naomi arbabi, a Canadian lentzian Lawyer

[JamesVincent]

Otherwise, it's a wait and see situation!

Thanks Donald. Looks like you guys have the only legit operating whackjob around for now.

[DNetolitzky]

Oh how I wish.

Sadly, Glenn Bogue, a.k.a. "Spirit Warrior", is still operating apparently beyond the reach of the Law Society of Ontario. I'd probably be gilding the lily if I went further than what I wrote in this article (https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... -_Part_III):

The Law Society of Ontario’s ongoing, inexplicable, and disturbing failure to control Bogue, and to respond to the damage caused by Bogue’s pseudolaw guru activities, while exploiting his lawyer status, is an embarrassment to the profession of law in Canada.

And it's now almost a year later, and Bogue continues to appear in court, for example World Energy GH2 Inc. v. Ryan, 2023 NLSC 109 (https://canlii.ca/t/jzfjl).

And there's another Ontario lawyer who has recently been suspended who was criticized in a reported court decision for advancing OPCA strategies for a client. The suspension, however, is apparently over trust fund questions.

Naturally, all this tempts me to write stuff.

[wserra]

Naturally, all this tempts me to write stuff.

Donald - getting up in the morning tempts you to write stuff. Good stuff, sure, but stuff.

[Burnaby49]

It's the endless Alberta winters.

[eric]

It's the endless Alberta winters.

What is this winter of which you speak? It's made it up above freezing almost every day, golfing in Calgary in December, and no snow on the ground. Of course it doesn't help that in the last three months our total cumulative precipitation has been exactly 31 mm.

[Burnaby49]

I found that out from my wife after I'd made the post. She has two brothers in Edmonton and she phoned one today and was told there was no snow at all, just balmy Vancouver temperatures. However, unfortunately for the farmers, none of the rain we've been getting in abundance.

[LordEd]

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british- ... -1.7072762

Looks like the law society has suspended her license pending investigation.

A Vancouver lawyer accused of filing a groundless pseudolegal lawsuit against her neighbour over a glass deck divider has been banned from practising law in British Columbia while the province's law society investigates a complaint.

Naomi Arbabi was temporarily suspended on Dec. 28 after an interim action board of the Law Society of B.C. "determined that extraordinary action was necessary to protect the public," according to an email sent to CBC News on Tuesday.

"The suspension will last until the order is rescinded or varied," the email read.

I'm sure an appeal or lawsuit is being filed as we speak in the naomi arbabi court by i.

[Mrtickles22]

One thing the papers haven't been reporting on, for some reason, is that Arbabi's associate (whose linkedin now says he worked for six years at "law corp") is also a Coquitlam city counsellor.

And he was a 2017 call, not some neophyte. But its likely he had no idea what Arbabi was doing and might have been on a fee split or commission - ie, he's running under her firm and eats what he kills but isn't in a strict partnership with her.

[Burnaby49]

I didn't bother checking him out however your analysis seems reasonable. If so he's certainly bailed by now because being connected to Envision would no longer benefit him in any way and would, instead, be a major handicap to his practice.

[Frater I*I]

It's the endless Alberta winters.

What is this winter of which you speak? It's made it up above freezing almost every day, golfing in Calgary in December, and no snow on the ground. Of course it doesn't help that in the last three months our total cumulative precipitation has been exactly 31 mm.

It rains M&M's up in Canada...?

[eric]

Not M + M's, in Canada it's Smarties.
Next stupid remark - Obviously you must work for a major North American vehicle manufacturer. Periodically, a spec writer for them decides that the abbreviation for millimeters should be mils, rather than mm. This causes great consternation amongst their part suppliers. Rather than making for example a plastic pin of ten millimeters in diameter that they are used to, they receive a spec telling them what they think is a pin ten thousandths of an inch in diameter - a difference of roughly fifty to one.

[Frater I*I]

Not M + M's, in Canada it's Smarties.
Next stupid remark - Obviously you must work for a major North American vehicle manufacturer. Periodically, a spec writer for them decides that the abbreviation for millimeters should be mils, rather than mm. This causes great consternation amongst their part suppliers. Rather than making for example a plastic pin of ten millimeters in diameter that they are used to, they receive a spec telling them what they think is a pin ten thousandths of an inch in diameter - a difference of roughly fifty to one.

