Michael Millar - Detaxer & Poriskyite's tax evasion trial

[Burnaby49]

the two hour speaking limit that the British Columbia Court of Appeal

Two hours? Two hours? The last time I argued in the Second Circuit, I (and everyone else) got seven minutes.

The two hours was the actual chronological time as opposed to perceived time. Subjectively it seemed like two weeks sitting through it.

[The Observer]

Two hours? Two hours? The last time I argued in the Second Circuit, I (and everyone else) got seven minutes.

Then Millar has missed his niche in life - teaching others how to con appeal courts in giving 2 hours of time to present arguments.

But to be fair, I am guessing appeal courts know that you can present a coherent argument in only 7 minutes, while Millar would need at least 2 hours and even then he wouldn't get it right.

[Burnaby49]

As far as I'm aware the British Columbia Court of Appeal has a standard of two hours per party. That's how it's been for both of Lawson's appeals and this one. No doubt more complex appeals on more weighty matters than Millar's delusions are granted more time.

[KickahaOta]

I suspect that a good part of this is a different approach to oral argument. In most US appellate oral arguments I've listened to (admittedly a very small sample), there's very little time spent by either side spent on luxuries like "explaining your case in your own fashion and at your own direction". The trend seems to be an extremely short opening summary before the appellate judges start firing questions. The parties are expected to make their cases fully in their briefs, both factually and legally; oral argument is for the judges to ask for clarification where needed, not for the parties to rehash their arguments or present new ones. In fact, oral argument is very often skipped entirely at the appellate level, because the judges decide that they have all the information they need from the briefs and don't have any significant questions.

In contrast, based on the descriptions I've heard here, Canadian oral argument seems to be a much more free-wheeling affair.

[Burnaby49]

Sounds right to me. While the appeal court tried to get Millar to focus on delay they didn't insist on it or cut short his clearly irellevant ramblings about idiotic arguments he'd lost numerous times at trial and which he'd obviously already lost here. If he wanted to piss away his two hours in the end that was fine by the court. But, like the US, oral is just a supplement to written, a chance for the court to get clarification or more information on written arguments.

[notorial dissent]

Sounds right to me. While they appeal court tried to get Millar to focus on delay they didn't insist on it or cut short his clearly irellevant ramblings about idiotic arguments he'd lost numerous times at trial and which he'd obviously already lost here. If he wanted to piss away his two hours in the end that was fine by the court. But, like the US, oral is just a supplement to written, a chance for the court to get clarification or more information on written arguments.

I would say from the sounds of it Miller did a bang up job of fleshing out any possibly valid point(s) he might have had. Doesn't strike me as the brightest bulb on the tree.

[Burnaby49]

Michael Millar's judgment will be released 9:30 Monday morning, courtroom 70, Robson Street Courthouse. I'll probably be there. If not it will be posted on the court's website soon.

[Burnaby49]

This morning (actually yesterday morning given that it's past midnight) I attended Michael Millar's hearing where the British Columbia Court of Appeal's judgment on his conviction appeal was released. A long, grueling session. Court started at 9:30 and we were done and out by 9:32. Application denied which meant that his appeal was dismissed. The only other thing the judge said was that Millar wished to speak to bail pending a sentencing appeal.

Millar was not at the hearing. Court protocol required him to surrender to the sheriffs prior to the hearing to await the outcome in lockup. If he lost, which he did, he would be required to immediately start serving his custodial sentence unless, as occurred, he took his last shot at staying out of jail by appealing his sentencing. However this did not automatically guarantee his interim release until his sentencing appeal hearing because an extension of bail was discretionary. In the event bail was extended and Millar is again out and about until November 5 when his hearing is scheduled. If (when) he loses that he's done and he'll finally be incarcerated. He can appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on both his conviction and sentencing but, as I understand it, he won't be granted bail while those are in process. The chances of the SCC accepting a Millar appeal are, in my opinion, completely insignificant to none.

You can read the full judgment here;

https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/19/0 ... CA0298.htm

I found it enlightening. The May 5th, 2016 court hearing where he was cuffed and arrested for a short time was apparently very traumatic for him since it played a large part in his grievances at his conviction appeal hearing. I was at that hearing and wrote;

Then she referred to a document, perhaps the one she'd handed to parties and said that the phrase ""A private person residing outside of Canada" was not known to this court and I must ignore it. It has no legal effect." I assume that Millar was claiming that he couldn't be tried because he was the mythical private person residing outside of Canada although he was actually residing inside of Canada. She then stated that Millar's document said that he did not want a jury trial as currently formed. He was demanding a private trial with no members of the public allowed. Was he concerned about me? Judge said that he needed to make an application to exclude the public and that they were rarely granted because of the importance of having an open court system. You can have a trial by judge if you want but you have no right to a private trial.

This set him off on an batshit crazy rant. "I explained the equitable issue in my notice! I've dismissed proceedings and I want equitable common law proceedings." Judge said "do not continue or interrupt" but he kept ranting. Sheriff edged closer. More rants. Judge said "Mr. Sheriff, take him into custody" and I heard sheriff call for backup. DON'T TOUCH ME! DON'T TOUCH ME! That had as much effect as his dismissing the case or demanding a common law trial and in seconds he was cuffed with his hands behind his back and the sheriff holding on to him.

However I didn't know what the documents were that the judge and Millar were discussing. Turns out that one was an;

Original Jurisdiction: Private Person Residing Outside Canada Within a Non-Military Occupied Private Estate Not Subject to the Jurisdiction of Canada – Notice of Conflict or Variance of Law

That's a handful as a document title. The second document was a "Bill of Exceptions"

[26] During a pre-trial conference held on May 5, 2016, which was also the date fixed for jury selection, the appellant sought resolution of two largely nonsensical “applications” he had filed on May 4, 2016. One was styled “Original Jurisdiction: Private Person Residing Outside Canada Within a Non-Military Occupied Private Estate Not Subject to the Jurisdiction of Canada – Notice of Conflict or Variance of Law”. The second was styled as a “Bill of Exceptions” in which the appellant sought “exclusive equity for the hearing of this matter, to proceed with the public excluded and I require to have this case sealed, which also means I require a hearing in private with an equity Chancellor”. He asserted that failing to recognize the Bill of Exceptions would require a demonstration of cause as to why, among other things, the court could not recognize his private status and private capacity.

Millar must have been upset to read that his finely crafted legally binding documents were considered by the appeals court to be "largely nonsensical". Better than totally nonsensical I guess but the effect was the same.

The above quote was from a section at the beginning of the appeal relating the history of the proceedings. The section focused on the obstructionist behavior by Millar that slowed down the process and it highlighted his indifference, during his trial, regarding how long the trial lasted. In fact the court quoted a comment by Millar where he'd said that “I feel like they’re rushing to move this along unnecessarily.”

And;

The appellant’s refusal to engage in the process in a timely fashion became a regular feature of the litigation.

Since the delay argument was Millar's only hope of winning the appeal the court's citing chapter and verse about how he constantly delayed proceedings was an ominous sign of where they were going. But the court saved that for later and, before addressing delay, demolished all of Millar's other grounds for appeal. First, an overview of what the court thought of them;

[5] The appellant subscribes to the view that the ITA only applies to “artificial persons” who agree to be taxpayers. He argued at trial, as he does on appeal, that because he entered into contracts as a “natural person” or “private person” with students paying for Paradigm’s services who were also “natural persons”, he was not required to pay income tax or remit GST on amounts received under those contracts. The essence of the appellant’s position has consistently been rejected by trial and appellate courts and was rejected by the trial judge in this case: see, for example, Kennedy v. Canada (Customs & Revenue Agency), [2000] 4 C.T.C. 186 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 (Chambers); R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767, leave to appeal ref’d [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 522; R. v. Porisky & Gould, 2012 BCSC 67, rev’d on other grounds 2014 BCCA 146; R. v. Anderson, 2014 BCSC 2002; R. v. Steinkey, 2018 ABCA 361; R. v. Lawson, 2019 BCCA 109; R. v. Porisky, 2019 BCCA 159. In Lawson, this Court characterized an argument similar to the one advanced by the appellant in this case as a “bogus, nonsensical theory” (at para. 12).

