confused capacities & agreements

[HardyW]

...

Laws can be replaced or repealed or superceded, that is the nature of things. Law changes, evolves, and grows as we do. The distinction you are making between fiction and living man is a fiction in itself and is not relevant.

It is not relevant in this current jurisprudence (under a juristic unit). ...

I may have to revise my suggestion that Dnatural is not Parzival.

Parzival used the novel term 'juristic unit' and now Dnatural apparently in all innocence, uses the same made-up term.

[wserra]

I may have to revise my suggestion that Dnatural is not Parzival.

They both post from Canada, but from a long ways apart. Yes, spoofing is possible, but I don't think is occurring here (at least in parzival's case).

[Burnaby49]

Entirely possible that there are two different posters but acting together. I haven't been paying enough attention (actually none at all) to see common traits or repeat phrases. It was obvious where this was going right from the first nonsensical post at the beginning of the month so I tuned out.

[AndyK]

Interesting ??? A quick Internet search on "Parzival" came up with:

Parzival: A medieval romance written by the knight-poet Wolfram von Eschenbach

Arthurian hero Parzival and his long quest for the Holy Grail following his initial failure to achieve it.

Among the most striking elements of the work are its emphasis on the importance of humility, compassion, sympathy and the quest for spirituality.

Also, the English translation of Parzival is Percival. Think he'd get upset if we called him Percy?

[HardyW]

The only reference to "juristic unit" found on a quick internet search was on
www.canadiangovernmentconspiracies.com/

Unfortunately the whois information tells us that

canadiangovernmentconspiracies.com is a domain name registered by REDACTED FOR PRIVACY. The site is based in REDACTED FOR PRIVACY, REDACTED FOR PRIVACY, REDACTED FOR PRIVACY. This domain does not appear to have registrar lock enabled.

Perhaps Dnatural is the author of that site and Parzival is her/his student.

[Dnatural]

I thought this site catered mostly to those who know law and/or have an interest in its discovery, but no one yet has been able to bring in any proof or logic except Parzival. What does this say about Quatloos'ers... have the logical and law enthusiast left?

'Weak minds discuss people. Average minds discuss events and strong minds discuss ideas. Now that everyone has a mirror let's see if we can speak about law and its origins, as well as understand its reach.

I am here to tell Quatloos'ers that b/c a law is repealed by a subsequent law that if this subsequent law does not speak to the matter in question then the law that was repealed is active.

Courts have more than one jurisdiction. One in equity and one settled in the common law of the land. Equity can only deal with estates annexed to the land but not the land itself; incorporeal matters NOT corporeal.

So when someone brings in the law that makes a claim that can only be seen in the common law then the law of repeals clearly states that it must go to the law which speaks to that matter bought into the court, either through petition or requisition.

So since equity law is proof of the exclusion to the preemption that created it then it is lawfully explained through the law of repeals aforementioned... Is it not? A US citizen first MUST make a claim to land and renounce his citizenship to the powers of equity and once this is done he has standing, in the preemption, which b/c of the law of repeals activates those laws to settle his claim.

Additionally from this vantage point the claimant can show proof of the trust through the Settled Land Act which explains clearly the powers afforded to the settlor. This cannot be seen in equity as equity does not deal with the trust only the laws that govern the things used in the trust.

Does this help? If it does then I implore you reread what Parzival has provided in precedent, captures and those commissioned to set the foundations for law to operate.

I'm telling you for absolute certainty that Supreme Court Judges HAVE TO learn and study history through former law-interpreters like Maitland, Littleton, Coke and Blackstone. The issue most are having here is they are learning only one part of the law and so will never understand the whole... except Parzival who is bringing in the whole.

[HardyW]

In England, to study the up to date law one can visit a good library and consult Halsbury's Law which is regularly updated with both new legislation and with new court cases. No-one would think of referring to 200 year old text books: mostly because 200+ year old law which is still relevant will be included in this compendium and explained in up to date language and with reference to interpretations made by courts over the centuries.

I'm pretty sure there must be a similar resource to Halsbury in each jurisdiction, British Columbia for example, that Parzival could refer to which will explain exactly what property rights his hypothetical modern-day cestui que use (or as he calls it "life tenant") has.

As other posters have pointed out, tenure for life is very rare in modern times and probably so I expect is land conveyed by settlement.

[AnOwlCalledSage]

I am here to tell Quatloos'ers that b/c a law is repealed by a subsequent law that if this subsequent law does not speak to the matter in question then the law that was repealed is active.