Well played sir...well played..

Nope, I'm an aviation mechanic, with experience working on Airbus products...

[Burnaby49]

The decision is out although not yet posted on the the Supreme court of British Columbia's website.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british- ... -1.7089006

While, as I've commented frequently, Arbabi was certain to lose I questioned whether or not McLelland would get special costs. She did.

With the court calling Arbabi's arguments frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court, I'm guessing that she's also going to lose her license to practice law.

[Burnaby49]

I wrote in my last posting;

While, as I've commented frequently, Arbabi was certain to lose I questioned whether or not McLelland would get special costs. She did.

Not quite correct. I went back and read my previous posts and what I was uncertain about was whether or not was one of Cathleen McClelland's request to the court;

4. A court referral of complaint to the Law Society of BC

There is nothing in the news article on this point so I'm assuming it wasn't granted. The judgment should be posted on the court's website next week and I'll review it here and link to it when it's up.

[JamesVincent]

So no real surprises overall.

[Burnaby49]

You can read it for yourself. While I don't have a link to the decision I have, thanks to Colleen McLelland, a pdf of it. So I'll cut and paste it. The formatting is screwed up but you'll get a pristine copy at such time as it's posted on the court website.

Introduction

[1] The defendant applies for an order striking the plaintiff’s notice of civil claim
pursuant to Rule 9-5 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules [Rules].

[2] Although both the plaintiff and defendant are self-represented in this action, it
is important to note that the plaintiff is a practicing member of the Law Society of
British Columbia.

Background

[3] The background facts are not clearly set out in the pleadings or application
materials. What follows are the facts that I have pieced together from those
documents and from the parties’ oral submissions. The facts do not appear to be
particularly controversial.

[4] The plaintiff and defendant are owners of non-adjacent units in a
condominium building located on West 8th Avenue in Vancouver, BC. The defendant
has resided in the building for approximately 35 years, and is the owner of unit #302.
The plaintiff purchased unit #304 in June 2021. Units #302 and #304 are separated
by unit #303. Each of the strata lots in question have access to a rooftop deck. It is
undisputed that the rooftop decks are limited common property as defined in the
Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43 [SPA].

[5] When the plaintiff viewed unit #304 prior to purchasing it, there was a clear
glass divider between the rooftop decks of units #302 and #303. The plaintiff claims
that the clear glass divider afforded her views of the ocean, mountains, bridges and
Stanley Park, and that those views influenced her decision to purchase unit #304.

[6] The defendant’s evidence is that, years ago, the original rooftop privacy
divider between units #302 and #303 was removed and disposed of by the owner of
unit #303, without any authorization from the building’s strata council.

[7] Strata council minutes (the “Minutes”) from September 25 and December 19,
2019, were in evidence. No other Minutes were provided, nor were the strata
corporation bylaws or rules.

[8] The September 25, 2019 Minutes indicate the following under the heading
“Third Floor Decks”:

The council is developing standards for deck repairs and maintenance as well
as a policy for the repair and maintenance of deck dividers. Council will talk to
each affected individually and work out the most reasonable solution. The
staining, repair and maintenance of the decks are owner responsibility.

[9] Minutes from December 19, 2019 indicate the following under the heading
“Deck Dividers”:

Strokes Renovation will be providing pricing on deck dividers. Once the plans
have been finalized, a meeting will be set up with the third floor owners and
the plans will be implemented.

[10] It is clear from the Minutes that replacement of the deck dividers was on the
strata council’s agenda long before the plaintiff purchased her unit.

[11] On or about September 5, 2023, a contractor hired by the strata council re-
installed a privacy divider on the limited common property adjoining the defendant’s
strata unit, which has partially obstructed the view previously enjoyed by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff claims that the defendant somehow influenced or caused the strata
council to install an opaque divider to replace the transparent divider.

[12] Neither of the parties to this action is a member of the strata council.

Notice of Civil Claim

[13] In her notice of civil claim filed October 5, 2023, the plaintiff claims that the
defendant “… caused to be installed a 66 ½ inch tall privacy wall at the border of her
part of the rooftop deck … thereby blocking the view of the ocean, mountains,
Stanley Park, bridges and more …”. She seeks compensation from the defendant for
trespass, which she quantifies at $1,000 per day for each day until the alleged
trespass is remedied. The “trespass” alleged is the blocking of the plaintiff’s views.