[6] For reasons I will express in summary form, I would not give effect to the appellant’s submissions that challenge the authority of the investigators or prosecutors, the jurisdiction of the court, or the validity of the charging documents. I would also reject the appellant’s contention that the manner in which he purported to structure his affairs exempted him from the requirement to pay income tax or remit GST on the services he was providing. In addition, I would reject the appellant’s argument that the judge improperly interfered with his cross﷓examination of the CRA witness or that her decision to order that the appellant be handcuffed was unnecessary, abusive or otherwise gave rise to a miscarriage of justice entitling the appellant to either a stay of proceedings or a new trial.

So some quick quotes to show how his totally idiotic arguments fared;

Natural Person acting in his Private Capacity

[62] There is no merit in any of the appellant’s jurisdictional arguments and we did not call on the Crown to respond to any of these issues. I include in this basket of issues the appellant’s submission that he was exempt from the obligation to pay income tax or remit GST for services he provided to Paradigm clients by virtue of acting “in [the] private capacity of [a] natural person”; that the CRA lacked authority to investigate; that the federal Crown lacked authority to prosecute; that application of the ITA and Code to this case intruded upon matters falling exclusively within provincial jurisdiction; and all of the remaining issues set out by the appellant in his factum at paragraphs 53(a)–(f), 54(a)–(e) and 58(a)–(e). All of these issues have conclusively been determined against the appellant in the authorities set out in paragraph 5 herein, or are otherwise lacking in merit.

Capitalization

[63] We found it unnecessary to hear from the Crown in response to the appellant’s arguments that: (1) the form of the indictment was either insufficient or invalid as a consequence of being contrary to the Forms that are set out in the Code, and (2) there is a material and prejudicial difference between the use of upper or lower case letters on an indictment to describe the place in which the prosecution is proceeding or the person charged. There is no merit in any of these grounds.

[64] Section 849(1) of the Code is a complete answer to many of the appellant’s arguments. In addition, the appellant has demonstrated no prejudice on this account.

Bias on the part of the trial judge

[66] In any event, the appellant has failed to demonstrate any merit in this ground of appeal. On the limited transcripts before us, I have no hesitation in concluding that the judge showed considerable patience and fulfilled her obligation to provide the self﷓represented appellant with procedural assistance. We have been taken to nothing in the record of proceedings that could possibly meet the test for reasonable apprehension of bias restated in Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25 at para. 20.

[67] If the appellant is suggesting that the judge displayed a reasonable apprehension of bias by failing to deal with the two applications he presented on May 5, 2016 (the Bill of Exceptions and Notice of Conflict or Variance of Law), there is no merit to the claim. The judge was not obliged to spend judicial time on nonsensical applications which, as she correctly pointed out, had absolutely no foundation in law.

The Actus Reus and Mens Rea arguments he babbled out at the hearing on the spur of the moment with obviously no prepared arguments

[74] In oral argument, the appellant sought to challenge the trial judge’s conclusions that the actus reus and mens rea in relation to each of the four counts had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This ground of appeal was not clearly stated in the appellant’s amended notice of appeal, nor was the point developed in his factum.

[75] The submission the appellant advanced in support of this ground amounted to a recycling of his jurisdictional submissions. As I have said, there is no merit in these arguments. In any event, it was open to the judge to find that the elements of each of the offences had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing said by the appellant in oral argument calls into question the propriety of the judge’s factual findings or the legal analysis underlying the convictions.

And that disposed of all of Millar's arguments except delay, something he showed absolutely no interest in discussing at the hearing. In my write-up of the hearing I'd pointed out that the appeals court outright told Millar that all of his arguments but delay were garbage and he should focus on that and that alone. He ignored this advice at his peril because it was the only issue given any real review in the decision;

[7] In my view, the central issue in this case concerns whether the appellant’s right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed. The delay from the initiation of proceedings to the verdicts exceeds the 30﷓month presumptive ceiling for cases tried in superior courts. All but three months of the total delay in this case occurred prior to the release of R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27.

I'll go into a brief explanation of the delay issue. I wrote this in a prior posting;

I'm going to cut in here, before Millar starts the avalanche that overwhelmed me until break, to explain the delay issue. I will review this in some depth now because this is his only substantial argument and it has enough merit that he has at least a chance of winning on it. If the court does accept his delay argument his convictions will be set aside and a stay of proceedings entered.

Delay is the amount of time that the trial process takes. As the old adage goes "Justice delayed is justice denied". Until July 8, 2016, nobody really paid much attention to delay, trials seemingly lasted forever. When delay was considered an issue the analysis of whether or not it was excessive was based on a Morin analysis, taken from a Supreme Court of Canada ("SCC") 1992 decision.

R. v. Morin,
1992] 1 SCR 771
http://canlii.ca/t/1fsc6

However, on July 8, 2016, the SCC released the Jordan decision;

R. v. Jordan
[2016] 1 SCR 631, 2016 SCC 27
http://canlii.ca/t/gsds3

This judgment, also in respect to delay, superceded Morin and set up a new standard for analyzing delay because it claimed that Morin, the court's own decision, had;

. . . . . . . given rise to both doctrinal and practical problems, contributing to a culture of delay and complacency towards it. Doctrinally, the Morin framework is too unpredictable, too confusing, and too complex. It has itself become a burden on already over burdened trial courts. From a practical perspective, the Morin framework’s after the fact rationalization of delay does not encourage participants in the justice system to take preventative measures to address inefficient practices and resourcing problems.

Effectively Jordan said that the trial courts needed to smarten up and get more efficient and Jordan was the SCC's cudgel to beat them into compliance. This is the analytical framework the SCC set up;

A new framework is therefore required for applying s. 11(b). This framework is intended to focus the s. 11(b) analysis on the issues that matter and encourage all participants in the criminal justice system to cooperate in achieving reasonably prompt justice, with a view to fulfilling s. 11(b)'s important objectives. At the heart of this new framework is a presumptive ceiling beyond which delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial is presumed to be unreasonable, unless exceptional circumstances justify it. The presumptive ceiling is 18 months for cases tried in the provincial court, and 30 months for cases in the superior court (or cases tried in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry). Delay attributable to or waived by the defence does not count towards the presumptive ceiling. Once the presumptive ceiling is exceeded, the burden is on the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances. If the Crown cannot do so, a stay will follow. Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown's control in that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) they cannot reasonably be remedied. It is obviously impossible to identify in advance all circumstances that may qualify as exceptional for the purposes of adjudicating a s. 11(b) application.

Jordan set a strict 30 month time limit for criminal trials to conclude after charges were laid. While the analysis is complex it essentially starts by calculating total time period between charges being laid against the defendant and the conviction. The court, after listening to arguments by the Crown and the defendant, determines how much of this time can be allocated to the defendant. What's left is considered delay by the Crown and the inherent delay of the system, the inertia of the court system. If the time remaining after deducting the defendant's portion of delay from the entire trial time period exceeds the 30 months Jordan limit, the defendant's conviction is set aside and proceedings stayed, which is what happened to Barrett Jordan as a result of his SCC win.

The problem was that Jordan just got dumped on Canada's inefficient, lackadaisical trial culture without warning and it applied to trials already underway, trials which had already exceeded the 30 month limit and trials that were too close to the limit to remedy. This resulted in a landslide of appeals, many of which won. High profile trials of very serious crimes like murder ended up with charges stayed and even the few minor Paradigm trials I attended were affected. Peter Balogh, convicted of income tax evasion, won a stay on a Jordan argument (in my opinion a seriously flawed, incorrect decision by the trial judge). This was later reversed on appeal and the convictions confirmed but it is under appeal yet again.

However there was some relief given for the transition period for cases where charges were laid before the release of Jordan.

For cases currently in the system, a contextual application of the new framework is required to avoid repeating the post Askov situation, where tens of thousands of charges were stayed as a result of the abrupt change in the law. Therefore, for those cases, the new framework applies, subject to two qualifications. First, for cases in which the delay exceeds the ceiling, a transitional exceptional circumstance may arise where the charges were brought prior to the release of this decision. This transitional exceptional circumstance will apply when the Crown satisfies the court that the time the case has taken is justified based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed. This requires a contextual assessment, sensitive to the manner in which the previous framework was applied, and the fact that the parties’ behaviour cannot be judged strictly, against a standard of which they had no notice.