Well, I'm not a lawyer but that's complete bollocks isn't it. It's not ancient law books you need. It's a good dictionary

[Burnaby49]

I'm telling you for absolute certainty that Supreme Court Judges HAVE TO learn and study history through former law-interpreters like Maitland, Littleton, Coke and Blackstone. The issue most are having here is they are learning only one part of the law and so will never understand the whole... except Parzival who is bringing in the whole.

More bullshit. Regardless of Dnatural's "absolute certainty" Supreme Court judges can do whatever they want, they are answerable to no one. So if they chose not to "learn and study" Dnatural's laundry list of required reading what does he propose doing to force them to undertake his fantasy requirements?

[morrand]

Also, Professor Irvine summarizes the facts of the Chupryk case as follows (at 50): "On the death of his wife, Michael Chupryk found himself (or so the Court determined) the life tenant of a dilapidated and deteriorating property; he was also the holder of a one-third share in the remainder interest, the other two-thirds being vested in Sophie Haykowski, Mr. Chupryk’s god-daughter and relative by marriage." It is hard to square this summary with your assertion that

you so agree, that all citizens are life tenants........

for if all citizens are life tenants, for what reason was it necessary for Mr Chupryk's status as a life tenant to have been determined by the court? For what reason, further, was it necessary for this esteemed professor of law to state that fact?

once again dodged the point, that is SETTLED LAND ACT APPLIES AND IS PART OF THE COMMON LAW....

[...]

UNLESS THIS COMMENTARY ON CANLII IS WRONG!!!
the forgotten statute

Hardly dodged the point. You made this article central to your argument, and you continue to do so. I found it, read it, and it does not support your argument at all.

Prof Irvine admits up front that the Manitoba Court of Appeals has ruled against the point which he argues, citing (and this is a copy-and-paste job) Chupryk v Haykowski (1980), 110 DLR (3d) 108, 3 Man R (2d) 216, [1980] 4 WWR 534; leave to appeal further to MBCA denied, (1980) 110 DLR (3d) 108n [Freedman CJM]; leave to appeal to SCC granted (1980) 33 NR 622 (SCC). He also goes on to explain that, in effect, very little of this actually matters:

My modest aim in this first essay is principally to set straight a historical flaw in Manitoba’s historical record. In doing so, I am aware that I am addressing legal issues which are on the point of fading into history and near-oblivion, as newer methods are adopted for making provision for the successive enjoyment of family real estate. The old “strict settlement”, if not yet dead, is now a rare survival, and the settled estate and settled land legislation of the nineteenth century is of vestigial importance compared with the trust-based arrangements that have supplanted them, and which have attracted their own patina of statutory mechanisms. But the very obsolescence of old-fashioned strict settlements means that few if any opportunities will present themselves for the judiciary to correct misconceptions which it has created, and that is particularly so in Manitoba, where the passing of the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act in 1982 makes it impossible to imagine any future circumstance in which successive estates may exist otherwise than under the aegis of a trust. The short note which follows, then, is designed to show how the Manitoba Court of Appeal, in the case of Chupryk v Haykowski, misrepresented the Manitoba law of settled estates by ignoring or suppressing the existence of the English Settled Estates Act of 1856 as part of this province’s law; and how, in so doing, they obliquely sought to justify a unique, and I believe a misguided interpretation of another provincial statute – the partition-and-sale provisions of the Law of Property Act – to achieve the Court’s preferred outcome in the Chupryk case.

Irvine at 50 (my emphasis).

So what Professor Irvine is saying boils down to:

1. The Manitoba courts said in Chupryk that the Settled Estates Act of 1856 isn't a part of Manitoba law.
2. I think the court made a mistake, and here's why.
3. This would need to be corrected by the judiciary (the courts), but they aren't likely to do so now because settlements (life tenancies and the like) are practically obsolete.
4. It probably doesn't matter anyway because settlements are obsolete.

This is important. First, Professor Irvine is not saying what the law is. He is upfront in that: he is discussing what he thinks the law should be. He might be right, but his interpretation was not adopted in Chupryk, so it does not matter. Professor Irvine knows this, and admits it doesn't matter much, except for historical accuracy. There may someday be a reason for the courts to re-examine Chupryk and decide that Prof Irvine is correct, but they have not done so (or hadn't by 2011, anyway).

Second, Prof Irvine is saying it doesn't matter now anyway because the law has changed, so settlements in Manitoba (like life tenancies and remainder interests) have to be done through trusts now, and trusts have their own rules (their "patina of statutory mechanisms," as he puts it) to which none of this applies at all.

Professor Irvine, in other words—whom, I will remind you, you brought into the discussion—undercuts your argument in the very article you cite for support.

That's to the extent that life tenancies have anything at all to do with...well, anything else. To repeat a point that's been made elsewhere: nobody is debating with you that life tenancies were a thing at common law, and probably still are.

does the settled land act 1925 apply in the provinces of canada?