[14] The plaintiff’s notice of civil claim sets out the following under Part 3: Legal
Basis:

1. this is a claim of trespass by way of loss as pressed by a woman: naomi
arbabi, against a woman: colleen mclelland;

2. this is a claim based on law of the land, and not a complaint based on legal
codes acts or statutes;

3. a claim of trespass by way of loss did arise when after many attempts to
keep this matter private and resolve the dispute peacefully in a manner that
preserves the rights of both sides to the use and enjoyment and
administration of their own property, the woman: colleen mclelland did not
provide a remedy or a lawful excuse;

4. i, state i, did acquire my property at a time when a much lower, clear glass
divider that was installed previous to this 66 ½ inch wall allowed the addition
of the aesthetic appeals of the said view to the property of i, and i, did rely on
views in making the decision to purchase the property of i, and in negotiating
a purchase price for the property of i;

5. i, state i, did conduct due diligence searches to inquire about the conditions
of the property of i, and the neighbouring properties and did not find any
evidence of the woman: colleen mclelland having the right to block the view
of other properties behind her property;

6. therefore, the woman: colleen mclelland, is estopped from asserting a right
to install such a wall on her property that will block the view from the property
of i;

7. i, say herein and verify in open court all to be true.

[15] To the end of the notice of civil claim are appended two documents, titled
“Notice of requirement of court” and “Rules of Court”, which are attached to these
reasons as Appendix A and B respectively.

Defendant’s application

[16] The defendant applies to strike the notice of civil claim pursuant to Rule 9-
5(1), which reads as follows:

Scandalous, frivolous or vexatious matters

(1) At any stage of a proceeding, the court may order to be struck out or
amended the whole or any part of a pleading, petition or other document on
the ground that

(a) it discloses no reasonable claim or defence, as the case may be,

(b) it is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious,

(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial or hearing of the
proceeding, or

(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court,
and the court may pronounce judgment or order the proceeding to be
stayed or dismissed and may order the costs of the application to be
paid as special costs.

[17] In Save-A-Lot Holdings Corp. v. Christensen, 2022 BCSC 261, the court
summarized the authorities regarding applications to strike:

[40] In Rose v. British Columbia Life & Casualty Company, 2012 BCSC 1296
at para. 3, Mr. Justice Voith (as he then was) summarized as follows
regarding the predecessor to what is now rule 9-5(1)(a):
3 The recent and leading case of R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada, 2011 SCC
42, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 45, confirmed the following propositions in relation to the
former Rule 19(24)(a):

(i) A claim will only be struck if it is plain and obvious, assuming the
facts pleaded to be true, that the pleading discloses no reasonable
cause of action (at para. 17);

(ii) The power to strike claims that have no reasonable prospect of
success promotes efficiency in the conduct of the litigation and
contributes to more effective and fair litigation (at para. 19); and

(iii) The motion to strike is a tool that must be used with care, as the
law is not static and actions previously were deemed hopeless may in
the future succeed. Therefore, it is not determinative that the law has
not yet recognized the particular claim. In its analysis the court must
be generous and err on the side of permitting a novel but arguable
claim to proceed to trial (at para. 21).

[41] In Dempsey et al. v. Envision Credit Union et al, 2006 BCSC 750 at para.
17, the following summary of general propositions extracted from authorities
was set out regarding circumstances under which pleadings will be struck
[citations omitted]:

(a) the pleadings are unintelligible, confusing and difficult to
understand;

(b) the pleadings do not establish a cause of action and do not
advance a claim known in law;

(c) the pleadings are without substance in that they are groundless,
fanciful and trifle with the Court’s time;

(d) the pleadings are not bona fides, are oppressive and are designed
to cause the Defendants anxiety, trouble and expense; and

(e) the action is brought for an improper purpose, particularly the
harassment and oppression of the Defendants.

[18] The defendant submits that the claim should be struck for the following
reasons:

a) The plaintiff has no standing to bring a claim against the defendant
regarding her alleged interference with limited common property, as any
such claim can only be brought by the strata corporation;

b) The claim should have been brought in the Civil Resolution Tribunal; and

c) The claim is in the nature of an organized pseudo-legal commercial
argument (“OPCA”), which claims have been found to be frivolous and
vexatious by a number of courts.

