Michael Millar - Detaxer & Poriskyite's tax evasion trial

[Jeffrey]

In other words he thinks Parliament intended to exclude human beings from income taxes?

Why haven't the almost 450 members of parliament who were there when the income tax act became law endorsed Porisky's interpretation of the act?

[eric]

In other words he thinks Parliament intended to exclude human beings from income taxes?
Why haven't the almost 450 members of parliament who were there when the income tax act became law endorsed Porisky's interpretation of the act?

Although I wasn't around at the time, I believe the intent of the law was to be all encompassing, using the "inclusive" meaning of includes. Although we are venturing into political discussion, at the time the law was first written, there was much discussion in Canada about whether or not women were legally persons and there was, and still is, the question of "personhood" for First Nations.

[eric]

Off to Britain in three days for a five week trip swilling beer and meeting up with the UK Quatloosians and Millar will have to wait until I get back. I should make it back just in time to watch the Porisky and Lawson sentencings. So, between Millar and Balogh, I have a lot of catching up to do. But that should be it until November when Leo Fung goes on trial.

Enjoy! Although I have sympathies for your liver.
On Tuesday the merry group of privatesectoract.com people: Derek, Ty Griffiths (Kevin Kumar), their wives, and Kevin Manji are due for sentencing in Calgary and I plan to attend. Should things not follow procedure the trip won't be wasted - a few blocks away is a store that sells some interesting microbrews where I receive a great discount so I can drown my sorrows with a growler of a good IPA.

[Burnaby49]

Jeffrey, you're turning a deeply researched and substantiated legal analysis into a simplistic caricature. Do you think that Porisky and his educators could have made any money just by telling everyone that human beings aren't taxable? Is you understanding of this so shallow that you think they were doing it for free? Hey guys, you're human beings so you don't have to pay income tax?

Not at all. However I have to confess, while mocking your ignorance of the brilliance of the Paradigm System, that I myself find much of it over my head. I only spent thirty-five years as an income tax auditor so I can't hope to match Russell Porisky's deep understanding of the Income Tax Act. A man who, before fame and fortune came knocking, was a carpenter. So this is how I understand it. You are born and live your life before Paradigm enlightenment as a legal person. This means you are a human being but one bound to the system by your Social Insurance Number and other connections like your drivers license. This "joinder" makes you taxable. The natural man is a legal person who has shed that connection and has severed himself from government. You can chose to be a taxpayer or not but the road from legal person to natural person isn't easy and is beset with pitfalls. However, for a fee, Porisky and his educators, like Millar and Lawson, were there to guide you to your natural man state.

First off you had to have a contract for hire. As I said in a different discussion;

First you separate your two individuals. The real you, the natural man, has to sever yourself from that total loser, the taxpayer, to become tax free. It's elegantly simple, you become an independent contractor. As Russell says;

Remember that you have a right to contract with anyone for anything. Contracting is a fundamental right of all human beings, and is old as the first 2 people that could communicate. We have a right to the freedom of contract and privacy of contract and these rights are not only inherent in our society but are recognized and protected by law through legislation.

The "contract for hire" removes the servant from working for the benefit of the taxpayer and places the natural person in an agent position for the benefit of the natural person, thus the compensation to the natural person falls outside the parameters of the income tax act.

One of the reason that this is possible is because our inalienable Rights and Freedoms, the right to contract is a fundamental right and is recognized and protected in several Canadian and International documents. The Canadian Bill of Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and others.

Isn't that great? The theoretical answer of becoming an independent contractor to sever your two persons is also exactly what the nascent tax cheat needs in order to attain his dream. Separating your taxpayer from your natural person removes your obligation to pay tax and the right to "privacy of contract" justifies hiding your income from the nasty CRA. All of it sanctioned, nay demanded, by the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Almost makes tax cheating a civic duty and a moral obligation.

viewtopic.php?t=10271


When I write up my observations at Millar's trial I'll be introducing you to this sterling fellow who played a central role for much of a day of the trial.

http://bc.ctvnews.ca/watchdog-says-coup ... s-1.667697

This is the third arrest for Ronald Conn and second for Ella Conn related to illegal trading in the securities of the company Follicles. The previous arrests stem from 20 charges against the couple.

Ronald Conn has a lengthy history with the BCSC, with infractions and investigations dating back 14 years.

Ronald Conn was handed a 15-year ban from trading in 1997 for his involvement with Mindoro, a gold and platinum mining exploration company. He also received a $50,000 administrative fine, which he has yet to repay, according to the BCSC. Two other officers of Mindoro were found guilty of distributing shares illegally to 170 investors and lying about the potential earning returns.

In that case, the BCSC concluded that Conn illegally distributed thousands of inflated and illegal company shares while working as an experienced mutual funds salesman – the type of activity he had a professional obligation to prevent.

Conn owned a business that required that all employees sign up with Paradigm. This meant that they had 7% of their wages deducted at source and sent off to Porisky. This was apparently their only source deduction because they all had to sign contracts for hire with Millar which made them private contractors rather than employees. Millar seemed to be the connection between Conn's business and Porisky and he sold Paradigm material to the employees and gave classes on how to become a natural person.

The next step is to put all of that tax-free money into a natural man bank account. Put it in a regular account and you're screwed because it has joinder with the government. A natural man account is one set up without giving the bank any government issued ID such as birth certificate, passport or social insurance number. Banks tend to balk at this so you have to be inventive. Keith Lawson opened up his natural man account by using his Irish passport. Apparently that kept him from joinder in Canada.

And through all this classes, constant classes, I've just skimmed the surface of the knowledge necessary to get rid of that legal person paying all those taxes. The path to natural personhood was arduous but rewarding. Well, rewarding until the Canada Revenue Agency got the entire Paradigm student list from Porisky's computer. After that it got very expensive for them all.

[Burnaby49]

Off to Britain in three days for a five week trip swilling beer and meeting up with the UK Quatloosians and Millar will have to wait until I get back. I should make it back just in time to watch the Porisky and Lawson sentencings. So, between Millar and Balogh, I have a lot of catching up to do. But that should be it until November when Leo Fung goes on trial.

Enjoy! Although I have sympathies for your liver.

On Tuesday the merry group of privatesectoract.com people: Derek, Ty Griffiths (Kevin Kumar), their wives, and Kevin Manji are due for sentencing in Calgary and I plan to attend. Should things not follow procedure the trip won't be wasted - a few blocks away is a store that sells some interesting microbrews where I receive a great discount so I can drown my sorrows with a growler of a good IPA.

IPA's? You're an IPA drinker? IPA's are killing good beer with the out of control competition between brewers to make their beers as bitter as possible. I've walked out of brewpubs because all that was offered was IPAs. I go to Britain for the cask ale milds and bitters. The bitters, notwithstanding their name, are not bitter. Just slightly hoppy. Works great for me.

[KickahaOta]

I believe that Peter Hendrickson used the same idiot basis of interpretation to determine that almost all Americans were not taxable. The American tax code includes DC, Puerto Rico, Guam and American Samoa in the definition of the United States because they are in America but are not part of a state. So Hendrickson argued that only people living in these places were taxable. You live in California? You don't have to pay tax. We all saw how "Cracking the Code" worked in real life.

Of course, this sort of argument fares particularly poorly under the US Internal Revenue Code, because it doesn't leave the question of "Is 'includes' a term of expansion or of limitation?" to the feverish imaginations of the taxpayer, but rather settles the question explicitly:

The terms “includes” and “including” when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

[Burnaby49]

Time to get back to work. Just before my epic five week British beer-blast I attended much of Millar's trial but didn't have the time to write it up. I also attended Peter Balogh's trial and couldn't write that up either. So it's about time to get them done starting with Millar. While the trial is almost finished the parties still have to make closing arguments and Millar has filed an application requesting a stay of proceedings because of undue delay. I've been through those before. Each side tries to blame the other for the delays along with what is called "inherent delay", the normal delay of getting things through the court system unrelated to delay caused by the parties.

I'm under the gun here because I have a whole new batch of hearings coming up. Keith Lawson has a three day hearing scheduled next week in respect to charges he's made about abuse of process on the part of the Crown. I sat through his trial and the Crown acted impeccably so I can't see him getting any traction on that one. In September Millar has a three day hearing to get closing arguments done and address his delay complaint. Additionally Porisky's sentencing hearing is coming up. Leo Fung comes up for trial in November. There's just no end to the Poriskyites. The only one who's trial I won't be attending is Debbie Anderson because it is being held in Abbotsford, way up the Fraser Valley. Too far for my convenience.

[Burnaby49]

May 30, 2016

The first day of trial and I only managed to get part of the day in. I skipped the morning session because I was in the British Columbia Provincial Courthouse, a mile and a half away, listening to closing arguments in Peter Balogh's tax evasion trial and I left at the afternoon break to go pubbing. I was meeting the guy who I was going on the five week British pub-crawl with and we still had a lot of planning.

The day was largely taken up with a voir dire regarding the validity of the search warrant. Another of Millar's endless arguments about jurisdiction and privacy. He believes that if you put the word "private" on top of a document that it cannot be used against you in a court of law. Since all his documents had private on them none, in his view, were admissible and the Crown had no evidence. Apparently putting "without prejudice" on a document has the same effect although it has a totally different meaning. I used to put "without prejudice" on documents to taxpayer's representatives when we were negotiating settlements. It meant if the negotiations fell apart that any offers or concessions I made in the documents could not be used against the CRA in court. However the documents were not in any sense private in that they were exempt from the law. It was just a term used in negotiations. He also brought up again, for the nth time, that the Supreme Court of British Columbia actually had no jurisdiction in British Columbia because of some convoluted analysis he had made of county boundaries in various statues.

So the Crown argued that his privacy argument, using the word to mean that authorities could not gather evidence against him if he put "private" on documents, was not known in law. Privacy concerns are not in the Charter. Claiming a unilateral declaration of the privacy of his documents was not a valid argument.

So he argued jurisdiction. There was a territorial omission in the warrant, something to do with some statutory definition of county boundaries in some act or another, so the trial was being held in some other unknown proceedings not known in the law. To my knowledge he's lost this exact same argument in three other prior hearings, maybe four, but he just won't give up on it, it's an obsession. Crown said that they had proven a valid warrant. The absence of territorial divisions does not invalidate the warrant. British Columbia is the division of the warrant. It is Crown's submission that these is no defect on the face of the warrant. The Crown noted that Lawson had made the exact same argument at his trial and the court found that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of British Columbia is all of British Columbia, not just a specific territorial portion of it.

Millar complained that he had been described as an OPCA litigant. He said that the third letter in this referred to commercial but this wasn't a commercial issue and to categorize it as such was inappropriate. Then Millar was back on his jurisdictional obsession referring to the county of Vancouver and the county of Victoria in some act. So he found it "surprising" that the Crown claimed that British Columbia did not have divisions. Judicial districts are recognized by counties. So where are we? In a geographical area or a corporate structure? To just write this off confuses me.

He said I've asked that question but not got an answer (note re jurisdiction of court. More correctly he's had it answered half a dozen times but ignored the answer because it doesn't agree with his fantasy law). I'm proceeding under the belief that this is in the Supreme Court in the Vancouver New Westminster judicial district. If you are going to prosecute somebody in a corporate city you put that city down. I'm concerned that I'm being prosecuted in a corporate court. If you are prosecuting a man (note - I think as opposed to a corporation) then you should give the territorial division. I'm a man operating on the land with private rights and nobody has refuted that. My private status should be recognized but it's not been. A lot of meandering around I didn't bother to follow. He said that there must be some purpose for giving judicial districts or they wouldn't be there. This warrant has been issued for a corporate location vs a lawful one. Without an order about which court they are prosecuting me in this questions the validity. I have sought over and over to have my private status recognized and that greatly prejudices me. Are we dealing with a man on the land with common law rights or a corporate structure? (note - he has some stupid argument that if Vancouver is written as Vancouver city, then it is a normal city but if it is written as Vancouver City then it is some different type of city, a corporate city, which requires a different court. This is what I spent my day listening to).

Then on to another of his obsessions, upper and lower case. This is an argument he's lost multiple times in the past but he is helplessly obsessed with it, certain in his own mind that words in upper case have entirely different meaning than the same words in lower or mixed case. So the SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA where he is currently being tried is an entirely different court than the Supreme Court of British Columbia where he should be facing trial making the entire process a criminal sham.

Various documents have different cases for Canada and British Columbia. This shows intent to mislead. Why won't they (the Crown) change it back? He rambled on and on about the indignities heaped upon him through capitalization.

The judge immediately ruled against him. Sher said that Mr. Millar was concerned about the violation of his privacy rights by the Crown in the search. So I (judge) asked for the warrant and it was produced. Judge said that Millar made two arguments, the first was that it was inadequate. But there was nothing in the form to show that a judicial district was required to be included on it. The second argument was that Millar wanted some indication whether it was issued for a geographical area or a corporate location. This seems to be important to Mr. Millar but it is not important to these criminal proceedings The form is adequate. The warrant has been produced and now Mr. Millar knows what is on it. So I dismiss his application, the search warrant is valid.

Then Crown said that if Millar planned to argue that documents taken in the search were outside of the warrant we plan to hold him to a firm requirement of law regarding the application. This might have been in response to his application of December 9th, 2015 when he didn't bother to give the Crown the required advanced warning on an application he made to the court;. I said about that session;

Note - This session was supposed to consider an application by Millar. That requires a document, a Notice of Application, saying specifically what he is applying about. He prepared nothing and just came in and rambled. So the Crown said that if there was to be a day's session she wanted a Notice of Application so she knew what the Crown was responding to. Millar - Crown will just evade and mislead. Then he started going on how the Crown wanted to make an application to strike. Huh? An application to strike is a request to end proceedings and quash charges. Why would the Crown do that? That is what he wants.

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=10834#p217552

Then on to evidence. Millar asked "Was I notified what evidence will be entered? There are thousands of pieces of evidence". Judge responded that she wasn't the Crown and didn't know what the evidence would be. She told him to object if he had any issues with it.

So we started with a Crown witness, A CRA officer involved in the search of Millar's residence. He was there to prove documents. He described the search and the procedures used to chose and safeguard documents.

When he was done on direct it was time for Millar to eviscerate him with a hard-hitting incisive cross-examination. The first questions set the tone;

Q - Did you take an oath when you became a CRA officer?
A - Yes.

Q - How many?
A - One.

Q - Describe it.
A - To conduct the business of National Revenue.

Q - Do you know where that oath is now? Where is your oath located?
A - In the office.

Q - Is a Public Officer different than a Public Servant?
A - I wouldn't think so.

Q - Did you receive training about not going outside of the warrant? Describe it.
A - I had an introductory course when I joined Investigations.

Q - Was there anything you would not seize because you recognized it as private property?
A - We seized what was on warrant and other evidence.

Q - Are you tasked with seizing the property of the taxpayer or the private man?

Crown - Objection. Judge, how is this relevant?

Millar - I want to know if they are trained to seize private property.

Judge - We are not here for you to explore areas that are of interest to you. You are here for the Crown to present its case against you.

Millar - I want to know if he followed training.

Judge - What difference does it make if the documents are there? I'm not allowing this.

Millar - How do I know if they abused process if I can't find out what they knew?

Back to his Clarence Darrow mode;

Q - Do you acknowledge that the place you searched was a private home?
A - It was a private residence.

The judge asked the witness if he made a distinction between a private home and a private residence. He replied that they are one and the same, just how the CRA describes a home.

The judge then stopped Millar from going on about his questions regarding private residences, private man, whatever. Millar said "I don't know if this means anything but I'm observing . . ." then he just petered out. "That ends my Questions." Judge called afternoon break and I had to leave to, as always, go pubbing. Just across the street from the Courthouse at The Moose.

I will note that everything that Millar brought up today, jurisdiction, capitalization, putting "private" on documents, private person acting in a private capacity, all of this nonsense has been brought up in court by both him and Lawson numerous times in the past and has invariably been stomped on. But he obsessively keeps trying them again and again. It's like he actually can't stop. He's trapped in a loop of trying the same doomed arguments endlessly while not going near anything that could be called an actual defense.

[grixit]

It occurs to me that you could probably make big money doing pub reviews in law journals.

The Superior Court of South Wimberfelter sits next to a rustic looking grotto wherein is nestled Ye Knavish Hedgehog. But don't be fooled. Their so called "microbrewery on the premises", is just for show. But in fact, they just buy generic ale wholesale, pump it into their vat, throw little barley malt in for show, then wait a couple of days so they can call it "aged". I recommend instead that you go over to Gunnar's on Walnut Ave. Ignore the silly Viking decor, just ask for the Niffelheim Dark.

[Burnaby49]

June 01, 2016

The day started with Millar in court but he immediately hustled out. He had something to file at the registry. Crown said she'd been emailed about an application he planned to file and copies on the way. Judge - When should we deal with them? We need a hearing to determine if a voir dire is appropriate. We can do this today after the two witnesses. Crown wants the application (whatever it is, I'm in the dark) dismissed without a hearing. Something about Skype recordings. Millar back so judge asked if he is seeking an exclusion of electronic evidence. Yes and no. He wants all Crown evidence excluded. He wants all evidence taken from private property excluded. This would be the search of his place and Porisky's house. Crown - The applications seeks an order unknown to the law. Nothing in the application lays a foundation for exclusion. Crown counsel said that she was willing to argue for the summary dismissal of the application right now. Millar started his 'I'm attending in my private status' routine. The judge asked the Crown if she wanted her to address this before or after the witnesses. Note - In the end, as you'll read, the witnesses weren't called today. The entire day was taken up with Millar's relentless yammering.

I assumede that the applications related to his total failure of an argument that he is a private man on the land and all of his documents and property are private and can't be used by the Crown. He's extremely persistent at continuing doomed arguments.

Crown said that his private person arguments were OPCA (Objection!). Based on this he is using his own definition of private person to have evidence excluded on a basis not known to law. Judge asked Millar if he was willing top go ahead. He didn't seem sure. The judge told him that they were discussing whether the application warranted a hearing.

Crown - The onus is on Millar to support a voir dire. There is a lack of clarity about what he is seeking. The judge kept rephrasing the Crown so that Millar could understand it. We took the morning break so that the judge could read the applications.

After break the judge said that Millar had made two applications;

Application 1

1 - an order from the court recognizing as a natural person de jure man.

2 - An order that the court is the Supreme Court of British Columbia under the Supreme Court Act.

3 - An order stating that the case is proceeding in the Vancouver New Westminster judicial district.

4 - An order requiring the Crown counsel to bring forth a law that forces a man to participate with the CRA.

5 - I missed this one

Application 2

1 - An order stating that the search was at a private home.

2 & 3 - Wants evidence taken from private home excluded because it is the private property of a private person. Audio or visual communications are private conversations of a natural person. Seizing them is a violation of private rights.

Judge dismissed all but 2 & 3 0f application 2. Millar started yammering about hadn't answered his questions.

Judge - I'm not wasting time on this you can hire a lawyer.
Millar - Is a man not entitled to answers to these Questions?
Judge - Not from me.

Crown - The application is not required and can be dismissed. The Crown lacks an understanding of what he is seeking. There was a bit of back and forth with the judge then we proceeded to the voir dire. A note - my notes of the next part of the proceedings are somewhat disjointed. Things were probably more logically sequenced than I'm reporting.

Millar changed his mind and said that he wanted to call one of the Crown witnesses about something he wasn't clear about.

Crown - There is no basis in law and no legal significance to the order as formed for either private property or natural person. The private documents have no legal significance, They were seized under a valid warrant. Describing his home as private has no legal basis and no remedy for Millar. Both the documents and recordings were seized under a valid warrant. Both applications ought to be dismissed without a voir dire.

Judge told Millar that he would have to satisfy her that there was a reason for excluded evidence. Millar said that he needed the Crown witness (I assume one involved in the search) to prove private property and private person status. Whatever he was doing was the business of a private individual.

Judge - Did you tell investigator you were a private person.
Millar - I made a privacy claim at that time in a timely fashion.

Crown - Evidence of what was told to the investigator at the scene has no bearing on his application.

Judge - Is Crown is willing to acknowledge that the investigator was told at the time of the search about Millar raising privacy and private property concerns. Crown - Yes, Crown is willing to concede Millar raised privacy and private property concerns at the seizure and after orally and in writing.

Break for parties to discuss what the Crown had conceded. This makes absolutely no sense to me. What difference does it make what Millar said or when he said it? By definition his apartment was a private residence and whatever is in it is private property but so what? That was why they required a warrant, to allow the search team to enter his private residence and take his private property. The search warrant was valid and had his apartment as the address to be searched. Millar can yammer his idiotic theories until doomsday and not change the fact that the warrant and search were valid and therefore the evidence acquired under the warrant is admissible. There is no way the judge is going to determine otherwise based on some nonsensical theory of private persons and private documents. So why is she even considering this argument?

After break the judge asked - Does the Crown acknowledge that Millar had made the claim to being a natural person and private person at the time of the search and subsequently? Yes.
Has he also demanded the return of the seized records based on this. Yes,

Millar then passed a 45 page document up to the judge. Something to do with his argument about the court not having jurisdiction because of his position on it not residing in a county. He had a quote from that eminent legal authority, Wikipedia, that he said backed him up. Went over the same argument about counties and jurisdiction that he's already lost three times. More printouts. All supporting his completely discredited theory that the Supreme Court of British Columbia has no jurisdiction in British Columbia. Apparently the documents deliberately have British Columbia on some and The Province of British Columbia on others and one is legal and one is corporate. And darned if the court trying him isn't the corporate court when he can only be tried by the legal court. I'm surprised he didn't start looking under the chairs and in the lobby for it. It would have been great watching him try to present this to a jury.

I'm seeking to have an order stating that the search location was physically at or within the county of Vancouver under the County Boundary Act and the Supreme Court Act. He seemed to be bogging down in what was an already confusing submission. More acts cited, almost seemingly at random. Something about the Law and Equity Act. He's done a hell of a lot of reading if nothing else, combing all of British Columbia's acts for random lines he thinks will support whatever legal argument is chugging through his head. He said that his Bill of Equity he tried to present to the court in a previous hearing related to this argument. He was apparently demanding an equitable remedy to his charges rather than a statutory one but it was hard to tell what he was getting at. At least hard for me. He hauled out something from an 1879 statute that indicated, at least to him, that rules of equity prevail over statutory law. "So I want this taken notice of."

He brought up the Porisky search. All of the contracts between Porisky and the Paradigm students had natural person confidentiality. There was no access to the public. This shows that it was private contracts between parties who trusts so any release of evidence would be a breach of trust. A third party seizing and bringing them into public is a breach of trust. The searchers were third party interlopers into a private home. And anyone not party to the contracts violated the privacy of the contract. They violated his home but called it a residence. Millar certainly has his own unique interpretation of the law.

All of the documents are part of private contracts and are trust documents. Then a plaintive lament that a man can't claim a private contract anymore. The State thinks that it can come in and become a party to those contracts. The state can't violate the relationship and trust between parties. Big spiel how he's not OPEC. He found a few references to "natural person" in various acts and said that proved that the power and capacity of natural persons is higher than statutes. Strangely it doesn't appear to have said that i any of the statutory references he cited. He gave considerable weight to some regulation in respect to the sale of dishwasher detergent where it cited "natural person". So he's proven his case through dish detergent.

There are 1,089 references to "natural persons" in CANLii (How many of those are judges saying what a crock the arguments about them are?) Anyone who can read basic English can see that the legislation clearly recognizes natural persons and private persons.

They chose to call themselves natural persons in contracts with expectations of privacy and that can't be swept away. Crown disparages, laughs at, mocks, people who claim their rights. The state is attacking my rights rather than protecting them. He was babbling about regions, rights, legal statutes, whatever at this point. There are apparently two North Vancouvers and he lives in the one not covered by the warrant. A man's home is his castle.

He rambled on in this disjointed manner for over an hour, an hour that I won't get back. He seemed to stop, then recharge, over and over. At 12:30 judge asked him how much longer he planned to take. A few more minutes was OK but if he planned longer than that we would continue after lunch. He continued for a few more minutes talking about how hard drives and contents fall into private property of a private man and how communications between private persons are private. Then he asked for the lunch break so he could gather his thoughts for a conclusion.

Back at it after lunch. He had yet another reference. Something about somebody suing a member of government. I just gave up. He started pulling out every reference with the word "private" in it that he could find in a disjointed ramble about private persons passing private information to each other in private contracts about private property. Just sound-bites rather than a presentation. The sentences he spoke made sense as individual sentences but made no sense when strung together into actual arguments. Essentially he was just citing any use of "private person" and "natural man" that he could find in any act or regulation without any concern about the context in which they were used. He seemed to be claiming that if these words were in any act then they, in equity, applied to all acts. And apparently how they applied was at his option. He gets to determine their meanings as they applied to him.

Crown had enough and objected on the basis that he was going on about issues not before the court. How could they tell? I had little idea what he was going on about. He ran out of things to say but wouldn't, or couldn't quit so we sat around for a few minutes before he fired up the gibberish again. More disjointed bits and pieces. Then, after an hour and a half of this, done.

Crown - I've already said most of what needs to be said. It's not clear if this is a Vukelich or a full hearing.

Note, I discussed Vukelich hearings in the Keith Lawson discussion where I said;

Lawson was complaining about abuse of process and he wanted a stay of proceedings and damages against the Crown as a result of the mistreatment he'd received at the hands of CRA Investigations. Unfortunately for Keith there is no automatic right to a voir dire, the Crown may make what is called a Vukelich Application, named after this case;

R. v. Vukelich, 1996 CanLII 1005
http://canlii.ca/t/1f0d7

Which set the standard, at least in British Columbia, that a voir dire applicant has to meet before getting court approval. So the Crown was contesting Lawson's application on the grounds, I assume, that there was no merit in his application. They had made a written submission to the court and today was Lawson's opportunity to defend his position. Not to actually go into the voir dire itself but to only show that he had grounds to get his application accepted by the judge.

The judge said that this was not a voire die but a Vukelich was not necessary since there is no evidence to be entered.

Crown - He has related issues relating to privacy as he understands it.