The Manitoba Court of Appeals says it doesn't (indeed, this is the whole premise of Prof Irvine's article), or at least not in Manitoba. On the other hand, the Amusements Act (CCSM c 870), the Energy Savings Act (CCSM c E115.5), and the Deer Lodge Curling Club Limited Incorporation Act (RSM 1990, c 45) all probably do apply in Manitoba, unless the curling club has since folded. But none of these appear to have any more relation to "confused capacities and agreements" than life tenancies or the Settled Land Act (1925).

Hence my previous question, which you have not answered and which is on point with some of the other questions you have been asked in this thread, all of which questions you've ignored in favor of proving a point nobody is really debating. To wit:

[If] all citizens are life tenants, for what reason was it necessary for Mr Chupryk's status as a life tenant to have been determined by the court? For what reason, further, was it necessary for this esteemed professor of law to state that fact?

Well?

[Pottapaug1938]

I'm telling you for absolute certainty that Supreme Court Judges HAVE TO learn and study history through former law-interpreters like Maitland, Littleton, Coke and Blackstone. The issue most are having here is they are learning only one part of the law and so will never understand the whole... except Parzival who is bringing in the whole.

And, since you clearly never went to law school, I'm telling you that law students study old authorities like those only in an overview, because they discuss forms of the law which have long since been abolished or fallen into disuse. In my entire legal career, not once did I ever have to refer to any of them in court or in a pleading or document. As for Black's Law dictionary -- or any legal dictionary, for that matter? Most law students and most lawyers never open one up, let alone own one, partly because it's full of antiquated Latin maxims which are never used today.

I'll give you an example. In the old days, if a deed read "from A to B", that conveyed a different estate than "from A to B and his heirs" or "from A to B, and the heirs of his body." Also, a deed had to read something like "I, Pottapaug, give, grant, bargain, sell and convey...." The intent was to trigger the application of ancient English laws which provided the Crown with revenue. Now, modification of the old laws means that no modern-day conveyancer has to use that verbiage; and no, the modifying laws did NOT have to specify that the old statutes or forms were being repealed. It was enough to sasy "this is how to do it, going forward."

So, you and parzival -- whoever you are -- can stop wasting our time reciting centuries-old English lawyer-talk. You can also try to explain what your purpose is in sending us this huge heap of word salad. I won't hold my breath, though.

[parzival]

KISS
does the settled land act 1925 apply in the provinces of canada?

well?

Short answer: No
Long answer: Yes, except and unless the various provisions in the Act have been over-ridden by subsequent legislation. In the particular Manitoba case you mentioned they have been, along with BC and Ontario for sure. Alberta is probably the last hold out and it's being cleaned up this legislative sitting.
BTW, IANAL, I'm an effin' pig farmer. The only reason I'm showing any interest in this is because it means I can finally settle a ten year old estate that includes a life trust. It's either that or hope one beneficiary meets an untimely demise. I'm not going to even bother generating copy pasta from every province to show exactly where and how it's been over-ridden because I have much better things to do with my time and that's why I hire professionals.

first off thank you for the straight answer and why you believe that.

now I would like to discuss the commentary on canlii that corrects the chupky case

I would contend first that the 1856 Act is part of Manitoba law by reason of the fundamental rules governing the reception of English statutes in the settled colonies. Those rules as laid out by Blackstone, were explained and applied by the Manitoba Court of Appeal itself in Meanwell v Meanwell in 1941,34 but the fullest and clearest analysis of the doctrine of reception, both as to statute and judge-made law is surely that of Mr. Jean Côté, as he then was, in his justly-famous articles in the Alberta Law Review, in 1964 and 1977 respectively

and as we can see relies on meanwell
as we can see, the judges in many cases have determined that general regulation of property, equally applicable to any
country in which it is by the rules of English law that property is
governed.

In Doe d. Hanington y. McFadden, (c 836) z N.B.R. z6o (Berton's
Reports), Chipman, C.J., at p. 267, says:
The rule laid down by Blackstone is that "Colonists carry with them
only so much of the English law as is applicable to their own situation
and the condition of an English colony; such, for instance, as the
general rules of inheritance, and of protection from personal injuries:"
The same doctrine is maintained by Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Vaughan,
(1769) 4 Burr. 2494; Campbell v. Hall, (1774) Lofft, 655; 20 Howell's
State Trials ; 239. In the case of The Attorney-General v. Stewart, (1817)
2 Mer. 143, in which the question was whether the Statute of Mortmain
(9 Geo. 2, ch. 36) extended to the Island of Grenada, Sir William
Grant, M.R., also adopts substantially the same rule, and makes the
determination of the point to depend upon this consideration—"Whether
it be a law of local policy, adapted solely to the country in which it was
made, or a general regulation of property, equally applicable to any
country in which it is by the rules of English law that property is
governed." He comes to the conclusion that the Mortmain Act is
quite inapplicable to Grenada or any other colony, because "in its
causes, its provisions, its qualifications, and its exceptions, it is a law
wholly English; calculated for purposes of local policy, complicated
with local establishments, and incapable, without great incongruity in
the effect, of being transferred as it stands into the code of any other
country."

to hopefully move past the issues and maybe discuss the law as written to figure it out, since this is very specific,
so what does mean then

general regulation of property, equally applicable to any
country in which it is by the rules of English law that property is
governed.