Discussion

Standing

[19] The defendant relies on Ang v. Spectra Management Services Ltd., 2002
BCSC 1544, Extra Gift Exchange Inc. v. Collins, 2004 BCCA 588, and Cheikes v.
BM Clubhouse 40 Ltd., 2023 BCSC 14 as authority for the proposition that the strata
corporation is the proper party to enforce the interests of individual strata unit
owners with respect to the use of common property. Section 171 of the SPA
empowers the strata corporation to sue as a representative of all owners. In each of
the foregoing cases, the court held that where the wrong alleged is to the strata
corporation, the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, [1843] J.C.J. No. 1 applies such that only
the strata corporation, and not an individual owner, is the proper party to seek relief.

[20] However, the foregoing cases can be distinguished from the case at bar in
that Ms. Arbabi is not alleging a wrong to the strata corporation, but to her own
interest in limited common property.

[21] The Court of Appeal in Hamilton v. Ball, 2006 BCCA 243 considered the
rights of individual strata owners to sue for damages to their interest in common
property. In that case, the plaintiffs, being individual strata unit owners, alleged that
the defendants had maintenance and repair work done on common property without
their approval. The work was allegedly defective and done by unskilled persons,
rendering some warranties void and ultimately leading to damages requiring the
entire building envelope to be renovated, at considerable cost. The lower court
granted the defendants’ application to strike the claim on the basis that the plaintiffs
did not have standing.

[22] In allowing the appeal, the court said:

[26] Clearly, the Court was proceeding on the basis that the wrong being
alleged was one to the strata corporation, rather than to individual owners or
all the owners as a group. This is enough to distinguish Extra Gift from the
case at bar. I take the view, however, that Foss v. Harbottle does not apply
to strata corporations in respect of an action for injury to common
property. As has been seen, in this province the common property is not
owned by the strata corporation, but by the strata owners in proportion to
their respective unit entitlements. The concept of injury to the corporation is
not engaged by the circumstances of this case. (See also Pender v.
Lushington [1877] 6 Ch. D. 70 at 80 and Hercules Managements Ltd. v.
Ernst & Young [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165, at paras. 62-3.) The other side of this
coin is that the strata corporation’s ability to sue under s. 171 is purely a
creation of statute. Thus as Garson J. noted in Strata Plan LMS 1468 v.
Reunion Properties Inc. (2002) 3 B.C.L.R. (4th) 79, 2002 BCSC 929, the
only way in which the strata corporation could sue for damage to common
property of the owners is by means of s. 171 of the Act. As she observed:
The common property of a strata corporation is owned by all
owners as tenants in common (s. 12(1) of the Condominium
Act).

The claim for damage to the common property in this case is not
one for which the strata corporation could assert a claim other than
as a representative plaintiff. The strata corporation does not have its
own cause of action for defects in or damage to strata lots or to
common property, because neither the common property nor the
units are owned by the strata corporation.
[At paras. 23-4; emphasis added.]

[27] As for the notion that individual owners should not be permitted to
"circumvent" s. 171 and sue directly for injury or damage to their interests in
common property, I see nothing in the Act taking away that right, which I view
not as statutorily created, but as a common law incident of the ownership of
property, albeit a type of property unknown to the common law. Section 171
creates a mechanism by which a three-fourths majority of owners may use
the strata corporation as their vehicle for suing and spread the expenses
thereof. But in the words of Seaton J.A. in Strata Plan No. VR 368 v.
Marathon Realty Co. (1982) 41 B.C.L.R. 155 at para. 14, "that is as far as
the legislation goes." It would take much clearer language, in my respectful
view, to remove the right of individual owners to enforce their rights "on their
own hook". Section 171 is not thereby “circumvented”, but is simply
inapplicable. Nor do I foresee that frivolous actions and multiple claims are
likely to result, since the court retains the ability to make orders as to costs,
and the owners who do take legal action must bear the expenses of the
litigation themselves, like any other co-owners of property. (In the case at
bar, since the plaintiffs have alleged fraud on the defendants’ part, they run
the risk of special costs.) As well, it is open to the court to respond to any
multiplicity of actions by authorizing a representative action under R. 5(12), or
by following the course ordered in Beck, supra, at paras. 30-36. Short of
this, all parties that should be before the court can be joined under R. 5(3) as
defendants if they do not consent to be plaintiffs.

