The Court won't let Aileen Rogozinsky copyright her feces

[Burnaby49]

What to say, what to say . . . . . There are just so many approaches I can take with this discussion;

"If we can't copyright our own body wastes what freedoms do we have left?"
"Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench says that Ceylon's GOODF copyright scams are full of crap."
"I'll give you my surgically removed tissue when you pry it from my cold, dead hands."

So many possibilities, so many possibilities, and, sadly, I'm always tempted to take the low road.

Sorry, I was lost in reverie over the wealth of material available for this posting. I'll start again. We have a new case from the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, the same court that released Meads v. Meads;

http://canlii.ca/t/gfpjn

Which includes this in Appendix E paragraph 5;

5. Common Law Copyright is also claimed by Secured Party over any and all means of identification of [his or hers] person, defined as; all fingerprints, footprints, palm prints, thumbprints, hand-prints, toe-prints, RNA materials, DNA materials, blood and blood fractions, biopsies, surgically removed tissue, body parts, organs, hair, teeth, nails, semen, urine, feces, excrement, other body fluids and matter of any kind, and breath samples, voice-print, retinal image, and the description thereof, and all other corporeal identification factors, and said factors physical counterparts, any and all body tissues of any kind, in any form, and all records and record numbers, including the results, recorded or otherwise, of all and any tests performed on any material relating to [his or hers] names, and information pertaining thereto, as well as any visual image, photographic or electronic, notwithstanding any and all claims to the contrary.

Breaking new ground here. The Phrase "all fingerprints, footprints, palm prints, thumbprints, hand-prints, toe-prints, RNA materials, DNA materials, blood and blood fractions, biopsies, surgically removed tissue, body parts, organs, hair, teeth, nails, semen, urine, feces, excrement, other body fluids and matter of any kind" is not one we've considered previously in Quatloos.

Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky is, in it's own way, a mini-Meads and like Meads, relates to a relatively trivial issue. However, also like Meads, it transcends the mundane and demolishes a myriad of Freeman beliefs. Another case for the citation mill. This was stated explicitly in the decision itself which concluded;

[94] All of the foregoing is little more than an application of the principles set forth in Meads v Meads. The particular approach taken by Ms. Rogozinsky appears to be relatively new to Canada. My hope, and the purpose of this exercise, (which may not be a model of judicial economy) is that a fuller treatment might head some others off at the pass.

The hearing was held by a Master in Chamber. The Master is not a judge but has judicial powers for some applications. Somewhat like a Federal Court of Canada Prothonotary. Decisions by Masters carry the same weight as decisions by judges;

Court of Queen's Bench Act, RSA 2000, c C-31

9(1) In regard to all matters brought or proposed to be brought in the Court, a master in chambers

(a) has the same power and may exercise the same jurisdiction as a judge sitting in chambers except in respect of

(i) appeals, applications in the nature of appeals, applications concerning the hearing of appeals and applications to vary or rescind an order made by a judge, and
(ii) subject to subsection (2), stays of proceedings after verdict or on judgment after trial or hearing before a judge, unless all parties consent to the exercise of that jurisdiction by the master,

There is one small difference - technically a Master's judgment is less binding than that of a Queen's Bench judge. Put another way, a QB judge can ignore the reasoning of an unappealed Master's judgment. However a Queen's Bench judge is not going to override this judgment because it is foursquare within the reasons given in Meads v, Meads.

The background to the decision is simple, Aileen Rogozinsky ran up a large Mastercard bill from the Bank of Montreal and then felt disinclined to pay it off. On July 7, 2014 the Bank sued for the outstanding balance. All run of the mill mundane stuff apart from how Aileen handled her defense and counter-claim. She apparently searched the internet for solutions and found them in the babblings of Freemen debt-deadbeats like Ceylon and GOODF, and the lunacy of the three letter/five letter scheme gang. Then she took the fool's gold she'd found in her search and tried to apply it against the bank. Her initially volley was to deny that she owed the bank any money at all and she counterclaimed for $6,072,000.00.