Judge - I heard him say it was a section 8 Charter application.

That was news to me and apparently to the Crown. So we got a 15 minute break because the Crown had not realized this was a Charter application. I shared their confusion since Millar had not mentioned the Charter at all the entire time he was giving his, I'll be generous here, presentation. This is section 8 of the Charter and what he was apparently arguing about all along;

8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.

Break over. Crown said that we are reviewing parts 2 and 3 of a 3 part application. We are responding to Mr. Millar's section 8 Charter arguments. We are dealing with the search. She cited caselaw supporting argument that search was reasonable.

- It was authorized by law.
- The law was reasonable,
- It was executed in a reasonable manner.

Your honour has already agreed that there was a valid search warrant. There is no question that the grounds for the search warrant are at issue. There is no question that the law that the search warrant related to was valid. That leaves part 3. Millar has not attempted to argue that items were seized outside of the warrant. He is arguing that the search was unreasonable because he is a private person with private property and private contracts. That argument is not known to law. He picks and choses between legislation. They do not relate to his matter the way he wants them to. The private property seized is allowed to be tendered against him if the search is lawful. It is the Crown's argument that the basis he argues does not (I momentarily lost track at this point, I think Crown was arguing that his positions do not have support in law).

Millar got to respond to the Crown. More gibberish. A foreign government came into a foreign jurisdiction to attack him. Apparently he feels that the federal government has no authority within the provinces. If this was the case it would have no power anywhere since Canada is comprised of provinces. Maybe, if they push it, they couold have some standing in the Yukon, Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories. Anyhow he slowly got tuckered out and stopped. I suppose that even ironmen talking machines like Millar and Lawson have to get worn down eventually.

Judge said that she wanted to craft her reasons carefully so she would give them at 10:00 tomorrow. There are two civilian witnesses tomorrow. Millar said that he was curious about them. They shouldn't testify because they are private persons. Forcing them to testify against him would be a breach of contract and a breach of trust. Court would be putting them in the position of breaching private confidential relationships between private persons. I'd suggest he save that argument until the judge gives her decision tomorrow.

Judge adjourned until tomorrow.

[notorial dissent]

OMG And I thought some of our nutters were bad.

[Burnaby49]

I had to revise my last posting a bit because it was pointed out to me that, from time to time, I was calling Millar "Lawson". An entirely understandable error since they are almost totally interchangeable in my mind. They are both narcissistically self-obsessed with their own genius in analyzing income tax law. They both have the unshakable belief that they are entirely right and everybody else is entirely wrong. They actually share the same arguments and had at least one joint hearing (I've not yet reported it) where they acted together in arguing the gibberish I've related in both of their discussions. Jurisdiction, capitalization, private person, natural man, private contacts, these are interchangeable between them and both have given all of them their best shot.

If I had to make a distinction between them I'd say that Millar is the more entertaining as you can gather from the report I posted of him getting arrested at his own hearing. He rants and storms in indignity about how unjustly he is treated, how the world must recognize his brilliance and accede to whatever he demands. Lawson just drones on and on in a monotone, relentlessly grinding me down.

[Burnaby49]

June 2, 2016

Home stretch, my last posting on Millar's trial. Not the last posting on Millar however. He has a hearing coming up where he plans to try and get proceedings stayed on the basis of undue delay. A delay that, as far as I can see, was mostly caused by him. Then he has yet to get a decision on his trial. When he's convicted he'll have a sentencing hearing then get a shot at appealing. God knows what grounds he'll dredge up for that. Sadly I'll probably be the guy there recording and posting it all.

Well on to my last day attending his trial. The first order of business was the judge's decision on Millar's doomed applications from yesterday. No matter! He has a bright new shiny one to try out on the court today. However ruling first. Judge read from notes so this is my best attempt at getting them down on paper;

Mr. Millar is charged under a four count indictment. False tax returns, tax evasion, and counseling fraud. He filed two notices of application. One contained two separate notices. I dismissed one and heard the other two.

- Private property of natural person. He seeks exclusion of all evidence.
- Audio or video are private conversations of private persons and seizure a breach of private rights.

The evidence includes a warrant to search a bachelor suite on August 25, 2010. The documents seized stated they were confidential contracts between private persons. He raises concerns at the search claiming the status of a private person.

Something about a bundle of documents. He claims a breach of his rights under section 8 of the Charter. His primary argument is that he is a private person entering into private contracts.

Note - This is section 8 of the Charter;

8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.

Mr. Millar is correct that there is legislation concerning private persons and natural persons. The judge cited some examples from the Criminal Code. It is a basic principle of interpreting legislation that it is to be red as a whole and for their entire sense. These sections were making distinctions between persons and corporations.

I accept that there is (?). However Mr. Millar says he can chose when he becomes a private person and exempt himself from a search. There is no such principle in law.

I this case the warrant was issued under section 487 of the Criminal Code.

This is 487(1);

487 (1) A justice who is satisfied by information on oath in Form 1 that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is in a building, receptacle or place

(a) anything on or in respect of which any offence against this Act or any other Act of Parliament has been or is suspected to have been committed,

(b) anything that there are reasonable grounds to believe will afford evidence with respect to the commission of an offence, or will reveal the whereabouts of a person who is believed to have committed an offence, against this Act or any other Act of Parliament,

(c) anything that there are reasonable grounds to believe is intended to be used for the purpose of committing any offence against the person for which a person may be arrested without warrant, or

(c.1) any offence-related property,

may at any time issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer or a public officer who has been appointed or designated to administer or enforce a federal or provincial law and whose duties include the enforcement of this Act or any other Act of Parliament and who is named in the warrant

(d) to search the building, receptacle or place for any such thing and to seize it, and

(e) subject to any other Act of Parliament, to, as soon as practicable, bring the thing seized before, or make a report in respect thereof to, the justice or some other justice for the same territorial division in accordance with section 489.1.

Millar says that the voir dire necessary because the search interfered with his private rights. I reject that argument. The Criminal Code is valid federal legislation. Mr. Millar is correct that section 92 of the Constitution Act gives provinces authority over property however that fact that the Criminal Code and Income Tax Act affect property does not make them ultra vires.

Mr. Millar argued about the location of the search saying that it didn't fall within the area in section 9 of the Supreme court Act. That section does not have any bearing on Millar's accommodation. Mr. Millar wants a declaration that this is the Vancouver-New Westminster. This court does not give such a declaration.

This is section 9 of the Supreme Court Act;

9 (1) The court continues to be a court of original jurisdiction and has jurisdiction in all cases, civil and criminal, arising in British Columbia.

(2) The court may sit and act, at any time and at any place, for the transaction of any part of its business, civil or criminal, or for the discharge of any duty.

(2.1) Without limiting subsection (2), and despite any rule of law or enactment to the contrary, any criminal or civil matter that under any rule of law or enactment is to be or must be heard, or that an accused or a party is entitled to have heard, by the court in one of the County of Vancouver or the County of Westminster may be heard at any place within the Vancouver Westminster Judicial District that the court appoints.

(3) Subject to the direction of the Chief Justice, the court must sit in each place where there is a registry of the court as often as is necessary for the reasonable dispatch of civil trials and other business.

(4) The registrar must prepare a calendar of the dates when the court proposes to sit in any place to be published in the registry located there.

The judge said that section 5 of the Law and Equity Act had no application to criminal proceedings. Nor does section 9, that section has no relevance. Section 44 is not applicable to these proceedings. Section 57 is not applicable to a criminal case.

Mr. Millar made an argument that may require further evidence. This was regarding electronic evidence (Skype). Mr. Millar considers it like a wiretap. I will give Mr. Millar opportunity to object. (note - I assume this means when Crown tries to enter it at trial.)

In summary I dismiss Millar's application that there was a violation of his rights under section 8 of the Charter. He is entitled to make an application that items were seized outside the warrant.

My notes are almost illegible at this point but they seem to say that Millar had a new application on the same issues;

1 - An order that the contracts for hire are privileged.
2 - An order that the contracts for hire establish a trust relationship
3 - An order that the examination of his students not be allowed.

He just doesn't stop. He'd be happy to keep doing this over and over forever. Judge said that she dismissed this application as well. Millar zeroed in on the "outside of search warrant" comment and electronic evidence and wanted to renew application on electronic evidence. Judge told him he could object when Crown sought to tender it at trial.

Crown counsel said that she wanted notice of scope of any application regarding Millar's attempt to exclude any evidence he considered outside the scope of the warrant. Judge - Mr. Millar, if you are going to claim evidence was outside the warrant you have to give Crown notice of it or it may be disallowed.

Crown - Millar plans to bring similar applications about the privacy of his bank records. I raise it now because we plan to question witnesses on the bank records. He claims they have the status of private documents.

Judge - I made my ruling that the contracts were admissible. So is there any basis for wanting to exclude these records? Millar - General principle that the bank account was established and identified by private person. The bank has a fiduciary responsibility. Judge - Where is this principle from? (good question. Millar is really big on vague general principles that he claims justify whatever he wants but is very short on law to support his nonsense). A lot of his normal babbling. There is a distinction between the business records of a bank and the records of records of individuals. (Quite true. Banks don't mix their own business records with those of their depositors. So what?) I want the distinction made if these are business records of the bank or of the private person. These were set up as an account of a private person with expectations of privacy. These are private records not records of an artificial person.

Judge - Thank you, I don't need to hear from the Crown. Mr. Millar has objected to his bank records entered in evidence. They belong to a private person. When documents are seized under a search warrant they can be entered at trial. Notwithstanding claims of confidentiality. The fact that the Crown is tendering bank records as business records is not significant. I reject the application.

So, with the applications finally done we got back to the actual trial and one of Millar's students was called as a witness, woman I'd guess in late 40's.

Q - You have a folder? What is in it?
A - Contracts for hire.

Q - What is your job?
A - Supervisor of administration for legal services.

Witness had previously worked for Ubiquity, a privately owned health and welfare center.

Q - Who owned it?
A Ronald and Ellen Conn.

Ronald Conn and Ubiquity are going to play a significant part in both this and the next witnesses testimony so I'll make a digression and give a little of Ronald's background. He's this guy;

B.C.'s securities watchdog says a Vancouver couple bilked 21 investors out of more than $1 million by selling bad shares in a company that produces a hair-restoration product.

Ronald James Conn and his wife Sze Man "Ella" Conn were arrested outside of a Vancouver home last week after a lengthy investigation by the B.C. Security Commission's Criminal Investigations Team and the Vancouver Police Department.

Ronald Conn faces 15 counts under the Criminal Code and 119 counts under the Securities Act for unlawful trading, fraud and breach of bail conditions. Ella Conn is charged with five counts under the Securities Act and 15 under the Criminal Code.

The BCSC says Ronald Conn, and to a lesser extent his wife, solicited over a million dollars from investors between July 2008 and 2010, while he was already banned from trading securities in British Columbia.

Authorities say the couple conducted illegal activities from multiple offices in Vancouver's West Side and Coquitlam.

Ella Conn has been released on bail, while her husband remains in custody awaiting a bail hearing.

This is the third arrest for Ronald Conn and second for Ella Conn related to illegal trading in the securities of the company Follicles. The previous arrests stem from 20 charges against the couple.

Ronald Conn has a lengthy history with the BCSC, with infractions and investigations dating back 14 years.

Ronald Conn was handed a 15-year ban from trading in 1997 for his involvement with Mindoro, a gold and platinum mining exploration company. He also received a $50,000 administrative fine, which he has yet to repay, according to the BCSC. Two other officers of Mindoro were found guilty of distributing shares illegally to 170 investors and lying about the potential earning returns.

In that case, the BCSC concluded that Conn illegally distributed thousands of inflated and illegal company shares while working as an experienced mutual funds salesman – the type of activity he had a professional obligation to prevent.

Ronald Conn induced clients to invest in Mindoro, with his success earning him almost $400,000 US in sales commission. Conn found many of his investors through a course he taught through the Vancouver School Board called Successful Money Strategies Seminars. The course was advertised as introducing participants to wise money management, including maximum investment returns.

The BCSC said that after Ronald Conn realized that Mindoro was a scam, he started another illegal distribution with a company called La Paloma "in a desperate attempt to recoup his clients' investment."

Ronald Victor Markham, whom the BCSC called "the mastermind" behind the Mindoro plan, received a lifetime ban from trading and a $100,000 fine for his participation.

Because Ronald Conn was banned from trading at the time of his arrest, some of the securities charges are upgraded to more serious charges under the Criminal Code.

http://bc.ctvnews.ca/watchdog-says-coup ... s-1.667697

David Baines, our local scam investigator, had an appropriate header for his article;

DAVID BAINES

Lightning strikes thrice for man charged with hair-raising stock follies
In early 2010, BCSC investigators found evidence that Ronald Conn was selling shares of Follicles Worldwide and a related company, Roneen Holdings Ltd.

In May 2010, at the urging of BCSC staff, Crown counsel charged him under the Securities Act with the illegal sale of securities, and with breaching his earlier suspension order. He was arrested and released on bail. That matter is set for trial starting Dec. 6.

One of the bail conditions was that he refrains from promoting or selling securities. But according to BCSC enforcement staff, Ronald Conn, assisted by his wife, continued to sell shares of Follicles Worldwide.

In October 2010, they were arrested on new charges and released on bail. That trial is set for April 23, 2012.

Then lightning struck again last week when they were re-arrested on similar charges. No trial date has been set for this third set of charges.

http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/re ... d=65080626

So what happened to those charges and trials? Time to check BC Courts Online. The record is confusing, at least to me. Conn has had numerous charges and hearings from 2008 to February of this year. As far as I can tell this one is done;

Ronald Conn faces 15 counts under the Criminal Code and 119 counts under the Securities Act for unlawful trading, fraud and breach of bail conditions.

File Number 219961 which has the 119 Securities Act charges had a sentencing hearing for him on February 12, 2016 but I can't figure out the sentence or final charges.

Conn also co-authored this book full of new age gibberish;

Take an exciting new journey into the new shift revolutionalizing health care in this provocative handbook on Ubiquitology - healing by connecting mind and body with Spirit. Ronald Conn, Founder of Ubiquity Wellness Centre, North America's foremost private preventative, natural wellness clinic, reveals how after his Near Death Experience he gave birth to his vision and has used revolutionary Ubiquitous healing methods to help thousands achieve their health and wellness goals. Learn how to stay in the Peak Living Zone as Ed Rychkun, Reiki Master and Spiritual Writer takes you to the bottom line of how the Subtle Laws of the Universe work. He tells you why your life is the way it is, and how, by paying attention to the laws of subtle energies, manifesting a better quality life can become a reality. Ronald and Ed provide a mind blowing handbook taking you onto the fast-track to optimum health and quality life through their simple Mind, Body and Spirit Code.

https://www.amazon.ca/Shift-Happened-Ub ... 0978262336

It should be noted that the motto of Paradigm Education Group, Russell Porisky's tax evasion business, was "Shift Happens". As you'll see from the witness testimony the similarity of Conn's book title to Paradigm's motto is almost certainly not coincidental.

So, with that background, back to our witness.

Q - What is Paradigm Education Group?
A - An organization that worked with the Constitution applying the Constitution to natural persons.
Q - How did you hear of it?
A - When was hired at Ubiquity Wellness I was told that I had to meet an individual to discuss how they arranged their contracts.
Q - Who was this?
A - Michael Spencer. Witness pointed at defendant. (Note - Millar's full name is Michael Spencer Millar and he sometimes uses his middle name as his last name.)
Q - Describe the meeting.
A - We met and he went through an application for him as an agent.

Q - What did you understand what you had to do to work at Ubiquity?
A - A portion of my cheque was paid to Mr. Millar.
Q - How much?
A - 7%. Also 3% paid by Ronald Conn to Michael.

Q - What was the purpose of applying the natural person to . . .
Millar - Objection.
Court - Sustained. Too vague.

Millar asked if what he'd said to witness was hearsay. No. If you said something to her it is admissible.

Q - What was Mr. Millar's role in Paradigm?
A - To educate contractors about natural persons
Q - What did Millar tell you about Paradigm?
A - Not much. He just ran through the contracts.

Q - Who was present at the first meeting?
A - Millar and I?
Q - What, at that meeting, did he tell you about Paradigm?
A - Not much. Just that I had to sign to work at Ubiquity.
Q - Did you sign any other Contracts?
A - Just a contract with the owner of Ubiquity.

Morning break.

After break Crown passed some documents to the witness and asked if she recognized them. Yes.

Q - What is it?
A - A folder with contracts for hire, independent agent contract, contract for hire between me and Paradigm.
Q - Where did these documents come from?
A - Michael.

Court - Which Michael? Michael Spencer. Crown entered the documents into evidence and Millar objected. "Those are private confidential agreements between private people." Court - "I've overruled that objection."

Crown put the documents on the screen and went through the contract for hire between Michael - Educator and the witness. Then an agreement between the witness and Ubiquity setting down the terms of the contract of her employment.

Crown asked witness when she last saw the documents and she started getting hazy about when she gave the document to the Crown.

Q - Did you receive any other documents from Millar?
A - When I went to classes about natural persons.

The witness talked about the classes for a bit, how they learned about the structure of the basic law, said they had an educator. Crown asked who and witness got very snippy. "I'm sick and tired of calling him Michael Spencer or Michael Millar. Can I just call him Michael? Court - Yes.

Q - During the term of the contract for hire and independent agent agreement did you pay income tax?
A - No. Why? I was a natural person. Did Millar tell you that you had a choice of paying or not? Don't recall.

Q - What was your understanding of what Millar taught you?
A - He taught us what a natural person was. She said something about the Statistics Act that I didn't catch. Witness couldn't remember or explain the details of what Millar had taught.

Witness had brought some documents that Millar had sold her. One was Porisky's Freedom For All which was put into evidence. Court asked Millar if he had any objections. Witness asked "Does this mean that I won't get it back? Court - It will be a long while. Witness - No, I don't want to give it up. Millar finally objected. "It's not relevant and she doesn't want to give it up." Witness - Can I interject? Court - Yes. The information on the document is the same as the CD (the CD that the Crown had copied all of the evidence on). Court asked Crown if they could have the witness identify a different copy. Crown said that the difficulty was that they would have to break open an evidence box and affect continuity of evidence. So Crown had the witness verify that her same copy was the same as the scammed copy. Yes, identical. Millar - "I admit that these are the same". Court - We won't take your book. Witness thanked the court and said that there was information in it over and above what they taught in Paradigm.

Crown went through her Paradigm education.

Q - Who were in the classes?
A - People at Ubiquity.
Q - Who?
A - Witness mentioned five other people. Said it was sporadic. Sometimes people came, sometimes they didn't. Sometimes four, sometimes seven.

Q - Who taught the courses?
A - Michael.
Q - Anyone else?
A - No. Witness said that she went to these courses for at least a year. She worked two and a half years at Ubiquity.

Q - Where were the classes held?
A - At Ubiquity or at Michaels's home.

Witness identified a few other documents. Copies of cheques she paid for training materials. Direct examination ended after these documents were entered and a few more questions. One I wrote up so badly I have no idea what it is, and these;

Q - Did Michael tell you how much you owed in tax under a contract for hire?
A - No.

Q - Did Michael tell you anything to put on your tax returns?
A - "to the best of my knowledge" and "without understanding"

Then time for cross-examination.

Q - Who introduced us?
A - Either Ron or Ella.
Q - You didn't see a newspaper ad or infomercial?
A - no.

Q - You said that you had to sign a contract to work with Ubiquity.
A - Yes

Q - Court - Did either Ron or Ella tell you that they only hired contractors?
A - Yes.

Q - So that was their decision, nothing to do with me?
A - Yes

Q - So you asked me to enter into a contract to get the education you needed?
A - No. I was introduced to you and had to take the courses to work.

Q - You were contracting as a natural person?
A - Yes.

Q - You learned a lot about law, common law, other types of law?
A - Yes.

Q - Your contract was in the geographical area of Vancouver.
A - Yes.

Q - And you learned about different jurisdictions?
A - I can't recall.

He referred her to two different contracts. One between her and Millar and one between her and Ubiquity. He asked some question that rambled on and made no sense to me until Crown objected.

Q - Did you request these contracts?
A - no.

Q - You had the choice to attend classes, how many to attend . . . Objection, multi-part.
Q - Did you voluntarily attend classes?
A - Yes.

Q - Did you believe I tried to stir you up? Objection. Her beliefs are irrelevant.
Q - Did you believe I was stirring you up or persuading or encouraging you to anything you did not already want to do?
Court - I'm going to allow it.
A - No, he did not.

Q - did you apply the information taught to filing taxes?
A - Yes.
Q - Of your free will?
A - Yes.
Q - You knew potential consequences?
A - Yes.

Q - The education was not solely about income taxes?
A - Correct.

Q - Do you remember that, overall, it was about human rights and taxes only a part of it?
A - Yes. The material was not solely about taxes. It was about Canadian law, Charter of Rights, Constitution, Statistics Act, about how natural persons came to be in common law.

Q - Did you enjoy it?
A - No. I hate law.

Q - Have you red the Income Tax Act?
A - No.
Q - Do you understand it?
A - No. I have used an accountant to file my returns since I was twenty-four.

Then Millar started asking about taxes and Crown objected.

)A note here. Burnaby49 has read the Income Tax Act, almost all of it. I spent 35 years enforcing it. I can say with some certainty that nobody really understands it.)

Q - Your student contract, did you intend it to be private between us, excluding all others?
A - Yes. When I reread it I realized I'd violated the agreement.

Q - When the CRA interviewed you about our relationship did you do it voluntarily?
Crown - Objection on relevance.
Court to Millar - What is relevance? Then allowed.

Q - did you do it voluntarily or did you feel intimidated?
A - I did it voluntarily.

Millar - Did you? Sorry, I didn't expect your answer.

Lunch then back to cross.

You used a phrase a number of times "I had to" but I can't recall context. Oh, there we are. Related to classes.

Q - Both places the classes were held were private places, right?
A - Yes.
Q - Contract was between you and I?
A - Yes.
Q - Did you intent Canada Revenue to be a party to the contract to hire?
A - No.
Q - Did you intend Her Majesty to be part of contract?
A - No.
Q - You intended to have a one on one relationship with all other parties excluded?
A - Yes.
Q - Did I tell you not to put your private compensation on the tax form or was it a choice you made?
A - Choice I made.
Q - Did I tell you that education was about learning about your rights?
A - Yes.

Those are my questions.

So Crown had redirect;

Q - At the beginning of cross you referred as "most unfortunate time of my life" working for Ubiquity. Why?
A - Dealing with taxes.

Rather than give Q&A on this I'll just give summary. Witness got into trouble with CRA by deciding to file tax returns on basis of Paradigm's teachings. She ended up having to pay back taxes and interest. All and all I'd say that she got off lightly.

Millar got one more shot so he lead off with this monstrosity of a question. The contract for hire was a requirement of Ubiquity but you were free to decide with how you filed taxes so did you feel some pressure? Objection. Lots in one sentence. Judge asked him to clarify.

Q - Were you uncertain?
A - The teachings from Paradigm were very well worded and had strong validity. When it was time to pay taxes I was torn between what I'd been doing and what I'd been learning at Paradigm. I thought I was right but later had remorse about how I'd filed. It was my decision not Paradigm's or Michaels. She admitted that she'd voluntarily not reported her income. But she later filed amended returns showing her actual income.

And that was it for this witness. Crown said that there were only two more civilian witnesses rather than the planned five.

So on to second witness, another Ubiquity employee, who told a story essentially the same as the first. He was employed by them for five years. He described Ubiquity as a naturopathic business. Ronald Conn was his cousin. He called himself a business development manager which meant that he arranged loans and financing for clients.

Q - Have you herd of paradigm?
A - Yes

Q - What is it?
A - A group that taught about being a natural person rather than an artificial person.

Q - When did you hear about natural persons?
A - When I joined Ubiquity. I was told how I didn't have to pay tax.

Q - Who told you that?
A - My cousin. And a Mr. Porisky told him by phone that he didn't have to pay tax.

Q - Who did you know at Paradigm?
A - Michael Spencer. I met him at my first week in Ubiquity. My cousin told me that to work for Ubiquity I had to take Paradigm courses. He mentioned the contracts saying that 7% of what he was paid at Ubiquity went to Paradigm. He didn't pay it, the money was taken at source. He entered into a contract for hire between himself and Millar. He went through the same story about the Paradigm education as the first witness. Millar taught them. He and his wife attended classes, they worked together at Ubiquity.

Q - How many people were at meetings?
A - Five generally.

Q - What was the purpose of establishing yourself as a natural person?
A - The main point was that a natural person was not subject to income tax.

He entered some documents into evidence. Court asked "Any objections Mr. Millar, you generally object." "They are private documents." "Apart from that?" "No."

So witness entered documents into evidence the same as the first witness. Millar objected to every one on the basis that they were private property. Overruled.

Q - did you pay income tax on money you earned at Ubiquity?
A - Not at the time but I have since.

Q - Did Millar give you instructions on filing?
A - Mr. Millar told me to file but had us put square brackets. (Note - that is what I have in my notes but either I missed something or witness did not elaborate.)
Q - Did you declare your Ubiquity income on your return?
A - No.
Q - Why?
A - I believed that as a natural person I did not have to pay tax.

Q - Did you pay later?
A - Yes I did. I went to an accountant who had us declare it.

Note - I assume that the accountant tried to report the income under the CRA's voluntary disclosure program. If a taxpayer voluntarily reports undisclosed income he is assesses and pays interest but not penalties. There are some rules regarding whether or not taxpayers qualify for voluntary disclosure.

The disclosure must be voluntary. This means that you don't qualify if the CRA asks you to file a return or starts an audit.

Your disclosure must be complete. Taxpayers often get cute and only disclose income that they think the CRA is going to find anyhow. If the CRA finds othe income not disclosed the voluntary disclosure is invalidated.

A penalty must be involved. In other words, if after looking at a draft of the information you want to disclose, you find that you owe no taxes or penalties are not likely to be assessed, the VDP may not be for you.

The information or return must be more than a year old to qualify. The VDP does not apply to current filings.

