SteveSy wrote:
The Pollock court made a distinction of why Springer was taxed. The question before the court was is Springer's, and they only considered Springer, income taxable by the income tax. Springer operated a very profitable business, it wasn't just a regular paycheck as some of you like lead people to believe. More importantly, he was a federally licensed lawyer, the court had already made it clear in earlier decisions the measure can be anything as long as the act or activity is taxable. The act of obtaining and operating under a federal license was federally taxable. His income today would be in the millions btw.
Steve, I think you are saying that Springer was a "federally licensed lawyer" and that his "federal license" was somehow material to the Court's decision in Springer or in Pollock. That would be false. As you should well know, Springer's occupation as a lawyer and his attorney's license were not only not factors in the Court's Springer decision, they were not even mentioned by the Court in the decision.
As I and others have written in another forum, Springer challenged the constitutionality of the 1864 Revenue Act. Springer's employment and the source of his income were not mentioned by the Court in its opinion in the ''Springer'' case, but were mentioned by the Court in the 1895 case of ''Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.'', 157 U.S. 429, ''aff'd on reh'g'', 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Springer's income was from two sources: income in his profession as an attorney, and interest income on United States bonds. ''Pollock'', 157 U.S. 429, at 579-580.
Springer's challenge was based on the contention that the tax imposed by the statute was a
direct tax not apportioned among the states according to the population of each state.
Springer had filed a tax return for the tax year 1865 showing $50,798 in income and $4,799 in income tax, but refused to pay the tax. After Springer's failure to pay the tax, the Federal tax collector advertised for sale, and sold, two pieces of real estate owned by Springer in Springfield, Illinois (one of which was Springer's residence), apparently without physically seizing the properties or ejecting Springer from the properties.
The properties were deeded by the tax collector to the United States government. One of the deeds recited the statutory authority for the sale, but the description on the deed included some errors on the dates of the statutes.
In 1874, the government filed a lawsuit of ejectment against Springer.
Springer fought the government's attempt to remove him from the property by objecting to the sale on various grounds. His primary argument was that the 1864 income tax was a
direct tax that had not been apportioned among the states according to population, and that the tax therefore violated Article I of the Constitution.
Springer made various other arguments, one of which was that although there was an Act of Congress bearing a certain date, there was no such Act that had been amended on the amendment date cited in one of the deeds. Springer indicated that the statute in question may have been the 1864 revenue act, and argued that if this was correct, the 1864 Act did not authorize the sale of the real estate by the Federal tax collector. 'Springer'', 102 U.S. at 591.
The Supreme Court agreed with Springer that the recital of the Act of Congress in the deed was incorrect. The Court stated that the statute in question was actually the Revenue Act of 1864. ''Springer'', 102 U.S. at 593. Unfortunately, however, the Court
rejected Springer's argument that the 1864 Act did not authorize the sale by the tax collector. ''Springer'', 102 U.S. at 593.
The Court then upheld the tax imposed under the 1864 Act,
rejecting Springer's argument that the income tax was a "direct tax" within the meaning of Article I.
The Court concluded that "whenever the government has imposed a tax which it recognized as a direct tax, it has never been applied to any objects but
real estate and slaves", ''Springer'', 102 U.S. at 599, and ultimately held "that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty". ''Springer'', 102 U.S. at 602.
The holding in ''Springer'' was of course modified in part by the Court in the 1895 case of ''Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.'', 157 U.S. 429, ''aff'd on reh'g'', 158 U.S. 601 (1895), where the Court ruled that a tax on
income from property in the form of interest, dividends or rent should be treated as a tax on the property itself, and therefore as a direct tax required to be apportioned. The Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution later overruled the ''Pollock'' decision and made clear that there was no requirement for apportionment of income taxes. Later still, in ''Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.", 271 U.S. 170 (1926), the Supreme Court reviewed ''Pollock'', the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 and the Sixteenth Amendment, and concluded that Congress had always had the unfettered power to tax income. No Federal court has ever ruled that under Article I or the Amendment, Congress cannot tax income from personal services, income from employments. No Federal court has ever ruled that wages are not income or that wages are not taxable. There are of course statutory exclusions of certain kinds of compensation for services (certain combat pay, certain fringe benefits, and so on), but those are STATUTORY provisions OUTSIDE section 61. They are not constitutional restrictions on the definition of income.
The phony story that Mr. Springer's license as an attorney was somehow material to the Court's decision is an old tax protester lie -- as is the story that the statute in the Springer case taxed only income from Federal employments.
The following is adapted from my commentary from another forum:
Although it's not mentioned in the Supreme Court's opinion in the Springer case, the taxpayer was a practicing attorney. Technically, an attorney is an officer of the court. An attorney in private practice like Springer is not, however, a ''government employee'' (not an employee of the judiciary). I don't recall for sure, but some tax protesters may have falsely claimed that Springer was a government employee and that the Court's holding in the case was limited to income of government employees. That would be false.
Many people who read the phrase "officer of the judiciary" [which was the characterization made by a tax protester] might make three erroneous conclusions: (1) That the Court mentioned that fact in its Springer opinion (the Court did not mention it); (2) That the Court limited its holding in Springer to "officers of the judiciary" (the holding was not limited), and (3) that an "officer of the judiciary" is always a government employee.
Judges, bailiffs, court reporters, and court clerks are government employees. Attorneys engaged in the professional private practice of law are not government employees.
Mr. Springer had correctly pointed out that there was no such Act of "July 1, 1862" on the books. The Court agreed with Springer, but rejected Springer's argument that under the 1864 Act the tax collector's sale was not valid. The Court also rejected Springer's argument that the income tax on Springer's income was a "direct tax".
The 1864 Act imposed the tax on "the gains, profits, and income of every person residing in the United States, or of any citizen of the United States residing abroad, whether derived from any kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, or salaries, or from any profession, trade, employment, or vocation, carried on in the United States or elsewhere, or from any other source whatever [ . . . ]" Revenue Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 223, sec. 116 (June 30, 1864). Contrary to what some tax protesters may argue, Springer never contended that the Constitution prohibited the 1864 Act from taxing the income from a "profession, trade, employment, or vocation," or that the 1864 income tax was limited in its application to "government employees" rather than "every person residing in the United States" and "every citizen of the United States residing abroad."
[end of adapted commentary]
Steve, I think you have been reading tax protester literature. Bad, bad, for your mental health, Steve.
By the way, if Mr. Springer was a "federally licensed" lawyer, he was so only if (and to the extent that) he may have been admitted to the bar of a Federal court (which of course many lawyers are). Attorneys are licensed under state law, and are admitted to the bars of the Federal courts based mainly on their state bar admissions. You can call Federal bar admission a "federal licensure" if you like, but it does not change the point that Springer's status as an attorney, as an officer of the court, did not make him a court employee or any other kind of government employee, and was not relevant to the taxability of his income from the practice of law.
"My greatest fear is that the audience will beat me to the punch line." -- David Mamet