On November 7, 2014 the Bank took out an application for summary judgment. Ms. Rogozinsky, in response, applied to dismiss the Bank's action, and sought other ancillary orders intended to advance her counterclaim. On November 19, 2014 the Master heard the applications and granted summary judgment in favour of the Bank, and dismissed Ms. Rogozinsky counterclaim. These were oral decisions and the reasons for judgment cited above explain the basis for these decisions.

Time to review arguments and results. The first step in the Freeman ladder was Aileen's attempt to stop the bank from serving her with a notification of the Bank's action against her. At the first attempt her husband told the server she wasn't home. They were better prepared for the next attempt when the server found this notice on the front door;

NOTICE
CALLERS BY APPOINTMENT ONLY.
Cold-callers fine: $50,000
No Junk mail Please.
Private Property

Then again maybe this was unrelated to the bank's action. Maybe Aileen just wanted to stop her mother from dropping by unannounced all the time. Make an appointment next time mom! In any event this was easily overcome, the court just granted an application for substitute service.

When the issue finally made it to court this was Aileen's statement of defence;

[9] Ms. Rogozinsky filed a statement of defence on August 21, 2014 which denied the alleged debt, and indicated:

I. Ms. Rogozinsky had on August 18, 2014 sought information" ... about fractional reserve banking, GAAP matching principle, securitization, and selling of securitized items .... ";

2. the Bank had no right to sue because it was "offered a cure ... to settle any alleged financial obligation ... ", and the failure of the Bank to respond to these offers to settle meant" ... William Downe was Estoppeled under private terns and conditions with Aileen Rogozinsky by Canada Post registered letters.";

3. this also "breached Private Estopple" and "evoked [Ms. Rogozinsky's] contractual agreement under private terms and conditions of estopple.";

4. the Bank and its counsel infringed on "common-law copyright and trademark agreements", and were billed for that;

5. there is a distinction between the names "Aileen J. Rogozinsky" and "AILEEN J. ROGOZINSKY": the latter is a "legal entity", while the former" ... has a PERSON yet is not a PERSON; Aileen J. Rogozinksy is a private-women.", and:

a) " ... AILEEN J. ROGOZINSKY is radically different than Aileen J Rogozinsky unless proven to the contrary via STATUTE and exhaustive pursuit of common-law definitions."

b) "Aileen Rogozinsky asserts PLAINTIFF/Witten LLP has fraudulently created joinder or misrepresentation by addressing envelope to Aileen J. Rogozinsky while style of cause in STATEMENT OF CLAIM, contained inside envelope, is to legal person named as AILEEN J. ROGOZINSKY."

6. Ms. Rogozinsky:

a) has not authorized the Bank's counsel to participate in this proceeding,

b) " ... refuses to entertain any third party and/or solicitor intervention ... " on behalf of the Bank, and
c) denies any contractual relationship exists between Ms. Rogozinsky and the Bank's law firm.

7. no man or woman has been harmed;

8. "The court does not have jurisdiction in this case over Aileen J. Rogozinsky; she does not consent in/to a lesser capacity with the public court ... ".

[IO] J Ms. Rogozinsky therefore seeks:

1. to have the Bank's lawsuit dismissed "with prejudice", or struck out per Rule
3.68;

2. "Costs as per private-estopple";

3. removal of negative credit rating information "post haste";

4. costs on a solicitor and his own client basis; and

5. that the" ... STATEMENT OF CLAIM and related materials expunged from public registry ... "

[11] The back of the statement of defence has a Canada two cent postage stamp affixed to the lower right comer, diagonally signed across and dated, apparently by Ms. Rogozinsky.

[12] The same day Ms. Rogozinsky filed a Counterclaim which states:

1. she has been harmed "by public exposure.";

2. the Bank has breached" ... private Estopple of which included infringement of common-law trademark/copyright of Aileen Rogozinksky© or AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™.";

3. "The Plaintiff claims against the DEFENDANT under the terms of irrevocable private, estopple whereunder the DEFENDANT is forever barred from bring any and all claims, legal actions, orders, demands, lawsuits, costs, levies, penalties, damages, interests, liens and expenses whatsoever, against AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™ .";

4. "DEFENDANT put forth any claim without proper, answerable cause of action as private estopple supplants any else previously alleged."