So, as I understand the program, Millar would have qualified had he disclosed his Paradigm income before the CRA was aware that he was a Paradigm educator or sold Paradigm materials. This opportunity would have ended once Russell Porisky's computer was seized since the CRA then had the information necessary to identify him. The voluntary disclosure program would only have affected his tax evasion charges. He would still have been charged with counseling fraud, the most serious of his charges.

It appeared from the witness's testimony that the CRA contacted him before he went to an accountant. This would have disqualified him from taking advantage of voluntary disclosure.

This ended Crown's questions. We had a break then on to Millar's cross-examination.

Q - Ron Conn established your connection with Paradigm?
A - Yes,
Q - In order to work at Ubiquity you had to be hired as an independent contractor?
A - Yes.
Q - Set up by Ron?
A - Yes.

Q - I was introduced to you through Ubiquity.
A - Yes.

Q - You entered into a contract with me voluntarily?
A - Yes.
Q - As a natural person?
A - Yes.
Q - In Jurisdiction of British Columbia?
A - yes.
Q - Do you remember the contract defining the jurisdiction of Vancouver, British Columbia, and Canada?
A - I don't remember.

Q - Did you freely chose to attend Paradigm classes?
A - Yes.

Q - Did I tell you that you had to implement information?
A - No.

Q - Were the classes in a private area?
A - yes.

Q - Have you read and understood the Income Tax Act?
Objection. Not relevant.

Q - Did you intend the contract for hire to be a private contract between you and I excluding all others?
A - Don't remember.
Q - Did you intend the contract to include or exclude the CRA?
A - Exclude.
Q - Did you intend to include or exclude Her Majesty?
A - Include.
Q - You are aware that Her Majesty collects taxes?
A - Oh, exclude.

Millar asked a number of questions identical to those asked the first witness and got "I don't remember".

There was a short redirect and then witness done and court over for the day.

[Burnaby49]

Now it can be told!

I like a punchy opening. However, like tabloid headlines, the contents are much more mundane. This posting covers a two day Supreme Court of British Columbia hearing held on March 22nd and 23rd, 2016 relating to a voir dire on an application by the Crown. It was a joint hearing for three accused Poriskyites;

Debbie Anderson;
viewtopic.php?f=50&t=10747

Michael Spencer Millar;
viewtopic.php?f=50&t=10834

Keith Lawson;
viewtopic.php?f=50&t=8223

The Crown wanted a ruling that the records seized from Russell Porisky's house which related to the three defendants could be submitted in evidence at their trials as business records and have the documents excluded from the best evidence rules. As I understand it this would eliminate the necessity of proving them all. The three accused opposed allowing the evidence as business records. At least this was the purported reason for the defendant's objection. The session quickly turned into yet another venue for Millar and Lawson's demented obsessions with capitalization, private documents, private persons acting in their private capacity, and jurisprudence. One of the most manic sessions I've yet attended.

So why have I waited over six months to report it? As explained later in this posting I was the subject of a personal publication ban on the proceedings! What this meant was that I could not publish anything about the hearing until all three trials, if they were jury trials, were concluded. The theory is that jurors or potential jurors might read my postings and might, as a result, might become biased against the defendants. This continues right through trial because I often hear information not available to the jurors because they have been excluded while the parties and judge discuss issues. The ban did not include trials by judge alone because judges are supposedly immune to being influenced by my babbling.

The problem with this was Debbie Anderson. Lawson's jury trial is done and Millar re-elected to be tried by a judge. But Debbie's trial has yet to be held and, until very recently, she was full-speed ahead on having a jury trial. Apparently she's been giving that some second thought after juries found Porisky, Gould, and Lawson guilty on all counts in almost indecent haste. So last Friday she re-elected for a trial by judge effectively ending the publication ban. I've had this posting written up for months in anticipation of this so here it is.


Tuesday March 22, 2016

Another day in court another personalized publication ban. I was back in my old Nanaimo Three and Charles Norman Holmes territory at the New Westminster courthouse. It had been almost two years since I was here last, attending the Alexander Ream trial and handicapped by five broken ribs.

A busy courtroom at the start. Three defendants, one lawyer representing Anderson (I won't bother to introduce him he won't be in the cast of characters very long), two court clerks, two Crown counsel (same pair that handled the Porisky/Gould trial), a sheriff and the judge. Nobody in the public seating except me and another Crown lawyer watching the proceedings. That would change in a few minutes when Debbie Anderson changed status from a party to the proceedings to a spectator and spent the rest of the day sitting just down the row from me.

Lawson and Millar introduced themselves to the judge as being there in their private capacity as private persons making Special Appearances. Debbie didn't introduce herself. Lawson immediately noted that he was trying to get everything stopped because the court did not have jurisdiction over him. We got a lot of that later. Millar popped up and stated he was also challenging the court's jurisdiction. We got LOTS of that later from him.

A word about the judge before we begin. Not the same judge as the March 16th hearing. A blunt no-nonsense guy who had no compunction against stomping on Millar and Lawson when required. It was required a lot today.

Debbie's lawyer spoke immediately after the introductions saying that Debbie was not contesting the Crown's application to allow the documents to be entered into evidence in her trial. He said that his retainer had "extinguished" immediately after he made that concession on Debbie's behalf and he no longer represented her. So he asked the court to release him from representing her and when judge approved he was gone. Debbie, no longer a party, came and sat down in the public seating and remained there for the rest of the day. A long day.

Lawson said that he had issues to discuss. He's unclear on something. He'd filed his arguments on jurisdictional issues last Friday. Judge immediately squashed him on that one. He said that the court very clearly had jurisdiction over Lawson. He cited R. v Anderson, Debbie's own case, where he'd said;

E. Jurisdiction of the Court to hear this case

[34] Ms. Anderson also seeks a declaration that the British Columbia Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to try Counts 1 and 2 until after the Tax Court of Canada determines the exact amount of tax she has allegedly evaded. She cites s. 12(1) of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2, as authority for this proposition. That section provides that the Tax Court “has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine references and appeals to the Court on matters arising under the … Income Tax Act”.

[35] Ms. Anderson’s understanding is not correct. This jurisdictional issue was canvassed and dismissed by Bauman C.J.B.C. in R. v. McCartie, 2012 BCSC 928 (CanLII):

[11] I agree with the essence of the Crown’s submission at para. 22 of its argument:

[22] … The Redpath decision does not anywhere indicate that tax evasion charges should proceed in the Tax Court. Nowhere does the decision say that the provincial-level courts are without jurisdiction to try a criminal tax evasion case. Rather, the decision stands for the proposition that civil taxation questions should not be adjudicated in the criminal process.

[12] A similar view was taken by Justice Myers in R. v. Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356 (CanLII), where the taxpayers similarly brought application to quash tax evasion charges. They, too, raised the taxability/jurisdiction argument. Justice Myers rejected that submission as premature (at para. 20):

[20] I do not agree that the Crown is obliged to seek a remedy in tax court rather than launch a prosecution for tax evasion. There have been several cases in which the Crown has obtained convictions for tax evasion and failure to remit GST. While Mr. Lawson cited cases in which the courts have acquitted on charges of tax evasion and remarked in their decisions that the Crown should have pursued the matter in tax court as a collection matter; that is, a decision that is made at a trial or preliminary inquiry. It is not for this Court to pre-determine that issue by way of a motion for a prerogative remedy.

[13] In my view, that disposes of this aspect of the applicants’ argument.

[36] Moreover, a criminal court may determine the amount of tax allegedly evaded for the purpose of sentencing: see R. v. Alexander Street Lofts Development Corp., 2007 ONCA 309 (CanLII), leave to appeal ref’d [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 378, at paras. 28-31. Thus, if Ms. Anderson is convicted, and were the court to assess a fine, the court would have to determine the total amount of taxes evaded.

[37] There is no merit in Ms. Anderson’s position on this point.

http://canlii.ca/t/gkkbp

So he was not going to listen to any jurisdictional arguments. As the hearing later showed that didn't stop Millar and Lawson from making them ad nauseam.

So then Lawson decided to tell the court about me! "There's a gentleman in the public gallery who is detailing these hearings in his blog so I want the court to include him in the publication ban." Apparently I'm moving up in his estimate because last week he only described me as an "individual". Crown did not have any objection because this hearing was already covered by the previous bans since evidence was being entered. So they were fine with Lawson's request and I was banned yet again, this time for all three defendants. As with the ban last week the court used it's "inherent jurisdiction". So a word about inherent jurisdiction. The Supreme court of British Columbia is the highest level of trial court in the province of British Columbia. So any legal issues not covered by the lower courts are automatically covered by the Supreme Court's inherent jurisdiction. A pretty sweet deal for the Supreme Court judges. This wasn't the end of the day's discussion about the issue of the publication ban. The judge would keep returning to me during the course of the day.

I'll give my understanding of the law respecting publication bans since it seems to be suddenly and unexpectedly affecting me very intimately. Firstly as I understand it the ban only applies to jury trials. The intent is to stop jurors or potential jurors from being unfairly prejudiced against the defendants by something they have read in the media. So the ban only applies to jury trials on the assumption that judges are beyond being influenced by the gutter press. The "standard" ban covered by the legislation allows judges to impose a ban that covers two circumstances;

1 - Reporting on the actual trial in progress.
2 - Reporting on pre-trial hearings where evidence is submitted to the court.

So the hearing last week was not subject to the existing publication ban until the judge extended it because it was pre-trial, not trial, and no evidence was entered.

Today's extended ban was totally pointless because all three defendants already have standard bans which preclude me from posting anything about the current hearing because of prohibition 2. The bans are individually automatically lifted when the respective juries go into deliberations but I can't post anything about these joint hearings until all three trials are concluded since posting about one of them is posting about all of them. I already knew this before today's hearing but the judge decided to spell it out for me anyhow when he expanded the ban today. On top of that there was an orange sign on the registrar's table facing the public seating saying "BAN IN EFFECT"

So we finally got started with the Crown's submissions. The Crown's application was to have the judge approve the use of the documents seized during the search of Porisky's house. Specifically Two folders taken from a filing cabinet, one with Lawson's name on it the other with Millar's. They wanted them excluded from the hearsay rules and allowed as business documents.

Here is my understanding of the hearsay and business document issues. Generally document have to be proven because they are hearsay. This involves getting the maker of the document to testify that he produced it. Obviously this is impossible if large quantities of business records are involved. To start with there is the sheer volume. And, generally, it's not possible to identify who produced specific records or even if actual people did it rather than computers. It is also assumed that business records are correct, that's the whole point of having them. So a hearsay exception is made for them. These are the American rules on it, I assume Canadian rules are similar.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_ ... _exception

So the Crown argued that the seized records were business records and therefore not hearsay. Counsel ran through the general types of documents seized. The first category of documents were contracts between Paradigm and Millar/Lawson and between Millar/Lawson and their students. The second category were invoices, generally for Paradigm products and fees.

The Crown also wanted to avoid having to use the best evidence rule which required that the original document seized be used at trial. Judge cut in to note that counsel was not including Debbie Anderson in their arguments. Counsel said that it wasn't necessary since she was not contesting the application. Back on track the originals were not available because they were still in the custody of the Supreme Court of British Columbia pending the end of the Porisky/Gould trial. While the trial itself was concluded and verdicts reached the case wasn't over until their sentencing on May 24th and the Crown didn't want to prejudice a jury (I assume Lawson's jury since his trial is scheduled prior to Porisky sentencing) by having to tell them why original evidence not available.

Crown said that these documents were produced in the usual and ordinary course of Paradigm's business. Paradigm was a business in a broad sense. The judge agreed that Paradigm was a business since it produced and sent invoices.

We had to stand down at this point because of technical problems. Crown couldn't get samples of documents being considered up on the computer screens. Turned out to be a faulty cable and back at it at 11:00. Crown went through some of Lawson's educator documents seized at Porisky residence which detailed the terms of agreement between Lawson, Millar, and Paradigm. She quoted one line that said that they must act with the highest standards of ethics. Lawson cut in to say that he didn't know what Paradigm is. Judge told him he could cover that at trial. Right now they were just here to discuss "broad brush" availability of evidence. Crown agreed and said that it would be up to the jury to determine relevance of the documents.

The Crown was trying to connect documents seized at the Porisky residence with document seized at the Lawson and Millar residences. There were no bank documents seized at Lawson's home however the Canada Revenue Agency got them from the bank and they matched up to amounts in documents from Porisky search. Now 11:30 and break.

After break on to Millar documents. There are a number of Millar students who will testify at his trial on their contracts and dealings with him. I assume that they will verify their identities in the documents and attach them to Millar. Then a detailed walk through the seized Porisky documents trying to connect them to Millar. A lot of them were signed or came from "Spencer" which happens to be Millar's middle name. Crown suggested that these were documents prepared by Millar and sent to Porisky. I believe there were also bank records seized at Millar's home which matched up to at least some of the Porisky invoices. The Crown submitted that the accused were the authors of the documents and that the folders seized from the house were business documents.

Then lunch break. I headed off to Burnaby Hobbies, a 20 minute Skytrain ride and walk away so I skipped lunch. As I was walking to the Skytrain Station I noticed the three Crown counsel just going into a Japanese restaurant just by the station. Millar, Anderson and Lawson were walking behind me and they ended up in the same restaurant.

After lunch judge asked if we were on record. When it was confirmed that we were he said that, before we started again, he wanted to add a comment regarding the publication ban. He'd been giving it thought over lunch and decided, as best I understood it, to stipulate that there might be circumstances where it might not be necessary to wait until the last of the three trials was heard before lifting the ban. He said he wanted to allow for some flexibility. I had no idea what he meant but a lawyer I asked told me that he simply added a proviso to allow the order to be varied by further order of the court. Then back to business but there was still more about the ban later in the day.

Crown now into legal arguments. We set up the context (where records stored) and content (what records) so court should have no problem finding that the documents were business records. Crown submits that these were entirely normal types of business records. The issue for this vior dire is the admissibility of these records as business records. The reliability and weight to be given to the documents will be for the jury to decide. In respect to the joint written response by Millar and Lawson opposing the application the court has no jurisdiction to review the first part (I think this was the argument that the Supreme Court of British Columbia doesn't exist). That is for the trial judge. True enough, we have a two day hearing scheduled next week to thrash that one out. The defendants are making privacy claims that these are not business documents. They are implicitly suggesting some form of ownership of the documents suggesting some form of privilege. It is the Crown's position that there is no privilege. Lawson and Millar have not made any Charter arguments and have not argued that copies are unreliable. They have not argued that the documents are hearsay or irrelevant. It is the Crown's submission that the documents should be ruled admissible in the trials and accepted as business documents. Then Crown done.

The Crowns submission had been boring but that is the very nature of properly done legal submissions. It had been routine but logical and to the point. It flowed in a linear manner and made sense. Once the defendants started speaking all sense, relevance, logic and linear thinking fled the courtroom and didn't return. As crazed a session as I've attended with the possible exception of this one;

viewtopic.php?f=48&t=9388&start=260#p165879

Both Lawson and Millar had made written submissions, apparently very lengthy ones. I'm assuming that the arguments they raised orally matched those in their submissions. Lawson went up first. He said that he was unrepresented and he didn't want to make mistakes. So he asked the judge if arguing admissibility of evidence was going to affect his jurisdiction argument. Judge said no, there was no question that this court has jurisdiction for this hearing and the Crown has the right to make the application she has made. What you say here addresses only the issues in this court. Then Lawson brought up the Porisky search warrant and the admissibility of evidence obtained through the warrant. The judge cut him off. The validity of the Porisky search warrant is not relevant here. It has already been found valid and you can't argue it. The legality of the warrant is not a relevant issue here. If there was no finding in Porisky's case on the validity of the search warrant then it is already legally decided. All that is relevant in this court is whether the documents with your name on them are relevant in this court. It is not more complicated than that. The jury will decide on the totality of the evidence. These documents will be part of that totality. This voir dire is not to determine the weight to be given to the documents but whether they are relevant.

But Lawson couldn't leave the Porisky search warrant alone. He kept going back to it unconvinced that he couldn't get it thrown out by the court and the evidence obtained by it excluded. "Since Porisky's trial is concluded if we find a defect in the warrant would that be material here?" Judge "The legality of the search warrant is not relevant here even if it is faulty on it's face. It was relevant at Porisky's trial and not brought up. Even if you found minor errors in the warrant it would not be relevant anyhow because courts don't reverse on minor mistakes or defects."

Lawson seemed stunned by this and asked for a few moments to regroup so Millar took over. Judge encouraged Millar and Lawson to read out their submissions into the record. So Millar read what were essentially a few bullet points of it to kick-start his verbal rant. This report only captures part of Millar's statements because, once he was on a roll and got excited, it wasn't possible to do a complete transcript. At least not possible for me. Millar had bigger goals that the admissibility of a few documents. He wanted the whole trial tossed out because of fraudulent conduct by the Crown! The majority of his comments were complaints about how he wasn't being given fundamental justice and how mistreated he was by the Crown and the court. His fundamental justice argument seemed to be that the case had not been thrown out after he'd demanded it be thrown out. Unless he was allowed to unilaterally dismiss all the charges against him his rights had been irreparably violated. We got a lot of that, generally in an angry semi-rant in this session so I'll leave it out of the rest of this report.

Before Millar started the judge said "I want to caution you, I can't make it clearer, I don't want any submissions on jurisdiction wasting the court's time. There is clearly no question that the court has jurisdiction to hear this application". Good luck with that judge!

Millar replied "I have difficulty with that because it is straightforward to read the law and see that it hasn't been complied with. The application does not give the Crown standing to have jurisdiction to make it. A plain reading shows that it black and white that the Crown has no jurisdiction". Millar was like that all the way through the rest of the afternoon. Making the most preposterous statements with an absolute certainty that he fully understood the law and was instructing the judge.

The judge's response was "That is a general statement with no evidence." But Millar was already getting agitated. "They (Crown) are not in compliance with the law. And what about the territorial issue?" "What territorial issue?" Something about the County Boundaries Act and jurisdiction. Judge said "You don't understand Mr. Millar that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all of British Columbia". Millar wasn't having any of that nonsense.

Millar - The Crown hasn't established that proceedings are taking place in British Columbia. Criminal proceedings don't allow just upper case.

Judge - That's totally immaterial
Millar - That's just one example.
Judge - The rest better be better.
Millar - The legislation makes plain procedures and the prosecution is not using the prescribed styling.
Judge - If I tell you that I don't want to hear any more I want you to respect that and stop because you are wasting court time.

I was actually disappointed. I thought Millar might have something novel but he's living in the past, way, way in the past, flogging old already discredited arguments. This was what he was arguing, Some of the documents prepared by the Crown had styled the court as THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA but section 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act says;

2(1) The Supreme Court of British Columbia is continued under the name and style of the "Supreme Court of British Columbia".

And that was his whole point. The case against him had to be thrown out because the Crown had committed the criminal offense of using only upper case in some of their filings when the statute, in his dream world, required the use of both upper and lower cases for everything. Once, when freemen were young and vigorous and bursting with new ideas this was a crowd pleaser, a clear winner. Until it took a shit-kicking in court. Repeatedly. It's about as relevant today as this would be if it suddenly showed up on your television set.



I suppose that we need to show some charity here. Millar is getting on but is still living in a past when all things were still possible. Like so many of us he doesn't recognize that time has passed him by. His glory days were back in the old detaxer period of the late 1990s, early 2000's. Essentially all of the arguments he presented in court today came from that time period and are classic but failed old-school OPCA strategies. But Millar can't see it, he's too committed to his past investment in all of this to realize that it's dead and gone. The circus has folded it's tents and moved on but Millar is still standing in the fairground waiting hopefully for the clowns and elephants.

Over a year ago I posted the results of a trial hearing argued on this exact same basis on the use of upper and lower cases when using the name of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. It was a completely trivial local case I attended; Master Gee and his issues with paying his annual Burnaby business license fee;

viewtopic.php?f=48&t=10342

Master Gee used exactly the same argument as Millar except he expanded it to cover the CITY OF BURNABY too. I wrote;

Gildemeester immediately presented himself to the court as a private person acting in a private capacity and started arguing that the court didn't actually exist because its name on all the documents was in capital letters but in section 2.1 of the Supreme court of British Columbia Act it was in upper and lower case. He said he couldn't "relax" in court because the City of Burnaby was also styled in all capital letters in the various documents whereas it was in upper and lower case on the city website. Same with his and his wife's names. Everywhere he looked it was a fictitious alternate world of all capital letters. He wanted the court to issue an order that the documents all had to be changed to mixed case and that the court confirm that it was actually the Supreme Court of British Columbia acting as a Section 2.1 court. If it didn't his rights were not being respected. He said the fact that none of the documentation correctly identified the parties was a HUGE issue. He again demanded a court order. Judge wasn't buying it and refused saying that the capitalization issue was irrelevant. Well then, Gildemeester said, the case is over because it can't proceed if the parties and court are styled incorrectly. Judge said "We are proceeding". "You're going ahead?" Mark asked incredulously. The judge said he'd already ruled against him so the issue was finished. Mark rebutted by saying that this caused him to question the legitimacy of the proceedings. He kept going over and over the issue (at least it was an issue to him) about how neither Burnaby nor the court existed because of all those capital letters.

So Mark then demanded that the judge confirm that this was actually the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Judge responded "You know what court you are in". The judge said he hadn't memorized the Supreme Court of British Columbia Act so he had no idea what section 2.1 said but this was the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Mark accused the judge of sidestepping the issue. Mark said the judge was not willing to make him feel "safe" by confirming for the record that this was the real Supreme Court in adherence to 2.1 of the Supreme Court of British Columbia Act because this was obviously a court unknown to law "I don't want to participate in this court, I want to participate in a lawful court". Judge said "If you don't want to proceed that's fine but this application is proceeding regardless of your participation"

The judge stated in his decision;

[11] Mr. Gildemeester also objects that the petition refers to this court as THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA and that the proper name and style of the court is The Supreme Court of British Columbia. He makes the same objection about the City of Burnaby, based on their letters patent. He accuses the City of Burnaby of fraud. He also asserts that the City of Burnaby is on unceded First Nations lands. He has provided evidence that a person Mr. Gildemeester says is an Elder of the Squamish Nation has given him permission to use the land in this fashion.

[12] These defences are without merit. Mr. Gildemeester operates a business in the City of Burnaby. He is required to have a business licence. He is no different from other persons operating businesses in the City.

But past, failed cases mean nothing to Michael. He didn't argue them in court. This is a new day when dead arguments are miraculously resurrected!

He pulled out some unidentified document and said that the styling on it was in both upper and lower case. Then he started in on how he was here by Special Appearance. Judge told him to stop because special appearances were not recognized by this court. So Millar shifted to discussing the "defective fraudulent material" submitted by the Crown. "All documents related to me are a nullity because of defects". They'd failed to state the name of a court known to law. They'd also failed to stipulate his legal status. "The prosecution has had time to correct this and they've refused and caused irreparable prejudice against me". He used the phrase "irreparable prejudice against me" numerous times but I'm not going to repeat them all. He did a lot of ranting about his fundamental right to justice being denied due to the actions of the Crown and court and kept demanding that he receive the justice due to him which, apparently, was whatever justice he thought was due him. He said that the court had no jurisdiction because of these defects. If they were known to the public known they would shock the conscience of the community and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. He used the phrase "shock the conscience of the community and bring the administration of justice into disrepute" a number of times. It crossed my mind that the reason that the public doesn't know about the injustices being relentlessly inflicted on him was due to the publication bans which were imposed at the defendant's requests. Otherwise I'd be happy to shock the conscience of the community on his behalf by reporting how he is being martyred. Although Lawson had asked for today's publication ban I'm assuming that he did so on Millar's instructions. So Millar is actually acting against his best interests by having the ban.

The babbling by Millar about not knowing who or where he is because the Crown refuses to tell him. This goes back to comments he made in his December 9, 2015 hearing.

He said documents are invalidated in substance and form because of the case issue and are a nullity. He wanted a an order from the court of defining the "legal nature" of the plaintiff and defendant are because he doesn't know. Is the Crown acting against him as a private person? As the Michael Millar Trust? As the flesh and blood natural man? If the court doesn't do this the proceedings are a fraud.

Is this proceeding in common law, law of equity, admiralty law? The Crown won't say and I don't know so I can't get a fair trial. Court has been mislead by Crown's paperwork and I'm not getting fundamental justice.

Judge - What order are you asking me to make? I want an order saying whether this action is taking place against a private person or the officer and trustee of a trust. I want to know if it is common law, or admiralty law. There is no reason for a trial all the documents are a nullity all of the documents are a fraud.

Some rambling about how the Crown is trying to sneak some documents into court that don't match the documents served to him. Not explained but I assume a styling issue. I need guidance from the court. Is this proceeding as a trust matter or common law? What about the Michael Millar trust? The Crown is claiming that these are proceedings against the private flesh and blood man but they are really dealings against the Michael Millar trust. So it is a matter of equity. Unless the court spells this out I can't get a fair hearing.

Judge asked Crown counsel if she could write a letter answering Millar's questions. Sure but he won't be satisfied. The Crown does not recognize him as a trust, private person. None of this is recognized in Canadian law. He'll just argue against font styling again. There are no defects in the indictment. Judge told her to write the letter to Millar and he can argue it and she will make a ruling. Lawyer said she could but it wouldn't make any difference.

So I assume that if the Crown had sent him the requested letter it hadn't satisfied his demands that they tell him who he is.

Then on to his private person routine. "All of the records should be excluded because they are private documents of private persons acting in their private status and are outside of the jurisdiction of the court." He said he wanted all of the documents covered by the application excluded because they are private rather than commercial and public. "This issue has been willfully evaded and avoided by the CRA. It is clear that the documents seized are private because they say so on their face and are therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the court." What he is referring to is a notation that Porisky put on each individual document that it was a private document. That, apparently, is a magical talisman that bars them from being used by the Canada Revenue Agency, the Department of Justice, and the courts.