The second qualification applies to cases currently in the system in which the total delay (minus defence delay) falls below the ceiling. For these cases, the two criteria — defence initiative and whether the time the case has taken markedly exceeds what was reasonably required — must also be applied contextually, sensitive to the parties’ reliance on the previous state of the law. Specifically, the defence need not demonstrate having taken initiative to expedite matters for the period of delay preceding this decision. Since defence initiative was not expressly required by the Morin framework, it would be unfair to require it for the period of time before the release of this decision. Further, if the delay was occasioned by an institutional delay that was, before this decision was released, reasonably acceptable in the relevant jurisdiction under the Morin framework, that institutional delay will be a component of the reasonable time requirements of the case for cases currently in the system.

So with this in mind back to Millar's personal Little Big Horn. Firstly the appeals court dismissed the trial judge's Jordan analysis as being in error. You can read this in paragraphs 84 to 89. But that didn't matter. The Crown had said in argument that while the trial judge's analysis was wrong she'd still arrived at the correct result. And the court of appeal agreed;

[89] While the errors in principle I have identified tainted the judge’s analysis, I am of the view that a proper application of the Jordan framework would, for different reasons, have led to the same result. It is to that issue I now turn.

Keep in mind that thirty months is the magic number. Above that Millar wins, but if the court determines 30 months or less Millar goes to jail. The court of appeal knocked ten months off the total immediately;

[90] In undertaking this analysis on appeal, I consider myself to be bound by the judge’s factual findings, none of which appear to me to be tainted by error in principle, and none of which are alleged to be the product of palpable and overriding error.

[91] The total delay in this case from the swearing of the information to the verdicts is about 56 months — February 2, 2012 to October 11, 2016.

[92] The appellant takes no issue with the judge’s decision to deduct ten months for delay attributable to him. The net delay is, therefore, 46 months.

The big issue was the allocation of the 14 months between the Crown filing charges against Millar and the police actually finding him and hauling him into court. Deduct 14 months from the 46 months above and you're spitting distance from the 30 month goal. Millar had disappeared as soon as charges were filed but he claimed that he had no idea that the police were diligently looking for him. He'd just been going on with his life and somehow not been found for over a year. When he was found he was arrested and jailed until the charging procedure was over and he was out on bail. The trial judge allowed some, but not all of this time period to be allocated in the Crown's favour. She'd done this claiming that this period was a transitional exceptional circumstance. This is explained in the posting above as;

First, for cases in which the delay exceeds the ceiling, a transitional exceptional circumstance may arise where the charges were brought prior to the release of this decision. This transitional exceptional circumstance will apply when the Crown satisfies the court that the time the case has taken is justified based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed. This requires a contextual assessment, sensitive to the manner in which the previous framework was applied, and the fact that the parties’ behaviour cannot be judged strictly, against a standard of which they had no notice.

The appeals court disagreed with this characterization but allowed the time in favour of the Crown anyhow;

[93] From this period, I would deduct most of the time it took the police to locate the appellant between the swearing of the information and his arrest. Specifically, I would deduct the 14﷓month period between April 3, 2012 (the date by which summons could reasonably be expected to have been served) and June 6, 2013 (the date of the appellant’s arrest). As explained, this time should not have been deducted under the transitional exceptional circumstance identified in Jordan. On the judge’s factual findings, however, including her finding that the evidence established continuous efforts by the police to locate and serve the appellant, this 14﷓month delay ought to have been characterized as a discrete exceptional event that was unforeseen and reasonably unavoidable. The remaining delay is, therefore, 32 months.

Discrete exceptional events in the context of Jordan are explained here;

https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/r ... rt11b.html

(ii) Where presumptive ceiling is exceeded

Where the total delay (minus defence delay) exceeds the presumptive ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable. However, the Crown may rebut this presumption by showing that the delay is reasonable due to exceptional circumstances (Jordan, supra at paragraph 68).

Exceptional circumstances are defined as those that lie outside the Crown’s control in the sense that they are: (a) reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (b) such that Crown counsel cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those circumstances once they arise (Jordan, supra at paragraph 69).

While the determination of whether circumstances are “exceptional” will ultimately depend on the trial judge’s good sense and experience, they will generally fall under one of two categories:

1. Discrete events. Discrete exceptional events or circumstances are ones that are (i) reasonably unforeseeable or unavoidable, and (ii) could not be reasonably mitigated by the Crown or the justice system (Cody, supra at paragraph 48; Jordan, supra at paragraph 73 and 75). Delay caused by discrete events result in quantitative deductions of particular periods of time from the net total (Cody, supra at paragraph 48).

2. The requirement under the first prong of the test is that the event at issue be reasonably unforeseeable or reasonably unavoidable – it does not impose a standard of perfection upon the Crown (Cody, supra at paragraph 58).These could include not only medical and family emergencies (MacDougall, supra; R. v. Coulter, 2016 ONCA 704at paragraphs 81-82) but also unforeseeable or unavoidable developments that may cause the case to go awry, such as a complainant unexpectedly recanting while testifying. This category can also include inadvertent oversights and mistakes, as well as circumstances where the trial goes longer than reasonably expected despite good faith efforts to establish realistic time estimates (see, for example, R. v. Antic, 2019 ONCA 160). This latter example requires judges to be alive to the practical realities of trials in determining whether this time should be subtracted from the total period of delay (Cody, supra at paragraph 58; Jordan, supra at paragraphs 72-75). Delay that is the product of systemic limitations in the court system (such as where both the Crown and defence are ready to proceed, but the court cannot accommodate them) does not constitute a discrete event and should not be deducted (Cody, supra at paragraph 55; Jordan supra, at paragraph 81).

Where a discrete event was reasonably unforeseeable, it is incumbent upon the Crown to take immediate steps to address it. Where the Crown fails to do so, this period will not be deducted (Cody, supra at paragraph 52). That said, the requirement under the second prong of the test is that of reasonableness: the Crown need not exhaust every conceivable option for redressing the event in question to satisfy the reasonable diligence requirement (Cody, supra at paragraph 54).

That last paragraph is key. The Crown didn't let Millar just disappear off the map hoping he'd show up someday. The Crown did what it could to find Millar and satisfied the court that it "took immediate steps to address it". So the appeals court gave the time to the Crown's favour. This left the overall time two months over the Jordan limit. How to assess it? The court finally went to the transitional exceptional circumstances the trial judge had over-relied on;

[94] I turn next to consider, as a final step, whether the transitional exceptional circumstance should be applied in this case to justify a presumptively unreasonable delay that is two months above the Jordan ceiling.

[95] It will be recalled that the decision in Jordan was released on July 8, 2016, after the evidence portion of the trial concluded but before closing submissions had been made. The transitional exceptional circumstance recognizes that it is unfair to hold the parties to strict compliance with a standard of which they had no notice. As explained in Cody:

[68] ... The Crown may rely on the transitional exceptional circumstance if it can show that “the time the case has taken is justified based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed” (Jordan, at para. 96). Put another way, the Crown may show that it cannot be faulted for failing to take further steps, because it would have understood the delay to be reasonable given its expectations prior to Jordan and the way delay and the other factors such as the seriousness of the offence and prejudice would have been assessed under Morin.

[96] The Court also made clear in Cody that where a balancing of the factors under the Morin analysis would have weighed in favour of the stay, the Crown will rarely, if ever, be successful in justifying the delay as a transitional exceptional circumstance under the Jordan framework (at para. 74).

[97] In my view, the Crown has shown that it placed reasonable reliance on the state of the law prior to Jordan and cannot be faulted for failing to take additional steps in an effort to expedite this proceeding.