5. that the Bank is liable for "estopple fee schedule/ terms/conditions" and "breach of estopple I breach of trust", in the amount of$6,073,000.00:

a) six million for trademark/copyright infringement, b) $73,000.00 billed for" ... representative time ... ",

c) costs,

d) a restraining order to prevent the Bank or its agents " ... from contacting or pursuing Plaintiff or AILEEN ROGOZINSKY.", and e) that the statement of counterclaim and related materials are "expunged from public registry."

This is the kind of thing that Canadian Courts are facing nowadays. The bank, apparently undaunted by this steaming pile of gibberish (I've done enough scatological references), took out the application for summary judgment.

And of course no Freeman to be can go to court without citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

[19] Ms. Rogozinsky also explains that she:

1. is " ... neither an Alberta resident or non-resident; I am domiciliary, in fact I am domicile here by birth.";

2. does not "accept joinder" between herself, "Aileen-Janet Rogozinksy", and "AILEEN J. ROGOZINSKY ALSO KNOWN AS AILEEN JANET ROGOZINSKY";

3. "According to the "UNIVERAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS" "Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before law"; it is my choice, otherwise it is deemed that I am "held in slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms"; involuntary servitude is illegal."; and

4. believes the Bank and its counsel have committed offences under Criminal Code,
RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 302, 361, 363 and 423

At the hearing the bank stuck to the dry legalese that such institutions use and just claimed that they had proven that the debt existed and that Aileen had contractually bound herself to the terms of the Mastercard contract when she accepted the card. No flair at all.

Aileen, on the other hand, utilized top rate legal representation, at least in her representative's own mind;

[23] Mr. Rogozinsky spoke for Ms. Rogozinsky under Rule 2.23. He explained that he had been educating himself on the law and had mastered much in a short time.

He claimed that the bank action was futile because they had not responded to her offer to pay the alleged debt nor had they provide the "reasonable" request for evidence she had made to confirm the debt existed. This resulted in "tactic procuration", the bank's agreement that no credit card debt existed. The bank's lawsuit against Aileen was therefore a breach of "private estoppel" and should be struck out. If that wasn't sufficient our Leaned Friend had a second arrow in his quiver;

[27] Mr. Rogozinsky gave a second reason why the Bank's action should be dismissed. He had spoken to a Bank of Montreal securities expert who agreed that credit card debts are monetized and then sold on the bond market for multiple of their original value. No money is ever loaned to pay for credit card purchases. The money that had paid for Ms. Rogozinsky's credit card purchases was created by Ms. Rogozinsky' s signature. Money was printed when Ms. Rogozinsky signed the agreement. (I simply note at this point that this argument appears to be entirely circular: if the credit card agreement is unenforceable because it is "monetized", it could never be sold.)

[28] This, Mr. Rogozinsky argued, was fraud. The Bank had never revealed that it provided no funds via the Mastercard. There was, in fact, no contract at all between the Bank and Ms. Rogozinsky because the Mastercard contract had no value, and no consideration has been provided by the Bank. This fraudulent process enriches bankers, and causes inflation:

That note, in my estimation, that the alleged note was bundled securitized and monetized to the bond market to institutionalizations at a multiple of its original value thus giving credence to the idea that there is fraud in fact in here and so as a result of this basic principle and the complexities of that subject ...

The Master spent the next couple of pages reviewing the law of Summary Disposition, the law that allowed him to strike out pleadings before a case is actually heard in court. Essentially the law only allowed him to strike out a claim when it had no legal merit at all. So that is what he did;

[34] It was plain that Ms. Rogozinsky's defence and counterclaim disclosed no issues of merit requiring a trial and had no reasonable prospect of success. On this basis I was able to deal with them summarily, in open court.

