman had no personal relation to either Devon or Cherron Phillips. Judge Holderman said that some of the language in the two "Common Law" documents makes sense, but only in other contexts. He was asked about the targets of the liens against him, of which there were five. Apparently, they all missed: one was against 204 S. Clark St. (which is an office building a little more than a block from the Dirksen courthouse); one was against the Metropolitan Correctional Center, two were against properties which Judge Holderman had once owned, but had sold prior to the liens being filed; and one was a property in which Judge Holderman had no personal interest, but had entered a judgment on at some point. On redirect, it was clarified that the liens caused him concern, even though they didn't affect his finances immediately.
With that, the first day of trial ended. (And I went home and had a headache just as I was starting to write all of this out. Sorry for the delay.) Day two had the big star of the show, and Patrick Fitzgerald, too; details to follow.
Morrand, thank you for the report - I enjoyed reading it and I appreciate the updates - I hope you can do more of this if your time allows.
Two observations:
(1) I am struck by just how hard the Judge appears to be doing to save Phillips from herself, and concurrently how hard Phillips is trying to shoot herself in the foot and make the trial have the worst possible outcome for her. Its a great testament to the court system that despite 18 months of sheer insanity and this woman doing everything possible to get herself thrown in jail for the maximum amount of time, the judge has been extremely patient and calm. Even doing things like forcing an attorney on her, which she may not like but (if she would actually work with them) would likely save her jail time.
(2) If there was ever a greater example of how sov'run ideas fail, this is it. Philips has literally thrown everything including the kitchen sink from the sov'run textbook at this case, and is worse off for it. Yet despite the failures and all signs showing that the sov'run gibberish isn't working, she still sticks to it. I don't know if this is just stupidity or actual ignorance, but you would think most people in her position would realize the curtains are closing fast on this act. She could probably save herself a bit of (inevitable) jail time here by apologizing and stating she was mislead by sov'run gibberish but has now joined everyone else back in reality.
I know Philips used to be heavily involved in RuSA...but I have not heard her name mentioned on the conference calls recently. I am not sure if that is a good sign or not, maybe shes been so busy filing gibberish document's she hasn't had time to help run a fake government.
Join the Blue Ribbon Online Free Speech Campaign!