Then Millar got hoisted by his own petard. He'd been very lackadaisical in forwarding his own case, actually saying that he didn't care how long the trial took. That cost him when the court considered whether the delay had prejudiced or inconvenienced him;

[98] Prejudice was an important, sometimes determinative, consideration under the Morin framework. The appellant did not testify on the s. 11(b) application and did not assert any post-arrest prejudice beyond the existence of the charge and the requirement to report to a bail supervisor, which was relaxed on October 16, 2014. It was reasonable for the Crown to infer, including from the appellant’s conduct throughout the proceeding, that he was not prejudiced by delay, but eager to take advantage of any opportunity to delay the proceedings. In these circumstances, it was reasonable for the Crown in the pre-Jordan period to regard the delay in the prosecution of this serious case to be reasonable in the absence of any showing of prejudice.

[99] With respect to the post Jordan delay (a period of about three months), the analysis focuses on the extent to which the Crown had sufficient time to adapt (Jordan at para. 96; Cody at para. 71). In the case at bar, the Crown had virtually no time to adapt to Jordan and did everything that was reasonably within its power to expedite what then remained of the proceeding.

[100] Against this background, I am satisfied that the application of the transitional exceptional circumstance leads to the conclusion that the delay in this case was not unreasonable.

Now a personal observation. The post-Jordan delay environment is still a very uncertain area where decisions to some extent seem arbitrary. There are still significant areas of uncertainty in a Jordan analysis not yet definitively considered by prior jurisprudence so decisions are often based on, as I quoted above, the "trial judge’s good sense and experience". Courts often have a lot of flexibility on how they arrive at their final determination. In my opinion, had Millar acted more reasonably throughout the process, this could have gone either way. The court could probably have allocated the 14 month "disappearance" period and the final two month period in Millar's favour had they been shown evidence that Millar had been actually prejudiced by the delay and had he, at least to some demonstrable extent, tried to make a good faith effort to forward the case to a conclusion. But Millar's consistent course of behavior during the entire trial period was exactly opposite this. The evidence showed clearly that far from being harmed by delay he welcomed it. The court of appeals brought this out in the History of Proceeding section of the decision where they gave chapter and verse of how;

"The appellant’s refusal to engage in the process in a timely fashion became a regular feature of the litigation."

So, given that the Crown acted in a reasonable and expeditious manner, close calls were awarded to the Crown. Had Millar shown more cooperation with the trial court and Crown he may have won this appeal. But had he acted in a more reasonable manner the process would probably have been concluded in less than 30 months making the delay argument moot.

[LordEd]

Cbc noticed this one. Knew I'd find details here: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british- ... -1.5253991

[Burnaby49]

I attended Michael Millar's sentencing appeal hearing this morning. When he was sentenced to a jail term almost three years ago he'd ranted in court;

I DON'T VOLUNTEER TO GO TO JAIL AND I WON'T GO TO JAIL!

https://www.quatloos.com/Q-Forum/viewto ... 40#p241655

But the window to avoid doing jail time was rapidly closing in on him. He had two shots at it, an appeal of his conviction and, if that failed, an appeal of his jail sentence. He had his conviction appeal hearing on June 27, 2019 and I wrote it up here.

https://www.quatloos.com/Q-Forum/viewto ... 60#p276994

It was a total disaster, at least for Millar. He had only one viable argument that could get him off the hook, delay, the argument that the entire trial process had taken too long. Had he won on delay his convictions would have been set aside and a stay of proceedings entered. In other words, everything dropped and Millar a free man again. But he almost entirely ignored delay and instead focused on moronic sovereign gibberish. This resulted in his appeal being denied and his convictions confirmed.

His only shot left was today's appeal of his sentence. His goal should have been to argue that his sentences should not include jail time. There were two ways he could have gone about this;

1 - Through law - Showing that jail time was an excessive sentence based on the severity of his crimes. He'd have to do this by showing that comparable convictions and the sentences handed down in them did not result in jail time being imposed. A hard task given that all of his Paradigm compatriots who had been convicted of the same offenses, Keith Lawson, Russell Porisky, Debbie Anderson, et al, had received jail time and were either serving or had served it. But it was nonetheless at least a viable route. Unfortunately Millar is totally useless at any understanding and application of real law. The only law he knows is the daydream fantasy law constantly bubbling up inside his head. So arguing law was out.

2 - Finding mitigating circumstances - This involves showing that personal circumstances of one kind or another should exempt him from jail time. He's the sole support of sixteen orphans or a handicapped wife, cancer with six months to live, that kind of thing. An often made argument is that the appellant's personal health is so precarious that prison would result in a severe medical risk. Keith Lawson made that argument at his sentencing hearing where he claimed that British Columbia prisons did not have adequate medical facilities to treat his frequent urinary-tract crisis's. Nobody denied that he had significant problems but while he had at least an arguable issue he did not provide the court with any evidence to support his position on the claimed inadequate level of medical care in provincial penitentiaries. As far as I could tell Millar had no mitigating circumstances whatever to argue so he was screwed with this approach too.

So I thought that, finally, after all these years, he'd be led off in handcuffs to start serving a well-deserved jail term. But that was just petty, constricted thinking on my part. I'd underestimated him and didn't realize the full extent of his vast array of delay gambits. The hearing's over and, as he vowed, he's not in jail! He'd found a loophole! Well, sort of, in a way, for the moment.

Instead of wasting his time arguing to a court too ignorant of fantasy law to understand him he did a DebbieDash© and didn't show up for the hearing.

https://www.quatloos.com/Q-Forum/viewto ... 60#p281462

He's now a fugitive with an outstanding arrest warrant.

So on to the hearing such as it was. Usually hearings have one sheriff, this one had three, two in the courtroom and one outside. I'm guessing in case he lost today without an adjournment for a reserve judgment and they wanted enough sheriffs on hand to cuff him and lock him up if he caused a fuss. Two other spectators apart from me, a young (to me, I'm 70) woman and my old acquaintance Master Gee!

https://www.quatloos.com/Q-Forum/viewto ... 48&t=10342

The hearing was scheduled to start at 10AM but Michael hadn't shown. In itself that wasn't really very unusual. During his trial he was often down in court registry at the scheduled start of a hearing doing some very last minute filing of sovereign idiocy of one kind or another. However if that was the case today he hadn't bothered to notify anyone. Since judges generally don't enter the court until everyone is present Michael was paged twice without success. At 10:05 the three appeal judges entered the courtroom and the hearing started. When it was explained that Michael was a no show they had him paged again. When that came up empty one of the judges asked crown counsel if they had been contacted by Millar. No but crown counsel had received a "document" from Millar on January 2nd which he described as "bizarre" "gibberish" and "nonsensical". Crown counsel can be very judgmental. The gist of the document was that Millar had appointed one of the crown counsels, the lawyer who'd handled the case against him at trial and got him convicted, as his administrator to "settle the matter". In the absence of any further details I have to assume that he was appointing the lawyer as the trustee to a make-believe Michael Millar trust, the trust being himself. As an appointed trustee crown counsel could not act against his best interests so all proceedings had to be dismissed. At least that's what Charles Norman Holmes tried in a case I attended and wrote up years ago;

https://www.quatloos.com/Q-Forum/viewto ... =48&t=9683

Charles is Millar's friend and has attended some of his hearings so it's possible that this was Charles' idea. This may be why Millar didn't show up. He may have believed, in his fantasy world, that crown counsel would now be required to act on his behalf making his participation unnecessary. From my vast experience watching Millar in action I consider this an entirely plausible assumption. However, if so, it worked just as well for Millar as it did for Holmes.

One of the judges asked to see the document. He looked it over and said "He's appointed Ms (x) as his administrator. Congratulations Ms. (X)" Judge then asked crown if they had any suggestions on how to proceed. The succinct reply was "a warrant". Crown said that Millar knew the hearing date and time and had not notified them he wouldn't be attending. Apparently he hadn't bothered to notify Mr. Gee either.

Court stood down for five minutes while the three judges conferred and then they came back and agreed to issue an arrest warrant on the basis that Millar had contravened the terms of his release order. A judge told crown that at Millar's first appearance after he's been arrested to "please provide the material which I'm returning to you". This was the copy of Millar's January 2nd document. Then we were done.