At this point he was going way to fast for me to keep up and it was the same stuff anyhow. On and on about the legal magic of putting the word "private" on documents. He was just ranting about the legal status of persons and his inability to find out from the Crown or the court who he is. The judge just sat there and let it wash over him for a while then he said that it was of no relevance. "Do you have any problem with the words "Supreme Court of British Columbia"? How are you prejudiced by "The Supreme Court" instead of "Supreme Court?"".

This comment related to yet another argument that Millar had thrown into the mix. As I've noted the Supreme Court Act says;

2 (1) The Supreme Court of British Columbia is continued under the name and style of the "Supreme Court of British Columbia".

Note the quotation marks around Supreme Court of British Columbia. This meant, in Millar's dream world, that if a document had the word "the" in front of the words "Supreme Court" that it referred to yet another separate Supreme Court. To this point Millar has identified the existence of three entirely different Supreme Courts;

- Supreme Court of British Columbia
- The Supreme Court of British Columbia
- SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

And maybe even;

- THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

And nobody will tell him which one he is in. So his plaintive response in answer to the judge's above question about how he was prejudiced was "I don't know what court I'm in." All the judge said to help him with his identity crisis was "Go on to the next point. I've told you that you are not going to get any traction from this point."

So he moved on to the seal of the Supreme Court and some issue about the words on it. I didn't catch the issue. He said that the words on the seal don't match the Supreme Court Act so I assume it's just another argument about upper and lower cases. Judge - Go on to next point.

So he argued the failure to define the lawful place to establish the judicial district. His words not mine. Something about the county of Vancouver vs. the Vancouver Judicial District. He said that the Supreme Court Act screwed this up so there are no judicial districts and no Supreme Court. So he has shifted from claiming that there are multiple Supreme Courts of British Columbia to none at all. "I want to be assured that we are actually in a judicial district defined by law. So where are we? The Crown refused to answer that question so they are holding this hearing in a different court". Judge - Next point.

But Millar was too excited about the current point to move on. "I'm seeking the administration of justice and this isn't met if we don't know where we are". Then something about how the court has no jurisdiction over the seas. Happily this did not lead to a rant about maritime or admiralty laws. "The prosecution wants to prosecute me in a fictitious jurisdiction". Move on.

I've never heard the word "county" applied to Vancouver or the province of British Columbia so I looked the issue up in Wikipedia;

The BCSC sits in eight judicial districts called "counties". This is the only usage of "county" in British Columbia, which is a reference only to such court districts and has no similarity to the meaning in other provinces or in the United States or the United Kingdom. Prior to 1990, there existed in British Columbia a County Court, an intermediate court between the Provincial Court and the BCSC. In 1990, the County Court of B.C. merged with the BCSC and its judges became justices of the BCSC. The judicial districts of the Supreme Court have the same boundaries of the counties of the former County Court.

The judicial districts are: Cariboo; Kootenay; Nanaimo; Prince Rupert; Vancouver; Victoria; Westminster; and Yale. The Counties of Vancouver and Westminster are collectively one judicial district under the name of the "Vancouver Westminster Judicial District".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_C ... h_Columbia


So I assume that Millar believes he has found some error in the boundary definitions based on counties vs. judicial districts. Lawson has a two day jurisdictional hearing slated for next week on what appears to be exactly this point so I may get some further insight there.

Then something about the Crown having avoided using prescribed forms which moved them from a lawful court to an illegal court. Back to upper and lower cases and claimed minor errors in the documents which voided them. Apparently the Crown's documents don't adhere to the rules that Millar has pulled out of his ass about the usage of various cases in various documents. Judge - Move on to next point.

But he wasn't finished with his obsession about cases quite yet. Something about how names and style on criminal release and parole documents didn't style his name correctly leaving his status unknown because the name used for him is not known to law. There is a lack of legal clarity regarding the legal nature of Michael Spencer Millar. Sometimes it is in upper case and sometimes in mixed case. Each refers to a different person. Which Michael Spencer Millar is the Crown charging?

Then a long, barely coherent harangue about the incompetent, corrupt Crown counsel. Keep in mind I'm only relating a fraction of what he said. He was on an afternoon-long rant and there was no way to keep up and, really, there was no purpose in trying anyhow.

Back yet again to upper and lower case. Unless the forms submitted by the Crown followed the exact correct styling the paperwork did not invoke a lawful court. "All I want to do is confirm that I am in a lawful court in a lawful district."

Then Lawson popped up, apparently recovered from his prior defeat. "I'd like to put on the record about the court's comment that there are no such things as special appearances. That is not what Justice Cullin said so, for the record, there are special appearances." Judge responded "I don't know what Justice Cullin said but it doesn't apply here". So Lawson changed gears and said that the documents to be ruled on, including those taken under the Porisky search warrant, do not meet the requirements of the Criminal Code. He said "You've been curt with Mr. Millar so I won't read everything into the record". Judge said that he'd read Lawson's submissions and there was a lot of repetition with Millar. Back to the Crown's documents having substantial defects. So documents are void and ultra vires. Are we in a proper law process? Then back, yet again, to jurisdiction. Crown has used illegal names and styles for the Supreme Court. The judge said that if judges paid attention to these things no self-represented litigant would get a hearing in court. Lawson said that the Crown won't admit that we are in a lawful jurisdiction. Judge - "It is clear that you are in the lawful jurisdiction for this case. Mr. Millar's arguments actually undermine his position. The forms are not mandatory as long as they cover essential matters." Lawson - "If this is an innocent error of the Crown they should clear it up. They haven't done so it is fraud." Judge - "There is nothing wrong with the form of the indictment."

Lawson said that he'd read in some book that if you capitalized the word "city" it indicated a corporate status. So the city of Vancouver is the actually physical city but the City of Vancouver is a corporation. So, are cities places or corporations? "Are we talking about places when we talk about the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or are we in corporations?" Judge said "I can't see how you are confused about this."

So back to the old and familiar "The mandatory forms have not been complied with". Judge - "They are not mandatory, they are prescribed. They are to give guidance and it is wrong to say that they are required." Then Lawson went off on a ramble about how he is being prejudiced because he doesn't know where he is or how he can defend himself. The judge said "The Court considers the substance of forms not the precise form. You've gone to a lot of trouble but nothing that I've heard applies to the court having jurisdiction." Lawson wanted judge to confirm that we were in a lawful court. Judge said "You are in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and always have been so stop asking me about Section 2 of the Act and don't ask me again if you are in the Supreme Court."

Lawson asked for a break for a moment so judge decided to take the opportunity to revisit the publication ban. He asked "Are the two gentlemen in the back members of the press and do they understand the publication ban?". The only other guy in the back was a Department of Justice lawyer who just happened to be sitting in the same row as me so I was the person being addressed. I stood up and said that I was not press, I wrote for a blog. I understood the effect of the ban and did not plan to publish anything during the course of the trials.

Back to Lawson and his private interests. Judge asked "If you put words "private interest" in a document are you saying that it must be considered private?" Yes, the wording means that it doesn't extend to the public. Lawson said that putting the words "without prejudice" on a document also makes them private and they can't be used by the public. Judge said no, it is a term used in negotiations so that offers can't be used against you later if negotiations fail. "You can't write "Without Prejudice" on documents and exclude them from criminal investigations."

So Lawson argued that Paradigm can't be considered a business because it wasn't registered somewhere or another as a legal person. Judge said it didn't matter what Paradigm was since Porisky had been charged personally so it makes no difference to your situation what Paradigm is.

It was now 4PM and everybody had had their say. So judge said he would give his oral decision at 10 tomorrow morning and we'd be done by lunch. He will provide written reasons for judgment later.

A note about presenting styles. While the two defendant's arguments were almost identical their way of presenting them was entirely different. Lawson was at least calm and composed. Millar was very agitated, indignant at being here and having his arguments opposed by the Crown and angry at the Crown for persecuting him even though he's proven to them that they have no case against him. The two Crown counsels responded to him by ignoring him and keeping focused on business.

Millar's basic position seems to be that if an "i" isn't dotted or if, somewhere in all the documents, a "t" isn't crossed correctly or a word is misspelled he has irrefutable proof of the total corruption of the Crown and the case against him must be dismissed. He's claiming an absolute standard of no errors at all. Well, errors as he defines them since styling the court name in capital letters was deliberate. He said that he'd originally thought it was just innocent incompetence on the part of Crown counsel that resulted in all of the improper documents that they'd filed but he now realizes that it is deliberate fraud on the court. So his case must be thrown out because justice demands that the Crown do everything exactly right by a set of standards that Millar has essentially pulled out of his ass.

I would also note that Lawson tried almost of the same arguments out in a Supreme Court of British Columbia hearing four years ago and failed there. They've been fleshed out since then but are essentially the same.

]A. The formal objections

[9] The first formal objection I will deal with is: “a failure to properly identify either of the Applicants by his or her proper name in any of the counts or offences alleged therein.” This is so, Mr. Lawson argued, because his and his wife’s last name are capitalized in the informations and summonses. He cites a literary style guide in support of his argument. There is, of course, no legal requirement as to the capitalization of names in informations, summonses or other court documents. The accused are clearly and properly identified. Style guides are not legal authority, nor are they written as such.

[10] A second formal objection is: “… failure to state the geographic location where each of the alleged offences occurred.” In Mr. Lawson’s supplemental argument he states:
In the Information, neither of the terms “City of Burnaby,” and “Province of British Columbia” expresses a geographic location; i.e. a place, where the alleged offences were committed. The Canadian Style guide's rules for the style of geographical terms, in section 4.21(c), shows that those words are not a location, but are used in a corporate sense.

At the hearing, Mr. Lawson added that he was not a shareholder of Burnaby.

[11] I do not agree with this argument. In their context, the words clearly denote geographic locations.

[12] Furthermore, the courts have taken a dim view of applications to quash informations, summonses and indictments on formal or technical grounds. As Tim Quigley states in Procedure in Canadian Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at p. 17-2:

[T]he Criminal Code has long sought to reduce the potential for technical defects to halt proceedings and, in recent years, the judiciary has increasingly stressed this aim. There is a marked preference for amending faulty informations and indictments, rather than to quash them, especially after the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Moore [(1998), 1988 CanLII 43 (SCC), 65 C.R. (3d) 1].
...
The position now is that only an indictment or information that discloses no offence known to law or is so badly drafted that it fails to provide notice of the offence charged will be quashed and then only if it cannot be amended.

II. Other relief sought

[25] The first order sought is a declaration:

… that the court which will hear this application is the same Honorable Court having the name and style "Supreme Court of British Columbia" (the "Court"), as continued by s.2(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (R.S.B.C., 1996);

[26] In his supplemental argument Mr. Lawson argues that if the declaration is not granted there is:

…. the potential that the public will begin to perceive that if no lawful superior court exists in which people can have a reasonable expectation of the equal protection of law, as provided for by the Canadian Bill of Rights, then they will no longer seek to have their disputes and grievances settled in the courts, but will be more likely to take matters into their own hands to obtain justice by more swift and certain means against perceived adversaries and oppressors.

Earlier in his argument he refers to “YouTube” videos showing people swarming the courts of England “to demand justice and chasing judges from the bench.” There is a reference to the “public, who are paying close attention to this and related proceedings in growing numbers.”

[27] I will give Mr. Lawson the benefit of the doubt and assume that this was not meant as a veiled threat. Even so, the argument is not helpful, constructive or appropriate.

[28] There is no doubt that this is the Supreme Court of British Columbia, and no issue has been raised with respect to this Court’s constitution or jurisdiction, of which the Lawsons chose to avail themselves. The motion is unnecessary and frivolous, and is dismissed.

[29] The second order sought is:

an order confirming that this Court recognizes each of the Applicants in propria persona, and each having the status of a private person, also known as a natural person, at common law for the purposes of these proceedings.

According to Mr. Lawson, this request was made of the Associate Chief Justice at the pre-application hearing and denied. I reach the same conclusion. This has no legal merit. The Lawsons are named individuals. There is no basis for the recognition of any special status, nor does one exist for them. There are no separate laws, rules, rights, remedies or procedures applicable to “natural persons” versus other individuals, or, for the sake of completeness, individual persons. In line with this, I order that the reference to “private person” following the applicants’ names in the style of cause be struck.

[33] The fifth and sixth orders are related and can be dealt with together. They are:

• an order directing that each registry location of the Supreme Court of British Columbia shall ensure that it has a proper court seal, in accordance with s. 7(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (RSBC, 1996), having the proper name and style of the court, as set out in s. 2(1) of that Act;

• an order recognizing that the application filed by Applicants in this Court does not bear the proper seal of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, as set out in ss. 7(1) and 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (RSBC, 1996), and a further order declaring that the lack of the proper seal of the Court, or the use of an improper seal, shall by order of this Court be deemed to be an irregularity that shall have no adverse effect on the substance, jurisdiction, or otherwise in respect of this application, because the Applicants were informed by the court registry that the proper court seal was not in the possession of the registry of this Court, although the Applicants did insist that the proper court seal be used to file this application;

[34] There is no relation between this issue and the validity of the Information or summonses. If the Lawsons have any standing to raise this issue, this is not the proper procedure in which to do it. These applications are therefore dismissed.

R. v. Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356
http://canlii.ca/t/fqhb6



Wednesday March 23, 2016

Back in court but first a chat with Keith Lawson. I was reading the court calendar posted in the courthouse lobby when Lawson came up behind me saying "Hello Michael, oh, you're not Michael." Quite right, I'm not currently charged with any criminal offenses and facing trial. Lawson asked me what my position was on his case. I told him that I spent 35 years as an income tax auditor which should fully explain my position. He claims not to have read any of my Quatloos postings or even know what Quatloos is. Do you own it? Is it subscription? He said that he only knows about Quatloos from friends who've told him that I post about him on it. The only person I've written about who has actually admitted that he read my postings about him was the Chief. All the rest tell me they don't have time, it's not worth the bother, my posts are all lies anyhow.

When I told Lawson that I write about freemen and tax evaders he professed not to know what freemen are and said that he had no idea if Paradigm was based on freeman beliefs. I told him that Porisky's natural person argument was pure freeman and that Millar at least was arguing old freeman concepts in court. I told him it didn't matter to his prosecution since the crown seemed to be just treating him as an everyday tax evader. He said he'd attended some of the Porisky trial but apparently not on the days I attended. He went the first week and I went the second. He was surprised that Porisky offered no defense at all (as was I) and said that he'd tried to contact Porisky but it seems that Porisky had severed any connection with his followers. A pleasant enough chat, I told him I appreciated being upgraded from an individual to a gentleman. Then off to court.

Debbie Anderson did not attend today. Only other spectator was an older guy in a suit who I've seen at a few other Poriskyite hearings and who knows Lawson and Millar. No idea who he is. (Note - This is what I wrote at the time of the hearing. I've later learned that he's Lawson's father) The judge was going to give his decision today. I didn't expect any suspense about the results, it was pretty clear by the end of yesterday that the application would be approved. We got the same private person in private capacity special appearance routine from Lawson and Millar when judge came in. Before we got going some paperwork issues to do with sorting out submissions. Then Lawson had a question. Was this hearing proceeding under the authority of Section 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act? As I posted yesterday this is 2(1);

2 (1) The Supreme Court of British Columbia is continued under the name and style of the "Supreme Court of British Columbia".

Judge said no, it was proceeding under the authority of the Income Tax Act and (I believe) the Criminal Code of Canada. Then Lawson asked something I didn't get. Judge just said "I want to get along with this matter, anything else?" Lawson said that he was not properly identified in the paperwork. Judge said that his name and address were on it and that was enough. Judge told him that the court was properly constituted and "it is so fundamental and so basic that there is no point in discussing this further". Judge got started. "This application is about the admissibility and use of written and computer documents." He noted that the documents had come from Porisky's house and that Porisky and Gould had both just been convicted of tax evasion and Porisky of counseling tax evasion. "This application is limited to determining the admissibility of two educator files to be admitted to trial of the accused."

He said that he noted for the record that Debbie Anderson, on advice of counsel, was not contesting the Crown's application. However his order would apply to all three defendants. This voir dire is specifically in respect to documents found in folders in Porisky's house during the CRA search and seizure. There were three folders, each with a defendant's name on them. Anderson's folder contained 305 pages in pdf format. Millar's folder contained 336 pages in pdf format. Lawson's folder contained 193 pages in pdf format. Then "Crown's application is granted. Crown is to draft the order for me to sign. Written reasons to follow."

So hearing was over but Lawson suddenly stood up to say something as judge was leaving. Sheriff got up and stood beside him but he didn't say anything as judge left. Turned out to just be a minor quibble he had about some documents. He, Crown counsel and the registrar corrected it and we were done, all in twenty minutes.

[Burnaby49]

Tuesday October 11, 2016

I have a sad, sad confession. I've been extremely remiss in posting about Michael. He's been badly neglected. It's not that I don't have material. In the two working weeks of September 6th to 15th I attended six days of Millar hearings. Six very full days. The first three were for his application to have proceedings struck for undue delay and the last three were closing arguments on his criminal trial for tax evasion and counseling tax evasion. Then I got sidetracked with even older trial sessions I hadn't yet posted such as Peter Balogh;

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=11111

and more research on Lovey Cridge (to be posted later);

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=9989

And Michael went by the wayside. However I set today as a self-imposed deadline to finish posting it all because a hearing was scheduled for this morning to give the decision on the delay application and I wanted everything up to date to clear the deck for that. And I failed miserably. I worked on it over the weekend but wasn't near ready to post when I attended his hearing at 9AM. So I'm going to have to post out of sequence giving the decision on the delay application and the decision on his tax evasion charges now and the earlier stuff to be posted later.

This was a short session to, as I said, give the decision on the delay application so we were shoehorned into a one hour slot between 9AM and a trial that had the courtroom reserved at 10AM. Millar, as usual, identified himself to the judge as having a private status acting in his private capacity. It doesn't matter how many times the court tells him that this is just gibberish he won't stop believing in the magic of the phrase.

The judge covered the stay of proceedings application for delay in about one minute by saying that the application was dismissed and she had just filed a 45 page written reasons for judgment in the court registry that she wasn't going to read out. Then she said that she was going to give her reasons for judgment on Millar's four criminal charges. The indictment can be found here;

http://www.mediafire.com/file/i2m5cbw91 ... 015%29.pdf

The judge went through the counts sequentially but she first had some preliminary comments. First the significance of capitalization. Apparently Millar had dredged up the terms Capitus Maxima and Capitus Diminutio from the Freeman bible, Black's Legal Dictionary and equated them to upper and lower case. Outside of Millar's fever dreams these are what the phrases mean;

Capitis Diminutio Maxima (meaning a maximum loss of status) - The highest or most comprehensive loss of status. This occurred when a man's condition was changed from one of freedom to one of bondage, when he became a slave.

Capitis deminutio or capitis diminutio (lit. "decrease of head") is a term used in Roman law, referring to the extinguishing, either in whole or in part, of a person's former legal capacity. As the Romans only used majuscule letters (capital) and had no minuscule letters, this does not refer to capital letters in a name.

He interpreted this to mean that referring to a person in capital letters made them a slave but referring to them in lower case meant they were considered outside the control and authority of the law. Not surprisingly the judge disagreed. She said these phrases came from Roman law about the years 177 and 178. I missed whether it was BC or AD. She said that this was of historic interest only. The Black's definition did not refer to capitalization and our laws are not based on Roman Laws. Judge also said that a judge in a prior hearing at provincial court had dismissed Millar's capitalization arguments. "Capitalization is of no significance". I'm going to bet that this will not stop Millar from beating the issue to death yet again in later hearings.

On to jurisdiction. "Canada is not a foreign jurisdiction to British Columbia. British Columbia is a province in the Country of Canada and North Vancouver is part of British Columbia. This court has jurisdiction."

Then on to Count 1. This is;

Count 1 I Chef 1

Michael Spencer Millar, of the District of North Vancouver, Province of British Columbia, between December 31, 2003 and June 9, 2007, did make or participate in, assent to or acquiesce in the making of false or deceptive statements in his personal income tax returns for the 2004, 2005 and 2006 taxation years, filed as required by the Income Tax Act, by understating his taxable income in the amount of $93, 196 for the said taxation years and did thereby commit an offence contrary to paragraph 239( I )(a) of the Income Tax Act.

Judge read the charge out then said that the Crown must prove that there were false statements on the returns, that Millar knew they were false, and that he filed them anyhow. Judge referred to copies of Millar's 2004, 2005, and 2006 income tax returns seized in the search. Each claimed one cent in total income. Documents showed that these had been assessed by the CRA. So the Crown had demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that he'd filed the returns and had intended the CRA to rely on them.

Judge went over the Crown's analysis of Millar's income in those years. The Crown estimated this from his bank records on the assumption, which the judge accepted, that all amounts going into the bank account were from income from promoting the Paradigm scheme. These showed that Millar had significant income in these years. In 2006 he had $66,000 gross and $38,000 net.

Judge said that the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that Millar had more than one cent of income in each of the years in question so he'd filed false returns. Judge said that Millar had argued that, as a natural person, he was not required to file returns. She The primary flaw in this was that that the Income Tax Act made no distinction between artificial and natural persons. It just says "every person" which is not a limiting definition. The fact that other legislation might use the term "natural person" was not relevant to the Income Tax Act.

Judge said that "Mr. Millar invited me to discuss the Paradigm theory in depth. This is not necessary." She cited Kennedy and the 2012 Porisky and Gould decision. She said that Millar knew that he had filed false returns and said that the Crown had proven Count 1.

On to Count 2;

Count 2 I Chef 2

Michael Spencer Millar, of the District of North Vancouver, Province of British Columbia, between December 31, 2003 and June 16, 2009, did wilfully evade or attempt to evade the payment of taxes imposed by the Income Tax Act for the 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 taxation years by failing to report his taxable income in the amount of $126,431, and did thereby evade the payment of $12,3 78 in income tax, contrary to section 239( 1 )( d) of the Income Tax Act.

Judge said that the Crown must prove that Millar had income, that tax was payable on the income, that Millar knew that tax was owing, that he engaged in conduct to evade tax, and that he knew he was evading tax. Judge said that the Crown's analysis of Millar's income and conclusions on it were reasonable and beyond reasonable doubt. Crown had calculated that the taxes evaded on his income (as derived from the above noted bank statement analysis, totaled about $12,000 in the 2004 to 2008 period.

Judge said that she was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown's calculations were completely accurate but they were conservative so that taxes owing were probably understated. The judge said that Millar's conduct in filing one cent income returns and then not filing returns at all resulted in avoiding tax so his intent was proven.

Judge comment on mistake in law. She did an analyis of prior cases and read out parts of Klundert.

R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767
http://canlii.ca/t/21j7z

She read paragraphs 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 28. These are the cited paragraphs. Note that she did not read out the question and answer portion of paragraph 14. I have included it anyhow.

ANALYSIS

Application of the Act

[14] The respondent's explanation of his understanding of the Act and why it does not apply to him is convoluted to the point of being incomprehensible. He distinguishes between a "person" as described in the Act and a "natural person" as he understands that term to be used in the Magna Carta and the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III. In the following excerpt from his evidence in chief, the respondent explains why he is not obligated to pay income tax:

Q. Dr. Klundert, what was your knowledge in respect to your obligation to pay taxes?
A. I knew that I needed to file an income tax return.

Q. For who?
A. For, uh, the taxpayer.

Q. In what capacity?
A. And from my understanding, um, I needed as a natural person to file -- as legal representative of the taxpayer.

Q. And where did you get that understanding?
A. That understanding came to me as a result of, um, learning about my -- my, uh, position as a natural person and from studying some of the definitions of the Income Tax Act.

Q. What definitions?
A. The definition of a taxpayer, the definition of a person. [page85 ]

Q. Alright.
A. And the definitions of a legal representative of a person.

Q. Um-hmm.
A. Of a -- legal representative of a taxpayer. Excuse me.

Q. Well, what was your obligation, as you understood it, to pay taxes?
A. I believed that I -- I didn't owe any taxes, and so I was not obliged to pay taxes.

Q. That is in what capacity?
A. As a natural person.

Q. Alright. And why not?
A. Because I believe that the -- as a result of my studies, that the Income Tax Act applied to the taxpayer, but as a natural person I was a legal representative of the taxpayer and I had the, uh, option of, un, acting as a natural person or willingly representing the -- the natural -- the -- the -- the taxpayer, and then submitting, uh, as a taxpayer.

Q. Submitting what?
A. Filling out the income tax form as a taxpayer.

Q. What were you trying to do in regard to this law?
A. I was trying to fulfill the law because I knew that I needed to fill out an income tax form. And so I filled out the income tax form as a natural person, as the legal representative of the taxpayer. And I believed that the taxpayer, uh, didn't owe anything. He owed zero.

Q. Did you -- when did you -- well, I guess the first question is did you read the definition of person in the Income Tax Act?
A. Yes, I did.

Q. When did you first read it?
A. I read that early in '94, again before I -- I filed that 1993 return.

Q. Did you then or have you ever since acknowledged your obligation to pay in your capacity as a natural person?
A. No. At that point as a result of understanding who I was as a natural person, I then began working in my individual capacity for myself as a natural person and not for the taxpayer.

[15] In essence, Klundert's evidence was that as a natural person he had no obligation to pay taxes because he didn't owe any. The respondent did not consider himself to meet the definition of "person" as that term is defined in the Act. According to the respondent, he had the option to act as a natural person -- to whom the Act does not, in his view, apply, or to submit to the Act as a taxpayer. Because the respondent considered himself to be earning income in his individual capacity for himself as a natural [page86 ]person and not as a taxpayer, he did not believe he was under any obligation to pay income tax.

[17] Mr. Christie says if the respondent is wrong, he has made a mistake of law based on his misinterpretation of the Act. According to Mr. Christie, the respondent is not saying the Act does not apply to him. Rather, the respondent is saying that according to his interpretation of the Act, he was not under any obligation to pay.