Then he gave his analysis. This is the part where the stupidity of Ms, Rogozinsky's tactics were given a full airing. The Master broke her position down into four arguments;

1 - Proof of Contract and Debt

Aileen had demanded that the bank prove she owed the money according to detailed requirements she had provided. The bank gave proof, satisfactory to the Master, that the purported debt existed. The court rejected the argument that the debtor could determine the level of proof of debt required saying;

[ 42] There is no obligation on a creditor to prove a debt in the manner demanded by a debtor. As Justice Powers picturesquely observed in Royal Bank of Canada v Skrapec, 2011 BCSC 1827 at para 51, (appeal quashed as without merit 2012 BCCA 10): The fact that a letter is sent to the bank, registered or otherwise, demanding that the bank prove its claim in a specific way, does not oblige them to do that. He might just as well have asked the bank officers to dress in some specific costume and march down the street, if in fact the debts were owed. It does not mean they are required to do it.

[ 43] In this case the Bank has provided an adequate and uncontested evidentiary basis for its claim. In a summary judgment application, once the Applicant has satisfied its evidentiary burden, the burden then passes to the Respondent to furnish cogent evidence to displace that evidence, or to show that there is plainly arguable merit to their position; neither of which happened here.

2. Monetizing and Securitizing the Credit Card Debt

The Master quashed this argument with brutal efficiency. Aileen had argued that the bank had to provide her with the original version of the contract (referred to as a "promissory note") to confirm that it had not been monetized and securitized. However he considered that irrelevant. The Master said that he had been informed by in-house legal counsel that this exact argument has emerged in litigation in the Republic of Ireland where mortgage holders had claimed they should not have to repay a loan if it had been securitized. He said that Ireland had faced some economic challenges these last six years and was fertile ground for this type of invention by debtors but that this argument was equally invalid both in Canada and the Republic of Ireland

3. "No Value Provided" Money for Nothing Scheme

This is the old chestnut that the bank did not actually lend money. The money was created by Aileen engaging in a purchase. The Master spent almost three pages of the decision on this one citing jurisprudence from New Zealand, Australia, the United States, and Canada refuting this argument. He quoted from a cited case to show how the argument is supposed to work;

[51] J Bloy explains how "no value provided" works (at p 54):

The "no value provided" strategy effectively argues that only physical currency is money. The argument says that when a bank advances funds under a loan it does not actually pay any money: it merely makes book entries or electronically transmits notional amounts to another bank. The funds, therefore, are not lent out of the bank's existing reserves but are created at the time the loan is entered into. The legal effect of this, as contended by pseudolaw litigants, is either that the bank has failed in its duty to provide the loan in "dollars", or that the loan is unsupported by consideration because the bank has not sustained a loss. The practical result is the same: the debtor does not have to repay.

A practitioner may anticipate that this argument is in the wings if he or she receives a request, either by letter or court application, for three sets of documents from the bank, being: (1) validation of the debt (the "actual accounting"): (2) verification of the bank's claim (a sworn affidavit or even just a signed invoice): and (3) a copy of the original loan contract binding both parties. Some of these documents may be requested in "wet ink''. The debtor then informs the bank that he or she will be happy to pay the debt on receipt of those documents. What is intended, but not made explicit at this stage, is that the debtor will later argue no physical currency was advanced and that there is, therefore, no obligation to repay. The debtor may also argue that because the loan shows his or her name in all-capital letters, it does not bind the debtor but only the "person".

He even quoted from our missing in action Mary Croft's seminal work "How I clobbered every bureaucratic cash-confiscatory agency known to man".

All for naught. The Master ends this section with;

[54] Ms. Rogizinsky's 'money for nothing' argument is legally and factually incorrect. It has been tried elsewhere without success. It is an invention by someone who is in dire straits and is plainly without merit.