If Millar's next court appearance is the same as that of Debbie Anderson after she was apprehended following her failure to attend at her sentencing appeal hearing it will be a bail hearing where Millar demands bail yet again. Debbie didn't get it and, given Millar's history, he won't either. This isn't the first time Millar has had an arrest warrant issued for a failure to attend. When he was first charged in February 2012 he disappeared for 14 months before the police finally found and arrested him. He won't get a third chance so, once caught, bail will be denied and he'll start serving his sentence. He might continue while in jail his sentencing appeal but he won't win it so, once picked up, he's finally done.

[grixit]

Sad. On the run without even a ninja goat to keep him company.

[Burnaby49]

Sad. On the run without even a ninja goat to keep him company.

"On the run" is a relative term. He has no money, no resources, no skills apart from the ability to rant endlessly in court. He's not actually going anywhere. It took eight months to pick up Debbie Anderson in essentially the same situation but I doubt the Chilliwack police put out much of an effort to find her. When an officer had some free time they looked for her. Millar is the same. he'll eventually get nabbed but he isn't a police priority.

[notorial dissent]

So he doesn't volunteer, last I heard prison wasn't a volunteer situation.

He's most likely sitting at wherever/whatever he calls home these days thinking he has it all handled with that majik sovcit appointment and will be shocked and appalled and incensed when he is ultimately arrested and hauled off to jail for reals.

[Pottapaug1938]

So he doesn't volunteer, last I heard prison wasn't a volunteer situation.

He's most likely sitting at wherever/whatever he calls home these days thinking he has it all handled with that majik sovcit appointment and will be shocked and appalled and incensed when he is ultimately arrested and hauled off to jail for reals.

"But... but... but... it's a free country! You're not the boss of me! I do not consent! Fraud in the inducement! Trespass quaere clausum fregit! Nunc pro tunc, preterea praeteria! Magna Carta! Common Law!" and so on.

[notorial dissent]

So he doesn't volunteer, last I heard prison wasn't a volunteer situation.

He's most likely sitting at wherever/whatever he calls home these days thinking he has it all handled with that majik sovcit appointment and will be shocked and appalled and incensed when he is ultimately arrested and hauled off to jail for reals.

"But... but... but... it's a free country! You're not the boss of me! I do not consent! Fraud in the inducement! Trespass quaere clausum fregit! Nunc pro tunc, preterea praeteria! Magna Carta! Common Law!" and so on.

Yeah, and pages and pages more of that drivel each and every one equally useless. He didn't say them in the right order obiously.

[Burnaby49]

Last week I attended what is probably my last Michael Millar court hearing. I've broken my report on the hearing into two parts, the break being at the lunch break. So here you go, Michael's last stand!

[Burnaby49]

Well, that didn't take long. After 42 days of freedom Michael Millar is in jail and this time he's not coming out. A sad performance. When he went AWOL back in 2012 it took 14 months to find him and when Debbie Anderson failed to show at her sentencing appeal hearing it took eight months to nab her.

I'd said in a prior post;

Sad. On the run without even a ninja goat to keep him company.

"On the run" is a relative term. He has no money, no resources, no skills apart from the ability to rant endlessly in court. He's not actually going anywhere. It took eight months to pick up Debbie Anderson in essentially the same situation but I doubt the Chilliwack police put out much of an effort to find her. When an officer had some free time they looked for her. Millar is the same. he'll eventually get nabbed but he isn't a police priority.

And this is pretty much why they caught him so quickly. He wasn't on the run because he had nowhere to run to and no money to finance a getaway. However I have to assume he was more of a priority than Debbie because she was in no better a position to evade arrest. She was picked up in the parking lot of a grocery store in her home town.

Millar was arrested at his home on the morning of February 17th and had a bail hearing at noon on the 18th. I attended the hearing.

First a few notes - This post was written over a number of days but I started writing it on February 18th when I got home from the hearing. So when I write 'yesterday' I'm referring to February 17th, the day he was arrested and 'today' is February 18th regardless of when I get around to posting this.

And a warning about the accuracy and completeness of this write-up. My notes were so poorly done that I had to leave a few parts out or just guess what's written in the notes. Reasons are;

Reading my notes - My vision, never particularly good, has deteriorated drastically in the past year. It's now down to the point that I can't legally drive and reading is difficult. Not a big deal, just cataracts, a normal geriatric affliction. I have surgery scheduled (more on that at end of posting). However at the moment I can't see well enough to print coherent notes so I just scrawled down what I could. Much of my notes are illegible, even to me.

Paraphrasing - Vision was one problem, I couldn't see the page well enough to print fast enough for direct quotes. Also Crown and judge spoke quickly and always to point so it was too much relevant information coming at me too fast. Millar on the other hand, as is typical for him, rambled all over the map making actual quotes irrelevant.

That said on with the show!

Millar, a man living in an alternate reality, was apprehended in a rather dramatic manner, all of his own doing. Apparently, in his world, police with a search warrant will go away if you refuse to open the door. He found out that this reality works differently. The Crown's version of the arrest was taken from the police report and I'm going with the police version because I've learned from long experience that Millar's versions of reality tend to be subservient to the narrative of how his human and legal rights are constantly being violated by the system. He actually said in court yesterday that when police plan to execute an arrest warrant they have to phone or email the arrestee beforehand and let him know when they are coming. Just common courtesy I guess.

According to the Crown's narrative the police obtained a search warrant to search the apartment that he'd given as his address for hid court proceedings and bail requirements. The police didn't expect to find him there but hoped to find information indicating where he was. So on Monday morning they knocked on the door and found that he was actually at home. He refused to open the door. After 20 minutes of trying to persuade him to open up they told him if he didn't open it they'd break the door down. He still didn't open the door so they smashed it in.

At this point in the Crown's narrative Millar objected on the basis that their story was all hearsay since the police report wasn't in evidence. That might be one of the few valid points he made today. The Crown didn't bother to argue the issue and just skipped the rest of the story, I assume because it was just background and nothing turned on it. So from this point I'll go with Millar's version. Today in court he complained that he'd wanted to open the door after being told the police were going to break in. He said that he was actually scrambling to reach it, almost had his hand on the doorknob, but the police didn't give him any time and just busted in as soon as they'd warned him. He said that the police came in with drawn guns and arrested him. He complained at the hearing about this saying it was unnecessarily dangerous. My thought was "what did he expect?". He'd refused to cooperate and had compelled the police to break into his apartment by force. I assume drawn guns is standard operating procedure in that scenario. He said that he'd asked for a copy of the search warrant but wasn't shown it nor was he shown a copy of the arrest warrant. He claimed that this violated his rights. Maybe true, maybe not, but it didn't matter in the slightest to anyone except Millar either at the time or now. If today's judge was shocked by this narrative of how flagrantly the system had violated Millar's human and legal rights she hid it well.

Today's hearing was in respect to whether Millar should get bail again after skipping out on his prior bail. The Crown had made an application to have bail revoked while he wanted it extended. We started a bit late because there was one other matter ahead of us. When they were done a short recess and our turn. There were only three people in the public gallery, two women and me. One of the women was, I think, his wife, she's been at prior hearings. The other was a stranger to me. I'd commented in a posting on Millar's conviction appeal that a sheriff had complimented him on his suit. Not today. He came out of remand wearing a bright red track suit, standard prison garb. He was escorted by a single sheriff and wasn't handcuffed. He introduced himself to the judge as the "Occupant of the office of the general executor of the estate of Michael Millar".

Crown started the ball rolling by saying they were making an application to revoke bail and have Millar detained. An explanation here. Millar is doing his best to exhaust all possible avenues to keep out of jail. Once he'd been convicted and sentenced all he had left were appeals of his convictions and sentence. When an appeal on either of those is made it is general court practice to allow bail until the appeals are held. Millar's conviction appeal hearing had been heard and it was a disaster for him. He'd skipped on his sentencing appeal hearing which resulted in the search warrant. But he still had the right to a sentencing appeal and Crown wanted him safely in lockup until such time as the hearing occurred. He wanted to be allowed bail until such time as he had the sentencing appeal.

