TP Fails To Show To Defend His Gibberish

[The Observer]

PETER H. JONES,
Petitioner
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent


PETER HENRY JONES,
Petitioner
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent

Release Date: MAY 27, 2014

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

Docket Nos. 29579-09, 23503-10. 1

Filed May 27, 2014

P failed to file tax returns for the 1999 through
2007 tax years. R prepared substitutes for returns
under I.R.C. sec. 6020(b) for those years and determined
deficiencies in income tax and additions to tax under
I.R.C. secs. 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654. P raised
only frivolous arguments in his pleadings and failed
to appear when these cases were called for trial.

[*2] Held: P's liability for deficiencies and
additions to tax for all years is established by
P's default, deemed admissions, and facts deemed
stipulated.

Held, further, R's motion for penalties under
I.R.C. sec. 6673 will be granted.

Peter H. Jones, pro se.

Lisa M. Goldberg, Subin Seth, and Andrew Michael Tiktin, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HALPERN, Judge: By notices of deficiency (notices), respondent determined deficiencies in, and additions to, petitioner's Federal income tax as follows: 2

[*3]

Additions to tax
________________________________________________

Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec.
Year Deficiency 6651(a)(1) 6651(a)(2)/1/ 6651(f) 6654
______________________________________________________________________________

1999 $ 47,563 $ 10,702 $ 11,891 -- $ 2,284
2000 53,225 11,976 13,306 -- 2,863
2001 50,622 11,390 12,656 -- 2,023
2002 92,175 20,739 23,044 -- 3,080
2003 62,982 14,171 15,746 -- 1,625
2004 162,597 36,584 40,649 -- 4,660
2005 100,033 22,507 20,507 -- 4,013
2006 115,297 -- 23,059 $ 83,590 5,456
2007 12,455 -- 1,744 9,030 567
______________________________________________________________________________

/1/ or fraction thereof, of nonpayment, not exceeding 25 percent."

In response to the notices, petitioner filed petitions in which he failed to explain his disagreement with respondent's determinations beyond reciting tax-protester rhetoric such as his "conclusion that the paying of Federal income taxes was voluntary for the vast majority of most of the people in the United States". In his answers to the petitions, respondent for the most part denied petitioner's allegations. In his answer to the petition in docket No. 29579-09, respondent added to his determination that petitioner must pay additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) on account of his failure to file returns by asserting that petitioner must pay increased additions under section 6651(f) on account of his fraudulent failure to file returns. Respondent asserts that petitioner must pay section 6651(f) [*4] additions of $ 35,672, $ 39,919, $ 37,967, $ 69,131, $ 47,237, $ 121,948, and $ 75,025, for the tax years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively. If we do not find that petitioner is liable for those increased additions, then, in the alternative, respondent relies on the section 6651(a)(1) additions to tax that he previously determined.

We set these cases for trial during a trial session of the Court that commenced on January 30, 2012, in Courtroom 1524, Federal Building, 51 S.W. 1st Avenue, Miami, Florida. The cases were specially set to be called at 9:30 a.m. on January 31, 2012, and were on that date and at that time so called. Petitioner failed to appear. Respondent moved that, on account of his failure to appear at trial and on account of his failure to cooperate with respondent in preparing these cases for trial, petitioner be held in default and decisions be entered against him with respect to the deficiencies in and additions to tax for all years. 3 Respondent also moved the Court to impose on petitioner a section 6673(a)(1) penalty with respect to each case because petitioner's positions in these proceedings are [*5] frivolous and these proceedings have been instituted and maintained by petitioner primarily for delay.

For the reasons that follow, we will grant the motions, sustain the deficiencies and additions to tax, and impose penalties.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner resided in Marathon, Florida, at the time he filed the petition in docket No. 29579-09 and in Burlington, Ontario, Canada, at the time he filed the petition in docket No. 23503-10.

Respondent filed timely answers to both petitions. In each answer, respondent denied petitioner's allegations of error with respect to the deficiencies and set forth specific allegations in support of the additions to tax for fraudulent failure to file.

