Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier, 2015 ABQB 703
http://canlii.ca/t/glzx5
Adam is yet another individual trying OPCA bullshit to weasel out of paying his mortgage. He got a $15,950 second mortgage with Crossroads in August 2012 and defaulted. Crossroads responded with this;
Gauthier chose to appear at several application hearings without bothering to file anything in his defense. Finally he was given until October 13, 2015 to provide to the Masters’ Office with any pleadings and arguments in response to the Crossroads-DMD lawsuit. So On that date he attempted to file:[2] Crossroads-DMD claims that Gauthier is in default of the terms of the Mortgage, and, on June 4, 2015 sued for:
1. a declaration the Mortgage is in default, and for the debt owed as a consequence,
2. an order for possession of the Residence,
3. appointment of a receiver,
4. an order for sale of the Property to Crossroads-DMD,
5. costs on a solicitor and client full indemnity basis, and
6. a preservation order.
However a problem. Gauthier refused to pay the filing fees so the doocuments could not be filed. However Master in Chambers Sandra Schulz apparently took a "what the hell, just pass them over to me" attitude and told Gauthier to give them to her directly without filing them properly.1. a “Counterclaim of Adam Christian Gauthier, individual human being, man”;
2. an application to have the Statement of Claim amended:
... whereas they have my name written in all capital letters representing the artificial person, juristic personality, legal person, subject of Her Majesty the Queen which I am not. The name should be written as follows: Adam Christian Gauthier.
and
3. an Affidavit with six exhibits.
So, on to arguments;[7] These documents were not filed by the Clerk because Gauthier refused to pay filing fees, relying on an order issued in Calgary by Master Prowse to waive those fees. The Clerk takes the position that Master Prowse’s order is unauthorized as being outside his jurisdiction. I take no position on that, but did permit Gauthier to direct these documents to me, for the sole purpose of acting as a written brief for this reserve judgment.
[8] To be explicit, the October 13, 2015 Gauthier documents are not considered as filed with the Court. I have placed those documents on the Court file with an attached letter that indicates that the three October 13, 2015 documents are written argument by Gauthier in response to the Crossroads-DMD redemption order application. This means, for example, that Crossroads-DMD has no obligation to respond to the unfiled “Counterclaim”.
[9] Crossroads-DMD made no response.
[10] This decision is the reserve judgment in response to the October 1, 2015 oral argument and the written materials that were subsequently submitted to me.
Gauthier, as you'd expect, argued pointless gibberish. BUT NOT OPCA POINTLESS GIBBERISH! He was very clear about that! His gibberish was the real stuff, not that secondhand OPCA crap.A. Crossroads-DMD
[19] Counsel for Crossroads-DMD summarized the matter to the date of the application. She noted the mortgage had matured, and Gauthier is expected to pay the outstanding debt. She stressed that a timely response would be beneficial since the Residence has little remaining equity, and therefore asked for a one day redemption period. She also identified Gauthier as an Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [“OPCA”] litigant, per Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII), 543 AR 215.
So let's look at his non-OPCA arguments.[22] Gauthier explicitly rejected the Plaintiff’s characterization of himself as an OPCA litigant, and indicated that in any case, Meads v Meads is not a binding judgment, but instead is only obiter.
[28] Finally, at paras 22-23, Gauthier repeats his objection to being identified as an OPCA litigant; arguing the to do so is unfair and prejudicial:
22. ... while in court October 1, 2015 one of Hendrix’s Law’s agents attempted to prejudice my standing and thus my ability to defend myself by attempting to suggest/label me an OPCA litigant. Again this speaks to the malice and ill natured intent of these crooks. If they are lawyers then they should know what a “person” is in the eyes of the court as compared to a human being and that the Meads judgment is mostly obiter dicta and not a binding piece of case law.
23. I am not an OPCA litigant nor do I have any association with “freemen on the land”.
The analysis is long and complex, far more than I would have expected from a fairly simple decision. So I'm not going into detail.B. Gauthier
[20] Gauthier aired a range of complaints at the October 1, 2015 hearing. While he admitted he had stopped paying the Mortgage, his position is that the Mortgage’s terms were unfair and predatory. There was a lack of disclosure. He was not aware of the terms of the contract when it was signed; this was fraud. The Mortgage was unsupported by valuable consideration. Gauthier did not realize the contract was a negotiable instrument: He argued that the Mortgage improperly lacks a label, “Consumer Purchase”, as required by Bills of Exchange Act, RSC 1985, c B-4, s 190, making the Mortgage void.