[parzival]

Also, Professor Irvine summarizes the facts of the Chupryk case as follows (at 50): "On the death of his wife, Michael Chupryk found himself (or so the Court determined) the life tenant of a dilapidated and deteriorating property; he was also the holder of a one-third share in the remainder interest, the other two-thirds being vested in Sophie Haykowski, Mr. Chupryk’s god-daughter and relative by marriage." It is hard to square this summary with your assertion that



for if all citizens are life tenants, for what reason was it necessary for Mr Chupryk's status as a life tenant to have been determined by the court? For what reason, further, was it necessary for this esteemed professor of law to state that fact?

once again dodged the point, that is SETTLED LAND ACT APPLIES AND IS PART OF THE COMMON LAW....

[...]

UNLESS THIS COMMENTARY ON CANLII IS WRONG!!!
the forgotten statute

Hardly dodged the point. You made this article central to your argument, and you continue to do so. I found it, read it, and it does not support your argument at all.

Prof Irvine admits up front that the Manitoba Court of Appeals has ruled against the point which he argues, citing (and this is a copy-and-paste job) Chupryk v Haykowski (1980), 110 DLR (3d) 108, 3 Man R (2d) 216, [1980] 4 WWR 534; leave to appeal further to MBCA denied, (1980) 110 DLR (3d) 108n [Freedman CJM]; leave to appeal to SCC granted (1980) 33 NR 622 (SCC). He also goes on to explain that, in effect, very little of this actually matters:

My modest aim in this first essay is principally to set straight a historical flaw in Manitoba’s historical record. In doing so, I am aware that I am addressing legal issues which are on the point of fading into history and near-oblivion, as newer methods are adopted for making provision for the successive enjoyment of family real estate. The old “strict settlement”, if not yet dead, is now a rare survival, and the settled estate and settled land legislation of the nineteenth century is of vestigial importance compared with the trust-based arrangements that have supplanted them, and which have attracted their own patina of statutory mechanisms. But the very obsolescence of old-fashioned strict settlements means that few if any opportunities will present themselves for the judiciary to correct misconceptions which it has created, and that is particularly so in Manitoba, where the passing of the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act in 1982 makes it impossible to imagine any future circumstance in which successive estates may exist otherwise than under the aegis of a trust. The short note which follows, then, is designed to show how the Manitoba Court of Appeal, in the case of Chupryk v Haykowski, misrepresented the Manitoba law of settled estates by ignoring or suppressing the existence of the English Settled Estates Act of 1856 as part of this province’s law; and how, in so doing, they obliquely sought to justify a unique, and I believe a misguided interpretation of another provincial statute – the partition-and-sale provisions of the Law of Property Act – to achieve the Court’s preferred outcome in the Chupryk case.

Irvine at 50 (my emphasis).

So what Professor Irvine is saying boils down to:

1. The Manitoba courts said in Chupryk that the Settled Estates Act of 1856 isn't a part of Manitoba law.
2. I think the court made a mistake, and here's why.
3. This would need to be corrected by the judiciary (the courts), but they aren't likely to do so now because settlements (life tenancies and the like) are practically obsolete.
4. It probably doesn't matter anyway because settlements are obsolete.

This is important. First, Professor Irvine is not saying what the law is. He is upfront in that: he is discussing what he thinks the law should be. He might be right, but his interpretation was not adopted in Chupryk, so it does not matter. Professor Irvine knows this, and admits it doesn't matter much, except for historical accuracy. There may someday be a reason for the courts to re-examine Chupryk and decide that Prof Irvine is correct, but they have not done so (or hadn't by 2011, anyway).

Second, Prof Irvine is saying it doesn't matter now anyway because the law has changed, so settlements in Manitoba (like life tenancies and remainder interests) have to be done through trusts now, and trusts have their own rules (their "patina of statutory mechanisms," as he puts it) to which none of this applies at all.

Professor Irvine, in other words—whom, I will remind you, you brought into the discussion—undercuts your argument in the very article you cite for support.