Crown gave a rundown of his history. My notes read;

"Before court pursuant to an arrest warrant of January 06, 2020 and executed yesterday. Ordered remanded. Application to cancel bail. Convicted on three counts, evading income tax, evading GST (Goods and Service Tax), counseling fraud. Jail two and a half years. Bail was $30,000 on his own recognizance. One surety. Did not appear at sentence appeal hearing."

At his point Crown started the story of the arrest and was stopped by Millar's objection about hearsay. Crown just said "If Mr. Millar objects I'll leave it at a warrant was executed and Mr. Millar was arrested in the process."

Then Crown and judge started discussing legislation. As I noted in the Debbie Anderson thread there is new federal legislation that says that judges shall allow bail unless Crown can prove at least one of these three grounds is met;

Grounds for detention

There are three different grounds for detaining an accused prior to sentence. They are commonly referred to as primary grounds, secondary grounds, and tertiary grounds.

Primary grounds refers to whether detention is necessary to ensure the accused's attendance in court. Considerations include the accused's criminal history, their behaviour in the matter before the court, their connections (or lack of) with the jurisdiction, and the type of offences before the court.

Secondary grounds refers to whether detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public. This includes whether there is a substantial likelihood the accused will commit a further offence or interfere with the administration of justice.

Tertiary grounds refers to whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, and is generally reserved for very serious offences. The four factors to consider are:

- the apparent strength of the prosecutor's case,
- the seriousness of the offence,
- the circumstances surrounding the offence, including whether a firearm was used, and
- if found guilty, whether the accused is liable to a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment, or if a firearm was involved, faces a minimum of 3 year of jail.

Since Debbie had skipped on her existing bail the onus had been reversed and she had to prove that none of these three grounds applied to her. The same applied to Millar at this hearing. The Crown would explain why he should not be allowed bail and he would have to rebut.

But first the judge had to be convinced that Millar's original bail hadn't already been cancelled. Judge seemed to think that bail had been revoked at the January 6th hearing when Millar failed to appear and the arrest warrant was issued, "Wasn't that release order (bail) cancelled?" Apparently the judge was relying on court registry records that erroneously said bail had been cancelled but the Crown convinced the judge that it was still in effect.

The main issue for the Crown was to convince the court that Millar, if granted bail, was likely to skip yet again. They used his past history to show this, specifically his non-attendance at the January 6th hearing. Crown had to prove that Millar was aware of the hearing date so they told the court that Millar had agreed to the January 6th date at a case management session and that he'd been sent an email by Crown counsel confirming the date so he was clearly aware of the hearing. Millar, until now silent apart from his complaints regarding his broken door, decided to do some of the Crown's heavy lifting for them and said "I acknowledge that I knew the date."

Crown said that continuing custody was necessary to compel attendance. This strongly mitigated against release. Crown said that Millar asserted that court proceedings against him have ended. In support of this contention they brought into evidence an email that Millar had sent to his bail supervisor after the January 6 hearing when the arrest warrant had been issued. Millar had a previously scheduled February 6 meeting with the supervisor and the email said that Millar would not be attending the meeting because he had unilaterally cancelled it. He said that he'd advised Crown counsel that he had appointed her as the administrator of the Michael Millar estate so the charges against him (note that there were no charges, he'd already been convicted) had been settled and his bail obligations had ceased. "I have no obligations if there ever was one. The administrator ended charges before January 6th."

There were two Crown counsel at this hearing, the one presenting arguments and the counsel appointed by Millar as his administrator (lets call her MA). Presenting counsel said "My colleague has been appointed the administrator of his estate to settle charges. He directed her to settle outstanding matters and wanted the return of his property. Given this and his past conduct and wanton disrespect of his bail supervisor there is a real risk he will not obey bail terms."

It was now 1:00 and the judge called for a one hour adjournment for lunch. When I'm at the Robson street courthouse I normally go to the Templeton for lunch;

http://thetempleton.ca/

An authentic classic diner. Opened in the 1940's and not substantially changed since the 1960's. Unfortunately an hour break was cutting it too close so I settled for a burger elsewhere.

[Burnaby49]

At 2:00 it was back to the Crown's submissions. Crown moved on to the issue of the protection or safety of the public. My notes were hopeless at this point but I recall thinking that Crown didn't have much to work on in respect to this factor. Everyone knew that Millar was no threat to the public. The Crown conceded he was not a violent offender and there was a low chance of him engaging in further tax evasion or fraud. This was an easy concession given that he is unemployed with no income on which to evade tax and the Paradigm tax evasion scheme he'd fraudulently promoted was totally dead. Crown noted how the "court below" had said that it was Millar's position that the CRA and the court had no jurisdiction over him. He believed he shouldn't have been charged and he'd challenged this court's jurisdiction by violating his bail terms. "My concern is whether he would surrender and comply".

Judge - Protecting the public is re-offending. Crown agreed chances were low and that Millar was non-violent.

Crown moved on to grounds 3, the administration of justice. "He does not have a strong sentencing appeal. There is no principle that would affect sentence. His sentence was on the low end of sentencing range. In my opinion there is no chance he will serve a significant portion of his sentence before the appeal is heard. All sitting dates in March are available."

A bit of an explanation here since this issue came up again later. This refers to the possibility that if Millar is held until his sentencing appeal he may end up serving more time than he would have served had he just started his actual sentence without appealing it. This could happen two ways which can act separately or together;

1 - An appeal could result in a reduction of his custodial sentence. Currently he is to sentenced to 30 months in jail which, with a mandatory reduction, will only come to 20 months. If his sentence is reduced at the appeal hearing this might be even less. In the very unlikely event that an appeal eliminated his jail time altogether or his sentence was changed from custody to a conditional sentence to be served at home any jail time incurred from now to the appeal decision would be in excess of his final sentence.

2 - The time he serves from now until the sentencing appeal hearing might exceed his sentence time even if it is not reduced on appeal. As I noted above Millar can anticipate serving 20 months in jail. If bail is refused and he is held for over 20 months while waiting for a hearing date he will have served excess time.

This was the reason for Crown's above comments. The Crown made two claims. The first was that there was little likelihood of a sentence reduction so Millar could safely be jailed for at least 20 months without exceeding his current custodial sentence. I thought the second comment, "All sitting days in March are available", rather astonishing. It meant that Millar's appeal could be heard very quickly because the British Columbia Court of Appeal has so few hearings scheduled during the entire month of March, less than three weeks away, that Millar's appeal can be heard on any court date the parties chose during the month. Crown closed this part of the arguments by saying they had little confidence that he will appear at his appeal if granted bail.

My next section of notes are unintelligible. They relate to his bail surety. Crown had some concerns about the address of the individual guaranteeing the $30,000 bail surety since it was the same address where he was just apprehended. The police report said that there was one other person in the apartment at the time, I assume the woman in court today so I'm also assuming that she's surety. Judge didn't think this significant saying that bail is often guaranteed by someone living in the same residence. At least that's what I can decipher from my notes.

Judge asked if Millar needed to be released to prepare his sentence appeal. Crown said that he'd already filed it on November 25, 2019. Judge asked if appeal was ready to go. Yes.

Then it was Millar's turn to argue why he should be granted bail. He immediately went full-frontal into the fantasy law existing in his alternate reality and his burning grievances against how he was arrested. Both totally irrelevant to this hearing.

"There is one matter. My surety is in the courtroom and she has my power of attorney. I want it on record that she has access to all of my court records. I want that on record."

This comment could relate to one of two things. He may be referring to the woman in the galley who provided his bail surety. He may want her to have access to his court records if he's jailed. Alternatively, a less likely possibility but still possible, he might have been referring to his bizarre claim that MA, the Crown attorney who prosecuted him, was now the administrator of his fantasy estate. As I'll relate later this issue of MA being named his administrator was a key reason why he's sitting in jail right now rather than out on bail. In any case nobody asked him to explain his comment.

Millar said that there were a number of points he wished to make. The first, the one consuming him, was his arrest yesterday. "I have a concern how it unfolded. The officer provided no proof of right to arrest. No search warrant given. This was pre-planned and pre-organize. There is no excuse for no paperwork. This was not a lawful arrest. The issue of a lawful arrest was not followed, there is a simple and lawful procedure."