[21] Gauthier explained he would have filed a Notice of Counterclaim, were it not for the fact his computer had malfunctioned, but counsel for Crossroads-DMD had received a draft copy of his planned counterclaim. He questioned whether this hearing should be conducted in morning Chambers, but was unable to suggest an alternative venue. Gauthier also complained that his name had been printed in all capital letters on the Statement of Claim, preferring that it be written following the “Canadian Style”, and he wanted the Statement of Claim amended to correct that. A full audit should be conducted on the Mortgage account.
[24] He further argues that the Mortgage is “a consumer note without the words “consumer purchase” on the face of the instrument.” The absence of those words makes the mortgage void, per Bills of Exchange Act, s 190(2).
[25] Gauthier takes the position that he was unaware when he signed the Mortgage that it had no associated value because Crossroads-DMD:
... loaned book-entry credit created at no cost whatsoever ... and fraudulently passed that cost-free book-entry credit off to [Gauthier] as legal tender whereas in truth and in fact [Gauthier] himself provided his own legal tender by virtue of the 6,340.54 in cash monies taken from his account ...
The alleged debt was created by [Crossroads-DMD] as a book-entry credit at no cost to [Crossroads-DMD] and thus [Crossroads-DMD] has no right whatsoever to claim payments in Canadian cash currency in return for book-entry credit created out of thin air totally unbacked by either real wealth or security in the hands of [Crossroads-DMD].
[26] Gauthier’s October 13, 2015 Affidavit at paras 1-4 further explains the theoretical construct in which Gauthier places himself.
1. I am a man and an individual human being with standing within the territory commonly known as Canada. (See exhibit 1 “Statement of Live Birth”).
2. I am exercising my right NOT to take recognition as a person before the law. Article 16 ICCPR
3. I am not a person or any class of person.
4. I am the Beneficiary and Grantor of the account referred to as the juristic person ADAM CHRISTIAN GAUTHIER (Instrument #’ A 1629383 (birth certificate) and P2023004 (statement of live birth) held on file with the Office of the Registrar General).
22. ... while in court October 1, 2015 one of Hendrix’s Law’s agents attempted to prejudice my standing and thus my ability to defend myself by attempting to suggest/label me an OPCA litigant. Again this speaks to the malice and ill natured intent of these crooks. If they are lawyers then they should know what a “person” is in the eyes of the court as compared to a human being and that the Meads judgment is mostly obiter dicta and not a binding piece of case law.
First the OPCA identification. The court went into an analysis of the entire issue of obiter and then related it to Meads v Meads;
So there. Like it or not if you walk like a duck and quack like a duck . . . .A. The Legal Status of Meads v Meads and other Judgment Authorities
[32] As a preliminary point I will respond to Gauthier’s argument that I should not consider myself as bound by the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Meads v Meads decision of Associate Chief Justice Rooke. Gauthier called it “obiter”. My suspicion is that Gauthier views a declaration of that kind to be a kind of simple invocation that will allow him to escape otherwise binding court authorities. It does not, but I think it would be helpful to offer him an explanation of “obiter” or “obiter dicta”, and what that term actually means.
[33] Obiter are statements of law, principle or conclusions, that do not directly relate to the outcome of a court decision. For example, a judge might write a decision that says because of facts A I conclude B, and therefore do C, but if I the facts had been X, I would have concluded Y, and then I would have done Z. The X, Y and Z analysis is obiter. The court did not use that part of the decision to reach its actual conclusion. An obiter component of a judgment is not binding on other courts. It is, however, potentially influential.
[35] The Meads v Meads decision was made by a justice (judge) of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta. I cannot ignore any non-obiter findings and principles of law in that decision. Those have binding authority on the Masters of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta
[36] Though this will come up again later, one point that Gauthier argued is that he is “an individual human being, or man with inherent jurisdiction on the land commonly known as Canada”, and “not a person as defined by Interpretations Act RSC 1985”. He is “... the Beneficiary and Grantor of the account referred to as the juristic person ADAM CHRISTIAN GAUTHIER ...”.
[37] This is obviously an attempt to invoke the OPCA double/split person or “Strawman” concept: individuals have two interlinked aspects, a physical “human” element and an attached or interlinked non-corporeal legal element, what Gauthier calls a “person” or “juristic person”.