That's to the extent that life tenancies have anything at all to do with...well, anything else. To repeat a point that's been made elsewhere: nobody is debating with you that life tenancies were a thing at common law, and probably still are.

does the settled land act 1925 apply in the provinces of canada?

The Manitoba Court of Appeals says it doesn't (indeed, this is the whole premise of Prof Irvine's article), or at least not in Manitoba. On the other hand, the Amusements Act (CCSM c 870), the Energy Savings Act (CCSM c E115.5), and the Deer Lodge Curling Club Limited Incorporation Act (RSM 1990, c 45) all probably do apply in Manitoba, unless the curling club has since folded. But none of these appear to have any more relation to "confused capacities and agreements" than life tenancies or the Settled Land Act (1925).

Hence my previous question, which you have not answered and which is on point with some of the other questions you have been asked in this thread, all of which questions you've ignored in favor of proving a point nobody is really debating. To wit:

[If] all citizens are life tenants, for what reason was it necessary for Mr Chupryk's status as a life tenant to have been determined by the court? For what reason, further, was it necessary for this esteemed professor of law to state that fact?

Well?

great points, and leads us to the next issue, SUBJECT MATTER, has anyone looked at the requirements of the Settled Land Act, in other words, can anyone as life tenant be recognized as settlor to the Settled Land Act?

this bring us to the next issue of subject matter, what is the different subject matter of the estates established by law?

as you can see, there is 2 issues that need to be answered in order to determine what act apply and what acts can be revived due to the law of repeals and subject matter.

to simplify further since most even lawyers are not following the rules of law, and that is the subject matter to the estates within law of property within the English colonies, that from what is proven by case law applies to all that use it.

the settled land act bars the life tenant, so how can anyone in equity revive the settled land act if there is no settlor, as stated by law of property?


and btw better read the commentary again, specifically states all English colonies are bound to Settled Land act as COMMON LAW.. but will ignore that also.

Unsettled Estates: Manitoba’s Forgotten Statute and the Chupryk Case

is about the revolutionary statute that is forgotten, and the mistakes between settled estates that is created by govt, and the Settled land created by common law...... like the heading implies....

The SLA 1925 is applicable to this case as stated in Chupryk v. Haykowski, 1980 CanLII 3025 (MB CA):
"The Act of 1882 was amended in small particulars by further statutes passed in 1884, 1887, 1889, and 1890, but its policy has stood the test of time, and though it has now been repealed and replaced by the Settled Land Act 1925, its general principles still continue to govern the rights and liabilities of a tenant for life under a strict settlement".

[parzival]

subject matters are different....
common law statute law of property.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Ge ... /section/1

1 Legal estates and equitable interests.
(1)The only estates in land which are capable of subsisting or of being conveyed or created at law are—
(a)An estate in fee simple absolute in possession;
(b)A term of years absolute.

common law statute settled land act, that created law of property
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo ... /section/1

1 What constitutes a settlement.
(1)Any deed, will, agreement for a settlement or other agreement, Act of Parliament, or other instrument, or any number of instruments, whether made or passed before or after, or partly before and partly after, the commencement of this Act, under or by virtue of which instrument or instruments any land, after the commencement of this Act, stands for the time being—
(i)limited in trust for any persons by way of succession; or
(ii)limited in trust for any person in possession—
(a)for an entailed interest whether or not capable of being barred or defeated;
(b)for an estate in fee simple or for a term of years absolute subject to an executory limitation, gift, or disposition over on failure of his issue or in any other event;
(c)for a base or determinable fee [F1(other than a fee which is a fee simple absolute by virtue of section 7 of the Law of Property Act 1925)] or any corresponding interest in leasehold land;
(d)being an infant, for an estate in fee simple or for a term of years absolute; or
(iii)limited in trust for any person for an estate in fee simple or for a term of years absolute contingently on the happening of any event; or
(iv). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F2
(v)charged, whether voluntarily or in consideration of marriage or by way of family arrangement, and whether immediately or after an interval, with the payment of any rentcharge for the life of any person, or any less period, or of any capital, annual, or periodical sums for the portions, advancement, maintenance, or otherwise for the benefit of any persons, with or without any terms of years for securing or raising the same;creates or is for the purposes of this Act a settlement and is in this Act referred to as a settlement, or as the settlement, as the case requires:
Provided that, where land is the subject of a compound settlement, references in this Act to the settlement shall be construed as meaning such compound settlement, unless the context otherwise requires.