"It was only a short time before they announced that they were breaking the door down and did it. The officer came in with his gun drawn. This was unnecessarily dangerous. They were professional after that."

Judge - The issue here is if the arrest warrant was valid.

Millar - If they didn't follow procedure the arrest is not lawful.

This relates to another of Millar's obsessions, covered multiple times in this thread. He's obsessed by government rules and procedures. All government functions have rules and procedures. The Canada Revenue Agency has its T.O.M.s (Taxation Operations Manuals). As an example;

The Canada Revenue Agency’s (CRA) Income Tax Audit Manual contains a wealth of information that may be useful for tax practitioners in representing their clients in tax audits and appeals. Spanning over 1,200 pages, the audit manual consolidates in one volume the CRA’s operational policies and procedures for the administration of income tax. Essentially, the book sets out an end-to-end road map for CRA auditors to follow in selecting, planning, conducting and finalizing an income tax audit.

These are advisory, not mandatory. I spent 35 years as a CRA auditor and don't recall ever referring to them, but Millar has elevated their importance to the level of statutory law. At trial he cross-examined the CRA employees who investigated him and the Paradigm tax evasion scheme on their knowledge and application of the relevant T.O.M.s for their function. It was his position that if the T.O.M.s weren't followed to the letter, exactly as written, his prosecution was illegal and charges against him had to be dropped. Sadly for Millar's defense the trial judge couldn't care less about the level of training or competence of CRA employees. All she cared about was whether Crown had presented sufficient evidence to convict him. The CRA's internal policies were irrelevant to that issue. Based on this past history of procedural obsession I assume that he thought that his totally unsupported statements about the conduct of the police at his arrest would void his arrest and he would have to be released. Unfortunately for Millar today's judge couldn't care less about police procedures or how they chose to carry out the arrest. All that mattered to the judge was whether or not the police acted under a valid arrest warrant.

Millar moved on to this curious comment made in isolation without any context given;

"My home is not my residence. It's where I live but it is not my residence."

I don't know what Millar meant by this or what relevance he thought it had. I assume it related to the search warrant however search warrants are issued to specific addresses. The type of real property at the address and it's use is irrelevant. Millar did not argue that the warrant was served on the wrong address.

Then on to yet another unusual comment regarding another legal rule he'd made up on the fly;

"I received no notice from the court, the Crown, or police that that there was an arrest warrant. The arrest should have been preceded by a phone call but this did not occur."

Of all the idiotic imaginary rules he's made up during the course of the trial that has to be the stupidest. Police have to make courtesy calls to criminals to notify them of the time and place they intend to arrest them? Is Saturday afternoon at 3 convenient? No? How about Sunday at noon? That's out too? You'll check your calendar and get back to us? Fair enough, I'll wait for your call.

In any case I doubt he was as ignorant of the warrant as he professed. Master Gee, a fellow traveler in bizarre legal theories, was in the courtroom with me when the arrest warrant was requested by the Crown and issued. I can't see him not telling Millar about it. I attended Master Gee's court hearing years ago;

https://www.quatloos.com/Q-Forum/viewto ... 48&t=10342

Then Millar complained about the Crown's arguments for detention.

"The Crown said that detention was justified on various grounds. Crown used the term "conduct". I question the use of the word conduct, it is a question of belief. I'm shown in an unfavourable light. It's about being open and honest. They deal with people with criminal minds. I don't work that way." He complained about the Crown's comment that he showed "wanton disrespect" of the bail supervisor. He saw his email as being professional, positive, courteous.

Judge cut in "You indicated that you would no longer comply with bail terms."

Millar - Bail expired on the 6th. I would need a new contract to go past the 6th. If I was incorrect I seek forgiveness. I never suggested that the courts and Crown had no jurisdiction over me. (Note - That's an outright whopper of epic proportions. He argued constantly, throughout the entire trial process, that the courts had no jurisdiction over him.) I reported this about the first Millar hearing I attended, on October 16, 2015;

His big point seemed to be that since he didn't agree to anything, and since the court has no jurisdiction over him, there was no reason to have a preliminary inquiry since he can't be convicted. So he wanted the judge to tell him how to do this (entering motions is how he put it). Judge asked Crown counsel if she knew what Millar was talking about. Millar, acting like he was addressing the simple-minded, said the jurisdiction had to be proven by the party making the claim. Judge - Claim? What do you mean claim? Millar said the Crown had to prove jurisdiction over him before things could proceed. By this point he was just babbling gibberish and neither the judge nor I could understand him. Judge advised him to get counsel. He then asked the judge to tell him what motion he should make to prove to the court that it had no jurisdiction over him so that he could stop the proceedings before a preliminary inquiry.

The next part of my notes are illegible. Something about Keith Lawson's trial. From what I can glean out of my scribblings Millar said that the judge in Lawson's trial had said that anyone who mistrusts the police or courts needs to be punished. Millar started philosophizing how people distrusts courts and authority figures. In everything he's done in this process he's put his trust in the court. He greatly respects the court. Comments like those of the trial judge are from thought police and cause distrust.

The judge ended this philosophical meandering by telling Millar that the point was that a person can have bail conditions imposed but won't adhere to them.

Millar - I'm going there. I've had bail since October 2013, six and a half years (incredible as it seems that's how long this trial process has been going) and I've only missed two hearings. I've followed bail for six and a half years. I was trying to do my best hoping that the process would be fair. On and on about trust and how he trusted the court with the underlying implication that his trust had been misplaced and the courts had failed him. He's been trying constantly to do the right thing.

Judge - The question before us is why you didn't surrender on January 6th. This is a strict rule.

Millar started complaining that his positions weren't liked. He was challenging jurisdiction (he'd just said that he hadn't). Why did he get no respect for doing this? He started on about sending registered mail to the Crown, Attorney General of Canada, the minister of the CRA and a large number of others. Then on to another obsession, equity. He'd tried to invoke equity at trial but it was shelved and not dealt with. He had an ongoing problem with "How do I do it?" He wasn't treated in an equitable manner. Equity is the foundation of the British Columbia legal system. "We have a Law and Equity Act. To have equity swept away at the Supreme Court of British Columbia is shocking!" So he tried to be pro-active by declaring his own equity the . . . .

Judge cut him off in mid-sentence. "There is nothing in the Law and Equity Act that affects your charges. You just can't create a document and say that it takes effect. It's quite extraordinary to try and appoint the lawyer prosecuting you as your agent. I need to know why you didn't comply with your court order." The judge just couldn't get past the narrow petty issue of why Millar skipped bail and move on to the far more relevant issue of the interaction of the implications of equity in the British Columbia court system and Millar's legal fantasies.

Millar - I was in compliance. I settled everything so the sentencing hearing was moot.

The judge sounded astonished by Millar's comments "You don't think that one person can unilaterally after conviction, that they could create a document voiding everything? You thought that settling by sending that package of documents voided your trial and conviction? Extraordinary. (If that worked) nobody would be in jail." The judge said that she didn't understand how he thought he could do that. It wasn't rational.

Maybe not rational in the judge's world but a legitimate legal process in Millar's world "Sending documents of registration of my birth was the basis of my equitable (decision?) and the settlement of my debt." He said that he met a guy in "rehab" (he obviously meant remand) who said that you could either do time or pay money. "So the concept for money or time is not unknown."

Judge - "You got a concession after conviction that you were allowed bail It's a great concern that you can avoid (your sentence?) by sending documents."

Millar - it's a form of payment.

Judge - It's not a form of payment. Tell me why I should believe you will show up.

Millar - If I'm incorrect I will show up.

Another note - What I think Millar was trying to do here is a stunt he pulled at trial. He made a big fuss there because he'd submitted fake bonds to the court, which he called Bills of Acceptance that he'd written up himself and that he claimed paid off any debt he had to the court or Crown. Debbie Anderson tried the same thing at her bail hearing with equally dismal results. As I wrote Debbie ranted away that;

I do not consent to being in custody. This matter has been settled in private through securities. I was beguiled into believing that I was a trustee in tort. I believed that the matter was settled. This relates to trust, the Crown hasn't mentioned this.