In paragraph 7 of his answer in docket No. 29579-09, respondent makes the following allegations in support of his determination that petitioner is liable for the fraudulent failure to file penalty for 1999 through 2005:

a. Petitioner has over 30 years of experience in
the construction industry and possesses a degree
from the Air Force College.

b. Petitioner was president of Peter Jones Contracting
Inc., which rendered contracting services, during
the taxable years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
and 2005.

[*6] c. Petitioner failed to maintain, or to
submit for examination by respondent, complete and
adequate books and accounts of his income producing
activities for each of the taxable years 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, as required by
the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
For example, petitioner failed to provide any records
pertaining to his income, including his bank statements,
deposited items, and cancelled checks.

d. During the taxable year 1999, petitioner received
the following checks resulting from his business
activities 1999:

Date on check Payor Amount
_______________________________________________________________________

Jan. 28, 1999 PBM Development, Inc. $ 5,250

Feb. 1, 1999 PBM Development, Inc. 5,250

May 28, 1999 Steve Daniels, Inc. 3,000

Sept. 28, 1999 Ocean Harbour Condominium 5,000
Assoc. Inc.

Oct. 8, 1999 Ocean Harbour Condominium 6,000
Assoc., Inc.

Nov. 29, 1999 Jimmy and Rhonda Johnson 5,000

Total 29,500

These checks constitute taxable income to petitioner for the taxable year 1999.

e. During the taxable year 2000, petitioner received
the following checks resulting from his business
activities:

[*7]

Date on check Payor Amount
_______________________________________________________________________

June 6, 2000 New Edition Contracting $ 4,400
& Remodeling, Inc.

Aug. 18, 2000 City of Key West 18,924

Oct. 10, 2000 Thomas J. Dowdell III 18,500

Total 41,824

These checks constitute taxable income to petitioner for the taxable year 2000.

f. During the taxable year 2002, petitioner received
the following check resulting from his business:

Date on check Payor Amount
_______________________________________________________________________

April 3, 2002 City of Key West $ 75,000

This check constitutes taxable income to petitioner for the taxable year 2002.

g. Petitioner owned two seats on the New York Mercantile
Exchange during the taxable years 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. Petitioner, to conceal
his ownership in these two seats, transferred the
two seats to Thomas Hansen as a nominee. Thomas Hansen
then rented one of the seats to John Losordo. Thomas
Hansen and Jon [sic] Losordo made rental payments
to MBF Clearing Corporation, which MBF Clearing Corporation
then remitted to petitioner. In this way, petitioner
received rental income in the amounts of $ 132,000,
$ 132,000, $ 184,000, $ 204,500, $ 234,000, $ 349,000,
and $ 341,000, during the taxable years 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively.

h. Petitioner repeatedly refused to provide MBF Clearing
Corporation with his social security number to prevent
MBF Clearing [*8] Corporation from filing Forms
1099 with respondent reflecting petitioner's rental
income from his two seats on the New York Mercantile
Exchange.

i. During the taxable year 2004, petitioner sold
real property located at 275 West Sea view Drive
in Marathon, Florida for a sales price of $ 464,500.
Petitioner previously paid $ 69,000 for this real
property, resulting in [a] taxable gain in the
amount of $ 395,500 upon his sale of this property
during the taxable year 2004.

j. Petitioner received taxable social security benefits
in the amounts of $ 5,462 and $ 5,610 during the
taxable years 2004 and 2005, respectively.

k. During the examination, petitioner asserted meritless
positions that he is not a "taxpayer" for federal
tax purposes, including (1) he has not been presented
with any evidence that he is a domiciliary, citizen
or resident of, and is not engaged in a taxable activity
in or received income in, Puerto Rico, Guam, the
Virgin Islands, or any other location in the Caribbean
Basin, (2) he has not been served with a notice to
file tax returns or to keep books and records for
the years in question, and (3) he was not involved
in any taxable activity with alcohol, tobacco, firearms,
foreign trusts, or foreign earned income for the
years in question.

l. Petitioner's failure to maintain complete and
accurate records of his income-producing activities
and his failure to produce complete and accurate
records to respondent in connection with the examination
of his taxable years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
2004, and 2005 was fraudulent with intent to evade
tax.