[38] In Meads v Meads this concept is reviewed and rejected at paras 417-446. Rooke ACJ concludes that in Canadian law the double/split person concept is entirely unfounded in any sense, and has been systematically rejected every time anyone has ever raised it in a Canadian court. He then goes to evaluate the documents that the respondent, Dennis Larry Meads, had filed in the Meads v Meads action. Rooke ACJ explains at paras 432-439 that the Meads’ documents are meaningless because they attempt to invoke the double/split person concept, and concludes at paras 438-439:
[438] ... everything good and of value attaches to the physical person of Mr. Meads, while all obligation and debt is allocated to the unfortunate DENNIS LARRY MEADS, corporate entity.
[439] Of course, that does not work. Mr. Meads is Mr. Meads in all his physical or imaginary aspects. He would experience and obtain the same effect and success if he appeared in court and selectively donned and removed a rubber Halloween mask which portrays the appearance of another person, asserting at this or that point that the mask’s person is the one liable to Ms. Meads. Not that I am encouraging, or indeed would countenance, the wearing of a mask in my courtroom.
[39] This means that ACJ Rooke’s conclusion that the double/split person “Strawman” is a myth is not obiter. He used that conclusion of law to reach the result in Meads v Meads. As a consequence that conclusion is binding on me. To be explicit, even if that were not the law I would come to exactly the same conclusion. Gauthier’s claim that distinguishes an “individual human being” from the “person” is entirely meaningless. They are one and the same. Gauthier’s apparent belief as to the legal meaning of the word “person” is entirely false and incorrect.
[42] Another rule Gauthier should be aware of is that there are parts of Meads v Meads which are obiter, but which are nevertheless binding on me because those passages originate in other, non-obiter court decisions. For example, at para 216 Rooke ACJ indicates notaries do not have judge-like authority. Meads did not argue that in his materials or court appearance, so that statement is obiter. However, Meads v Meads then references an Alberta Court of Appeal decision: Papadopoulos v Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 (CanLII) at paras 3, 10. That decision includes the following explicit statement:
The appellant put great stock in the fact that his unconventional documents had been notarized by a Notary Public, but the involvement of the notary could not give these legally ineffective documents any force of law. ...
[43] The passage in Papadopoulos v Borg is not obiter and is binding on me. It is from the Alberta Court of Appeal.
[44] There is a third important point for Gauthier to understand concerning Meads v Meads. The weight and influence of a judgment increases when other judges and courts accept that a decision provides the correct approach to a legal issue. Judicial reasoning operates in that sense on a consensus basis, and if a judge’s obiter reasoning is generally accepted then that obiter becomes increasingly influential. Consensus results in a generally understood and agreed upon principal of law.
[46] If Gauthier thinks he can wave away Meads v Meads by a simple declaration that decision is just one judge’s opinion or because it is obiter, then he is wrong. What was one opinion is now a judicial chorus. Not one court has sung a dissenting note. Anyone who makes claims like the “Strawman” clause and then says Meads v Meads does not apply to them is going to face a very, very steep uphill battle in our Courts.
So after branding Gauthier for life with that abhorrant label the court moved on to the issues;B. Gauthier is an OPCA Litigant
[47] Gauthier at his October 1, 2015 court appearance and in his affidavit complains counsel for Crossroads-DMD has incorrectly and maliciously labelled him as an OPCA litigant. After a review of Gauthier’s materials and arguments, I agree with the manner in which he was identified. Gauthier has advanced stereotypic and well known OPCA arguments and motifs, such as the double/split person “Strawman”. He also appears to place special significance on his birth documentation as creating an “account”. The Newfoundland Court of Appeal concluded in Fiander v Mills that a court should presume a litigant who argues these things does so for an improper and ulterior purpose. There are legal consequences to that presumption.
[48] Gauthier is clearly aware of the Meads v Meads decision, and I suspect some of its successors. He nevertheless chose to advance “Strawman” and unorthodox birth document concepts in court. If Gauthier wants to avoid the OPCA litigant classification in future court appearances, then he should take into account that Canadian courts have systematically rejected and denounced those concepts.