4. "Private Estoppel"

This is the three-letter/five-letter unilateral contract argument, the belief that you can impose binding contracts on third parties, a belief much promoted by our own Chief Rock Sino General;

viewtopic.php?f=48&t=9377

Remember where, earlier in this posting Aileen had said that she had already paid the debt off? I'll repeat it;

[9] Ms. Rogozinsky filed a statement of defence on August 21, 2014 which denied the alleged debt, and indicated:

I. Ms. Rogozinsky had on August 18, 2014 sought information" ... about fractional reserve banking, GAAP matching principle, securitization, and selling of securitized items .... ";

2. the Bank had no right to sue because it was "offered a cure ... to settle any alleged financial obligation ... ", and the failure of the Bank to respond to these offers to settle meant" ... William Downe was Estoppeled under private terns and conditions with Aileen Rogozinsky by Canada Post registered letters.";

This is how she claimed to have done it. In response to the correspondence from the bank demanding payment on the debt she sent the bank four documents (all reproduced in full in appendixes "A" through "D" to the decision) which "estopped" them from collecting the debt because they did not reply to the letters. The first letter was called a "Conditional Acceptance" which stated;

NON-NEGOTIABLE

©Anton of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Representative for
ANTON ROGOZINSKY™ and all derivatives thereof
©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Representative for
AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™ and all derivatives thereof
c/o 31 Claireview Road
Edmonton, AB.
TSA3X2

Attn: William Downe or current CEO of
BMO Mastercard
1 First Canadian Place
100 King Street West
Toronto, ON MSX IA!
(Disregard registered letter RW777965354CA-should it arrive)

Monday, April 21, 2014
lJ.
Re: Account Number(S): 5191 2300 5055 2448 and 51912301 6833 5850

Dear William Downe,

I would be happy to settle any financial obligation I might lawfully owe, as soon as I have received the following documentation from you:

I. Validation of the debt (the actual accounting-both sides of ledger);
2. Verification of your claim against me (via a sworn affidavit or a hand signed invoice in accordance with The Bills of Exchange Act R.S.C.1985 );
3. A copy of the contract signed by both parties and therefore binding both parties.
4. Please also provide me with a true and certified copy (NOT photocopy) of the Original Note (Credit Agreement), under penalty of perjury and with unlimited liability and confirm that this Note, has never been sold. Please also confirm the name of the individual who is the duly authorized representative from your company, who has carried out due diligence under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and what actions s/he has taken in relation to this account.

I hereby give you ten (10) days to reply to this notice from the above date with a notice sent using recorded post and signed under full commercial liability and penalties of perjury, assuring and promising me that all of the replies and details given to the above requests are true and without deception, fraud or mischief. Your said failure to provide the aforementioned documentation within ten { 10) days, from the above date, to validate the debt, will constitute your agreement to the following terns:

1. That the debt did not exist in the first place;
OR
2. It has already been paid in full;
AND
3. That any damages suffer, you will be held culpable;
4. That any negative remarks made to a credit reference agency will be removed;
5. You will no longer pursue this matter any further.
6. You agree to pay all fee schedules.

Please Note: I wish to deal with this matter in writing and I do not give your organization
permission to contact me by telephone. Should you do so, I must warn you that the calls
could constitute 'harassment' and I may take action under The Business Practices and
Consumer Protection Act.

Yours sincerely,
By:

By: Sovereign ©Anton of the family Rogozinsky
Authorized Agent and Representative for ANTON ROGOZINSKY™
[signature: Anton of the family: Rogozinsky]
By: Sovereign ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky
Authorized Agent and Representative for AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™
[signature: Aileen of the family: Rogozinsky]

No assured value, No liability. Errors & Omissions Excepted. All Rights Reserved.

WITHOUT RECOURSE - NON-ASSUMPSIT

Calls may be recorded

A classic unilateral contract. The second notice was essentially just a repeat of the first which noted that the bank had not met the original ten day deadline and granted them another ten days. The third notice was essentially the same as the second except that it warned;

... if you sell the alleged liability pass it back to your client and/or appoint an agent to act on its/your behalf on this matter you will have broken our agreement and you agree to pay the following fee schedule$ [3 times what they claim] for dishonoring our agreement, $1,000.00 per hour or part of it or Authorized Representatives time nunc pro tune, $1,000.00 per recorded delivery or any other response nunc pro tune and $1,000,000.00 ONE MILLION CANADIAN DOLLARS per unauthorized use of© or TM nunc pro tune any further contact is not now necessary, if however you deem a need to contact me by any method the fee is $100 per item payable in advance, place the cheque in the envelope; if no payment is made in advance the fee will rise to $1000.00 per item and you will also be held culpable for any cost incurred while recovering the debt you owe.