[18] It is rather transparent that what the respondent has attempted to do is to articulate his defence in a way that complies with this court's ruling in his first appeal. It is an effort on the part of the respondent to transform his belief as to the validity of a law into an assertion of a mistake in his understanding of the law which could negate the requisite culpable state of mind -- being now aware that a mistake of law as to the applicability of the Act is not a defence. In this sense, the respondent attempts to place himself within the realm of mistake of law identified by Doherty J.A. in Klundert No. 1 -- those who are attempting to obey the law, but are mistaken in their belief. [page87 ]

[19] Unfortunately for the respondent, the Act does not distinguish between persons and natural persons. The definition of "person" in the Act includes human beings of which specie the respondent belongs.

[20] More important, the essence of his argument is that "the Act does not apply to me because I choose to have it not apply to me". Contrary to what Mr. Christie says, this is a jurisdictional argument (and one which is void of merit) that leads to a mistake of law which does not afford a defence. This court has already said in Klundert No. 1 -- this kind of mistake of law is irrelevant to the fault requirement of the charge of tax evasion.

[28] As summarized earlier in these reasons, the respondent's defence in its essence, is that he does not owe any tax either because the Income Tax Act does not apply to him as a "natural person" who has chosen to file his return as a "legal representative of the taxpayer" or because the Income Tax Act does not apply to income where the "natural person" has earned the income but has chosen to file the return as "the legal representative of the taxpayer". That defence was not available in law. It is, in effect, simply a variation of the mistaken belief that Doherty J.A. addressed in Klundert No. 1 when he explained that:

. . . a person's mistaken belief that a statute is invalid or is otherwise not applicable to that person's conduct . . . is a mistake of law that is irrelevant to the existence of the fault requirement in s. 239(1)(d). As stated in para. 25, above, where as a matter of law a defence is not available to an accused, it must not be put to the jury and the jury must be clearly instructed that the defence is unavailable.

Judge said that while Klundert was not binding on this court because it was decided in a different province she found it persuasive. Millar did not testify explaining why he'd filed one cent returns so there is no evidence that he actually believed Paradigm theory. In any case his beliefs are irrelevant to this charge so Crown has proven count 2.

Next up for judicial consideration was this;

Count 3 I Chef 3

Michael Spencer Millar, of the District of North Vancouver, Province of British Columbia, between January 31, 2005 and June l6, 2009, did wilfully evade or attempt to evade compliance with the Excise Tax Act or payment or remittance of the Goods and Services Tax for the 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 taxation years, by failing to collect or remit Goods and Services Tax of $1 1,873 on goods and services sold by him, and did thereby commit an offence contrary to section 327(l)(c) of the Excise Tax Act.

I didn't bother to try and copy down the details of the judge's anlysis of this one. I was too busy trying to catch up with the judge on the prior counts and assumed that it largely mirrored count 2. The judge went through varius documents seized in the search and concluded that he knew that he should have collected and remitted GST. Millar said that he was not engaged in a commercial activity because he had structured his affairs as a natural person. That is just wrong. So Crown has proven count 3.

The last count is the one that's going to have him seeing jail time;

Count 4 I Chef 4

Michael Spencer Millar, of the District of North Vancouver, Province of British Columbia, and elsewhere, between December 31, 2001 and August 26, 20 l 0, did counsel various persons to commit the indictable offence of fraud in excess of five thousand dollars, contrary to section 380 of the Criminal Code, and did thereby commit an offence contrary to section 464(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown has two ways of prosecuting Poriskyites. Through the provincial court or through indictment at the Supreme Court of British Columbia. It is at the Crown's discretion. The distinction is that the Supreme Court can impose higher sentences including jail time. The Crown has taken the approach of proceeding through the Provincial courts for simple Poriskyite tax evasion by individuals such as Arthur Doerksen, Peter Balogh, and Leo Fung. But they've gone by indictment for the promoters such as Porisky, Gould, Lawson, Anderson, and Millar in order to be able to try for jail time.

The judge went through an extensive explanation of the definitions of counseling and fraud. Crown claims that counseling others to evade tax is counseling fraud. Judge brought up a critical point. The Crown doesn't have to prove that the people counseled actually committed fraud, just that Millar counseled it. Judge said that charge related to providing Paradigm material and teaching the theories. Millar claimed that the court should not assume that he taught everything in the Paradigm material. He also taught other things apart from Paradigm. The judge went through the testimony of the three witnesses who were Millar's students. One witness testified that she had to join paradigm in order to work at a job where the employer referred all employees to Millar. Millar did not tell her that she was required to pay tax. She testified that she filed 2003 to 2007 as having nil income but then later turned herself in to the CRA. The judge agreed that the student made her own choices but Millar's conduct in teaching Paradigm material were acts encouraging students to evade taxes. By selling Paradigm material Millar was encouraging people to evade tax. Crown has proven that Millar intended to persuade people to evade tax. The three Millar students who testified actually filed tax returns leaving out their incomes. Crown has shown that Millar counseled students to evade tax in, I thinks she said, the 2005 to 2008 period.

So guilty on all count. Then I think the judge got over-ambitious. She asked Crown if she was ready to proceed with her sentencing submissions and, if so, how long would it take. Crown said that she could but noted that we were almost out of time. It was 9:50 and our courtroom time ended at 10:00. Judge asked Millar if he wanted to make submissions. "Absolutely." Crown estimated a day was needed so Judge left to find a one-day slot. While we waited lawyers and spectators for the next hearing trickled in. Judge came back and asked parties if November 17 worked for everybody. Yes.

Crown is busy until then with Debbie Anderson's trial up in the Fraser Valley.

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=10747

I won't be going to that one. It's being held in Chilliwack, a daily return trip of about 120 miles from my house. My dedication to reporting on the destruction of the Poriskyites fails abysmally when it requires a daily drive like that. I don't even drive so it would require public transit.

[notorial dissent]

Burnaby, I can just see the crocodile tears you are shedding for poor dear neglected Michael. He is so sorely abused and neglected, it is just heart rending. Poor Michael reduced to nothing more than a (very) boring footnote in the history of an otherwise utterly failed and nonsensical undertaking.

It would seem the judge didn't treat him with any more care or consideration than he deserved either.

Nov is NOT going to be happy time for him I fear. I am sure he will get to waste the better part of a day though on his misconstruances of various words and phrases that have nothing to do with why he is going to jail.

Poor poor Michael. (really need a crocodile tears smilie)

[Burnaby49]

Sigh, time to get down to it. Between September 7th and September 16th I spent six days I'm not getting back sitting in courtroom 65 of the Supreme Court of British Columbia listening to Michael Millar expound endlessly on his idiotic beliefs. How idiotic? Secret messages hidden in government forms based on how the words in the forms are capitalized! Canada has no legal jurisdiction within Canada because it is just a legal fiction, not a geographic location! And on and on about how private persons acting in their private capacity to do their private business are not subject to the laws of the legal fiction in which I supposedly reside. Page after page of notes of this nonsense. And I sat through it all. It's so exhausting just thinking about trying to decipher my notes and typing it all up. Bit at a time, that's the answer.

One reason I've been overwhelmed is that 2016 has been extremely active for Poriskyite trials in Vancouver. Porisky himself and his wife Elaine Gould, Keith Lawson, Peter Balogh, Michael Millar, Debbie Anderson, and Leo Fung is coming up. However when I'm done posting Millar's six days I'm largely over the hump until the inevitable appeals. Porisky has already appealed his conviction. I'm guessing he's done that hoping that he will, as in 2012, be released from jail while the appeal winds its way through the system for another four years or so.

Anyhow enough whining, back on topic. Millar's September hearings were broken up into two parts. September 7 to 9 were used to hear his arguments that his charges should be thrown out because of delay and to start closing arguments. September 14 to 16 were spent listening to closing arguments. While the trial itself had finished in July it took until September to get around to hearing the closing arguments. I'll post The September 7th to 9th hearings as one post then get down to the 14th to 16th.

So on to delay. First a basic primer on the issue. This is a Charter of Rights and Freedom issue. The Charter says;

Section 11(b) provides that
“ 11. Any person charged with an offence has the right... (b) to be tried within a reasonable time;

So what is a reasonable time?

Until very recently the defining case was Morin;

R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 SCR 771, 1992
http://canlii.ca/t/1fsc6

But on July 8th, 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada threw Morin out the Window and set a new standard in Jordan;

R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27
http://canlii.ca/t/gsds3

In R. v. Jordan (2016), the Supreme Court established that a delay longer than 30 months from when a charge is laid to the trial's completion is "presumptively unreasonable" and any delay by the Crown beyond that time that is not justified by exceptional circumstances that are either unforeseeable or beyond the Crown's control must result in a stay of proceedings.[4]

Which has Crown counsels across Canada scrabbling to try and fit their ongoing cases into the new framework. Essentially Jordan cuts down the amount of time Crown has to get the case to trial significantly from the old standard. The clock starts ticking when charges are filed. There are three sources of delay, the Crown, the defendant, and the court.

Section 11 of the Canadian Charter entitles a "person charged with an offence ... the right ... to be tried within a reasonable time". Where there is a breach of this right, the available remedy to a court is a stay of proceedings.

The burden is on the applicant to prove a breach of s.11(b) of the Charter. The Crown has the burden of proving any waiver of rights.

The applicant must first establish that the period raises the issue of “reasonableness”. (See R. v. Morin and R. v. Reid) Once reasonableness has been raised, the delay that can be attributed to the applicant or waived by the applicant must be calculated to be subtracted from the overall calculation.

The length of permissible time to have a matter tried cannot be based on the mere passage of time. If it were it would effectively be a judicially created limitation period for criminal offences.

The remaining time must be considered in light of the “interests section 11(b) seeks to protect, the explanation for the delay and the prejudice to the accused”

The suggested elements to consider can be summarized as follows:

[69] From the foregoing review it is possible I think to give a brief summary of all the factors which should be taken into account in considering whether the length of the delay of a trial has been unreasonable.

(i) The Length of the Delay.

The longer the delay, the more difficult it should be for a court to excuse it. Very lengthy delays may be such that they cannot be justified for any reason.

(ii) Explanation for the Delay.

(a) Delays Attributable to the Crown.

Delays attributable to the action of the Crown or officers of the Crown will weigh in favour of the accused. The cases of Rahey and Smith provide examples of such delays.
Complex cases which require longer time for preparation, a greater expenditure of resources by Crown officers, and the longer use of institutional facilities will justify delays longer than those acceptable in simple cases.

(b) Systemic or Institutional Delays.

Delays occasioned by inadequate resources must weigh against the Crown. Institutional delays should be considered in light of the comparative test referred to earlier. The burden of justifying inadequate resources resulting in systemic delays will always fall upon the Crown. There may be a transitional period to allow for a temporary period of lenient treatment of systemic delay.

(c) Delays Attributable to the Accused.

Certain actions of the accused will justify delays. For example, a request for adjournment or delays to retain different counsel.

There may as well be instances where it can be demonstrated by the Crown that the actions of the accused were undertaken for the purposes of delaying the trial.

https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Canadian_ ... roceedings

So when a delay applications being heard the Crown's job is to show, as much as possible, that delay was caused by the defendant. It is the defendant's job to show it was really caused by the Crown and court. Millar didn't seem to understand any of this and just essentially listened while the Crown and judge discussed the various aspects of delay.


September 07, 2016

I chatted with the sheriff before the hearing. He recognized me from prior hearings and was impressed by my diligence. Who pays you? Sadly, nobody.

Millar immediately started babbling about private capacity. It's how he always starts his day in court. Another oddity, he never sits down. He spends the entire court day standing at the defense table. I assume it has something to do with putting himself under the jurisdiction of the court if he parks his backside on a chair but I really have no idea.

The judge is giving Millar a lot of leeway. Since this hearing results from his application he is supposed to present his case first but he wants the Crown to go first. So judge told Crown to go first. Crown first entered an affidavit. Judge complained that there was far more electronic evidence entered than matter warranted. Millar seemed totally unprepared although it is his application and the trial ended two months ago. The Crown had tried to get him to read their submission but he hadn't done so and now he said he had no idea what was in the Crown's documents. He said he didn't know what was supposed to happen today.

He had an issue with trial transcripts. A bit of background. This hearing is a result of Millar making an application for a hearing on undue delay on his whole prosecution from charges being laid until now. So it is his responsibility to prove that there has been an excessive delay. Part of the process in a delay application is to provide transcripts of the various court hearings. This is Millar's responsibility but he'd done nothing. Instead the Crown had requested copies of them all and included them in their filing. Millar, after doing nothing, complained that the transcripts were not complete. Some hearing years ago that apparently took about fifteen minutes. He's a master of minutiae. His general theme throughout the entire six days was that every little detail, forms, spelling, styling, had to be exactly correct, no errors at all. Any mistake, no matter how minute, was valid grounds to throw the whole case out.

Anyhow, since he hadn't bothered to look at the Crown's submission we stood down for half an hour while he went through the Crown's documents. This was right at the start of the first day which did not bode well. When we resumed the judge told him that if he felt that anything was missing from the Crown's submission it was his job to provide it. Crown explained that they had asked for copies of the transcripts of all of the Millar hearings but did not get them all. No idea why. Millar got very agitated that Crown hadn't included EVERYTHING in their filing. Seem to imply some dark plot but did not define the parameters of EVERYTHING. Keep in mind that since Millar initiated this hearing Crown has no responsibility to provide ANYTHING. Crown can provide as much, or as little, as it wants.

We started at 10AM and finally got down to things at 11. Millar wanted to know if the person who prepared the Crown's affidavit did so in a personal or official capacity. Judge - No difference. Millar said that he wasn't consenting to anything because he wasn't giving up any rights. The judge said that she would accept the Crown's affidavit anyhow. So we'd spent an hour getting one thing entered into evidence. This was, unfortunately, a harbinger of the entire three days.

While I didn't know much about delay the judge didn't seem all that clear on the issue either. As I understand it she is a recent appointment to the criminal bench having served her time in family court. Delay is not an issue there. The judge kept asking questions such as why the delay clock didn't start ticking when CRA started investigating Millar rather than when charges were laid. Or why didn't it start when the CRA raided his home under a search warrant. Even I could answer that, it's basic. Delay is driven by section 11 of the Charter which states;

11. Any person charged with an offence has the right...
(b) to be tried within a reasonable time

The Charter itself, the supreme law of Canada, clearly states the start of the delay period.

Anyhow once Millar was more or less up to speed Crown started by saying there was a period of 55 months from the laying of charges to the anticipate end of the trial on Friday (note, this hearing was originally slated for three days ending Friday. This was to cover delay and closing arguments. In the event the court had to schedule another three days next week for closing because delay ate up this three day block). So the proceedings exceeded the Jordan 30 month ceiling by 25 months. Judge didn't know if "end of the trial" was to end of closing arguments which was the end of the actual trial itself or until sentencing. So judge asked "What is the law on when the trial ends?" Crown went into that later.

Crown said that 27.5 months of the delay could be attributed to Millar. Said this occurred in five time periods.

Time Period 1 - Laying charges in February 2012 until April 2013

This was the biggest time period. When Millar was charged he suddenly disappeared right off the radar. It took the police over a year to find him and eventually arrested him in a 6AM search of his girlfriend's place. Judge - Why was there a delay from laying charges to the arrest? Crown said because he was evading service and not coming to court until he was arrested and brought to court. From February 2012 until April 2012 the Crown was trying, unsuccessfully, to find him. Judge - "Why does he bear the burden for this period? How did he evade service? In my view as a judge I am concerned about this period."

Crown went through how CRA and Crown both had frequent correspondence and interaction with Millar until February 2012 when it stopped. Crown showed documents from the police showing that they tried to phone and serve documents but no response. There was another attempt in April. There was a letter in April from Millar questioning the Crown's standing to act against him. Judge - He is not telling the Crown he agrees with the summons? Crown - Exactly. Then another letter from Millar saying he doesn't accept that the court can try him. Judge - Why then didn't the Crown just serve him? So why not arrest him? Judge wanted to know why this 14 month period wasn't the Crown's fault for not pursuing it. Turns out they did, in the case of one police officer obsessively. An arrest warrant was made out in June 2012 but it took a year for the RCMP to find him. This included two search warrants and surveillance of his apartment. He'd apparently moved and kept his new address quiet. So judge asked about Jordan. Why didn't the Supreme Court of Canada pick the date of a search to start the clock? Or of the arrest? Why the date of charges being laid? Uh, as I wrote earlier, the Charter clearly states that delay starts with charges. That's pretty fundamental.

Then lunch. I went to the Templeton on Granville. I'm a sucker for old greasy spoons.

http://thetempleton.ca/



I had the Farmer's breakfast;

Farmers Breakfast - rosemary potatoes sautéed with veggies, topped with aged white cheddar and two eggs, fresh salsa and sour cream.

And unfortunately ended up with egg yolk decorating my black pants. So back to court. The judge said that she thought that the delay between the charge and the arrest should be counted against the Crown. Crown gave a long list of the steps taken to find Lawson after he was charged. An arrest warrant was issued in June 2012. The police interviewed his father, neighbors, the strata manager, a tax preparer who'd done Millar's returns. They conducted a surveillance of his girlfriend's home and finally did a search of it. I thought it an impressive list.

Crown noted that Millar had said, and written in a letter, that he didn't recognize the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the proceedings. The police looked for him for over a year and Crown said that he was evading the summons to get him to court. That year seemed out of the control of Crown to me. Millar had been in communication with the Crown until charges were laid and then disappeared until the police found and arrested him.

Time Period 2 - Arraignment

This was one month. This was the excess time that it took to get a court hearing in respect to an arraignment because Millar spent three weeks or so pondering whether to get a lawyer or not.

Time Period 3 - Legal Representation

About a year and a half after the last period. Some issue regarding Millar getting representation resulted in a three and a half month delay. Crown explained it but judge complained there were too many details. Can't see forest for trees.

After afternoon break the Crown tried to take the big picture approach, I assume in response to judge's forest/trees comment. Somehow periods 4 and 5, while discussed, weren't specifically broken into periods or I missed it. Crown said that Millar was an unrepresented accused who subscribed to OPCA views and pursued them throughout proceedings. His belief in these philosophies gave rise to excessive delays. The delays must be considered reasonable given Millar's approach from day one to today. His consistent approach to the Court and Crown has to be contrasted to the steps taken by the Crown to move proceedings along. These delays were the result of his choices. Crown referred to his behavior in court. This was consistent with his beliefs. Judge - How is this different than a defendant refusing to cooperate? It goes beyond that. He conducted attacks on the proceedings, constantly attacking jurisdiction. Judge said that it may have taken a few days for the hearings but how does this affect overall time? I'll make an obvious point here that the judge seemed to be missing. While Millar's endless applications may not have resulted in much actual court time the real time killer was scheduling them. With the courthouse swamped with cases it can take months for a one-day application to be heard. So the amount of overall delay from the constant applications was greatly in excess of the actual court time involved.

Anyhow Crown responded that the trial date was set at Millar's request to allow him to watch another trial first. (This was the Porisky jury trial. Apparently that showed Millar he wasn't going to get a friendly reception in front of a jury so he opted for a trial by judge). Judge - How did this affect the time? Crown responded that Millar's trial would have been finished in June had he not made all those applications. The first scheduled trial date was November 16, 2015. Millar declined the date so that he could watch the Porisky and Lawson trials. Back to time periods 2 and 3. Judge seemed to equate Millar's antics with a defendant who just refused to cooperate with the Crown. A bit more back and forth and the Crown's submission was concluded. Since it was 3:50 the court adjourned so Millar up first thing tomorrow.


September 08, 2016

Millar made a long, long, long day of it. He said that he had three issues, three time periods he wanted to discuss. First the pre-arrest period of over a year where the Crown said that he was dodging service. He said that he'd personal matters he had to attend to during that time period although he didn't bother to inform the court what they were. He said that he didn't want to discuss them. Just "personal matters". And, also for undisclosed reasons, he didn't have an address. Then off on a philosophical digression how the police perceive everything from a wrongdoer's perspective. Reminds me of Lawson's argument that he was unfairly treated because CRA and Crown only investigated whether he was guilty and didn't bother to investigate whether he was innocent. Millar said that his "innocent" explanations about why he wasn't found were ignored. He said the Crown didn't take into consideration that people have lives to live. He was very vague about details that would substantiate his explanations. He said that Crown had misinterpreted his documents (I assume including the one where he said Crown had no standing and the court had no jurisdiction) however he didn't explain how they misinterpreted them. When the Crown said that "He made a choice not to come to court" they assumed knowledge which "may or may not be accurate" but he didn't elaborate on that comment either. While he said that Crown was wrong in their assumptions he didn't say why he disappeared for over a year or why, during this period, he didn't contact the Crown or court. Then, ten minutes after he'd started we had to stand down because of technical problems. Crown's laptop wouldn't work. Turned out to be a minor keyboard issue. Flaky technology seems to be a secondary theme in most of the trials I attend.

Then on to his obsession, private property and his private status and how it is well recognized in law and caselaw. He referred to a letter from September 2010 which he didn't bother to read out. He said that this was fundamental law. He went on about how private property was fundamental law for everyone to protect against invasion by corporate entities. Next up was private persons. He said that he was trying to educate the CRA that they were stepping outside of their jurisdiction by dealing with a private person. "These are not unreasonable concepts". (note - I've attended two prior hearings of his where he argued this issue and lost. There are others that I didn't attend). The CRA was wilfully blind to the fact that he had no commercial activities and was acting in a private capacity. This is all well recognized in law. (If so, why did he lose those hearings?) He said that he had been consistent in these fundamental concepts supported by the law and was surprised that issue is taken with these ideas. "When the truth is laid out and ignored I seriously question actions and intent."

Then another document from April 2012. Again on about private property, private business "private everything". He tried to inform the agents of state that what they were doing was improper. "What was my intent?" He wanted "communication remedies" to protect private men and women from the actions of the state. He said he complained to an agent of the Crown about a violation of his common law rights. We are a common law country. Then on to biblical principles given by the creator. Common law is the basis of criminal law. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights ended subjugation.

"When a legitimate question is asked and no answer given you have to keep searching". Then on to how he was treated as a legal debt but he's a live man possessed by the holy spirit. He was defrauded of his birth inheritance. No tax avoiding here, just seeking answers and the King's Peace. His estate is being held from him by an undisclosed legal process. "Where is my inheritance being held?" And I sat through all of this writing it down, the only person in that courtroom, apart from Millar, who wasn't paid to be there.

He had notified the CRA of his private status prior to the search but he was ignored. His prosecution is an unlawful criminal enterprise. His defense is nothing but foundational core concepts. There was no proper service of lawful documents all of the documents were flawed. They did not follow their own manuals.

My given name is Michael Spencer and nobody can use it or profit by it. Millar is not my name. Neither the CRA or the judge want to deal with the truth. Oaths are the foundation of common law to do what is right under god but nobody has oaths. Income tax is not god's law. (This sounds like a borrowing from Belanger's demented theory that no laws are valid because they are not, literally, included in the King James bible. Something about a verse saying "Thou shalt not add or take away from my laws")

He said that his letter gave no mention of warrant or prosecution, just that he knew about the investigation.

Then on to a March 22 letter, I didn't get the year. He said the prosecution was "hanging its hat" that I took action to delay. He went on about how a layperson like himself wouldn't know what was going on. It took time to research and there is "real life" here. He said he didn't want to deal with it. Real people leading real lives don't do things in timely fashion. It's "just life".

I would have thought that criminal charges were about as "real life" as it gets but Millar and Porisky seem to agree that criminal charges are just a minor irritating distraction from the important things in life. At one Porisky hearing I attended he requested an adjournment for an unspecified time because, in the four years since he knew he was having a retrial, he had been just too darn busy to get around to doing anything about his criminal charges.

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=10485#p218213

I'd guess that Millar's excuse that events and real life intervened are meaningless as arguments and evidence since he refused to say what these real life issues were that diverted him from addressing his criminal charges. It's like claiming you were too sick to attend a scheduled court hearing but refusing to provide any details about your claimed illness. I'd say that was particularly the case when the claimed life events apparently stopped Millar from doing anything about his criminal charges for 14 months and, had he not been found and arrested, probably a lot longer.

Then back to his obsessions. He's a legal man and there is a distinction in law between corporations and private men. He said that he took an oath of innocence with his creator. He has been robbed of his inheritance. The CRA and Income Tax Act have no jurisprudence over a man like him. He said that he'd not been in the military and was therefore not subject to military law. The Crown has given no evidence to repute this. He's not a taxpayer, that's a legal fiction. His letter had demanded evidence to support their actions but they did not provide it. "All their actions were an invitation to participate and I chose not to participate." Judge stopped him and asked "I know that the Crown has raised the idea that these ideas (his incessant endless obsessions about capitalization, private man and jurisdiction) are part of the delay. I want evidence about delay. Are you saying in this document that you did not know about the warrant?" I noted his response as a "gibberish answer." Millar simply did not seem to understand what was required of him. He hasn't really addressed anything relevant to delay after close to an hour of talking.

My notes are almost illegible at this point, I was having great difficulty keeping up. I have something about him saying that April 2013 was a reasonable starting point for ascribing delay to him. He said that he had evidence that he was out of the country during the time they were searching for him but he doesn't want to give it because it is private information. He wanted the judge to accept it without entering evidence. "It will open up a can of worms if I provide it." He actually seemed to believe that the judge should accept his totally unsupported statements about his inability to focus on his case because "people have lives to live" and accept that he'd taken a trip out of the country because she is required, as a matter of law, to accept that it is his right as a private person not to reveal his private business.

Judge told him to discuss that with Crown at break. Maybe the Crown was willing to accept that he was out of the country without evidence, maybe they weren't, but she couldn't accept his statement without evidence. So morning break. Crown asked Millar for copies of the documents showing he was out of the country. "I would prefer not, it's private information of a private person".

After break Crown said that they agreed that he was out of the country from April 11 to May 14, 2012. "He allowed us to review some document supporting this. This does not indicate the state of his knowledge before, during, or after this period."

Millar said that it was strange that after he was arrested the Crown wanted one day allocated to him because he refused to give his name, address, and date of birth so he spent a night in jail. He seemed to think it suspicious that the Crown didn't have arresting officer's notes in court. Judge said that his was his application and he was responsible for providing documents. Started talking about how he was arrested at 6:30 in the morning. Crown - Is he giving evidence or discussing documents? Judge told him to wait until he had documents before discussing the arrest.