This occupied a lot of the court's attention and is not really of interest to me so if you want the nitty gritty on this read it yourself from paragraphs 49 through 67.C. The Mortgage is a Void Consumer Note
[49] Gauthier argues that the Mortgage is a void consumer purchase bill of exchange or promissory note and, as a consequence, must be marked as a “Consumer Purchase”: Bills of Exchange Act, s 190(1). The Mortgage has no such notation. Gauthier therefore concludes that the Mortgage cannot be enforced against him and is void: Bills of Exchange Act, s 190(2).
Then on to the issue of whether Crossroads got paid off the moment it wrote up the mortgage because this created money for crossroads.
Again I'm not going to analyze this. The Master went into an extensive review of Australian jurisprudence between 1992 and 1994 and some jurisprudence past those years. Just to much case-specific detail to summarize.D. Crossroads-DMD Creates Money Out Of Thin Air
[68] Gauthier argues that the Mortgage should not be enforced because it is fraudulent or grossly unfair. He argues that Crossroads-DMD did not disclose to Gauthier that what it loaned was “book-entry credit created out of thin air”. The “book-entry credit” cost Crossroads-DMD nothing and this was concealed from Gauthier. Therefore it is unfair to Gauthier for him to repay in real money what is, in effect, something of no actual value.
Somehow the Master managed to dig up the source document on the "book entry credit" scheme;
Then chapter and verse how Gauthier blatantly stole from this book. Sorry, has "adapted his documents from this source".[74] It is obvious that the Australian courts have on many occasions considered and rejected “book-entry credit” arguments that are exactly the same as those advanced by Gauthier. There is another connection. I was able to locate a copy of the evocatively titled “manual” identified in the Australian judgments: Laurence F. Hoins, How To Screw ‘Your’ Bank: What Bank? Any Bank, 2nd ed (Nowra: self-published, 1992) [“How To Screw ‘Your’ Bank”].
[75] The author of How To Screw ‘Your’ Bank, Laurence Hoins, describes himself as a man of many careers and talents, and offers his services to assist those who seek to implement his concepts. He says a bank withdrew its debt collection action when confronted by his stratagem and documents. How To Screw ‘Your’ Bank is a guide to nullify debt collection:
So that argument got dumped too. As did all of the rest of them;[79] Further, comparison of Gauthier’s materials and the form documents in How To Screw ‘Your’ Bank make it is obvious that Gauthier has adapted his documents from this source.
I note my old friend Master Gee in paragraph 100. I attended that case and wrote it up here;H. Redemption Order
[96] The Redemption Order sought by Crossroads-DMD is granted in the regular court template form. The redemption period is set for 30 days from the date of service of the Order flowing from this decision, following which the Plaintiff may list the property for sale for 60 days at $372,000.00 or such higher sum as the listing realtor may recommend. Costs are awarded on a solicitor-client indemnity basis. Counsel for Crossroads DMD may submit the order directly to me for signature without first obtaining the approval of the Defendant as to the form of Order.
V. Amendment of the Statement of Claim
[97] Gauthier’s October 13, 2015, application at paragraphs 1-4 seeks:
1. An amendment to the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim whereas they have my name written in all capital letters representing the artificial person, juristic personality, legal person, subject of Her Majesty the Queen which I am not. The name should be written as follows: Adam Christian Gauthier.
2. I do not wish to take recognization as a person before the law as per my article 16 right from the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights.
3. Any attempt to intimidate me or arbitrarily force me to do so would be in violation of Article 8 of the ICCPR which prohibits holding someone in servitude. Via being recognized as a subject of Her Majesty.
4. Any attempt to force me into recognition as a person before the law also violates Article 5 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. [Sic.]
[98] I will not respond to Gauthier’s application unless it is filed with the Court and then served on the Plaintiff. However, it is obvious from the documents provided that Gauthier subscribes to double/split person “Strawman” theories. He objects to being identified by a name in all capital letters because he believes that designates his “artificial person, juristic personal, legal person”: his “Strawman”. He need not worry on this point. As I have previously indicated the binding character of Meads v Meads, Gauthier is just one entity, human and legal person, all wrapped inextricably together in one neat package. That is a principal of law recognized universally by Canadian courts. It is not only binding on me, it is also legally correct.
[99] I have noted what the Newfoundland Court of Appeal has said in Fiander v Mills about “Strawman” theory. Gauthier advances these concepts at his own risk, including the risk of an award of costs against him personally.