m. Petitioner's fraudulent failure to file income
tax returns for the taxable 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, and 2005 is part of a pattern of intent
to evade taxes.

n. Petitioner had taxable income in the amounts of
$ 153,136.00, $ 164,621, $ 177,768, $ 269,501,
$ 228,518, $ 745,112, [*9] and $ 341,610 for
the taxable years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
and 2005, respectively.

o. As a result of petitioner's fraudulent failure
to file income tax returns for 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, he is liable for additions
to tax under sec. 6651(f) of $ 35,672, $ 39,919,
$ 37,967, $ 69,131, $ 47,237, $ 121,948, and
$ 75,025, respectively.

In paragraph 8 of his answer in docket No. 23503-10, respondent made the following allegations in support of his fraudulent failure to file determination for 2006 and 2007:

(a) Petitioner has over 30 years of experience in
the construction industry and possesses a degree
from the Air Force College.

(b) Petitioner failed to maintain, or submit for
examination by respondent, complete and adequate
books and records for the taxable years 2006 and
2007, as required by the applicable provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code and the regulations promulgated
thereunder. For example, petitioner failed to provide
any records pertaining to his income, including his
bank statements, deposited items, and cancelled checks.

(c) During the taxable year 2006, petitioner received
checks related to his business activities from Robert
or Laura Welliver in the amounts of $ 10,000, $ 20,000,
and $ 38,000. These amounts constitute taxable income
to petitioner for the taxable year 2006.

(d) During the taxable years 2006 and 2007, petitioner
had unexplained bank deposits, in addition to the
amounts described in the preceding paragraph, in
the amounts of $ 71,226 and $ 48,350, respectively.
These amounts constitute taxable income to petitioner
for the taxable years 2006 and 2007.

[*10] (e) Petitioner owned two seats on the New
York Mercantile Exchange during the taxable years
2006 and 2007. Petitioner, to conceal his ownership
in these two seats, transferred the two seats to
Thomas Hansen as a nominee. Thomas Hansen then rented
out one of the seats to John Losordo. Thomas Hansen
and John Losordo made rental payments to MBF Clearing
Corporation, and MBF Clearing Corporation then remitted
those payments to petitioner. Petitioner received
rental income in this manner in the amounts of $ 225,500
and $ 18,500 during the taxable years 2006 and 2007,
respectively.

(f) Petitioner repeatedly refused to provide MBF
Clearing Corporation with his social security number
to prevent MBF Clearing Corporation from filing Forms
1099 with respondent reflecting petitioner's rental
income from his two seats on the New York Mercantile
Exchange.

(g) Petitioner received taxable social security benefits
in the amounts of $ 5,838 and $ 6,037 during the
taxable years 2006 and 2007, respectively.

(h) During the examination and in his petition, petitioner
has asserted meritless positions, including that
he is not subject to Federal income taxes, and that
the paying of Federal income taxes is voluntary,
except for those working for the Federal government
or Federal agencies, those in the U.S. military,
and those domiciled in the District of Columbia,
the Federal territories or possessions, or their
forts and enclaves.

(i) Petitioner's failure to maintain complete and
accurate records of his income-producing activities
and his failure to produce complete and accurate
records to respondent in connection with the examination
of the taxable years 2006 and 2007 was fraudulent
with intent to evade tax.

[*11] (j) Petitioner's failure to file income
tax returns for the taxable years 2006 and 2007 is
part of a longstanding pattern of intent to evade
taxes.

(k) Petitioner also failed to maintain complete and
accurate books and records and file income tax returns
for the taxable years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
2004, and 2005, during which time he had taxable
income of $ 153,136, $ 164,621, $ 177,768, $ 269,501,
$ 228,518, $ 745,112, and $ 341,610, respectively,
further evidencing a longstanding pattern of intent
to evade taxes.

(l) Petitioner had taxable income in the amounts
of $ 359,510 and $ 64,137 for the taxable years
2006 and 2007, respectively.