[28] Finally, I note as a matter of statutory construction the juxtaposition
of, and similarity between, ss. 171 and 172 of the Act. Both employ the same
introductory wording and permit the strata corporation to sue – s. 171 on
behalf of all owners, and s. 172 on behalf of some owners. Both require a 3/4
majority vote before the suit is commenced. As Mr. Holmes contended, it
could hardly be argued that s. 172 takes away the right of individual owners
to sue "about matters affecting only their strata lots". If this is correct, it is
difficult to see why s. 171, which uses parallel wording, should be taken to
mean that the rights of owners in respect of their interests in the common
property are abrogated and vested solely in the strata corporation.

[23] Accordingly, the plaintiff has standing to commence an action with respect to
injury or damage to her interest in common property.

Civil Resolution Tribunal

[24] Although not addressed in oral submissions, the notice of application refers to
the Civil Resolution Tribunal (“CRT”) having jurisdiction over strata property claims.

[25] Section 121 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act, SBC 2012, c 25 [CRTA],
defines the CRT’s jurisdiction in relation to certain strata property claims:

121 (1) Except as otherwise provided in section 113 [restricted authority of
tribunal] or in this Division, the tribunal has jurisdiction over a claim, in respect
of the Strata Property Act, concerning one or more of the following:
(a) the interpretation or application of the Strata Property Act or a
regulation, bylaw or rule under that Act;
(b) the common property or common assets of a strata corporation;
(c) the use or enjoyment of a strata lot;
(d) money owing, including money owing as a fine, under the Strata
Property Act or a regulation, bylaw or rule under that Act;
(e) an action or threatened action by a strata corporation, including
the council, in relation to an owner or tenant;

(f) a decision of a strata corporation, including the council, in relation
to an owner or tenant;
(g) the exercise of voting rights by a person who holds 50% or more of
the votes, including proxies, at an annual or special general meeting.
(2) For the purposes of this Act, the tribunal is to be considered to have
specialized expertise in respect of claims within the jurisdiction of the tribunal
under this Division.

[26] Under s. 16.4 of the CRTA, a party presumptively must not bring or continue
a claim in this court over a subject matter that is within the jurisdiction of the CRT
(Downing v. Strata Plan VR2356, 2019 BCSC 1745 at para. 30).

[27] Although the notice of civil claim asserts that “this is a claim based on law of
the land, and not a complaint based on legal codes acts or statutes”, the dispute falls
under several of the s. 121 categories over which the CRTA confers jurisdiction on
the CRT, including:

(a) the interpretation or application of the Strata Property Act or a regulation,
bylaw or rule under that Act;
(b) the common property or common assets of a strata corporation;
(c) the use or enjoyment of a strata lot;
…
(e) an action or threatened action by a strata corporation, including the
council, in relation to an owner or tenant;
(f) a decision of the strata corporation, including the council, in relation to an
owner or tenant…

[28] Despite the plaintiff framing her claim as one in trespass based on the natural
law of the land, the factual basis of the claim is the erection of a divider wall on
limited common property, which has allegedly affected the plaintiff’s use or
enjoyment of her strata lot. The mere assertion by the plaintiff that she is not
bringing her claim pursuant to statute does not mean that the SPA is inapplicable,
nor does it oust the authority of the CRT.

OPCA

[29] The plaintiff began her oral submissions with the following statement:

First, I must address that I make reference to “i” as a lower case “i” because I
am here present in the highest and most humble form. I’m not a free man on
the land, not hung up on a juxtaposition as a sovereign citizen, I don’t follow a
guru or a teacher, I’m not a member of a church, never heard of the Moorish
law, I am not a freedom fighter, and I’m not part of any group or movement,
commercial or otherwise. I am not so naïve to think that we do not need a
legal system, but I do think that our legal system has a lot of flaws, but who
doesn’t. I am not here to discuss those flaws.

[30] Despite this disclaimer, the plaintiff’s actions bear many of the hallmarks of
claims made by OPCA litigants. Such litigants employ a collection of techniques and
arguments to disrupt court operations and to attempt to frustrate the legal rights of
governments, corporations and individuals: Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 at
para. 1. The indicia of such actions were canvassed extensively by Rooke A.C.J. in
Meads.