2 complete different estates, 2 complete different subject matters, 2 different capacities in law....
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo ... section/36

36 Undivided shares to take effect behind a [F1trust of land].
(1)If and when, after the commencement of this Act, settled land is held in trust for persons entitled in possession under a trust instrument in undivided shares, the trustees of the settlement (if the settled land is not already vested in them) may require the estate owner in whom the settled land is vested (but in the case of a personal representative subject to his rights and powers for purposes of administration), at the cost of the trust estate, to convey the land to them, or assent to the land vesting in them as joint tenants, and in the meantime the land shall be held on the same trusts as would have been applicable thereto if it had been so conveyed to or vested in the trustees.
(2)If and when the settled land so held in trust in undivided shares is or becomes vested in the trustees of the settlement, the land shall be held by them (subject to any incumbrances affecting the settled land which are secured by a legal mortgage, but freed from any incumbrances affecting the undivided shares or not secured as aforesaid, and from any interests, powers and charges subsisting under the trust instrument which have priority to the trust for the persons entitled to the undivided shares) [F2in trust for the persons interested in the land].
(3)If the estate owner refuses or neglects for one month after demand in writing to convey the settled land so held in trust in undivided shares in manner aforesaid, or if by reason of his being outside the United Kingdom or being unable to be found, or by reason of the dissolution of a corporation, or for any other reason, the court is satisfied that the conveyance cannot otherwise be made, or cannot be made without undue delay or expense, the court may, on the application of the trustees of the settlement, make an order vesting the settled land in them [F2in trust for the persons interested in the land].
(4)An undivided share in land shall not be capable of being created except under a trust instrument or under the M1Law of Property Act, 1925, and shall then only take effect behind a [F3trust of land].
(5)Nothing in this section affects the priority inter se of any incumbrances whether affecting the entirety of the land or an undivided share.
F4[(6)In subsections (2) and (3) of this section references to the persons interested in the land include persons interested as trustees or personal representatives (as well as persons beneficially interested).]
(7)The provisions of this section bind the Crown.

and now the interesting part

109 Saving for additional or larger powers under settlement.
(1)Nothing in this Act precludes a settlor from conferring on the tenant for life, or (save as provided by the last preceding section) on the trustees of the settlement, any powers additional to or larger than those conferred by this Act.
(2)Any additional or larger powers so conferred shall, as far as may be, notwithstanding anything in this Act, operate and be exercisable in the like manner, and with all the like incidents, effects, and consequences, as if they were conferred by this Act, and, if relating to the settled land, as if they were conferred by this Act on a tenant for life.

subject matter

if relating to the settled land, as if they were conferred by this Act on a tenant for life.

now for who can and can not revive the Settled Land Act

106 Prohibition or limitation against exercise of powers void, and provision against forfeiture.
(1)If in a settlement, will, assurance, or other instrument executed or made before or after, or partly before and partly after, the commencement of this Act a provision is inserted—
(a)purporting or attempting, by way of direction, declaration, or otherwise, to forbid a tenant for life or statutory owner to exercise any power under this Act, or his right to require the settled land to be vested in him; or
(b)attempting, or tending, or intended, by a limitation, gift, or disposition over of settled land, or by a limitation, gift, or disposition of other real or any personal property, or by the imposition of any condition, or by forfeiture, or in any other manner whatever, to prohibit or prevent him from exercising, or to induce him to abstain from exercising or to put him into a position inconsistent with his exercising, any power under this Act, or his right to require the settled land to be vested in him;that provision, as far as it purports, or attempts, or tends, or is intended to have, or would or might have, the operation aforesaid, shall be deemed to be void.
(2)For the purposes of this section an estate or interest limited to continue so long only as a person abstains from exercising any such power or right as aforesaid shall be and take effect as an estate or interest to continue for the period for which it would continue if that person were to abstain from exercising the power or right, discharged from liability to determination or cesser by or on his exercising the same.
(3)Notwithstanding anything in a settlement, the exercise by the tenant for life or statutory owner of any power under this Act shall not occasion a forfeiture.

subject matter.....

R. v. C. (W. J.), 2008 MBCA 11 (CanLII)
How does repealing a statute affect another statute that incorporates it by reference?
28 Generally speaking, when legislation is repealed, it ceases to be law. As described by Professor Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Markham: Butterworths Canada Ltd., 2002) (at p. 527):
Repeal is the key terminal event in the operation of legislation. When a repeal takes effect, the repealed legislation ceases to be law and ceases to be binding or to produce legal effects. … It also means that everything dependent on the repealed legislation for its existence or efficacy ceases to exist or to produce effects.)