He seemed obsessed by that one day. He said that there was no transcript of the court hearing. He found this strange, suspicious. He said that it was over the top, the ridiculous extent that the Crown goes to claim everything that they can. Judge told him that it was his responsibility to provide the transcript. Then he said that he was "moving on to the adjournment". What is considered a reasonable time period for an unrepresented individual to seek, investigate and research? I applied for legal aid in late 2013. It was impossible to find a lawyer willing to defend the natural person argument. This was patently unfair which is an ongoing theme.

The last time period was November 17, 2015 to May 16, 2016. This was the time between Millar's first scheduled trial date and the end of the Porisky/Gould and Lawson trials. Millar had requested an adjournment until both of these trials were over so that he could observe them. They were both jury trials and all three defendants were convicted on all counts with a minimum of jury deliberations. I think this is what caused Millar to re-elect from a jury trial to a trial by judge. He saw how much juries dislike Poriskyite tax evaders.

Millar said that the November trial date hadn't been suitable for personal reasons. As usual he declined to explain to the court what these reasons might be. He said that it made sense to wait until Porisky trial was over because of the evidence seized at Porisky's house. This trial also relied on the Porisky evidence. The additional time after that was for Millar to observe the Lawson trial. He said that because of the Lawson trial we were able to avoid the inconvenience and cost of the jury trial. As a result of watching these two trials he made a better informed decision. So waiting from November to May was a better choice for a fair process. In other words the time spent on an adjournment he'd requested should not count against him because he did the court a big favour by not demanding a jury trial as a result of watching Porisky and Lawson get convicted by juries after very short deliberations.

Then on to June 2016 to present. This was a delay caused by him trying to put together his closing submissions. The delay was not his fault, he's just a layman who has no idea what is going on. Then he noted that this hearing for his delay application replaced the time that had been allotted for closing submissions. He denied that he'd ever attempted to delay proceedings. Said that calling him OPCA was offensive. They (Crown) relied on Meads where judge offered a lot of opinion that may not have been used in that case and now is a blanket opinion. Calling me OPCA is not appropriate and prejudicial. Which belief of mine duplicates Meads v Meads? They claim I'm an OPCA litigant. They've prosecuted over a dozen cases on same issues and evidence. They are taking on private citizens exercising their rights. It's outrageous! Said that he still hadn't got an answer to whether or not this is the real Supreme court of British Columbia under the Supreme Court Act. A lot of rambling that I didn't bother to record. Mostly along the lines of a little man, unschooled in law trying to fight for his rights. "When did we become a police state against my beliefs. They are based on research and law."

Mercifully lunch. Off to Harvey's for my favorite burger and then to the library for a while. The Skytrain station between the library and my return to the court had an almost irresistible pull, enticing me to go home and skip the afternoon session. But I kept going back to the purgatory of capitalization, jurisdiction, and private persons going about their private business.

After lunch Millar offered a new time-frame to evaluate delay. He started his analysis right at day one when the investigation started. Numerous reasons he couldn't go to trial. He was looking for a lawyer. He was waiting out Porisky and Lawson. It was not possible to go to trial at the November 2015 dates because of personal reasons. judge cut in - "I have no evidence that you could not agree to earlier date for personal reasons." So, finally, with great reluctance, he explained why he had requested an adjournment of his November trial. "They asked me if I was available and I said no."

Crown said that Millar was offered a November 16, 2015 trial date. He declined and sought to have his trial after Porisky then he wanted to follow Lawson. He declined other dates because he wanted to wait out Lawson.

Crown's turn. Your honour has our written submissions. Millar's arguments cut both ways. He says the process took too long but also that he deeded the time to get a lawyer and learn the process. It is clear from the hearing today that Millar has beliefs that affected the delay. A significant amount of the time related to choices made by Millar.

A lot of back and forth between judge, Crown, and Millar about various delay issues. The last fifteen minutes before afternoon break were largely taken up with the judge questioning Crown upon various aspects of their delay submission. The judge got worked up about the volume of cases given to her. This was in response to the judge's own question to Crown. She'd asked for guidance on how other trials on delay had handled the period between the end of the actual trial and the sentencing hearing. Potentially a significant issue here since the trial had ended in June and this hearing was almost three months later with no idea how long we had yet to go to sentencing. The Crown had determined, through the cases it had found, that the interpretation of the law in this area was very uncertain with different courts coming to different conclusions and no set rule. So the Crown gave the judge a batch of cases showing this to make the point that there was no certainty on how other trials handled the time up to sentencing. But the judge got worked up that the cases cited by the Crown did not give her any guidance. Which, at least as I saw it, was the point of the Crown's submission. Crown told the judge that the cases could not assist her.

There was also, pre-break, a lot of discussion on the closing submissions. This three day hearing was originally slated for closing submission but got hijacked by the delay application. Closing submissions had been originally scheduled for July 11th but the court had told Millar he could do written submissions if he wished. He said he wanted to but wouldn't be ready by July 11 so they were rescheduled for now. Since we were not going to have time to cover both delay and closing submissions in these three days another hearing had to be scheduled.

After the break Crown did a review of its position that the overall time was reasonable given how the case had unfolded but, if it was excessive, it was due to Millar's choices.

Millar's closing was essentially that the Crown had gone to far by charging him. This was essentially an income tax matter of numbers on a paper. The Crown could have treated it just as a tax dispute but went to indictment for $24,251 that he was alleged to owe to her majesty. There is no injured party or damage. Just some possible damage to her majesty over a tax argument. He felt the principle of proportionality had been violated. Very much a "nothing to see here folks" argument. And, as I understood it, things may have gone at least somewhat in Millar's preferred direction if it hadn't been for the little matter of his being a Paradigm teacher counseling his students to defraud the government.

Then discussion about tomorrow's start on closing arguments. Millar is supposed to go first but he said he didn't want to. So judge wanted Crown to go first because Millar is self represented.

Then an issue that I wasn't up to speed on although it has been mentioned a few times. The Crown had entered some Skype videos of Millar doing something or another that Crown thought important as evidence. However nobody had formally identified Millar as the guy in the videos. Judge had seen them and apparently it is clearly him but (as I understood it) judge didn't want to be the one identifying him on the videos, although she had actually done so, because that shouldn't be her role if she was judging him. At least that's how I interpreted the discussion. I was flagging by this point. And, mercifully, that was it.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was wrong in saying that June 6, 1944 was the Longest Day. That had to be my court hearing today. I just found a refreshing counterpoint to Millar's endless obsessive arguing about jurisdiction. A recent decision from the Ontario Court of Appeal on the same issue. I can't find the trial decision that led to the appeal but I'd bet it is sovereign, probably Moorish. The entire reasons of the court of appeal were;

[1] The appellant contends the trial judge did not have jurisdiction over his trial. He is wrong. The appeal is dismissed.

R. v. Nicholson, 2016 ONCA 677
http://canlii.ca/t/gtnhg


September 09, 2016

The start of closing submissions. Crown up first. But first there was a discussion on the Skype recordings. Crown had caselaw supporting its use. Something about comparing voice and video Skype of seized Skype film to Millar's situation. Judge said to Millar "The issue is the law of evidence. Can I conclude that it is you on the video and audio tapes?" He didn't answer. Crown started submissions.

Crown said that the facts and evidence are largely uncontested. He doesn't contest what has happened. There are implications for three legal issues;

1 - Was he urging others?
2 - Did he continue teaching after courts rejected his theory?
3 - Issue of SIN (Social Insurance Number)

'There are no contested facts so it is not my intention to go into details of what happened and why. There is no issue that Millar taught the Paradigm theory or that he made his living doing it. The Paradigm Theory is based on an illogical and unfounded interpretation of the law.' Crown went through the basic theory of the natural person, private contract, and how private persons are not subject to tax. Total income not reported 2004-2008 was $127,178 (When you get down to it Millar wasn't making much from his Paradigm labours, about $25,000 a year). By teaching it he counseled fraud and by acting on these beliefs he committed tax evasion. The evidence of this is from the documents and evidence seized at his residence.

Crown mentioned the Skype calls. Even without the Skype calls there is sufficient evidence to identify him as the individual charged. If there are contentious issues they relate to mens rea and actus rea. Judge cut in to explain mens rea and actus rea to Millar. Crown said that the Paradigm material seized had a full review of mens rea and actus rea. Judge said that she was uncomfortable with the Crown's point that some Paradigm material was accurate and some not. This point somewhat eluded me. I couldn't see why Paradigm material could have complete bullshit interpretations of the Income Tax Act while having an accurate explanation of the concepts of actus rea and mens rea.

Crown went through the evasion offenses first. All of the tax offenses bear similar elements. Actus rea - the tax returns from 2004 to 2006 files with false statements. He knew they were false. The real issue was mens rea. Cited caselaw regarding mens rea. Kennedy and Klundert. The Crown cited paragraph 13 of Kennedy;

[13] It seems to me that M.N.R. v. Teodori (1997), 97 G.T.C. 7187, [1997] Q.J. No. 1793 (Sup. Ct. (Crim. Div.)) (Q.L.), is of relevance on this appeal. In that case, the taxpayer respondent, who had been a director and officer of a company he controlled, was charged with failing to ensure that the company remitted Goods & Services Tax it had collected from customers. The trial judge had acquitted the taxpayer, stating that he found it impossible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence because his action was not intentional or wilful. On an appeal of that acquittal Gomery J. wrote at 7191:

The most nearly comparable provisions of the Criminal Code are those relating to fraud. The mens rea necessary to a determination of guilt in fraud cases is defined by the Supreme Court in Theroux v. The Queen, 1993 CanLII 134 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5 and Zlatic v. The Queen, 1993 CanLII 135 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 29. In the Theroux decision Sopinka J. at page 16 notes that fraud encompasses

"...the use of corporate funds for personal purposes, non-disclosure of important facts, exploiting the weakness of another, unauthorized diversion of funds, and unauthorized arrogation of funds or property..."

[Emphasis of Gomery J.]

and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to show that the accused has personally profited from the fraud (p. 17). As for the element of mens rea, at p. 19 he writes as follows:

"Having ventured these general comments on mens rea, I return to the offence of fraud. The prohibited act is deceit, falsehood, or some other dishonest act. The prohibited consequence is depriving another of what is or should be his, which may, as we have seen, consist in merely placing another's property at risk. The mens rea would then consist in the subjective awareness that one was undertaking a prohibited act (the deceit, falsehood or other dishonest act) which could cause deprivation in the sense of depriving another of property or putting that property at risk. If this is shown, the crime is complete. The fact that the accused may have hoped the deprivation would not take place, or may have felt there was nothing wrong with what he or she was doing, provides no defence.. . .

...The personal feeling of the accused about the morality or honesty of the act or its consequences is no more relevant to the analysis than is the accused's awareness that the particular acts undertaken constitute a criminal offence."

He concludes as follows (p. 20):

"Correspondingly, the mens rea of fraud is established by proof of:

1. subjective knowledge of the prohibited act; and 2. subjective knowledge that the prohibited act could have as a consequence the deprivation of another (which deprivation may consist in knowledge that the victim's pecuniary interests are put at risk).

Where the conduct and knowledge required by these definitions are established, the accused is guilty whether he actually intended the prohibited consequence or was reckless as to whether it would occur."

[Emphasis added.]

R. v. Kennedy, 2004 BCCA 638
http://canlii.ca/t/1jflb

Crown said that it did not have to prove that the fraud that Millar counseled took place, just that he counseled it. Crown said that The Canadian Illusion was the core of the Paradigm teachings.

Note - For those of you with a spare few hours and a yearning to be convicted of income tax evasion here is Russ Porisky's video of the Canadian Illusion. You get the man himself explaining the concepts that got him a five and a half year jail sentence! He's very long winded so you'd better take a washroom break and shut off your phone first;

Part 1;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSCzqVabmaQ

Part 2;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnaohKJmHM0

Basically the Crown went through the morning showing how Paradigm was professionally promoted as an organized tax evasion scheme that claimed to be the truth rather than a theory. The key point was that the main purpose of Paradigm was to "legitimize" income tax evasion by setting up a theory that evaders could use as a defense if caught on the basis that they could not be convicted because they had no mens rea.

After lunch Crown went into mistake of law. There is a very narrow possibility of using a mistake defense. Crown noted that all Poriskyites who have been tried have lost in court and Millar knew this. He had the Paradigm Sydel analysis. Crown brought up Mori (note - This is yet another Poriskyite income tax evasion conviction that I have not, as yet, gotten around to writing up. There are just too many of these guys!)

The Mori decision is unreported however I, of course, have it. So for anyone interested here are the Reasons for Judgment on his conviction;

http://www.mediafire.com/download/6ggpb ... _Ct_J).pdf

Crown also brought up Klundert;

R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767
http://canlii.ca/t/21j7z

Saying that it had decided against the same natural person's argument as Millar. Crown even brought up Cheek, the leading American case on the issue;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheek_v._United_States

The judge said that the fact that the Paradigm analysis of the Sydel case was found in Millar's home didn't mean that he read it. Crown said that "It is our position that an inference could be drawn that an individual is knowledgeable about material in their possession" and noted that his name and phone number were written on it. But judge said that while Millar's name and phone number were on the Sydel analysis that didn't mean that he read it. She said that anyone could have put his name on it. Judge mentioned that she, personally, had all kinds of documents around her place that she hadn't read.

If the judge wasn't playing devil's advocate her position completely baffles me. Is she implying that it is a reasonable assumption that somebody surreptitiously entered Millar's home and, unknown to Millar, seeded it with Paradigm documents? And that to make it even more damning they his name and phone number on them? As far as I'm aware it is an accepted rule of law that when individuals are found with documents in their possession they are considered to be knowledgeable about the documents contents. Otherwise how can any document in an accused's possession ever serve as evidence? The only way, under the judge's analysis, would be to get witnesses who actually saw the accused reading a specific document. Even then, given the judge's position, it would be a reasonable defense to say he didn't actually read it but just looked at how pretty it was with the Paradigm logo on it.

Break and then back to the Crown's submission. Your Worship can infer that Millar is familiar with the contents of any documents in his possession. Restated that his handwriting was inside the Sydel analysis. Crown note that The Canadian Illusion and most of the other materials seized at Millar's home had his name and phone number on them.

Crown moved on from counseling to his evasion charges./ He was both teaching and acting on Paradigm theories. Cited a letter to his ex-wife about child support dated January 2, 2008 in which he laid out the money he'd earned in 2007. His bank account did not have a SIN number and Millar has stated that since we have not proven that he had a SIN number he has not committed evasion. My notes are confusing at this point. I think it was the Crown who said that Millar had cited the Naudi case for evidence that the Crown had to prove his SIN number. This is Naudi;

R. v. Naudi, 2003 BCPC 453
http://canlii.ca/t/1g7df

As far as I can see irrelevant to any of Millar's issues but I'm not going to bother analyzing it. Then we were done for the day. Closing arguments to continue on September 14th.

[Burnaby49]

In a previous post I wrote;

The Crown has two ways of prosecuting Poriskyites. Through the provincial court or through indictment at the Supreme Court of British Columbia. It is at the Crown's discretion. The distinction is that the Supreme Court can impose higher sentences including jail time. The Crown has taken the approach of proceeding through the Provincial courts for simple Poriskyite tax evasion by individuals such as Arthur Doerksen, Peter Balogh, and Leo Fung. But they've gone by indictment for the promoters such as Porisky, Gould, Lawson, Anderson, and Millar in order to be able to try for jail time.

As is often the case with my legal analysis, this is not correct. The correct position on whether or not to go by indictment is that the Crown can use its discretion to proceed summarily (not by indictment) on tax evasion offences under the Income Tax Act and Excise Tax Act. A jail sentence is available for ITA/ETA offences regardless of whether or not the Crown decides to proceed by indictment. However, with respect to matters where the accused is charged with counselling an indictable offence under s.464(a) of the Criminal Code the Crown must proceed by indictment.

[Burnaby49]

One reason I was trying to get the hearing on the delay application reported was that I knew, from the judge's comments on October 11, that the decision on delay would soon be available and I wanted the delay hearing written up before I reviewed the decision. I just made it with my report finished on the same day the decision was released;

R. v. Millar, 2016 BCSC 1887
http://canlii.ca/t/gv4pw

This decision reflects a lot of uncertainty on the part of the judge. I expect the same for any number of coming delay decisions until there is a body of precedence that address the implications of Jordan, the very recent Supreme Court of Canada decision that upended the previous understanding of what constituted delay.

R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27
http://canlii.ca/t/gsds3

The judge tried to fit her decision within the new Jordan parameters while acknowledging that the overall trial process under review had taken place mostly before the release of Jordan.

First the judge explained how the delay application came about. I didn't report on this part of Millar's trial because I was swilling ale in England at the time.

[3] Mr. Millar stands charged under a four-count indictment with offences which can be summarized as filing false income tax returns in 2004 through 2006, evading income tax in 2004 through 2008, failing to pay GST for 2005 through 2008, and counselling fraud between December 31, 2001 and August 26, 2010.

[4] The charges proceeded to trial. The evidence portion of the trial commenced on May 30, 2016 and continued to June 13, 2016. During that period, Mr. Millar provided four written applications. His second written application, on a form dated June 1, 2016, referred to s. 11(b) of the Charter, but did not provide any detail or seek a stay of proceedings. That was the first time that Mr. Millar gave the Crown notice that he took the position that there had been delay which has affected his constitutional rights. After I asked questions about this application, Mr. Millar filed his fourth form of application, dated June 6, 2016, relying on s. 11(b) of the Charter.

[5] Mr. Millar’s delay application arose near the end of the evidence portion of the trial. The Crown agreed to seek transcripts and correspondence relevant to the question of delay, but required time to do so. The trial submissions were being adjourned to enable the Crown and Mr. Millar to exchange written submissions. As a result, I directed a schedule for the exchange of written submissions not only on the trial issues but also on the delay application, with the oral hearing to commence September 7, 2016. That hearing was originally scheduled for three days.

[6] On July 8, 2016, which was during the period between the completion of evidence at trial and the commencement of submissions on both the delay application and the trial, the Supreme Court of Canada released R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 [Jordan]. That decision changed the law regarding s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The judge noted how the Crown had assisted Millar in his application;

[9] The procedure followed for Mr. Millar’s delay application was modified from the usual procedure, in order to assist Mr. Millar. The ultimate or legal burden of proof is on an accused person to demonstrate a breach of s. 11(b) the Charter on a balance of probabilities (R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 [Morin]), at 788. As a result, the applicant accused usually goes first in making submissions. Here, to assist Mr. Millar, the Crown provided its submissions first, both in the exchange of written submissions and in the oral hearing of the delay application.

[10] In addition, the Crown provided most of the evidence for the delay application, by providing Exhibit 1 on the delay application. That exhibit attaches electronic versions of some of the transcripts, documents, and correspondence relating to the delay application. The parties agreed to the contents of Exhibit 2 on the delay application, being one page of agreed admissions concerning events on June 6 and 7, 2013, when Mr. Millar was arrested and released.

The judge set the framework for the analysis;

[19] As a result, the questions in this case can be summarized as follows:

a) Has the period from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial, excluding delay attributable or waived by the defence, exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 30 months for cases in this court?

b) If so, has the Crown rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances?

c) If not, is the time the case has taken justified based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it existed prior to Jordan?

Then the judge went through an analysis of the five time periods catagorized by the Crown at the delay hearing and gave a seprate analysis on each. I'll briefly review the decision in each.

i) the First Period, of about 14 months, from about April 3, 2012 to June 7, 2013.

This is the period between the Crown laying charges against Millar and his first court appearance. He finally ended up in court only because the police raided his girlfriend's apartment at 6:30 in the morning, found him there, and brought him in. Paragraphs 29 to 68 of the decision chronicle the CRA's efforts to locate Millar after he failed to show up for his initial court appearance. I won't go into them you can read it yourself.

It was the Crown's position that the reason that Millar could not be found during this period because he was deliberately evading the police so the delay was his fault. It was Millar's position that, Hey, shit happens! He had personal issues, a life to lead and he was was too busy living it to address his legal problems.

The Judge wrote;

[111] The analysis relating to the First Period is the most complex. It raises the question of whether the relevant period for the delay analysis should commence on the date the information was sworn, even if Mr. Millar was not aware of the information’s existence.

[112] The law is not entirely clear on that issue. Two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada are particularly relevant, the 1986 decision in R. v. Carter, 1986 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 981 [Carter], and the 1989 decision of Kalanj.

The judge was very "on one hand" and "on the other hand" about this time period. She decided that the purpose of the delay provision in the Charter was to limit the amount of "vexations" that a criminal defendant suffers by knowing he is charged and having to face the effects of the charges on his life. However since Millar claimed that he didn't know about the charges and went about his life for over a year in ignorance of them he really suffered no vexation until he was arrested. So she started the delay clock ticking away at the time of his arrest at the end of period 1.

[122] In my view, choosing the later of the date of the swearing of an information and the service of process on the accused accords better with the rationale of s. 11(b) and with the reasoning in McIntyre J.’s majority judgment in Kalanj. The liberty of the accused will not be affected until he or she is served with process, as occurred here when Mr. Millar was arrested on June 6, 2013 and entered into a recognizance the following day. The accused does not suffer the vexations of a criminal charge until the accused knows that he or she has been charged.

[123] The Crown did not provide me with any other cases considering this issue. With the assistance of my law clerk, I found three cases which did so. Perhaps the reason there are so few cases is that, pursuant to the law prior to Jordan, which is set out in Morin, it was important to consider the issue of prejudice to the accused. The explanation for so few cases involving a lapse of time between the charges being sworn and served may be that an accused could seldom suffer prejudice if they were not aware of the charges against them.

. . . . . .

[135] The Crown did not argue that the time period should commence with Mr. Millar’s arrest rather than the date the information was sworn, but I must apply the law. It may become important in later cases, because of the analysis required by Jordan.

[136] In my view, Kalanj is only binding on the issue the court was required to decide in that case, namely that pre-information delay will not be considered in a s. 11(b) analysis. In my view, the better analysis applicable when an information is sworn long before it is served, at least when the accused may not be aware of the charge or charges, is as set out by Lamer J. in his majority reasons in Carter and his dissenting reasons for judgment in Kalanj. This is because the accused’s liberty and security interests will not be affected until either the accused is served with legal process, or the accused is aware of the charges.

[137] Following this analysis, the applicable start date for assessing s. 11(b) delay in this case is June 6, 2013, the date Mr. Millar was served and arrested. Accordingly, the First Period fell outside the period relevant under s. 11(b).

Then over to "on the other hand";

[138] In case I am held to be wrong about the appropriate start date for the delay analysis, I will proceed to consider the issue of delay for the period prior to the service of the information.

[139] If the period relevant to delay is held to have begun on the date the information was sworn, February 2, 2012, I must consider the Crown’s position that the First Period, commencing about two months later, should not be considered in the period of delay. The Crown argued that the delay was solely due to Mr. Millar’s actions in evading service, or alternatively, resulted from a discrete exceptional event or exceptional complexity, or in the further alternative, that it resulted in the Crown’s reasonable reliance on the law as it was at the time.

[140] A person accused of a crime does not have an obligation to cooperate to receive a summons or warrant. I will refer to cases discussing that.

Judge did an extensive review of jurisprudence and came to this conclusion;

[157] These cases, decided prior to Jordan, suggest that an accused may be faulted for evading service, and the Crown may be faulted for deliberately delaying apprehending the accused.

[158] In this case, I am not satisfied either that Mr. Millar evaded service, or that the Crown deliberately delayed apprehending him.

[159] As stated, the evidence does not clarify when Mr. Millar knew he had been charged. He clearly knew that items seized from the Fullerton Home had been detained, and there had been ongoing court proceedings to continue their detention. He had been advised in the October 13, 2010 letter from Mr. Rauh that a detention period may be extended if charges were laid. However, the evidence on the delay application did not disclose when the detention order of January 7, 2011 expired, so it does not disclose when or if Mr. Millar would have known, by the absence of further hearings about extending the detention of items from the Fullerton Home search, that charges had been laid against him.

[160] It seems likely that some of the efforts to serve Mr. Millar would have come to his attention, but it is possible that he did not know about the charges until his arrest. This is particularly so if, as suggested by the apartment manager of the East 10th Home, Mr. Millar had commenced living with Ms. Ciucci in early 2012, before the information was sworn. In that event, the efforts to find Mr. Millar at the Fullerton Home failed simply because he was no longer living there, not because he was evading service.

[161] Since he did not have an obligation to cooperate with the service of process, and I am not satisfied that Mr. Millar deliberately evaded service, I am not prepared to conclude that the delay was due to Mr. Millar’s actions.

However the Crown could get a pass if there are "exceptional circumstances" that caused the delay. Essentially circumstances beyond the Crown's control. Judge cited Jordan in respect to the current state of the law on this;

[163] The Crown argued that there were “exceptional circumstances” giving rise to the long period between the swearing of the information and Mr. Millar’s arrest. The meaning of such “exceptional circumstances” was discussed in Jordan at paras. 69, 71-73, 77, and 78, as follows:

[69] Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown's control in the sense that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) Crown counsel cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those circumstances once they arise. So long as they meet this definition, they will be considered exceptional. They need not meet a further hurdle of being rare or entirely uncommon.
…
[71] It is obviously impossible to identify in advance all circumstances that may qualify as "exceptional" for the purposes of adjudicating a s. 11(b) application. Ultimately, the determination of whether circumstances are "exceptional" will depend on the trial judge's good sense and experience. The list is not closed. However, in general, exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases.

[72] Commencing with the former, by way of illustration, it is to be expected that medical or family emergencies (whether on the part of the accused, important witnesses, counsel or the trial judge) would generally qualify. Cases with an international dimension, such as cases requiring the extradition of an accused from a foreign jurisdiction, may also meet the definition.