But, yet again, the bank foolishly failed to respond. This led to the final letter, the "Notice of Irrevocable Estoppel by Acquiescence". This bound the bank through "tacit procuration" to all the terms in the previous letters. This irrevocable estoppel even bound the bank from any future actions in respect to the debt;

Notice that failure to provide Proof of Claim by BANK OF MONTREAL, has created a permanent and irrevocable estoppel by acquiescence, forevermore barring BANK OF MONTREAL from bringing any and all claims, legal actions, orders, demands, lawsuits, costs, levies, penalties, damages, interests, liens and expenses whatsoever, against AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™, or ANTON ROGOZINSKY™.

While Mr. Rogozinsky characterized this correspondence as an attempt to compromise and settle the debt the Master disagreed saying that said the bank had no need to compromise on the collection of the debt. They were entitled to it all and the correspondence was not an attempt at compromise but was a unilateral demand which in carried no weight in law. The Master identified the letters as a Meads Foisted unilateral agreement and said;

[64] This group of pseudolegal strategies ignore a simple but critical legal principle: a contract cannot emerge out of silence because silence does not confirm a mutual understanding or "consensus ad idem" between the parties to that agreement: Meads v Meads, paras 458-469. Rather, a binding agreement only occurs if acceptance is communicated: e.g. Felthouse v Bindley (1862), 11 CB (NS) 869, 142 ER 1037 (UK Ex Ch). This is a fundamental principle of contract law: The Law of Contract, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, l5th ed. Oxford, p. 62; The Law of Contracts, 6th ed. Waddams, Canada Law Book; paras 92 and following.

[66] The Bank had no obligation to respond to these documents. There are no legal consequences that flow from that inaction. Silence is neither acceptance, nor agreement. Nor is it an admission of any kind unless it is in response to a Formal Notice to Admit Facts, made in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Bank is not estopped from seeking to enforce and collect any outstanding debt.

The Master went into considerable detail in paragraphs 68 to 73 reviewing the jurisprudence on the Three/Five letter schemes and explaining the variance used by practitioners. He also had unkind words in respect to the claim of "tacit procuration" resulting from the lack of response to the letters;

[67] Mr. Rogozinsky said that the Bank's silence was agreement by "tacit procuration". This phrase appears many times in the documents Ms. Rogozinsky filed with the Court. There is no such legal concept in Canadian law - it is an imaginary, made-up term. In fact, the only occasions where that phrase ever appears in any reported Canadian judgment is in a document or argument that was rejected as an OPCA foisted unilateral agreement scheme: Whitfield v Chrysler Credit Canada Ltd., at paras 5, 10-11; Williams v Johnston, [2008] OJ No 4853, 2008 Carswell (Ont) 7115 at para 3, 2008 CanLII 63194 (Ont SC), affirmed 2009 ONCA 335, 176 ACWS (3d) 609, leave refused [2009] SCCA No 266; Herbison v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 BCSC 2020 at para 39, 2013 Carswell BC 3390, affirmed 2014 BCCA 461; R v Gerlitz, 2014 ABQB 247 at para 12.

After beating Aileen's arguments to death the Master granted judgement in favour of the bank.

But wait, there's more! The master didn't stop there! He also explained why he struck out Aileen's counterclaim. This covered her Notice of Default Fee Schedule in her Notice of Irrevocable Estoppel by Acquiescence where she demanded;

1. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per invalid claim in writing, nunc pro tunc,

2. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per letter and/or notice sent by recorded mail, nunc pro tunc,

3. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per hour or portion thereof, of the Authorized Representative,

4. Representative's time, nunc pro tunc,

5. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per attempt to contact
by telephone and/or mobile phone

6. $1,000,000 (ONE MILLION CANADIAN DOLLARS) per Authorized© or TM
infringement.