[100] As for writing names one way or another, it does not matter. In R v Lindsay, 2002 BCCA 687 (CanLII), 180 BCAC 4, Detaxer David Kevin Lindsay argued this distinction was relevant on court documents, and demanded his name be formatted in the manner sought by Gauthier. Esson JA indicated the distinction between name formats was meaningless. See also R v Linehan, 2000 ABQB 815 (CanLII) at para 13, 276 AR 383; R v Kennay, [2001] BCJ No 2929 at paras 6, 8 (QL) (BC Prov Ct); R v Hyde, 2003 BCSC 368 (CanLII) at paras 7-8, 61 WCB (2d) 530; R v Lemieux, 2007 SKPC 135 (CanLII) at paras 45-46, [2008] 2 CTC 291; R v Loosdrecht, 2008 BCPC 400 (CanLII) at para 36, [2009] 4 CTC 49; City of Burnaby v Gildemeester, 2014 BCSC 2441 (CanLII) at paras 11-12, 22 MPLR (5th) 137.
VI. Costs
[101] Crossroads-DMD is successful in its application for a redemption order. The terms of the Mortgage are that Crossroad-DMD receives solicitor-client indemnity costs for any litigation steps required to enforce the Mortgage. I would have awarded those costs in any case to Crossroads-DMD for any steps required to respond to Gauthier’s “consumer note” and “book-entry credit arguments”. These two arguments are clearly frivolous and nothing more than OPCA ‘money for nothing’ scams that should be deterred.
viewtopic.php?f=48&t=10342
No doubt he'd be proud to find that he is now part of Canadian judicial history.
Then the Master took a shot at men scribbling on whiteboards. Had she overdosed on Dean Clifford and Robert Menard? She even worked in the Hot-Off-The-Press Boisjoli decision.
Note that the Master awarded Soliciter and Client costs. This is unusual and is usually considered punitive,VII. Conclusion
[102] In preparing this decision I have expanded my investigation and analysis perhaps further than the minimum required. My hope that a more complete dissection of Gauthier’s misconceptions will assist him and others to better understand the law. As I have observed in my response to his “consumer purchase” argument, some aspects of law and legislation are cryptic, and reported judgments such as this one will hopefully be a useful educational resource.
[103] Gauthier also indicated to me that he has other litigation either pending or underway, and it would be unfortunate if he pursued avenues that Canadian courts have identified as frivolous and vexatious. This Court takes a strict approach to attempts to misuse its processes, as is illustrated by the recent Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629 (CanLII) decision. I recommend Gauthier review that judgment carefully.
[104] Beyond that, it would be a pity if Gauthier lost his home because he exercised poor discretion in his search for reliable sources of legal information. There are better alternatives than obsolete legal dictionaries, discounted texts like How to Screw ‘Your’ Bank, and Youtube videos of men scribbling on whiteboards. The decision is, of course, up to Gauthier, however, he should think carefully before he makes statements such as:
I can find no law that authorizes book-entry credit and thus must conclude it is fraudulent criminal activity which I cannot take part in. ...
He cannot expect the courts to view him as a ‘fair dealer’. When he makes such statements the Court may be inclined to accept the alternative that Gauthier’s appearance in court is for an improper and ulterior purpose. If so, Gauthier can expect negative consequences.
Heard on the 1th day of October, 2015.
Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 6th day of November, 2015.
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/ ... Costs.aspxSolicitor and client costs are set at a higher scale compared with party and party costs, and approach complete indemnity to the successful litigant.
They are exceptional and, to some, useful mostly to punish a litigant. For example, in Winnipeg Holdings, Justice Meredith granted solicitor and client costs, writing:
Also referred to as party and party costs on the solicitor and client scale or, in British Columbia, with some minor distinction, special costs. For example, note the following extract from Fullerton:"The purpose of granting costs on the higher scale seems not to be that the successful party should emerge from the litigation unscathed by costs charged by his own solicitor, but that others should be deterred from similar conduct, and/or that a penalty should be inflicted....
"I based my award upon a principle of misconduct: that others should be deterred from like conduct, and that the petitioner should be penalized."
In McCarthy, Justice Sinclair of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench defined solicitor and client costs as follows:"Special costs, or solicitor-and-client costs are ... awarded when a court seeks to dissociate itself from some misconduct. Because the court is expressing its disapproval, the award must go beyond mere indemnity and enters the realm of punishment."
"Solicitor and client - this basis is intended, so far as is consistent with fairness, to provide complete indemnity to the party to whom they are awarded as to costs essential to and arising within the four corners of the litigation."