29 This rule can be displaced by statute and, indeed, several survival clauses were built into the federal Interpretation Act. One of these clauses, s. 44(h) of the Interpretation Act, provides some assistance in addressing the issue at hand. It reads as follows:
Where an enactment, in this section called the “former enactment”, is repealed and another enactment, in this section called the “new enactment”, is substituted therefor,
(h) any reference in an unrepealed enactment to the former enactment shall, with respect to a subsequent transaction, matter or thing, be read and construed as a reference to the provisions of the new enactment relating to the same subject-matter as the former enactment, but where there are no provisions in the new enactment relating to the same subject-matter, the former enactment shall be read as unrepealed in so far as is necessary to maintain or give effect to the unrepealed enactment.[emphasis added]

so we have an issue of commentary proving settled land act applies, and that makes law of property 1925 apply, yet this issue can not be overcome for some reason

[Dnatural]

I am here to tell Quatloos'ers that b/c a law is repealed by a subsequent law that if this subsequent law does not speak to the matter in question then the law that was repealed is active.

Well, I'm not a lawyer but that's complete bollocks isn't it. It's not ancient law books you need. It's a good dictionary

Interpretation Act.
44. Where an enactment, in this section called the “former enactment”, is repealed and another enactment, in this section called the “new enactment”, is substituted therefor,
(h) any reference in an unrepealed enactment to the former enactment shall, with respect to a subsequent transaction, matter or thing, be read and construed as a reference to the provisions of the new enactment relating to the same subject-matter as the former enactment, but where there are no provisions in the new enactment relating to the same subject-matter, the former enactment shall be read as unrepealed in so far as is necessary to maintain or give effect to the unrepealed enactment. [emphasis added]

Bollocks you say.. again the law begs to differ.

Land (Settler Land Act 1925) - [PS. please keep in mind the operation of prescription when you read into any law... b/c it is forgotten does not make it void. One's capacity in law determines what law they have the right to speak from. Jurisprudence does not force law unto anyone and only reacts to the capacity presented.]

“Land” includes land of any tenure, and mines and minerals whether or not held apart from the surface, buildings or parts of buildings (whether the division is horizontal, vertical or made in any other way) and other corporeal hereditaments; also a manor, an advowson, and a rent and other incorporeal hereditaments, and an easement, right, privilege, or benefit in, over, or derived from land, and any estate or interest in land [F2,but does not (except in the phrase “trust of land”) include] an undivided share in land;

Land is various concepts based on the one's capacity yet they all exist simultaneously and law of repeals states 'but where there are no provisions in the new enactment relating to the same subject-matter, the former enactment shall be read as unrepealed in so far as is necessary to maintain or give effect to the unrepealed enactment.'

As stated here it has to relate to the same subject matter in order to have the right to repeal yet Law of Property - that which governs those who purchase using the legal name - is a different legal estate (fee simple) to that which is settled in the Settled Land Act - that which is settled for and on behalf of the settlor. As you can see it is about ones capacity that determines what law they speak from.

Law of Property can never repeal matters belonging to the settlor as it cannot see the settlor let alone the strict land trust.

[parzival]

I am here to tell Quatloos'ers that b/c a law is repealed by a subsequent law that if this subsequent law does not speak to the matter in question then the law that was repealed is active.

Well, I'm not a lawyer but that's complete bollocks isn't it. It's not ancient law books you need. It's a good dictionary

Interpretation Act.
44. Where an enactment, in this section called the “former enactment”, is repealed and another enactment, in this section called the “new enactment”, is substituted therefor,
(h) any reference in an unrepealed enactment to the former enactment shall, with respect to a subsequent transaction, matter or thing, be read and construed as a reference to the provisions of the new enactment relating to the same subject-matter as the former enactment, but where there are no provisions in the new enactment relating to the same subject-matter, the former enactment shall be read as unrepealed in so far as is necessary to maintain or give effect to the unrepealed enactment. [emphasis added]

Bollocks you say.. again the law begs to differ.

Land (Settler Land Act 1925) - [PS. please keep in mind the operation of prescription when you read into any law... b/c it is forgotten does not make it void. One's capacity in law determines what law they have the right to speak from. Jurisprudence does not force law unto anyone and only reacts to the capacity presented.]

“Land” includes land of any tenure, and mines and minerals whether or not held apart from the surface, buildings or parts of buildings (whether the division is horizontal, vertical or made in any other way) and other corporeal hereditaments; also a manor, an advowson, and a rent and other incorporeal hereditaments, and an easement, right, privilege, or benefit in, over, or derived from land, and any estate or interest in land [F2,but does not (except in the phrase “trust of land”) include] an undivided share in land;

Land is various concepts based on the one's capacity yet they all exist simultaneously and law of repeals states 'but where there are no provisions in the new enactment relating to the same subject-matter, the former enactment shall be read as unrepealed in so far as is necessary to maintain or give effect to the unrepealed enactment.'