She didn't run. Did nothing wrong. She didn't show because everything had been settled. The Crown has kept her securities. She is the heir beneficiary of her name. The Crown has the legal right to her name. Her security was on bonded paper! She said that the Crown has the legal right to her security and is trustee but it's now trying to make her the trustee.

The security she was ranting about would have been a fake promissory note of some kind. Sovereigns believe that they can write promissory notes for whatever amount they chose and this is exactly the same as payment in cash. Unlike real promissory notes there are no provisions, or any intent, to pay it off, just an indefinite IOU they claim is worth whatever amount is put on the note. Robert Menard did something similar with his dine and dash scam and Michael Millar did exactly the same thing at his trial with what he called a bill of acceptance. You can read about his antics here;

https://www.quatloos.com/Q-Forum/viewto ... 34#p227241

So she wrote up a fake promissory note, gave it to the Crown, and considered the whole matter finished. She'd settled whatever debt society thought she owed it through some scribbling on a sheet of bonded paper. And, like Charles Norman Holmes way back, she invoked the strawman belief by naming the Crown as the trustee of her legal name so they couldn't act against her best interest. Then the Crown betrayed her by keeping her valuable security but denying that the conviction had been settled by their accepting it. I'll say one thing in Debbie's favour. She seems to truly believe this nonsense. She was almost incoherent with anger and resentment for the way she'd been betrayed after acting in good faith to settle her charges.

I think that what Millar was trying to argue here was that it was his choice whether he served time or paid a fine. He'd chosen to pay the fine by tendering worthless bullshit bonds to the court so he was now free and clear of charges or convictions.

Judge - Normally you start sentencing immediately. The Crown says that there is no realistic prospect that your sentence will be reduced so there is no prejudice in retaining you now. Respond to that.

Millar - At case management the Crown said that they wouldn't seek a higher sentence on appeal.

Judge - That's not what we are talking about here,

Millar - Crown said that court could increase his sentence.

Judge - That's not a realistic possibility.

Millar - I don't know how to file an appeal submission!

Judge - You already did so.

Millar - "Yes but I built mine on the Crown's but I haven't had a chance this time." He said that he did this on his conviction appeal and he wants to redraft his sentencing appeal statement.

This relates to another constant tactic he used during the trial. Whenever he and Crown were supposed to file statements he'd wait until the Crown filed theirs then write his based on what the Crown's submission said.

Judge - That's for another date. What prejudice is there to you if the sentencing appeal hearing is done expeditiously?

Millar said he wanted time to go over his appeal, rethink it, ruminate a while. What he didn't seem to realize was that any more time he was allowed in order to perfect his appeal wouldn't be while he was back out on bail, he'd be in jail. I was getting the impression that the judge had made her mind up and bail was going to be denied. This was why she'd asked the question about prejudice. She was asking what downside there was to him being in jail if he got a quick sentencing appeal hearing.

The court and Crown discussed possible days in March to hold his hearing and agreed that any day in March was fine. Crown obviously just wanted to finally get this done "March is wide open. We'll be available on any date." Millar complained that he wanted to redo his already filed appeal statement. Crown opposed this and said that they'd agree to him submitting two pages of reply. So they chose Thursday March 19th for the hearing. He was allowed to submit two pages of reply to be filed by March 12. However the judge said that he'd be in jail until then, bail denied.

My notes seem to indicate that at this point Millar again brought up how his arrest had been unlawful. Crown said that they didn't agree with his interpretation of events.

Judge called a fifteen minute break which stretched to half an hour. When court resumed she read out a written decision she'd put together at break.

First the judge said that she was "confounded" by his argument that he could unilaterally abrogate everything. She gave a bit of history. He'd been convicted October 15, 2016 (almost four years ago!). He filed an appeal and got bail. Conviction appeal heard June 2019 and dismissed. He'd immediately applied for bail and it was granted. A term or release was that he surrender on January 6, 2020. He failed to appear. He was arrested under a court ordered warrant and brought to today's hearing.

She said that a judge must allow bail unless accused demonstrated that release is not justified. The main argument relied on by Crown is their concern that if Millar is released he will not appear at the sentencing appeal. The third ground to consider is the administration of justice. The court has to balance the length of sentence with the strength of the appeal.

"I have focused primarily on whether Mr. Millar will appear. It was his burden to meet the contention that he will appear. Mr. Millar argued that he did not get a copy of the search warrant and his door was broken down. The arrest warrant was valid and he is here under a valid warrant."

Mr. Millar says that there are two main reasons that he should not be detained. The first one is significant. He has had bail for six and a half years. He's followed bail rules with two errors Normally a great deal of weight is put on this.

The second reason is that he sent a Notice of Fiduciary Appointment and Presentment to the Crown on December 30, 2019. That document is not familiar to law. He said in equity it settled matters between him and the Crown. He was of the view that all matters had been settled so he did not come to court as required. Millar said in court today he may be in error on the effect of the documents and seeks forgiveness and seeks to be excused.

I cannot believe that he reasonably believe in the effects of these documents. It is a stretch too far to make me believe that he had good faith in that document. In any case it isn't a realistic possibility that he will serve too long by being detained for four weeks to the sentencing appeal. So there is no prejudice. I order the release cancelled and his appeal is dismissed.

She asked Millar if he wanted an earlier date that March 19th, unfortunately no, he needed to time to prepare. He had yet another pointless rant about the police breaking his door down and that was it. He was led off to remand and I went home.

On March 2, 2017 (almost exactly 3 years ago) Millar shouted out, in court after he was given a custodial sentence;

"I DON'T VOLUNTEER TO GO TO JAIL AND I WON'T GO TO JAIL! I WANT MY BOND BROUGHT FORWARD FOR SETTLEMENT!"

Surprisingly it's turned out that volunteering to go to jail isn't a prerequisite for being forced to serve jail time. At least it was probably surprising to Millar. Notwithstanding his rants he's in jail and he can expect to stay there until he serves out his full sentence. The sentencing appeal is his last possible shot but I agree with the Crown. I can't see him getting any relief there.

A personal note - The reason I said "unfortunately" in a previous paragraph is because March 19th is one of the few dates that I can't make his hearing. I'm finally scheduled for cataract surgery that week. The next hearing will be his last then we can all forget about him. I really wanted to be there for the final fiasco.

[The Observer]

Thanks for another great write-up. Sorry to hear about your current vision problems, but at least you have relief within grasp. Cataract surgery is routine nowadays and gives us a new lease on sight instead of being casually blinded during our golden years. It's just too bad that it comes at the final tolling of Millar's legal crusade.

The judge sounded astonished by Millar's comments "You don't think that one person can unilaterally after conviction, that they could create a document voiding everything? You thought that settling by sending that package of documents voided your trial and conviction? Extraordinary. (If that worked) nobody would be in jail." The judge said that she didn't understand how he thought he could do that. It wasn't rational.

Has this judge had any knowledge in the past of how far off the beaten path tax protesters and sovruns will go in search of their Camelot? I find myself astonished that she seems to be naive, especially given the resounding stomping Rooke handed out over the last few years.

My other observation is the amount of time she devoted to debating the claptrap that Millar kept injecting into the proceedings. I understand a certain amount is necessary to demonstrate that the court was giving him due consideration, but this has been his modus operandi for the last few years, none of which has gained him one inch of ground in his hopeless fight. If nothing else, her curtailment of his plaintive bleating could have gotten you the opportunity to dine at the Templeton.

[NYGman]

Thanks for another great write-up. Sorry to hear about your current vision problems, but at least you have relief within grasp. Cataract surgery is routine nowadays and gives us a new lease on sight instead of being casually blinded during our golden years. It's just too bad that it comes at the final tolling of Millar's legal crusade.

Hey now, some of us are not even 50 and are losing their vision due to these things. Having mine done May (Right) then June(Left), so I will be able to see properly again. But I do agree, modern technology and materials will make it so I will not need glasses anymore. Really am amazed at how these things can impair your vision. My prescription went up +5 in one year, and that was a few months ago, and now I can't even correct to 20/20. I know it has gotten worse since, I am missing the details.