http://www.mediafire.com/file/hex6ec93n ... uspend.pdf
1. The Law Society has received evidence that raises serious concerns about the Responding Party's competence and/or capacity to practice law.
Moderator: Burnaby49
1. The Law Society has received evidence that raises serious concerns about the Responding Party's competence and/or capacity to practice law.
Is it possible that Glenn filed this in defiance of the Steinkeys' decision to pursue a legitimate appeal?
I take this to mean that they filed a paper with the court which claimed ownership of both the actual charges against them (charging information) and the docket of their case with all of the crown's evidence. This meant that they owned all of the information the crown had relied on at trial and they were not allowing the crown or court to use it. This meant that they had to be acquitted.In the papers that I submitted ... was an endorsement by myself and my husband of the docket claiming all right and title to that docket number. ... I filed a notice of indenture to that endorsement ....
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We endorse this charging information and claim it as our property, by true character or nature, and that was to notice the court that we had done that. We are asking for acquittance and a discharge, silence and extinguishment of this matter.
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R. v. Steinkey, 2017[98] The Steinkeys have convinced me that their proposed grounds for their conviction and sentence appeals are not frivolous. Their proposed grounds of appeals are not “baseless”, the standard the Supreme Court of Canada may favour.[45] The grounds of appeal are undeniably arguable, a test many courts have adopted.[46] And it cannot be said that the likelihood either the conviction or sentence appeal will succeed is extremely low, a benchmark I have utilized in the past.
I can't argue that the possibility that Steinkeys' appeal would succeed was not extremely low. As we'll see in a moment they had no chance at all of winning their appeal, a fact that should have been known to the judge reviewing their appeal application.And it cannot be said that the likelihood either the conviction or sentence appeal will succeed is extremely low, a benchmark I have utilized in the past.
The procedure at appeals is for the appellants to argue their case first then the crown responds. I'm told that after the Steinkeys had presented their case the appeals court bench told crown not to bother presenting their arguments. They'd already decided and didn't need any crown submissions to point out the blindingly obvious.[1] The appellants appeal a decision which dismissed their requests to withdraw their guilty pleas: R. v Steinkey, 2017 ABQB 378 (CanLII). The appellants pled guilty to making false statements in their income tax returns, arising from their adherence to theories of taxation advanced by the Paradigm Education Group. The pleas were based on an Agreed Statement of Facts, which was part of a resolution arranged while the appellants were represented by experienced counsel. The procedure contemplated by s. 606(1.1) of the Criminal Code was followed before the judge who took the pleas. The appellants unsuccessfully applied to withdraw their pleas on the basis that the Agreed Statement of Facts did not support the convictions, because it did not disclose the necessary mens rea. In R. v Steinkey, 2017 ABCA 291 (CanLII) at para. 103 they were given leave to appeal their convictions on the issue: “Can an actor be wilfully blind if he or she does not suspect that a belief he or she strongly holds is probably unwarranted?”.
[2] The issue on which leave to appeal was granted does not arise on this record. Section 19 of the Criminal Code states that ignorance of the law is not a defence. Obviously, if the accused persons know that their view of the law is mistaken, their mistake would be no answer to the charges. Section 19 covers the situation where the accused honestly and sincerely believes in what is a mistaken view of the law. It was not necessary for the Crown to show that the appellants were “wilfully blind” about their mistake, because they were properly convicted even if they were genuinely mistaken.
[3] The appellants intentionally filed their tax returns, and they intentionally did not include in their incomes the sums received from their corporation. That satisfied the mens rea requirement of the offence. As numerous other cases have demonstrated, honestly held political, ethical, philosophical, or moral beliefs in bogus taxation theories such as those of the Paradigm Education Group are not a defence: R. v Klundert, 2011 ONCA 646 (CanLII) at para. 6, 107 OR (3d) 561, leave to appeal refused [2012] 1 SCR ix; R. v Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 (CanLII) at paras. 9, 20, 93 OR (3d) 81, leave to appeal refused [2009] 1 SCR x; R. v Kennedy, 2004 BCCA 638 (CanLII) at paras. 11-3, 207 BCAC 102, leave to appeal refused [2006] 1 SCR xi.
