I've found what seems to be the second judgement in Lexis.
There are before me two applications. One is an application by Mr Waugh, which in effect invites me to revisit various parts of the judgment I have handed down earlier this morning. The other is an application by the Bank for orders
(a) for permission to amend the Particulars of Claim to plead that Mr and Mrs Waugh are obliged under the terms of the Charge to perfect the instrument by executing it as a deed,
(b) for an order (by way of specific performance) requiring them to do so, and
(c) in default, for an order under section 39 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 that the Charge be validly executed as a deed by a District Judge of the Chancery Division
Behrens discusses and disposes of Waugh's application, concluding that "I am not willing to reconsider my judgment or to alter its effect in any way."
He then moves on to the Bank's application.
The bank anticipates that notwithstanding an order of the court the history of this case shows that Mr and Mrs Waugh are unlikely to execute the charge and they therefore also invite me to exercise my power under s.39(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 to direct that if they do not execute the charge within a time specified by the court the charge can be executed by a person that the court may nominate for that purpose.
He quotes:
S. 39 provides
(1) Where the High Court [or family court] has given or made a judgment or order directing a person to execute any conveyance, contract or other document, or to indorse any negotiable instrument, then, if that person—
(a) neglects or refuses to comply with the judgment or order; or
the High Court [that court] may, on such terms and conditions, if any, as may be just, order that the conveyance, contract or other document shall be executed, or that the negotiable instrument shall be indorsed, by such person as the court may nominate for that purpose.
(2) A conveyance, contract, document or instrument executed or indorsed in pursuance of an order under this section shall operate, and be for all purposes available, as if it had been executed or indorsed by the person originally directed to execute or indorse it.
The notes to paragraph 9A- 138 of Vol 2 of the 2014 White Book make clear:
An order under this section should not be made in anticipation of a failure to execute unless the defendant has already shown by his conduct that he refuses and will refuse to execute (Savage v Norton [1908] 1 Ch. 290).
Behrens says:
"I take the view that this case does fall within the proviso to the note. "
He goes on:
In my view, execution by an officer of the court is execution by an individual and therefore, under s.1.3 of the 1989 Act such execution needs to be witnessed. It seems to me therefore, that the order should make it clear if and in so far as the document is not properly executed by Mr or Mrs Waugh, any execution by an officer of the court should be attested in accordance with s.1.3 of the 1989 Act.
The question arises as to who that officer should be. In my view the appropriate person is a District Judge of the Leeds District Registry authorised to deal with matters in the Chancery Division.
The conclusion:
It follows that the applications by the bank succeed, but the application by Mr Waugh for me to reconsider my judgment fails.
Dan
I've always wondered what success!!! 1!!! looked like 