(m) As a result of petitioner's fraudulent failure
to file income tax returns for the taxable years
2006 and 2007, he is liable for additions to tax
under I.R.C. section 6651(f) of $ 83,590 and $ 9,030,
respectively.

As stated, we set these cases for trial in Miami, Florida, on January 31, 2012, at 9:30 a.m. When the cases were called, petitioner failed to appear in person or by counsel. Respondent made the motions. We ordered petitioner to show cause why respondent's motions should not be granted. Petitioner filed a response and a supplement to response, in both of which he advanced only frivolous and meritless claims.

[*12] DISCUSSION

I. Motion To Dismiss for Default

A. Introduction

In pertinent part, Rule 123(a) provides:

Default: If any party has failed to plead or otherwise
proceed as provided by these Rules or as required
by the Court, then such party may be held in default
by the Court either on motion of another party or
on the initiative of the Court. Thereafter, the Court
may enter a decision against the defaulting party,
upon such terms and conditions as the Court may deem
proper * * *

A party may be held in default when he fails to appear for trial. E.g., Ritchie v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 126, 128-129 (1979); Tucker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-309, at *8. The default has the effect of admitting or establishing all well-pleaded facts in the Commissioner's answer. See Bosurgi v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1403, 1409 (1986); Gross v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-218, 2008 WL 4366066, at *5. And those well-pleaded facts may support entry of decision against the taxpayer. See Smith v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1049, 1056-1057 (1988), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1991). Default may lead to entry of a decision including a penalty or an addition to tax for fraud. See id. at 1060.

Respondent argues that petitioner's failure to appear when these cases were called for trial on January 31, 2012, constitutes a default and that it is appropriate for the Court to enter decisions against him upholding the determined deficiencies [*13] and additions to tax. 4 Respondent relies on admissions and deemed stipulations to establish certain facts not averred in his answers.

We hold petitioner in default. He has failed to comply with the Rules of the Court. He has not cooperated in the preparation of these cases for trial, he has failed to comply with Court orders, and he did not appear for trial. His responses are filled with tax-protester rhetoric. Such conduct provides ample basis for holding him in default. See, e.g., id. We shall address separately the deficiencies and additions to tax.

B. Deficiencies in Tax

Petitioner admits that he did not file Federal income tax returns for 1999 through 2007. He had taxable income of $ 153,136, $ 164,621, $ 177,768, $ 269,501, $ 228,518, $ 745,112, $ 341,610, $ 359,510, and $ 64,137 for those years, [*14] respectively, resulting in deficiencies in the amount respondent determined for each year. We will sustain respondent's determinations of deficiencies in tax.

C. Addition to Tax for Fraudulent Failure To File Return

Section 6651(f) imposes an addition to tax of up to 75% of the amount of tax required to be shown on the return where the failure to file a Federal income tax return is due to fraud. "[R]espondent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner underpaid his income tax and that some part of the underpayment was due to fraud." Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 646 (1994). There is no question that petitioner's failure to file a return for each of the years in issue resulted in underpayments for each year. To establish fraudulent intent, the Commissioner must prove that a taxpayer intended to evade a tax known or believed to be owed by conduct intended to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent the collection of tax. See, e.g., DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 874 (1991), aff'd, 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992); Mohamed v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-255, at *20; Akland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-249, 1983 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 536, at *45, aff'd, 767 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1985). Not only do respondent's averments show such intent, but petitioner is deemed to have admitted that his failure to file returns for the years in issue "was not due to mistake" and "was due to * * * [his] fraudulent intent to evade taxes". We have [*15] adequate grounds on which to sustain respondent's section 6651(f) additions to tax for all years in issue.

D. Addition to Tax for Failure To Pay Tax

Section 6651(a)(2) provides for an addition to tax when a taxpayer fails to pay timely the tax shown on a return, unless the taxpayer proves that the failure was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. A substitute for return prepared by the Commissioner pursuant to section 6020(b) is treated as the "return" filed by the taxpayer for purposes of section 6651(a)(2). See sec. 6651(g). For each month or fraction thereof for which a failure to pay continues, section 6651(a)(2) adds 0.5% of the tax required to be shown on such return, up to a maximum addition of 25%. The substitutes for returns respondent prepared for the years in issue show tax due for each year, and petitioner has not made any payments toward those liabilities. We will sustain respondent's section 6651(a)(2) additions to tax for all years in issue.