[4] In any event, wilful blindness was clearly made out on this record. The appellants were warned by the Canada Revenue Agency auditor before they filed their tax returns that their taxation theories were unsupportable. The Agreed Statement of Facts acknowledged that “they should have made further inquiries”.
[5] The appellants’ applications to withdraw their guilty pleas were therefore properly dismissed. No reviewable error having been shown, these appeals are also dismissed.
This is section 19;Section 19 of the Criminal Code states that ignorance of the law is not a defence. Obviously, if the accused persons know that their view of the law is mistaken, their mistake would be no answer to the charges. Section 19 covers the situation where the accused honestly and sincerely believes in what is a mistaken view of the law. It was not necessary for the Crown to show that the appellants were “wilfully blind” about their mistake, because they were properly convicted even if they were genuinely mistaken.
It doesn't say that ignorance of the law is not an excuse for committing an offense except if the "person" really honestly believed that the law wasn't valid, or it's immoral, or the accused misunderstood it. It clearly says that the law must be applied regardless of the accused's understanding and interpretation of it. This isn't a little-used, esoteric section of the Criminal Code known only to a few discerning lawyers. This is absolutely fundamental rule of law that every practicing Canadian criminal lawyer and criminal court judge needs to know in order to perform the basic requirements of their jobs. You don't even have to have any formal education in Canadian law to know this. Any Quatloos reader, regardless of their legal background, knows this point of law if they've followed my postings because it's an issue I've covered in numerous discussions. Note that the appeals bench dismissed the appeal on the basis of the Klundert decision. As the court wrote;Ignorance of the law
19 Ignorance of the law by a person who commits an offence is not an excuse for committing that offence.
I discussed Klundert here;[3] The appellants intentionally filed their tax returns, and they intentionally did not include in their incomes the sums received from their corporation. That satisfied the mens rea requirement of the offence. As numerous other cases have demonstrated, honestly held political, ethical, philosophical, or moral beliefs in bogus taxation theories such as those of the Paradigm Education Group are not a defence: R. v Klundert, 2011 ONCA 646 (CanLII) at para. 6, 107 OR (3d) 561, leave to appeal refused [2012] 1 SCR ix; R. v Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 (CanLII) at paras. 9, 20, 93 OR (3d) 81, leave to appeal refused [2009] 1 SCR x; R. v Kennedy, 2004 BCCA 638 (CanLII) at paras. 11-3, 207 BCAC 102, leave to appeal refused [2006] 1 SCR xi.
Mr. Justice Thomas W. Wakeling wrote in his decision allowing the Steinkeys leave to appeal.Time for an update on Mr. Klundert. It took three trials to find the guy guilty of tax evasion, not because his guilt wasn't abundantly clear but because of boneheaded jury instructions by the first two judges. In the first trial Klundert's defense was that he didn't pay his tax because he had a sincere heartfelt belief that he wasn't required to.
. . . .
Although this is not a defense in law in Canada (we have no Cheek equivalent) the judge actually instructed the jury that if they believed that Klundert had a sincere belief that he did not have to pay tax he was innocent of tax evasion. So the jury found him innocent.
The Crown appealed this and the appeals court slapped the judge around a bit and ordered a new trial. Klundert used the same defense again. As the appeals court said in respect to the second trial;
[11] At his second trial, despite this court’s ruling, the respondent again took the position that the Act was beyond the powers of the federal government. However, he did not argue that he failed to pay taxes that he knew were owed because he believed the Act to be unlawful and so inapplicable. Rather, he explained his failure to pay taxes as arising from his belief that he was not obligated to pay taxes. Klundert took the position that he was not obligated to pay income tax because he believed the Act does not apply to him. Klundert testified that he is neither a “person” nor a “taxpayer” as defined in the Act.