[73] Discrete, exceptional events that arise at trial may also qualify and require some elaboration. Trials are not well-oiled machines. Unforeseeable or unavoidable developments can cause cases to quickly go awry, leading to delay. For example, a complainant might unexpectedly recant while testifying, requiring the Crown to change its case. In addition, if the trial goes longer than reasonably expected -- even where the parties have made a good faith effort to establish realistic time estimates -- then it is likely the delay was unavoidable and may therefore amount to an exceptional circumstance.

In the end the judge came to the same conclusion as before but for different reasons based largely on pre-Jordan law;

[164] Constable Johnson took many steps to try and serve Mr. Millar, ultimately including the search of the Fullerton Home and the East 10th Home. I do not consider the difficulty in serving Mr. Millar with process to be a discrete exceptional event.

[165] However, it is unusual to require steps including two search warrants to locate an accused person. As a result, I conclude that service on Mr. Millar was a matter of exceptional complexity. I consider that the period of at least 5 ½ months, from December 21, 2012, being the date of the first search warrant for evidence of Mr. Millar’s whereabouts, to June 6, 2013, the date of his arrest, arose from the complexity in serving Mr. Millar with legal process.

. . . . . .

[168] Mr. Millar argued that he suffered prejudice from the delay in this case. Some of the witnesses who testified that they had received instruction from Mr. Millar in the period covered in the indictment could not recall everything he told them.

[169] It is true that the memory of those witnesses may have been fresher if they had testified earlier. However, I am not satisfied that any further evidence about what Mr. Millar told any students would have affected his guilt or innocence of the charges against him. Much of the important evidence at trial was in written teaching materials and DVDs about the “natural person” theory as described by the Paradigm Education Group. As a result, Mr. Millar did not demonstrate that any prejudice arose from the delay between the swearing of the information and Mr. Millar’s arrest.

[170] In my view, the Crown reasonably relied on the law which applied prior to Jordan that the delay between the swearing of the information and the service of process on Mr. Millar would not affect Mr. Millar’s s. 11(b) rights unless he could show some prejudice. As a result, if the period prior to June 6, 2013 should be taken into account in determining whether the presumptive ceiling for delay was exceeded, the entire period must be deducted as a transitional exceptional circumstance.

. . . . . .

[171] In summary, I have concluded that the applicable time period began upon Mr. Millar’s arrest on June 6, 2013. If I am wrong in that, I would conclude that the Crown reasonably relied on the law prior to Jordan, and that the First Period of about 14 months, from April 3, 2012 to June 6, 2013, should be deducted from the relevant period.

[172] I would also conclude that there was an exceptional event arising from the complexity of serving Mr. Millar with legal process, which would justify deducting at least 5 ½ of the 14 months, but because I have concluded that the Crown reasonably relied on the law prior to Jordan and that the entire 14-month First Period should be deducted, the deduction of 5 ½ of those 14 months does not make any difference.

ii) Second Period: About one month, from September 13 to October 17, 2013

The judge doesn't need my help to succinctly explain this one.

[173] I turn now to the Second Period, of about one month, from September 13, 2013 to October 17, 2013. This period starts with the originally scheduled timeline date for Mr. Millar to enter a plea and ends on the actual date on which Mr. Millar was deemed to have pleaded not guilty.

[174] The Crown argued that this delay of about one month arose from Mr. Millar’s choice to seek a lawyer who would make arguments he wished to make, and that if Mr. Millar had acted reasonably, he would have made his election and entered his plea by the deadline date of September 13, 2013.

[175] Mr. Millar argued that it is difficult to find a lawyer and that this period should not be deducted.

[177] I accept the Crown’s submission on this point. Mr. Millar had ample opportunity to either find a lawyer or to receive advice sufficient to enable him to elect the mode of trial and to enter a plea before the timeline date. As a result, I will deduct this one-month period in the calculation.

iii) Third Period: About 3 ½ months, from April 23 to August 7, 2015

[179] This period of delay related to the period when the Crown was seeking a joint voir dire regarding the admissibility of items seized from the Porisky Search.

I reported on the joint voir dire here;

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=10834&start=20#p234470

The judge said that the Crown could have continued scheduling the trial during this period since the trial schedule did not rely on the outcome of the voir dire and that, while the voir dire was appropriate, it was not an exceptional circumstance. So the judge did not deduct this period from the delay calculations.

iv) Fourth Period: About 6 ½ Months, from November 17, 2015 to May 30, 2016

Again I can do no better than just quote the judge;

[183] The Fourth Period is about 6 ½ months, from November 17, 2015 to May 30, 2016. This period starts on a trial date which was available for Mr. Millar and ends on the date the trial began.

[184] The Crown’s position is that Mr. Millar was offered an earlier trial date, and it was his choice to delay his trial until after the two related trials.

[185] Mr. Millar argued that it was reasonable for him to seek to have his trial after the related trials, because he was acting for himself, and was able to learn from watching the other trials.

[186] Mr. Millar made the choice to have a later trial date, essentially preferring to educate himself rather than resolve the charges against him more promptly.

[187] As a result, this period of delay of about 6 ½ months is due solely to the actions of Mr. Millar, and must be deducted from the period to be compared with the presumptive ceiling.

v) Fifth Period: About 2 ½ Months, from June 25 to September 9, 2016

This period was the time between what the judge called the "evidence portion" of the trial and the closing submissions which started September 9th. Judge said that the Crown was ready to go with closing on June 25th and it was Millar who caused the delay. Millar said that court offered him the opportunity to make written submissions and he took it. It was reasonable for him to do so and he shouldn't be penalized for it.

Judge agreed with Millar that it was reasonable for him to want time to prepare and he wasn't advised at the time that this specific delay might be applied against him. However his request for a delay occurred before the release of the Jordan decision and, at that time, such a delay would not count against the Crown. Since the Crown was willing to proceed on June 25th the judge said that Millar had waived the fifth period by requesting the delay and it would be deducted from the overall delay period.

This left a discussion on the issue that had bedevilled the judge at trial. When does the period considered for delay end?

[193] Assessing the overall period also requires consideration of when the period should end.

[194] The position of Crown counsel was that the law was not clear about when the period which the court should compare with the presumptive ceiling should end.

The alternatives were;

[197] I conclude that, ordinarily, the period the court should use for comparison with the presumptive ceiling should end with the date of the “anticipated end of trial”. This raises the question of whether the “anticipated end of trial” means the end of evidence, or the end of oral and written submissions, or the announcement of the verdict, or the conclusion of sentencing.

And the judge decided that;

[199] In my view, the relevant date in this case is the date that the verdict was anticipated and was in fact delivered, which was October 11, 2016. Once a verdict is announced, bail conditions will not continue unless there is a conviction, and in that case would effectively relate to the conviction. The stress and stigma of an unresolved criminal charge will have been resolved with either an acquittal or a conviction. The accused can no longer be prejudiced in mounting a defence. In other words, the delay following the verdict would not affect Mr. Millar’s liberty, security, and fair trial rights.

Specifically;

[200] I have concluded that the period for comparison with the presumptive ceiling should begin on June 6, 2013, the date of Mr. Millar’s arrest, and continue to October 11, 2016, the anticipated and actual date of the verdict. That is a period of about 40 months.

So, on one hand;

[201] From that, I must deduct delay attributable to or waived by the defence. On that basis, I deduct 10 months, consisting of the one-month Second Period, the 6 ½-month Fourth Period, and the 2 ½-month Fifth Period, for the reasons discussed.

[202] That results in a period of 30 months, which is the same as the presumptive ceiling. It is only delay beyond that presumptive ceiling which is to be considered unreasonable using the analysis required by Jordan. Therefore, on my primary analysis, I must conclude that Mr. Millar’s rights under s. 11(b) of the Charter have not been breached.

But on the other;

[203] If I am wrong in determining that the relevant period does not commence until Mr. Millar’s arrest, my analysis is more complex.

[204] The overall period would begin on February 2, 2012, the date of the information, and would end on October 11, 2016, the anticipated and actual date of the verdict. That is a period of about 56 months.

[205] From that period, I must deduct delay attributable to or waived by the defence. On that basis, I deduct 10 months, consisting of the one-month Second Period, the 6 ½-month Fourth Period, and the 2 ½-month Fifth Period, for the reasons discussed.

[206] That results in a period of about 46 months, which significantly exceeds the presumptive ceiling of 30 months.

The alternatives considered in handling this significant excess were;

[213] The case was not so complex that it should have required 46 months. However, it was sufficiently complex to require more than 30 months, and I will take that into account in assessing the overall reasonableness of the delay.


[214] I must next consider whether the Crown reasonably relied on the law as it existed prior to Jordan. As discussed, if the relevant period began on February 2, 2012, I would deduct the First Period of 14 months on the basis of the law existing at the time as a transitional exceptional circumstance.

[215] That leaves a period of 32 months, which is slightly over the presumptive ceiling. The difference of two months between my primary and my alternate analyses arises because the Crown argued that a two-month period was a reasonable period for service of legal process on Mr. Millar and accordingly submitted that the period to be deducted as the First Period should begin two months after the swearing of the information.

So now we're parsing things down to a few months. At this point the judge resolved the problem by getting subjective;

d) Reasonableness of Delay

[216] The analysis of whether delay has been unreasonable is not just a question of a number alone. This was discussed in para. 51 of Jordan as follows:

While the presumptive ceiling will enhance analytical simplicity and foster constructive incentives, it is not the end of the exercise: as we will explain in greater detail, compelling case-specific factors remain relevant to assessing the reasonableness of a period of delay both above and below the ceiling. Obviously, reasonableness cannot be captured by a number alone, which is why the new framework is not solely a function of time. Contrary to what our colleague Cromwell J. asserts, we do not depart from the concept of reasonableness; we simply adopt a different view of how reasonableness should be assessed.

[217] After considering all these factors, including the complexity of the case and the transitional exceptional circumstances here, I conclude that the delay in resolution of these charges was not an unreasonable delay. That is so whether I am correct in determining that the applicable period started with the date Mr. Millar was arrested and served with the information, or if I am wrong in that, and the applicable period started with the date that the information was sworn.

SUMMARY

[218] The ultimate or legal burden of proof is on an accused person to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that there has been a breach of his or her Charter rights. Mr. Millar has failed to demonstrate that he was not tried within a reasonable time. As a result, I dismissed his application to stay the proceedings against him on the basis of delay.

I anticipate that this judicial uncertainty and hedging is going to go on for quite a while until the fallout from Jordan settles down and the courts have some certainty about its implications.

[Burnaby49]

Done it! I've finally finished writing up my last three days of Michael Millar's hearings. It's been a very active year for Poriskyite tax evasion trials and I'd fallen way behind in posting it all but I'm now completely up to date. Until tomorrow when there is yet another hearing. And more in November.

Millar's trial was over except for closing submissions. So the judge (no jury) scheduled September 7, 8, and 9 to hear them. However Millar made an application for a hearing on undue delay and this was instead heard in this time slot with closing submissions rescheduled for September 14, 15, and 16. This is what I'm reporting. This was Millar's last chance to argue why the Crown was wrong and why he should be acquitted. Instead it was three days of relentless lunacy as Millar obsessively repeated beliefs from the past he that seems unable to relinquish. It's like he's a hopeless captive of his own arguments regardless of how many times they've failed in court. Reading this you can get at least a sense of the endless, overwhelming barrage of sheer gibberish that Millar subjected us to over these three days. Millar went on and on, and on, and on, about how nobody understood the law but him, hints of dark conspiracies against him, unfairness, persecution, and, of course, capitalization, private persons immune from law under private contracts, and jurisdiction. And I sat through almost all of it. Readers are at least safely out of the line of fire.


September 14, 2016

The judge started session by discussing undue delay issues from last week. She cited a Supreme Court of Canada case (I missed the name). The individual was charged eight months after his arrest. Should the eight months be included in the delay? Judge said that the SCC said no. Judge said that the laying of Information (how charges are laid in Canada) and date of arrest have to be taken into account. Judge told Crown that they may wish to argue that charges didn't occur until Millar was arrested. She told the Crown to consider it and the Court would discuss it tomorrow. Millar said that it looked like the Court was giving the Crown an opportunity to strengthen the prosecution's case. Judge said that was right. Millar started complaining that the judge was helping the Crown too much. Judge said that she had to apply the law. She told Millar "If you disagree with my decision, appeal."

Then on to closing arguments. Crown first. First Crown covered voice and handwritten evidence. Crown submitted a two page document on law in respect to this issue. Judge had what was, to me, an incomprehensible argument. There were audio tapes and videos of Millar in evidence. However the judge did not want to use them because, while she had heard his voice in court (hours and hours and hours of his voice in court and a lot more to come), he had the right to remain silent but had been compelled to speak. (Note - as I understand it this is not legally correct. Had he retained a lawyer to actually run his defense in a sane manner he would not have been required to speak at all. I attended Peter Balogh's and Arthur Doerksen's trials and neither said a word to the court during their trials. However Millar was obsessed about his jurisdiction and capitalization arguments, neither of which would have been used by a lawyer, and money was probably an issue). She also made the same point about the videos which was certainly more valid since he was compelled to attend. Judge made point that while it clearly was Millar in the videos but she was only able to identify him because, as I said, he was compelled to be here. Judge didn't like the idea that Crown had nor brought somebody in who knew Millar to identify him on the videos and tapes. She felt it unfair to him that she, as his judge, had to do it.

Crown went through the law which apparently said that it was OK for a judge to identify individuals on recorded media without independent verification. Additionally the videos and tapes were seized from Millar in the search of his apartment. Plus he self-identifies as Michael Millar in the videos and tapes. Based on this the judge should be satisfied that Millar is the individual in the recordings. A long discussion by Crown connecting the material taken in the search to the individual in the court.

"He is taken to know the contents of the items and materials seized from his residence absent evidence to the contrary." Judge asked why the Crown wanted to enter this evidence if it was not absolutely necessary to the case. Crown said that the judge could compare Millar's signatures (on bank documents) to the signatures on the seized documents. Crown responded that the judge could take the evidence as a whole. Judge seemed concerned about an appeal.

This is the first time I've heard a judge question the Crown on entering relevant evidence. How can the Crown know what a judge considers necessary and what is not? Evidence in these cases is more a case of accumulated weight rather than a single smoking gun.

Also, as far as the judge's questions on why it should be accepted that Millar knew what was in documents seized at his residence I've attended the Porisky, Lawson, Balogh, and Doerksen trials. All relied on documentary evidence seized at the accused's residences and in all of these the judge accepted that the accused were assumed to know the contents of the seized documents.

Back to Crown's closing arguments. Or not. Another issue. Judge questioned how the Crown could prove the date range in which the Crown said that Millar was counseling fraud. Crown said he'd started in early 2002. They apparently got this from a document in a folder from the Porisky and Gould seizure. Copy of a February 2002 email from Millar to Porisky. Crown said that Justice Brown had said that these were business documents. This document covered the earliest date that Millar counseled. The latest date was after the CRA searched his apartment. There is evidence that he counseled as late as June 2009 and there is bank evidence that he counseled through all of 2008. Crown went through various documents showing that he counseled in 2008 to early 2009.

The Crown's comment about business documents relates to a joint voir dire that I reported here;

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=10834&start=20#p234470

Morning break and I had business down at the court registry. Last week there was a yellow sign in the courtroom saying that a ban was in effect but this week there was no sign. So I went down to the registry to check. Registry said that the ban was put in place in February 2015. This was the date of Millar's preliminary inquiry and, according to the registry clerk, should have only covered the inquiry hearings (which I had not attended). Apparently the ban should have been lifted but nobody had got around to it.

Break over and on with closing. Returned to income tax and GST offenses. Actus rea and mens rea. Crown went through copies of the tax returns that Millar had filed in 2004 to 2006. He'd declared 1¢ in total income for each of these years. After proving that Millar filed tax returns showing no income Crown went through documents proving that he'd actually had income. Things like invoices, contracts for hire, bank statements, then lunch.

Before we resumed after lunch judge asked if there had been any progress of the transcript issue. This was from last week's delay hearing where Millar had complained that the Crown had not provided a transcript of a specific prior hearing. Crown said that they would try to get it and have it available by Friday. Crown had said that they'd asked for a transcript but not received it. Millar said that he'd gone down to the registry and heard a recording of the hearing transcript which proved that it was available. He seemed to think it important for some undisclosed reason. existed. Judge essentially told the Crown to get a copy of it even though it is Millar's responsibility if he wants it entered into evidence.

Back to more of the Crown going through documents. On to mens rea regarding the income tax offenses and a final conclusion from Crown that the Crown's evidence proved that Millar was guilty on all counts and Crown's case was concluded.

Then it was Millar's turn and I faced my own trial, listening to two and a half days of his relentless onslaught of grievances and gibberish. I'll give a spoiler here. It included capitalization, his claimed private person status, and jurisdiction. Lots and lots and lots about capitalization, his private person status, and jurisdiction.

First he had a question on procedures. He wanted to read things into the record. I think he loves going down to registry and hearing his own voice. Judge told him she'd read his submission so he can emphasize and highlight but not necessary to read it into the record. But, given the volume of his outpouring in the next few days, he essentially did anyhow.

He started by saying that it was "the prosecution's theory that the Paradigm theory and my interpretation is illegal. I have raised, since my arrest, my status and capacity as a private person and have used it consistently in communications. My attempts to have that state acknowledged has largely fallen on deaf ears. My need to constantly repeat my status could have been remedied by state actors acknowledging it. The basic concept of private persons is the foundational concept of common law. It is a shock not to have my private status recognized. The law is designed to protect a man and his property. The CRA is making a controversy where none exists by challenging the concept of the natural private person."

"I have questions and concerns about the legitimacy of the proceedings. The Information (his charging document) was not in proper form because Canada and British Columbia were in capital letters. It is the same issue in this court where the paperwork is not in compliance with the proper procedures to guide the court process. This leads to my concerns with these proceedings. I want just a yes or no answer; are we in the Supreme Court of British Columbia under 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act?" Then he went off on a ramble about the County Boundary Act I didn't bother to write down.

"I have three concerns. Natural persons, Supreme Court legitimacy, county and city boundaries, these are all on issue. I have no evidence that this is being done correctly." He complained that nobody will answer his questions. "If any of those three issues are wrong we are in an unfair biased process." He noted a request he's made to Crown (he called it prosecution) regarding the private person they were prosecuting. On about capitalization and how his name was done in different styles in different documents. "It muddies the water." He hinted at dark conspiracies by using different stylings and capitalizations for his name. "I have raised these concerns over and over because they have not been answered."

"I've been accused of wilfully misunderstanding the law." Then back to his Holy Grail, section 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act. This says that the name of the Supreme Court is in upper and lower case. He then showed the court some civil proceedings document that had "Supreme Court" done properly. "Capitalizations are visual clues as to what and where things are happening. So the court has used capitalization to distinguish between civil and criminal claims." Then he went on to obsessive nit-picking about the styling in various forms. He explained, in a very elliptical manner, that the use of upper and lower case in court documents is not random. He mentioned that this is in the Law and Equity Act. He said that the legislature had deliberately chosen to use different styles of capitalization for different purposes and intents and the documents in his case were not styled for a criminal offense. Capitalization is designed to show the parties where they are (I assume he meant in which one of his mythical numerous Supreme Courts of British Columbia an action is being heard) and what type of action it is. "The prosecution has failed to show which court or county we are in." Judge cut in to say that it doesn't matter if words in documents are in upper or lower case. Millar vehemently disagreed. "Styling has meaning". Judge - "You have been told over and over it doesn't matter. It's just you. You say it matters." Millar responded "Capitalization fits into legislative intent! I want it on record that this is a continuous concern".

He talked about the Legal Profession Act which says that the Society has the powers of a natural person. "Natural persons keep coming up for everyone but me!" This is what he's referring to;

Part 1 — Organization

Division 1 — Law Society

Incorporation

2 (1) The Law Society of British Columbia is continued.

(2) For the purposes of this Act, the society has all the powers and capacity of a natural person.

http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/ ... g/98009_01

Millar said that he wanted it noted that his rights are not being recognized in this venue. He wants his hearing in a private chamber to respect his rights. Millar has demanded a private trial before; at this hearing;

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=10834#p227241

It didn't work out well for him.

"It is the prosecution's theory that events occurred in Canada. Events were in British Columbia not in Canada. Canada and British Columbia are foreign to each other with their own jurisdictions. The prosecution wants to ignore that events in British Columbia don't take place in Canada."

"This case has nothing to do with income tax. It is about a man's rights and having them respected." Then back to the paperwork in his case and capitalization. "Whether or not I taught Paradigm theory is irrelevant." Something about the bible. He's lost me by this point. Then on to identification issues and a long ramble about legal and natural persons. "Are we talking about natural persons or artificial persons?" More babbling about natural and artificial persons and how he is a man but his indictment does not name a man because of capitalization. "Indictment is not legislatively authorized because the form is not in accordance with the Criminal Code. More about lawful courts and jurisdiction I didn't bother to record.

Then he actually discussed the Income Tax Act! He said that the only relevant section of the Act was the one that defined the applicability of the Act. "Who is it applicable to? Residents of Canada. It could have used citizens but it used residents. Since we are in British Columbia this jurisdiction is not part of Canada." He said that Canada was an "artificial construct" and that British Columbia is a foreign jurisdiction to Canada. Apparently Millar doesn't believe that Canada even exists apart from a fiction.

This is what he was referring to;

Tax payable by persons resident in Canada

2(1) An income tax shall be paid, as required by this Act, on the taxable income for each taxation year of every person resident in Canada at any time in the year.

http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts ... 1.html#h-3

Even with the abysmal low level of sense in any of Millar's arguments this one is really stupid. I'm not even sure of what the point is that he's making by saying that the Canadian parliament could have chosen the word 'citizen' could have been chosen instead of 'resident' in section 2(1) but I assume it is because, in his dream world, this is to allow informed, knowledgeable natural persons such as himself who have spent the years necessary to thoroughly understand these issues to opt out of paying income tax if they chose. But, putting gibberish aside, it's blatantly obvious why parliament chose residents over citizens and the reason has nothing whatever to do with bullshit OPCA conspiracies. Canada has millions of immigrants who came here as non-citizens but with permanent landed-immigrant status. My wife was one. Canadian citizenship is voluntary, there is no requirement that they become citizens. So if 'citizens' was used in the Income Tax Act this would mean they would not be taxable even thought they are living here and working here earning income. In that scenario if they chose to forego citizenship they could live here all their lives without paying any income tax. So why would any immigrant become a citizen? We poor bastards unlucky enough to be born here would end up being responsible for paying the income taxes necessary to support everybody. Is that what Millar thinks is reasonable and legally correct?

Millar did not bother to explain in any detail how his point about 'resident' rather than 'citizen' actually helped his case. Not that it matters. If the Income Tax Act had said citizen instead of resident he'd have just flip his argument over and claimed that citizens of Canada aren't taxable in Canada. The issue isn't analysis of the law. The issue is Millar not paying income tax and making an income by counseling how to not pay tax. Whatever it takes. What difference would it make to him? A claim that he's not a Canadian citizen would have as much of a basis in reality as his current claim that he's not a resident.

One thought I had on this. In his delay hearing he proved to the Crown that he'd been out of the country for a few weeks. He'd have needed a passport for that since now even travel to the United States requires a Canadian passport or proof of Canadian citizenship. So, if he's not a resident or citizen of Canada what documents did he use to enter whatever foreign country he went to and when he returned to Canada? Not surprisingly he refused to discuss this point in court. It was the private information of a private person. That's a very helpful concept when you don't want to have to justify your position.

On that note the day ended.

Now an interpretation of my own. I think I've finally figure out what Millar is getting at with his capitalization theory. I'll try to explain but there is no certainty that I'm correct.

This is section 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act;

2 (1) The Supreme Court of British Columbia is continued under the name and style of the "Supreme Court of British Columbia".

So if a document has the court named exactly as styled above then it is the real Supreme Court. But if it is styled SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA it is a different Supreme Court with different responsibilities to those of the regular Supreme Court. It is also a court without jurisdiction since only the real Supreme Court of British Columbia has jurisdiction in British Columbia. This flows through to all stylings and capitalization's in official documents. This is a deliberate act by the provincial legislature to give visual clues, to those that are astute enough to understand them, about the hidden meanings of the documents. The capitalization and stylings within the documents determine which of the parallel Supreme Courts it is to be heard in and the type of action covered by the document, civil or criminal.

This also extends to how the accused's name is capitalized. As I understand it if he is named in a court document as MICHAEL MILLAR the document is referring to the legal man but if his name is styled Michael Millar then it is referring to the private person. Since at least some of Millar's documents make reference to MICHAEL MILLAR and THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA it is obvious to anyone who understands these things that the Crown is deliberately prosecuting him in the alternate Supreme Court, the one without jurisdiction, and they are prosecuting him for a criminal offense when the secret coding in the documents clearly show that he has actually been charged with a civil offense. Millar has uncovered the secret. The British Columbia legislature has legislated that all of the necessary information to indicate the charges, including whether they are criminal or civil, the parties, and the court the action is being heard in, is to be shown by the capitalization styling of words in official documents regardless of the actual content or meaning of the documents. Who knew?

However since there is no consistency in the styling of the documents in Millar's prosecution even Millar, obviously the leading expert in this arcane language, can't tease out of it which Michael Millar is being charged, which court he is in, or what the action is about. Hence his constant badgering the judge to tell him if this is the real Supreme Court of British Columbia and his demand that the court unequivocally recognize his private person status. This should all be clear in the documents but the corrupt or incompetent court and Crown have totally muddied the water by their inconsistent use of styling.

At least that's how I understand what he is saying. I might be entirely wrong. I can't claim to have his deep insightful knowledge of the law and his genius at legal interpretation.

I only got through this posting to this point with the help of a bottle of wine and Angela Hewitt's interpretation of Bach's The Art of Fugue. Wine is done and I've worked my way through both of Angela's CD's so time for a break. Tomorrow I'll try to get through another day of Millar's blather with the assistance of Handel's Organ Concertos by Simon Preston, Trevor Pinnock, and the English Concert. A superb version of one of my favorite works.