The Master just blew that off with the comment that any claims based on the fee schedules were illegal and should be struck out as being frivolous, and vexatious.

And, after all this, we arrive back where we started, at the copyrighting of bodily secretions. If you thought I wasn't going there; think again. The Common Law Copyright Notice was the last significant point reviewed by the Master. This notice is included as Appendix E. Aileen sent it to the bank and her $6,000,000 counterclaim seems to have been based on the bank naming her six times in various documents including their statement of claim.

The Master had some words about Ceylon and GOODF regarding the migration of their idiocy into Canada;

[71] The Three Letters variation usually omits the 'second dishonour notice' and 'the judgment'. In this instance the Three/Five Letters scheme used by the Rogozinskys omits 'the judgment' document, but otherwise conforms to the usual Five Letters pattern.

[72] Bloy in his paper identified one particular OPCA material commercial source that markets this scheme: the website "Get Out Of Debt Free" (http://www.getoutofdebtfree.org/), which is operated by guru Mark "Ceylon" Laining. The template documents offered by this UK based OPCA scam match those used by the Rogozinskys. It seems likely that this website and its guru are the source for Mr. Rogozinsky's legal information.

The Master also commented on the overreaching extent of the copyright claim;

[82] However, the "Common law Copyright Notice" does not merely stop with Ms. Rogozinsky's name, but also extends to her biological and physical properties (para 5) and" ... absolute control and mastery over the peaceful possession of [his or her] body, mind and mental facilities ... ", which, the bank is apparently interfering with by asking that the debt be repaid.

After a ramble through the extensive precedence hostile to these "bizarre, inexplicable" "nonsensical" claims the Master concluded that the alleged breach of copyright through the use of Aileen's name was frivolous. Her attempts to enforce them were without merit and had no prospect of success.

This leads us to costs. To add the final insult to the injuries sustained by our hapless heroine the Master imposed enhanced costs against her on a solicitor-client basis rather than the normal party and party costs because this had been agreed to in the Mastercard agreement that Aileen spurned as being fraudulent. However I don't doubt, in the absence of enhanced costs in the Mastercard agreement, that the Master would have imposed solicitor-client anyhow. He ended with a warning;

[93] My last observation is to simply stress to Mr. and Ms. Rogozinsky that their use of pseudolegal concepts has not and will not provide them any benefit. OPCA strategies are instead a potential basis for unfavourable cost orders, such as indemnity costs in favour of the bank, vexatious litigation and litigant declarations, and findings of criminal or contemptuous misconduct: Meads v Meads, Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114. It would not be difficult to imagine legal costs in a case such as this exceeding the face value of the original debt plus interest.

Although I doubt the Rogozinskys will heed it.

Aileen can appeal this decision to the Queen's Bench but I wouldn't anticipate it receiving a warm welcome. This is the court that unleashed Meads v. Meads on Canadian Freemen and the Master based his decision largely on the precedents set by Meads. They are not going to abandon their favorite child for the likes of a debt deadbeat like Aileen.

[KickahaOta]

All for naught. The Master ends this section with;

[54] Ms. Rogizinsky's 'money for nothing' argument is legally and factually incorrect. It has been tried elsewhere without success. It is an invention by someone who is in dire straits and is plainly without merit.

I applaud all of the Master's private investigations in this opinion; but the choice of words in this particular section makes me cry tears of joy... the water of love.

Tax deniers, this court will never fall for your latest trick.

[LightinDarkness]

Ah yet (another) GOODF failures. I occasionally browse their A4V/Promissory note forums and its hilarious. No matter how many notices these people get that the whole "accepted for value" thing is a scam - EVEN WHEN THE COMPANY TELLS THEM THAT DIRECTLY - they keep on at it all the way until they lose in court.

And then when they lose in court its because the judge is corrupt, NEVER because the entire GOODF site is based on a myth.