[12] The “defence” offered by the respondent at his second trial was merely a nuanced version of the defence offered at his first trial, a defence this court held was unavailable to him.
However the judge in the second trial, while stating that Klundert couldn't use this argument, allowed him to use it!
So the appeals court ordered a third trial. This time the judge stomped all Klundert's attempts to argue that he really, really, really didn't believe he had to pay tax and the jury found him guilty of tax evasion in 2010.. . . . .[24] In his charge, the trial judge correctly told the jury that the respondent’s evidence that he was a tax protestor did not provide a defence to the charge of tax evasion and did not go to the issue of Klundert’s intent to evade the payment of taxes. However, when he put the position of the defence to the jury, he stated that it was the position of the defence that:
[A]ny rational person could not have intended to evade by acting in the manner of the accused. They should acquit unless they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that his stated intention to solely protest was not his honest intent.
[25] In so doing the trial judge erred in law. Where as a matter of law a defence is not available to an accused, it must not be put to the jury. Where defence counsel argue such a defence before a jury, the trial judge’s obligation is to clearly and unequivocally tell the jury that defence counsel was in error and that arguments to that effect cannot be relied upon in coming to a verdict.
But even though it was settled law that the Steinkeys arguments had no legal merit Judge Wakeling didn't bother to explain why their arguments entitled them to a second level of appellate review or why their claiming to have acted in good faith and hold an honest belief they were correct was still "an arguable question". He didn't decide this in ignorance of Klundert, he knew all about it and, in fact, agreed with it. He discussed Klundert in his decision allowing the Steinkeys leave to appeal;[26] Can a taxpayer whose belief in the correctness of his or her legal position is so strong that he or she fails to recognize that his or her opinion may be incorrect, let alone is probably incorrect, be wilfully blind?
[27] This is a question of law. It is of sufficient importance to merit a second level of appellate review. It is an arguable question.
[28] The other questions relating to the sentence issue are also of the same character.
Mr. Klundert's situation was exactly identical to the Steinkeys. Like them he was convicted of income tax evasion after following Russell Porisky's Paradigm tax evasion scheme. Klundert's appeals and conviction set the Canadian standard for a defense based on a good faith belief. Judge Wakeling clearly knew this since he cited Klundert in his decision yet he chose to ignore it.[78] Justice Doherty, for a unanimous panel, predictably held that a taxpayer’s honest and sincere belief that the Income Tax Act was unconstitutional was irrelevant.[29] The taxpayer knew that Parliament had enacted the Income Tax Act and what his obligations under it were. He intentionally failed to file a return that accurately reported his taxable income and deliberately chose not to pay his income tax.[30] In acting in this manner, the taxpayer “wilfully ‘evaded’ compliance with this Act or payments of taxes imposed by this Act”, the essential component of tax evasion under s. 239(1)(d).[31]
[79] Why the taxpayer followed an unlawful course of action has no impact on the question of whether the taxpayer intentionally evaded income tax.[32]
[80] Justice Doherty[33], following the lead of the United States Supreme Court[34], held that “‘wilfully’ in the provision creating the crime of tax evasion as meaning: ‘a voluntary intentional violation of a known legal duty’”. The American Court rejected the notion that a “good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the law” must also have an objective reasonable foundation.[35]
[81] I agree.
Why is this even in the decision? The panel didn't bother wasting any court time in any unnecessary analysis. They included just the bare-bones minimum to dismiss the appeal, yet this line is totally irrelevant to the decision. So, what purpose did it serve? I'll hazard a guess. It's the panel expressing its disgust at having to review such pointless rubbish. I take this to mean, in judicial language; how did this pile of shit get approved for an appeal court hearing by an actual sitting appeals court judge? Even if the issue of why leave was granted didn't arise on the record I bet the panel members all sneaked a look at the decision granting leave to appeal to see which of their colleagues approved an entirely meritless appeal.[2] The issue on which leave to appeal was granted does not arise on this record.