E. Addition to Tax for Failure To Pay Estimated Income Tax

Section 6654(a) and (b) provides for an addition to tax in the event of an individual's underpayment of a required installment of individual estimated tax. Each required installment is equal to 25% of the "required annual payment", which, in turn, is generally equal to the lesser of (1) 90% of the tax shown on the [*16] individual's return for that year or, if no return is filed, 90% of his or her tax for such year, or (2) if the individual filed a return for the immediately preceding year, 100% of the tax shown on that return. Sec. 6654(d)(1)(A) and (B). The due dates of the required installments for a calendar taxable year are April 15, June 15, and September 15 of that year and January 15 of the following year. Sec. 6654(c)(2). For purposes of section 6654, an individual's tax consists of income and self-employment tax determined before the application of any wage withholding credits which, under section 6654(g)(1), are treated as payment of estimated tax. See sec. 6654(f). Section 6654(e) provides for certain specified exceptions to the applicability of section 6654, none of which is applicable to petitioner.

Because petitioner did not file a return for any year in issue, nor for 1998, his "required annual payment" for each year was 90% of the tax owed for that year. See sec. 6654(d)(1)(B)(i). Respondent's records show that petitioner did not make any estimated tax payments during any of the years in issue. Therefore, we sustain respondent's determination of a section 6654 addition to tax for each year.

II. Motion for Penalties Under Section 6673(a)(1)

Respondent asks that we impose a penalty against petitioner under section 6673(a)(1) with respect to each docket. Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court to [*17] require a taxpayer to pay the United States a penalty in an amount not to exceed $ 25,000 whenever it appears to the Court that a proceeding before it was instituted or maintained primarily for delay, sec. 6673(a)(1)(A), or that the taxpayer's position in the proceeding is frivolous or groundless, sec. 6673(a)(1)(B). We see no reason for these cases other than delay. Moreover, petitioner's cases are groundless, and his arguments are frivolous. Among his frivolous arguments, petitioner claims that he is not subject to Federal income tax, that the only persons required to pay Federal income tax are those people working directly for the Federal Government or the U.S. military, and that the Internal Revenue Code does not establish any liability for the payment of Federal income tax. A position maintained by a taxpayer is frivolous where it is "contrary to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law." Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986). Petitioner failed to report substantial amounts of income for nine years and has offered no plausible argument that he is not subject to Federal income tax. Rather, he relies on tax-protester rhetoric that has been universally rejected by this and other courts. See, e.g., Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 136, 138-139 (2000).

[*18] By initiating these groundless proceedings, petitioner has wasted the Court's and respondent's limited resources and deserves a substantial penalty. We will, therefore, require petitioner to pay a penalty under section 6673(a)(1) of $ 25,000 in each of these consolidated cases.

To reflect the foregoing,

Appropriate orders will be issued, and decisions will be entered under Rule 155.

FOOTNOTES:

/1/ Petitioner filed the petition with respect to 1999 through 2005 at docket No. 29579-09 in the name of Peter H. Jones and the petition with respect to 2006 and 2007 at docket No. 23503-10 in the name of Peter Henry Jones. The cases were consolidated on April 15, 2011.

/2/ Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All dollar amounts have been rounded to the nearest dollar.

/3/ In that motion, respondent asks that we find sec. 6651(f) additions to tax of $ 34,483, $ 38,588, $ 36,701, $ 66,827, $ 45,662, $ 117,883, and $ 72,524, for the tax years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively. Those amounts are less than the amounts respondent asserted in his answer in docket No. 29579-09. We shall assume that respondent concedes the differences as a reduction in the additions.