[LordEd]

The user 'eveyisfree' on GOODF may be our canlii candidate. Some of the letter dates are very similar when searching.

http://www.getoutofdebtfree.org/forum/v ... JdLXf8IJ0Q

[Burnaby49]

The user 'eveyisfree' on GOODF may be our canlii candidate. Some of the letter dates are very similar when searching.

http://www.getoutofdebtfree.org/forum/v ... JdLXf8IJ0Q

While the Bank of Montreal is involved in both cases I don't think it is the same person. Eveyisfree said in his/her first post that the notices of estoppel were sent in June and July 2013 however Rogozinsky sent hers in April to June 2014. The bank's letter of response to eveyisfree said;

Please not (sic) that your BMO Mastercard Agreement is still in force and that you are bound by contractual obligations. Therefore, you still owe BMO as of today arrears for an amount of 526.00 on which monthly interests will be added. The total amount of your indebtedness is now $11,265.98 as of this date, with an amount of 1,260.35 over your credit limit.

However Rogozinsky's BMO debt at issue for the Summary Judgment was $27,064. Given the bank's negative response to eveyisfree's estoppel letters I can't see them lending an additional $16,000 or so between mid 2013 and mid 2014.

Additionally Rogozinsky claimed at the hearing that she received no response to her letters. I assume that, had she received the response that eveyisfree copied on the GOODF website, she would have entered it in court to show that the bank had refused to meet the terms of her Conditional Acceptance letter.

[grixit]

All for naught. The Master ends this section with;

[54] Ms. Rogizinsky's 'money for nothing' argument is legally and factually incorrect. It has been tried elsewhere without success. It is an invention by someone who is in dire straits and is plainly without merit.

I applaud all of the Master's private investigations in this opinion; but the choice of words in this particular section makes me cry tears of joy... the water of love.

Tax deniers, this court will never fall for your latest trick.

Yeah, she thought she could skateaway, but, like her brothers in arms before her, she's going to fade to black, another victim of the sovereign industrial disease.

[Dr. Caligari]

"Aileen-Janet Rogozinksy", and "AILEEN J. ROGOZINSKY ALSO KNOWN AS AILEEN JANET ROGOZINSKY";

Also know as "Ass: of the family Hole."

[LordEd]

Hm, a swing and a miss on my part. I had only keyed on a single similar date and a matching signing name.

I'll leave the investigation to the pros.

[Fmotlgroupie]

What I love about this decision is how widely it cites international decisions, and how many of them in turn had cited Meads v Meads- the Alberta Court of Queens Bench is getting positively cosmopolitan!

[fortinbras]

Arguably, a person's fingerprints, DNA, etc., were not invented by him, nor did he register a copyright concurrent with the first public manifestation of those features. Therefore these personal features are not copyrightable.

On the other hand, a person's excreta might be copyrightable - as to configuration, shape, etc. I base this on a very early copyright decision involving a photo of Oscar Wilde which held, that altho anyone could photograph Wilde on other occasions, the precise angle of light, the effect of the breeze, the subject's expression and pose, the draping of his clothes, etc., was unique and either fortuitous or deliberately chosen by the photographer and therefore the specific photo could be copyrighted. So Aileen's poop could get a copyright - although I would really not want to be the Copyright Office employee who gets the application in his IN box.

On the other hand, unlike patents, copyright does not protect against independent, fortuitous production of similar material. Meaning that anyone (everyone) could poop with results exactly like Aileen's copyrighted specimen and, since they were not deliberately copying her (there would need to be some evidence that they were already aware of the details of her specimen) there is no legal issue.

[Burnaby49]

I don't think Aileen thought it out that deeply. Like Carol Volk, another copyright enthusiast, she doesn't seem too bright.

[notorial dissent]

Even on the cockamamie assumption that they could copyright/trademark the things in question, it still wouldn't escape the fair use exception(s), which I am sure law enforcement verification and identification purposes would come under, or could be made to by law.

[Burnaby49]

http://stewartmckelveyblogs.com/themedi ... w-Original