As stated here it has to relate to the same subject matter in order to have the right to repeal yet Law of Property - that which governs those who purchase using the legal name - is a different legal estate (fee simple) to that which is settled in the Settled Land Act - that which is settled for and on behalf of the settlor. As you can see it is about ones capacity that determines what law they speak from.

Law of Property can never repeal matters belonging to the settlor as it cannot see the settlor let alone the strict land trust.

Re Alfrey Investments Ltd. and Shefsky Developments Ltd. et al., 1974 CanLII 709 (ON SC)
Extinguishment of Owner's Title.**** A person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner, and exercising possibly the ordinary rights of ownership****, has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of The Statute of Limitations applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title. The Statute of Limitations is a law of extinctive, not of acquisitive prescription. It operates to bar the owner out of possession, not to confer title on the trespasser or disseisor in possession.

Acquisitive Prescription. Its Existing World-Wide Uniformity https://archive.org/details/jstor-783887/page/n1

Prescription Other Than in Fee https://archive.org/details/jstor-1323435/page/n1

by taking a few minutes one can start to piece together the means and ends to english law in it current form as the modern system of tenure.
also explained by blackstone
BOOK 2, CHAPTER 6
Of the Modern English Tenures

THESE villeins, belonging principally to lords of manors, were either villeins regardant, that is, annexed to the manor or land; or else they were in gross, or at large, that is, annexed to the person of the lord, and transferable by deed from one owner to another.61 They could not leave their lord without his permission; but, if they ran away, or were purloined from him, might be claimed and recovered by action, like beasts or other chattels. They held indeed small portions of land by way of sustaining themselves and families; but it was at the mere will of the lord, who might dispossess them whenever he pleased: and it was upon villein services, that is, to carry out dung, to hedge and ditch the lord’s demesnes, and any other the meanest offices:62 and these services were not only base, but uncertain both as to their time and quantity.63 A villein, in short, was in much the same state with us, as lord Molesworth64 describes to be that of the boors in Denmark, and Stiernhook65 attributes also to the traals or slaves in Sweden; which confirms the probability of their being in some degree monuments of the Danish tyranny. A villein could acquire no property either in lands or goods; but, if he purchased either, the lord might enter upon them, oust the villein, and seize them to his own use, unless he contrived to dispose of them again before the lord had seized them; for the lord had then lost his opportunity.66

[NYGman]

They say there sky is green, we prove the sky is blue, they say now we agree the sky is green the grass is blue.

I thought we were speaking the same language but obviously words must have alternative meanings, because they just don't get it.

I own land, I own it fee simple. I hold title, it is mine to dispose if. I bought it from the previous owner who held title, who bought it from the prior holder, all the way back to the first legal owner who actually acquired it from the native Americans who were the existing caretakers of the land at that time. Now avoiding the issue of what compensation was paid to the native Americans and our as a countries treatment of treaties with them, I still own my land. There is no trust involved, no life estate, and no application on an old irrelevant land act from Canada of all places.

Even if the law was applicable, no part of it would apply to me.

As for our legal system being based on common law, this is correct and in contrast to civil law, as in Quebec, France, Louisiana, and other places. The difference is one relies on statutes (civil law) the other allows for interpretation of laws by judges, to become part of the law itself. Thus a ruling if at the appropriate level, may be binding on related lower courts. These systems are not the same, but this has reminded me that there is a state and a province where common law isn't relevant.

So as you seem to skew Canadian, how will this work for Quebec?

[AnOwlCalledSage]

They say there sky is green, we prove the sky is blue, they say now we agree the sky is green the grass is blue.

And there we have it in a nutshell. If they deliberately misunderstand what repealed means and then brainfart dump "quotes" that refer to unrepealed laws to claim they are correct then talking to our pigeons using english is an exercise in futility.

The only question remaining is whether their posts are deliberate acts of self-entertainment or as a result of non-self-aware stupidity.

[Pottapaug1938]

An important thing to remember, about common law, is that it can change. It can change because one of its principles was overruled by a subsequent appellate court decision, or it can change because a statute, duly enacted, bars or limits its subsequent application.

[noblepa]

...
I am here to tell Quatloos'ers that b/c a law is repealed by a subsequent law that if this subsequent law does not speak to the matter in question then the law that was repealed is active.
...

A good counter example to this absurd claim is the 18th and 21st amendments to the US Constitution.

The 18th created prohibition, outlawing essentially all alcoholic beverages.

The 21st amendment stated simply "The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed." It said nothing more on the subject of alcohol sales, at least at the federal level.

The 21st also contained a clause that gave the states the right to regulate alcohol sales, but, other than that, did not "speak to the matter in question ".

Are you saying that alcohol sales are still prohibited in the US?

To say that " the law that was repealed is active" is an oxymoron, and a stupid one at that.