/4/ At least with respect to the deficiencies in tax that he determined, respondent states that dismissal of petitioner's cases pursuant to Rule 123(b) on account of his failure to properly prosecute would reach the same result that would be reached if we hold him in default under Rule 123(a). That is true. We have said: "A Rule 123(b) dismissal, as a sanction against petitioner, is available as to those issues for which petitioner bears the burden of proof. A Rule 123(a) default would be the proper sanction against petitioner as to those issues for which respondent bears the burden of proof." Lopez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-93, 2001 WL 388758, at *4 (citing Smith v. Commissioner, 926 F.2d 1470, 1476 (6th Cir. 1991), aff'g 91 T.C. 1049 (1988)). Petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to the determined deficiencies. See Rule 142(a). Nevertheless, respondent has moved that we hold petitioner in default and dismiss under Rule 123(a), and we will do so.

[LaVidaRoja]

But he "won" $50,000 in frivolous penalties! I don't believe I've ever seen the Court assert that large a penalty on someone who doesn't have a prior record of frivolous filings. Do we have a record here?

[LPC]

To me, footnote 4 was the most interesting part of the decision.

/4/ At least with respect to the deficiencies in tax that he determined, respondent states that dismissal of petitioner's cases pursuant to Rule 123(b) on account of his failure to properly prosecute would reach the same result that would be reached if we hold him in default under Rule 123(a). That is true. We have said: "A Rule 123(b) dismissal, as a sanction against petitioner, is available as to those issues for which petitioner bears the burden of proof. A Rule 123(a) default would be the proper sanction against petitioner as to those issues for which respondent bears the burden of proof." Lopez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-93, 2001 WL 388758, at *4 (citing Smith v. Commissioner, 926 F.2d 1470, 1476 (6th Cir. 1991), aff'g 91 T.C. 1049 (1988)). Petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to the determined deficiencies. See Rule 142(a). Nevertheless, respondent has moved that we hold petitioner in default and dismiss under Rule 123(a), and we will do so.

We've previously discussed the question of whether a "dismissal" is a decision on the merits (don't ask me for links to threads), and this footnote directly addresses that issue.

[operabuff]

Actually, this footnote addresses the difference between a default under rule 123(a) and a dismissal under rule 123(b), not whether either is a decision on the merits. Judge Halperin's explanation is consistent with my understanding, namely that a dismissal decides only those issues on which the petitioner bears the burden of proof, whereas a default will resolve those issues on which the government bears the burden of proof as well.

Historically, this has been important mostly in civil fraud penalty cases, where the government must establish fraud by clear and convincing evidence. In those cases, the government needs to establish a default by petitioner to get the penalty. Otherwise, it must present evidence sufficient to establish fraud, even in the absence of the petitioner.

Rule 123(d) is unambiguous about whether dismissals and defaults are decisions on the merits: "A decision rendered upon a default or in consequence of a dismissal, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, shall operate as an adjudication on the merits."

[notorial dissent]

Sounds like this guy could either be a CTC or at least CTC influenced fool as well.

[Jameson3171]

In response to the notices, petitioner filed petitions in which he failed to explain his disagreement with respondent's determinations beyond reciting tax-protester rhetoric such as his "conclusion that the paying of Federal income taxes was voluntary for the vast majority of most of the people in the United States"

Obviously he was going to faill to explain his disagreement. It is so hard to prove that it is voluntarily. You have to present physical evidence that is specifically and clearly supports your argument.

[Famspear]

In response to the notices, petitioner filed petitions in which he failed to explain his disagreement with respondent's determinations beyond reciting tax-protester rhetoric such as his "conclusion that the paying of Federal income taxes was voluntary for the vast majority of most of the people in the United States"

Obviously he was going to faill to explain his disagreement. It is so hard to prove that it is voluntarily. You have to present physical evidence that is specifically and clearly supports your argument.

No, you don't have to present "physical evidence."

Again, the question of "whether the paying of Federal income taxes is voluntary" is a question of law, not a question of fact. So, you cannot answer that question by presenting "evidence" - physical or non-physical. You prevail on a question of law by presenting arguments about what the law is, not "evidence" in the strict sense.

[wserra]

Obviously he was going to faill [sic] to explain his disagreement. It is so hard to prove that it is voluntarily [sic]. You have to present physical evidence that is [sic] specifically and clearly supports [sic] your argument.