September 15, 2016

We started fifteen minutes late because of a fire drill. Millar resumed his submission. He said that he had repeatedly and clearly brought out that his documents were private and created by private men and women exercising private rights. "Those combined are evidence that the contracting parties were the only parties with equitable interests and a legal interest in the transactions. So the CRA has no legal right to be a party to the contracts or intervene in the contracts. The parties did not intend that any third party have a legal or equitable interest in the contracts. The expressed intent of the parties as to capacity or status excludes all others from the contracts. Nobody has shown how Her Majesty has any equitable right in the contracts. The Crown has evaded this issue. This was a lawful exercise in private rights between private citizens. There is no evidence that the right to private income or private information has been eliminated. Common law does not allow the CRA to interfere in these private matters. They just make a blanket claim that no private rights exist and you are not a natural person."

I have to say that his argument that the CRA does not accept private rights and that natural persons are not a thing for tax purposes pretty well sums up the CRA's position. You have to at least, to a small extent, a very small extent, admire his obstinate banging-his-head-against-wall persistence. He's lost this exact same argument in court at least twice already and here he is, in his last crack at getting off of his criminal charges, charging with all flags flying right into this doomed argument yet again.

Now on to jurisdiction. "All evidence shows that the contracts occurred in the county of Vancouver, a geographic area, and not in Canada, a legal fiction. There is no evidence how they magically pop out of the geographical area to the legal fiction of the federal sphere. The search was not in the foreign jurisdiction of Canada." He's arguing this point because he has been charge under the Criminal Code of Canada which is federal legislation and he is being prosecuted by federal Crown lawyers. However he is being tried in a provincial court. That's just how the system works.

Readers please note, I'm not embellishing or expanding on his comments, whatever they are supposed to mean. I'm just writing them down as I hear them. These were part of his actual closing arguments in the Supreme Court of British Columbia. A court that is probably nothing more than another of his legal fictions. While Canada might be a "legal fiction" (Who am I to argue with Millar's profound scholarly analysis of the law?) that legal fiction paid my salary for 35 years so I'm willing to accept its existence as an actual entity.

Anyhow, back to what Millar considers closing arguments. He said that his bank account lacked any connection to any federal jurisdiction. "They provided no evidence that the account has been moved from provincial to federal jurisdiction. The account was set up for the private use of a natural person.

Then on to his social insurance number. Always a bête noire with these guys. "There is a question in respect to it. The lead investigator confirmed that he got it from seized forms. There is a correct procedure for connecting numbers to people but this was not followed." He cited the Naudi case, paragraphs 26 and 27. This is Naudi, an inconsequential case from 2003;

R. v. Naudi, 2003 BCPC 453
http://canlii.ca/t/1g7df

And these are paragraphs 26 and 27;

[26] I do not see how, based on the cross-examination from the transcript evidence and what we have just filed, based on the transcripts of June the 18th and August the 12th, that it could be said that Mr. Ratcliffe, based on his own evidence, had personal knowledge as to what the social insurance numbers were. When I look at this evidence, again referring to transcript of June 18th, page 83, starting at lines 22:

Q Okay. So on these diary -- expanded diary notes with Caroline, the -- Carolyn, the account number is on the top, constant all the way through, and that's consistent with mine as well; correct?

A Yes.

Line 27:

Q And did you put that account number on there?

A No, I did not.

Q Did you confirm with the person who put the account number on there?

A No, I did not.

Q And so how was it that you came to it that that was the correct account number?

A Basically it matches your social insurance number.

Q And did you compare it to my social insurance number?

A There is an option on the computer that I can go to do that. I don't know whether I did that or not in this specific case. The whole system is set up based on social insurance numbers or business numbers.

Line 42:

Q But what you're saying is that you did not confirm whether those account numbers are indeed ours?

A I don't know if I did that or not. I can do it if you want.

[27] But on August the 12th, line 7 to 8, page 10:

Q ... Now, in doing so you relied upon a social insurance number, correct?

A Correct.

Q What was your source of the knowledge that the social insurance number that you actually punched into the system to do the search, what was the source of your knowledge that that is the correct social insurance number for Felipe Marcel Naudi, for one thing?

A Basically, the system is set up on social insurance numbers.

Q Uh-huh. So somebody, someday, somewhere, decided that that was the social insurance number of Felipe Marcel Naudi?

A Yes. We also have a section in the computer that cross-referenced back to the social insurance number for people.

Q ... But you would have to acknowledge to me, you don't know who that person was who established that social insurance number to be the social insurance number of Felipe Marcel Naudi?

A No, I don't know.

Q And clearly, whether in fact that is correct or not you don't know?

A I didn't, to the connection of the two at the time, no.

Q No. But it is actually through the number that you do the search?

A Correct.

Lines 36:

Q So if the -- it depends on the accuracy of that number pertaining to that person that the results must be based? If the number were incorrect the results would be incorrect, correct?

A I assume such, yes.

There is similar further evidence given at page 11 that they have not confirmed the accuracy of the social insurance number as it relates to Mr. Naudi.

Somehow, somewhere in Millar's mind, that proves something or other. It's not surprising he reached back thirteen years to find a case that fit his arguments. The beginning of the twenty-first century was the beginning of his prime as a Porisky advocate and the beginning of his stream of revenues, as little as it was, from flogging Porisky's bullshit. He's reliving old memories and nostalgically drawing on the past for support.

The judge said that that this may have been evidence in that trial in 2003 but I have to make decisions based on evidence in this trial. The evidence in front of me is different than something you read out from thirteen years ago. So on to some craziness about capitalization in the words Social Insurance Number. This is a nine digit general identification number the government uses for multiple purposes. It is on the T4 slips that give employees annual income and deductions, it is used for Canada Pension Plan purposes and has seeped into the general financial world. Banks require it to open an account. According to Millar the Canada Pension Plan uses one form of capitalization for it, the CRA another. "So tax accounts are separate and distinct from the CPP process!" "Where in law is the tax account allowed to be created since they use Social Insurance Numbers in all lower case?" (note - Millar was speaking but I assume his spoken words were in reference to the correct mixed case SIN number rather than the bastardized lower case one used by the CRA.) "So how is the tax account related to me since I didn't apply for a tax account. The CPP application is voluntary. This shows that the Crown can't decide if you are taxable or not. An individual has to apply to be taxable."

Then, as is his habit, back to a topic he's beaten to death and resurrected any number of times, jurisdiction. Again with Canada being a foreign jurisdiction to British Columbia. "Section 3 of the Income Tax Act limits taxability to residents of Canada but it is not proven that residents of British Columbia are residents of Canada. The Income Tax Act deals only and specifically with residents of Canada." The He's already lost this issue in a prior decision from this very judge. Perhaps he thinks he can beat her down with sheer perseverance and repetition.

Then he said that Canada Pension Plan contributions are voluntary (not true, they are legally mandated. He's making easily refuted stupid claims that are nonsense on their face). "What is voluntary is accepting benefits." That part is true. I had CPP deductions taken off of every paycheque I made for 35 years without anyone asking me once if I wanted to pay into it but once I qualified to get a pension under the CPP I had to apply for it. But, so what?

At this point Handel's Organ Concerto op. 7 ended and I changed to Haydn's String Quartet op. 9 by the Kodaly Quartet. They have a 25 disc set of Haydn's complete string quartets and I have 15 of them.

Just disjointed rambling at this point. Shifting from one thing to another with no focus that I could discern. On about how government acts didn't affect him as a natural person. Playing word games with what does "person" mean? What does "business" mean? What's an individual? What is a personal trust? He seemed to just be speaking without linking to anything, just running on momentum and subconscious memory.

Then he pulled himself back into focus just a bit. The Income Tax Act is so complex that it is impossible for the average person to understand which makes it unenforceable. "I have no issue with the Income Tax Act except that I hold the position that private persons acting under private contracts are not subject to it because, foundationally, it is not possible for that to occur." I have no idea what he meant by that, it's a quote. More gibberish about how a rule of law society can't compel anyone to participate in anything, GST, income tax, CPP. Slavery and involuntary servitude otherwise. (If this is true why is he here? I doubt he is participating willingly. Perhaps because he knows if he doesn't attend court he'll be immediately nailed with an arrest warrant and tossed into jail without bail this time. I'd say that effectively refutes his comment about rule of law societies.) You are allowed to conduct your affairs outside of the Income Tax Act by private person and private contract. Then, mercifully, an all too short morning break. Keep in mind that he spewed out all of the proceeding pointless nonsense in just over an hour with four hours or so of court time to go. I'm not going to last.

After break Millar tried to file something. No idea what it was. Crown objected on the basis that it was new evidence. Millar said it wasn't evidence but information on the law. Judge allowed it since it was just a standard government form about something. It was an application form to collect Canada Pension Plan benefits. Then he was on about given names and family names. No connection to the form that I could make out. Something about "participation voluntary" in box 13. I checked the form online and box 13 is about sharing your CPP benefits with your spouse. Nothing about voluntary participation. Box 12 says that CPP pension payments are taxable income and you can voluntarily chose to have income taxes deducted from your CPP payments before they are sent to you. I declined the kind offer but that didn't make taxes on my CPP benefits voluntary, it just deferred them to tax time.

Then a ten minute ramble I didn't bother to write down. He's wearing me out. I couldn't figure out any point to it anyhow. Something about SIN numbers. Seemed to be about how, if you can't be forced to take a government benefit, you can't be forced to be a taxpayer. This comment shows the sheer, bare-faced hypocrisy of the Freeman/OPCA beliefs. I doubt that Millar ever declined any government benefits that he could get his hands on while, at the same time, he was actively engaged in tax fraud to cheat the system that pays for them. What about Canada's free medical care? Does he decline that out of principle or does he have some bullshit justification about how, although you can't be forced to accept benefits you can, if you chose, condescend to accept them?

Keith Lawson was exactly the same. He said at his trial that he'd voluntarily foregone collecting any government benefits because of his belief that he could, and had, opted out of the tax/benefit system. He was trying to show what he'd sacrificed by adhering to his principles. He gave a short list of government benefits that he'd virtuously refused to accept. I noted at the time that he was citing benefits he wasn't qualified to receive in any case, for age or other reasons, but he'd neglected to mention any that he was qualified to receive. The most glaring omission was our free medical care. Lawson is a voracious user of the medical system who, while defrauding the government out of the taxes he should have paid, demanded as a right the very expensive medical care he received. Perhaps he actually did convince himself that he was scrupulously obeying the income tax laws while selectively interpreting them to allow him to commit income tax fraud and collect whatever government benefits he wanted.

On to Millar's objections to being called an OPCA litigant. He's doing legitimate investigations. Then an extensive review of some 1955 Supreme Court decision I didn't catch. He read a lot of boilerplate about the role of the prosecution into the record. I was drifting off and even the judge was yawning. At least she's getting paid to listen to this. All pensionable time as we say in the government.

"The Crown is not seeking the truth. They want a conviction." More bald unsupported statements and disjointed comments. Then, just before lunch, a theme! Paradigm was not promoting income tax evasion. It was studying human rights. And he was studying and sharing his understanding of the law, trying to understand his human rights. "The Crown refused to discuss his understanding of law with him but just charged him. The state has the legal obligation to inform and educate Canadians about all of our human rights. They have failed to do so." He mentioned some United nations document on human rights. Then, like Donald Trump, he just couldn't keep focused on the point at issue and went off on a tangent about how the British Columbia government had failed to teach school children about international human rights treaties. Even the judge had had enough "This is a case on whether you violated the income tax law. It is not about human rights treaties." That didn't stop him for a moment. Something about United nations treaties barring the CRA from prosecuting him because of his human rights under some UN rules. Paradigm was filling this void by teaching human rights that the state should be teaching. Then, finally, lunch.

I have to admit that he made a very telling point. I can confirm that there is no level of government in Canada which teaches our school children that the United Nations has mandated that income tax evasion is a basic human right. So Millar, Lawson, Porisky and the rest of the Paradigm educators, as a public service, generously and voluntarily took up the burden of teaching these vital human rights issues that the Canadian government was keeping from the people of Canada. Now you'll note that I've mentioned that tax evasion was apparently the sole human right issue that Paradigm taught. However both Millar and Lawson stated at their trials that income tax law was only one of many human rights issues that they taught. The Paradigm syllabus apparently covered the whole gamut of human rights. However, very strangely, neither Millar, or Lawson, or even Russell Porisky himself have ever given any examples of any other human rights issues that they taught. A review of the Paradigm literature shows nothing else either. Had they given examples of any other issues that they claimed to have included in their classes and tutorials this might have served as a mitigating circumstance in respect to their evasion charges. However, for unexplained reasons, they declined to disclose any human rights issues they taught apart from income tax evasion. I can give absolutely no explanation for this baffling omission.

After lunch Millar started with an unsupported statement saying that the prosecution's case was legally wrong and that the juries were incorrect in finding Lawson and Porisky guilty. He constantly does that, making preposterous statements without citing any legal basis for them. When the Crown, or indeed any competent lawyer makes a legal point they back it up by citing the specific statutory provision supporting the statement and precedence if available. Millar just says things. At best he cites something called the Law and Equity Act, he really, really loves that Act. I have no idea what it is but you can find a copy here;

http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/ ... g/96253_01

Here is a sample of some of the section headings;

Power of court to discharge mortgagor on payment of mortgage money
Power of court in foreclosure actions to make order without regular hearing
Payment of interest after default
Cost in foreclosure proceedings
Venue in foreclosure proceedings
Right of redemption controverted
Covenants to insure against fire
Relief against penalties and forfeitures
Relief against acceleration provisions
Relief against forfeiture for breach of covenant to insure
Damage by collision at sea
Custody of infants
Surety who discharges liability entitled to assignment of securities
Writ of execution to bind goods only from time of seizure
Injunction or mandamus may be granted or receiver appointed by interlocutory order
Railway company not to be restrained on application made without notice
Railway company may be ordered to pay money into court

No doubt vitally important stuff but the Court certainly seems to find it irrelevant to Millar's issues. After his 'everybody but me is wrong' warm-up he moved on to private rights and how the Court and prosecution haven't even investigated the issue. I stopped paying attention after he started going on how Paradigm was a lawful exercise in claiming common law rights. The principal core issue is the natural man. "This has never been properly defined by the courts and the CRA has never answered my questions how they can tax a natural man." Then back to his true obsession, capitalization. He expanded this to include the type of font as being significant. On about some transcript being altered in a Porisky hearing way back. There was a Canadian flag in Porisky's courtroom (I've not seen one in the Supreme Court of British Columbia. On to Porisky's acquittal in on charges of failing to file tax returns. This was a case, I believe in 1998, where the judge didn't think the CRA had done enough work in checking right across Canada to confirm that Porisky, a local Vancouver area boy hadn't filed in, say, Moncton New Brunswick or Montreal. He didn't get off on the basis that he didn't have to file income tax returns because he is a natural man but because the judge wasn't convinced that the CRA had proven that he hadn't filed them.

Then on and on about natural persons and how he had been denied his natural person status before switching back, yet again, to capitalization and the claim that something hidden was going on because the courts won't be consistent in their usage of capitalization. He can talk about this stuff forever. This continued for over an hour then he switched topics just before the afternoon break and argued how the phrase "natural person" is not in the Income Tax Act although it could have easily been put there by the legislature. This proved that natural persons have been deliberately excluded from being taxable.

Then it was time for the break and I have a shameful admission. I bailed. Even with my huge capacity for boredom and idiocy I just couldn't take any more. So I have no idea whether or not he expanded on the issue of parliament's deliberate exclusion of the natural man from the Income Tax Act. I'm assuming he ended the day, another hour or so, by ranting about capitalization. Sadly it was only a temporary escape. I got another massive dose of craziness the next day.

You'll note that the judge said very little during his day-long tirade. A few comments when, I assume, she couldn't stand it any more. But, apart from that, she sat in silence just looking at him. I'm assuming that she was letting him get it out of his system so that he could not appeal on the basis that he was not allowed to present proper closing arguments. So we all suffered through it.


September 16, 2016

Home stretch, the last day of closing arguments. I can do this.

And Millar's at it again with a new twist. He passed up a copy of the Federal Court Jurisdiction Act to the judge. He said that this Act allowed Porisky's trial to be moved from Chilliwack to Vancouver.

I have two problems with this statement;

1 - The Federal Court does not hear criminal cases so it never had any jurisdiction over Porisky in respect to any of his charges.
2 - Why is Porisky's change of venue relevant to Millar's trial? Millar didn't bother to explain.

He started rambling about something in a February hearing and a hearing from December last year. Something about jurisdiction. He want the judge and Crown to explain to him the intent behind different stylings. Then something about the federal and provincial Interpretation Acts and how they invalidate all of the documents in the trial because of the Supreme court Act. I assumed that he is referring to 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act of British Columbia and his obsession with capitalization. He said that the Interpretation Acts prove that the judge is bound to accept his styling arguments. He kept going at this point until the judge cut in. "You made this point over and over yesterday". Then he waved an affidavit that he'd made last night demanding that the prosecution state what court we are in, what jurisdiction we are in, and agree that we all follow Supreme Court rules. I assume he meant follow them as he interprets them. Apparently the Crown is making false claims to convict him at all costs. He said that his wish and desire was to protect the court from the prosecution.

He said that he wished that the court wasn't being used for improper purposes. Judge said "You should recall that you are the person on trial, focus on that". Judge seems to be getting more active. Probably because she realizes he can go on forever if he is not reigned in. This hearing should be ending today but he seems to want a lot longer.

"I have a right to invalidate these proceedings if I can show improper processes as shown by the Interpretation Act. This entire process is invalidated. This is fundamental." Judge said "I think you are repeating yourself. I'll listen to your arguments and make a decision. This is not a conversation."

It was only at this point that he got started on where he'd apparently left off yesterday. Something about Crown's evidence. The decisions that they'd entered that proved his theory wrong. He said that the Crown was wrong in their interpretation of the cases. As usual he gave no details why Crown was wrong, just the bald statement. He said that all of the prior cases on the Paradigm theory were invalid because the defendants were self-represented and untrained so the decisions were unfair. Since every case had to be judged on its own merits the jurisprudence was irrelevant to his case. He went on about how the government had "beaten up" on the defendants in the prior cases. He noted that Porisky's lawyers had quit but he couldn't get an adjournment. This was an example of unfair proceedings against unrepresented parties. He said he'd read the "lawyer's ethics manual" and Porisky's lawyers didn't follow it. I assume that what he was referring to was the Law Society of British Columbia's Professional Conduct Handbook. You can read a copy here;

https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?c ... ofessional

The part in respect to a lawyer's ethical responsibility to his clients is given here;

https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?c ... Ethics#1-3

Of course, as always, Millar did not bother to explain how Porisky's lawyers had breached their professional ethics in respect to Porisky, just his statement that they had. The judge said "You are far afield. Mr. Porisky had a jury trial so there is no decision, just a verdict. There is no analysis. The Crown did not cite the recent Porisky trial."

Back to public and private business. Justice Brown just agreed that his private records were business records. This is contrary to the intent of the parties. On and on about private parties.
Where does the state get the right to declare private documents public?

Millar was referring to the joint voir dire held in March 2016 where Justice Brown of the Supreme Court of British Columbia allowed the Crown to enter documents seized at the residences if Russell Porisky, Debbie Anderson, Keith Lawson, and Michael Millar as business records. I attended the voir dire and reported on it here;

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=10834&start=20#p234470

Then on to another losing argument he'd not yet totally beaten to death. He said, quite correctly, that 'income' is not defined in the Income Tax Act. The Crown is using terms like 'taxpayer' and 'income'. Since 'income' has no defined meaning in the Act then it is defined by the word attached to it. (This is a new principle of lexicography that I was previously unaware of). "By using 'taxpayer' before 'income' the Crown admits that there is a private and taxpayer income." Some gibberish about profit. "The Crown doesn't have the power to change private income to taxpayer income through wordplay. They deny that I have any rights as to how I define my income."

Then he coughed up a 2004 document from something called the Public Safety and Awareness Canada. Judge cut in ""You have been charged with a crime. I am here to deal with that." That didn't stop him. He still went on relentlessly about the document. It said that Canadians are more positive than negative about the criminal justice system. "This goes to the level of trust in this entire process". I sat there listening to this and yet I have no idea what he was getting at with this argument. If he means that Canadians will lose all faith in the Criminal justice system if he is convicted in this corrupt travesty of justice perhaps he should look around the courtroom for spectators. I'm generally the sole onlooker and if the Canadian public is clamoring for updates on his case in the month and a half since these hearings took place the uproar hasn't reached me. We did actually have a group of four here yesterday for an hour or so. Apparently a family, mom, dad and a couple of teenage children. Asian, I'm guessing Chinese. They sat and took notes for a while and left. I couldn't see why they'd be in any way interested so I inquired after the hearing. It turns out that one requirement of getting Canadian citizenship is to sit in on a trial and keep notes of what transpired. All I can say to that family of aspiring citizens is good luck explaining Millar's arguments to your Board.

He's been at this almost an hour and is just getting warmed up. He brought up a Rocco Galati video. This is Rocco;

viewtopic.php?f=48&t=10450

Judge - "This is of no assistance. You are saying that because one thing might have been unconstitutional everything is unconstitutional. This makes no sense." So he babbled on about something or another I couldn't follow. Judge - "You've said that over and over. It doesn't help me to say things over and over again."

At this point Millar said the word 'conclusion'. He actually said it but clearly he didn't mean it because he was immediately off on another rant. "My private rights as a private man are a fundamental position. These rights have been denied. Unless the Crown can prove how these rights were lost their position is untenable. All of the documents seized and the Skype recordings were private. The Crown has failed to prove that a man can't claim his private capacity. They have to demonstrate how I lost it. The Crown has failed to prove that my activities took place in Canada. Caselaw proves that the provinces are primary and are not in Canada. Canada has invaded British Columbia as a foreign jurisdiction. The Crown is just claiming that I'm a taxpayer without proving it. The Crown has evaded the core issue of the jurisdictional matter regarding Canada, the provinces, and the county. This has never been properly addressed. The CRA and prosecution are ultra vires until they prove that they have jurisdiction. The CRA just deems my money to be public money. The CRA, by doing this, may fall within trafficking of persons under the Criminal Code. Taking my money, denying my beliefs, falls under trafficking persons."

Uh, what about that comment by the judge about saying the same things over and over? Finally it was morning break.

After break back to it. On to the Law Societies Act. Somewhere it used the term 'natural person'. This proves that he is a natural person under the Income Tax Act. Paragraph 52 of his submission details how the CRA acted in bad faith by ignoring his rights. They are liable for this since they acted in bad faith.

Paragraph 53. Still stuck on privacy. Legal trickery on the part of the Crown. He's been reduced to slave status. This case is about principles that are foundational of common law and rules of law (He picked up the word 'foundational' from somewhere and he can't get enough of it, seems to be another of his obsessions). "If there is any decision in this case I would hope and expect a full exploration of the issues". I lost track again. Essentially he is demanding that the judge answer all of his questions about jurisdiction, capitalization, whatever in her decision. He said that his labour is a property right and is protected. He want it answered where in the law it says specifically that his property rights have been removed and he's lost all of his privacy rights. Then he started talking about a copy of an indictment form from the Criminal Code. He said that it was styles in upper and lower case but his indictment is styled differently.

He said that he hesitated at all times to argue anything to do with claims of the prosecution because his privacy rights mean that he doesn't have to respond. A long ramble about how the Crown has avoided the real issues. Everything he did was private and the state has no right to interfere.

He said that everyone that he taught came to him. All of them are private people acting in their private capacity in any case. What I did or didn't do in private is none of the state's business. The Crown's arguments are moot because of the private nature of my teaching activities.

On and on. It's now noon and no end in sight. How could there be an end given his obsession with repeating the same points ad infinitum? "I don't question the validity of the court as long as I know which court it is." Then he started going through the Crown's arguments and trashing them. Not through a detailed analysis backed by citations and statutory references but, essentially, because the Crown disagrees with him. "I would appreciate a thorough analysis of the principles rather than a whitewashing or avoiding of the principles of private contract and private property." Arguing on and on about everything in the Crown's closing arguments and how it is all wrong. I've lost any sense of what he's getting at.

He's now way off in the blue yonder about the consent of the governed to be governed. His basic point seems to be that the Crown can't say anything in their submissions without first spending the next decade or two personally arguing with him about it and convincing him that they are correct. He said "I want everything properly laid out and properly explained to me. If I'm wrong I'd like to be told how." He began reading out the Crown's written closing submissions paragraph by paragraph while ranting on about jurisdiction, capitalization, and private person and how the Crown refused to debate him on any of it. He told the judge he wanted a full explanation and analysis in the decision on all of his documents and claims. Then, without any warning or obvious winding down, he was done.

So the Crown got another shot. They'll at least be brief and to the point. "It is the Crown's position that Millar is wrong. He's arguing jurisdictional issues that have no relevance to mens rea. He hopes that the Income Tax Act does not apply to private persons but he is wrong." Crown said in relation to his teachings that there is no evidence that he taught anything else other than Paradigm material. "It is trite law that a Social Insurance Number is not necessary to prove tax evasion. At the end of the day it is clear that you cannot contract out of paying income taxes. In the Crown's submission all of the offenses charges against Mr. Millar have been proven beyond reasonable doubt."

Crown mentioned delay. The major delay in this case was the time between laying the information and Millar's arrest. This was outside of the control of the Crown. Crown cited a case I didn't catch that supports the position that the clock started ticking on delay at his arrest.

Millar seemed confused about the delay issue. Although it was his application he had no comment. Judge said she would give an oral decision on delay at 9AM Tuesday October 11th and we were finally done.

So, as a very brief review. In the past two and a half days Millar argued absolutely nothing that he hasn't already previously argued, and lost numerous times, in this very court. Every single argument he made was absolutely guaranteed to be dead on arrival. He and his fellow Poriskyites have spent years arguing about natural persons, private persons, jurisdiction and capitalization, and have lost decisively every single time. And yet he persists, relentlessly yammering on about these issues in defiance of any common sense and personal experience. He's obviously a true believer but, even so, it just isn't a sane response to keep fighting the same doomed battle over and over. It's not going to be difficult to predict how this one plays out.