[31] Some of those indicia displayed in the plaintiff’s notice of civil claim are as
follows:

a) The plaintiff has adopted a type of ‘double/split person’ strategy, wherein
she identifies the parties as “the woman: naomi arbabi” and “the woman:
colleen mclelland”. She has used these terms in the style of cause and
throughout the notice of civil claim. The plaintiff’s correspondence with a
process server hired by the defendant explains her rationale for this split
persona as follows:

i: a woman; naomi arbabi; am a living breathing woman, and not a
name; when you ask if i am Naomi Arbabi the answer is always no as
Naomi Arbabi is an incorporated name and does not refer to a living
breathing woman.

In a follow-up email, the plaintiff goes on to say:

… Naomi Arbabi is an incorporated name that refers to a dead entity.
The same is true for all names, including yours. Therefore when you
ask someone to identify as a name they identify as the dead entity
corporation which was created by their birth certificate. I, a woman,
am not Naomi Arbabi, but Naomi Arbabi is the name I am called.
There is a subtle but crucial difference between the two. Unfortunately
this is not common knowledge, yet.

b) The plaintiff addresses court officials in an atypical manner. The “Notice of
requirement of court” attached to the notice of civil claim is addressed
“Greetings to the man or the woman, who at times acts as the clerk of the
court”. Her “Rules of Court” refer to “the man who at times acts as judge or
magistrate”.

c) The plaintiff purports to demand a court process with her own rules,
whereby she can “move this claim through the naomi arbabi court”. The
“naomi arbabi court … will not accept any legal arguments, codes, acts
and or statutes as this is a court in law based on the law of the land and
therefore a presumption of contract does not apply to i”.

d) The rules of the naomi arbabi court, appended to the notice of civil claim,
include a requirement that the judge give a specific oath prepared by the
plaintiff.

e) Although she has commenced a claim in this court, the plaintiff also
seems to deny that this court has jurisdiction over her, as the claim says
that her use of mandated court forms “should not be construed by any
man or woman as the submission of i, to any legal titles, legal codes, acts
or statutes”.

Result

[32] I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s claim falls within several of the grounds set
out in R. 9-5(1). In particular:

a) The plaintiff’s claim does not set out a reasonable legal basis for the claim
brought in this court;

b) It is frivolous and vexatious insofar as it denies the authority of the Court.
Such a denial is intrinsically frivolous and vexatious: Meads, at para. 556;
and

c) It is an abuse of process insofar as the plaintiff has filed her initiating
document as an attempt not to litigate legitimately in this Court, but
instead to utilize this Court's infrastructure for the purposes of her fictional
court: Parhar v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2021 BCSC 700 at
para. 33(d).

[33] Accordingly, the application to strike the notice of civil claim as an abuse of
process is granted, and the action is dismissed.

Costs

[34] Rule 14-1(9) provides that costs follow the event. The defendant seeks
increased or special costs as permitted by Rule 9-5(1).

[35] Given that the plaintiff is a member of the Law Society of BC, she has an
enhanced obligation to uphold the rule of law. The introduction to the Law Society’s
Code of Professional Conduct for British Columbia provides that “a special ethical
responsibility comes with membership in the legal profession”. Indeed, the oath
taken by all lawyers called to the bar in BC includes a term that the lawyer “will not
promote suits upon frivolous pretences”.

[36] I find that an award of special costs is appropriate. The defendant shall
receive special costs of this proceeding payable by the plaintiff.

“Associate Judge Hughes”

[JamesVincent]

2. this is a claim based on law of the land, and not a complaint based on legal
codes acts or statutes...

Should have just said "I'm a whackjob with an axe to grind". Would have saved everyone a lot of time and money.

[Burnaby49]

The judgment is finally posted on the Supreme Court of British Columbia's website;

https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/sc/24/0 ... SC0091.htm

[Burnaby49]

Donald has written a detailed analysis of the decision;

https://twitter.com/DNetolitzky/status/ ... 6350041543

[JamesVincent]

Donald has written a detailed analysis of the decision;

https://twitter.com/DNetolitzky/status/ ... 6350041543

Donald you always write great articles. Just the right mixture of humor, mocking and legality. Always a joy to read.