Why are we arguing with half of Dumb and Dumber?

[Famspear]

Obviously he was going to faill [sic] to explain his disagreement. It is so hard to prove that it is voluntarily [sic]. You have to present physical evidence that is [sic] specifically and clearly supports [sic] your argument.

Why are we arguing with half of Dumb and Dumber?

OK, OK, he's not the brightest bulb on the Christmas tree. But the pickings have been pretty slim lately.

[Judge Roy Bean]

... It is so hard to prove that it is voluntarily. You have to present physical evidence that is specifically and clearly supports your argument.

It's even harder when you're grammatically challenged.

[Jeffrey]

CTC influenced

How many CTC'ers own seats on the NYMEX.

[LPC]

Obviously he was going to faill [sic] to explain his disagreement. It is so hard to prove that it is voluntarily [sic]. You have to present physical evidence that is [sic] specifically and clearly supports [sic] your argument.

Why are we arguing with half of Dumb and Dumber?

Yeah, but which half?

[nattyb]

Obviously he was going to faill to explain his disagreement. It is so hard to prove that it is voluntarily. You have to present physical evidence that is specifically and clearly supports your argument.

jameson, you are an arrogant twit. Jones is you in the near future. If you honestly believe that you can do a better job than Jones did, you are truly delusional and need mental help. I sincerely hope that you do not have family to support because you will take them down with you.

[Famspear]

Obviously he was going to faill [sic] to explain his disagreement. It is so hard to prove that it is voluntarily [sic]. You have to present physical evidence that is [sic] specifically and clearly supports [sic] your argument.

For the Umpteen Gazillionth time:

When tax protesters argue that there is no legal obligation to file federal income tax returns or pay federal income tax based on the use of the word "voluntary" in some court decisions and other publications, the protesters are engaging in a fallacy sometimes called "whole word equivocation." Essentially, the government is using the word "voluntary" in one sense and the tax protesters are using the word "voluntary" in another sense and at the same time falsely claiming that the government is using the term the way the tax protesters are using it.

The tax protesters are arguing that the government is using the term "voluntary" as an adjective to mean: "acting or done of one's own free will without valuable consideration or legal obligation" (per Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 1312, G. & C. Merriam Co. (8th ed. 1976)) or "Acting or performed without external persuasion or compulsion" (The American Heritage Dictionary, p. 1355, Houghton Mifflin Co. (2nd ed. 1985)), or "Without legal obligation...." The American Heritage Dictionary, p. 1355, Houghton Mifflin Co. (2nd ed. 1985).

But that's not what the government means by "voluntary" in this situation.

Instead, the government is using the term in the sense of "proceeding from the will or from one's own choice or consent" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 1312, G. & C. Merriam Co. (8th ed. 1976)) or "done by design or intention" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 1312, G. & C. Merriam Co. (8th ed. 1976)) or "Acting one one's own initiative" (The American Heritage Dictionary, p. 1355, Houghton Mifflin Co. (2nd ed. 1985)).

Clearly, a person can consent to do something which he is also legally obligated to do. The term "voluntary" in the context of filing a federal income tax return and paying the tax means that the individual consents to doing what he is legally obligated to do: To file his tax return by the due date and to pay his tax by the due date. As one commentator has pointed out, this is consent in the same sense that many (but not all) motorists voluntarily drive within posted speed limits and voluntarily stop where a stop sign is posted -- even when there is no other traffic nearby, and even when no policeman is nearby.

Jamey, just as you and countless other tax protesters have done with the word "direct" (as in "direct tax"), you are equivocating over the word "voluntary."

Doing that will get you nowhere with the tax collectors.

[The Observer]

Doing that will get you nowhere with the tax collectors.

Sure it will. The tax collectors will just voluntarily separate his income and/or assets from him.

[notorial dissent]

Our troll du jour seems to be another member of the school of those who think words can out have one and only one meaning. I also think he has a real problem with the big words he keeps running in to. His lack of reading comprehension shows here as well as in that he can't seem to parse long wordy Supreme Court decisions.