SteveSy wrote:
More importantly, he [Springer] was a federally licensed lawyer, the court had already made it clear in earlier decisions the measure can be anything as long as the act or activity is taxable [. . . ]
viewtopic.php?t=2006&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=75
Oh, come on Steve, are you saying that you did not get the “federally licensed lawyer” nonsense from reading tax protester material? Are you saying that you got that phrase from case law somewhere? You have AN ACCOUNT that you use to do your own online “legal research" ??????? Is that what you’re saying?? Really? Come on, Steve. Westlaw? Lexis? CCH? Thomson RIA? Do you have any idea how much one of these accounts costs? Who is your “account” with? And where did you come up with the “federally licensed lawyer” garbage? You got the “federally licensed lawyer” garbage from a court case? No, you did not.
Come on Stevie, this is Quatloos! Wake up! You need a caffeine fix or something? You really think you’re fooling somebody?
Look, all I had to do was google “federally licensed lawyer” together with “Springer” and “tax”, and look at the tax protester garbage I found:
It was common knowledge that a general tax on citizen's revenue was considered a direct tax. The current income tax is an indirect excise tax. It taxes those things that naturally fall under the head of excises. Why is it not one of you can provide even a single quote from history to show that the earnings from a wage was considered taxable by excise for which the earner must pay? [ . . . ] Obviously because the Pollock court made it clear the case prior [sic] that excise taxes are on those things. Also don't go quoting Springer because he was a federally licensed lawyer.
--This is typical tax protester drivel, apparently from the year 2004, from:
http://misc.mailarchive.ca/taxes/2004-12/3480.html
(By the way, the author is listed as being “Lie Detector” at the Email address of steve_at_isisdev.com. Was that your nonsense, Steve?)
Steve, a search of the CCH database of the texts of Federal court cases on the subject of taxation since the year 1913 reveals
not a single court case with the phrase “federally licensed lawyer” (or a similar term) in the text of the opinion, much less any referenced to Mr. Springer as being a “federally licensed lawyer”. The terms searched for in CCH were:
federally charter attorney, federally charter attorney at law, federally charter attorney-at-law, federally charter counsel, federally charter lawyer, federally chartered attorney, federally chartered attorney at law, federally chartered attorney-at-law, federally chartered counsel, federally chartered lawyer, federally license attorney, federally license attorney at law, federally license attorney-at-law, federally license counsel, federally license lawyer, federally licensed attorney, federally licensed attorney at law, federally licensed attorney-at-law, federally licensed counsel, federally licensed lawyer, federally permission attorney, federally permission attorney at law, federally permission attorney-at-law, federally permission counsel, federally permission lawyer, federally permit attorney, federally permit attorney at law, federally permit attorney-at-law, federally permit counsel, federally permit lawyer, federally registered attorney, federally registered attorney at law, federally registered attorney-at-law, federally registered counsel, federally registered lawyer, federally registration attorney, federally registration attorney at law, federally registration attorney-at-law, federally registration counsel, federally registration lawyer
Further, the phrase “federally licensed lawyer” is not found in the two opinions in the Pollock case or in the Springer opinion.
I have already run across this tax protester argument in another forum. You aren’t fooling anybody, Stevie. The “federally licensed lawyer” nonsense is a permutation of the phony argument that under the Springer case, the income tax on individuals could apply only to “people connected with the federal government.” As the other protester stated in another forum:
The Civil War income tax was a tax on people connected with the federal government. It fell upon railroads, steamboats, and ferries (Section 80), railroad bonds (Section 81), banks, trust companies, savings institutions, and insurance companies (Section 82), and salaries of officers, and payments to persons in the civil, military, naval, or other employment or service of the United States, including senators and representatives and delegates in Congress (Section 86). Springer was an attorney - a civil officer of the court, who was subject to the tax. All the people subject to the tax were employees of the government, or received some sort of privilege from the federal government, such as the right to represent others in court (as it applied to Springer). The Civil War income tax did not apply to any individual, but only to those people enumerated in the legislation.
I called the protester on these falsehoods, pointing out first, that he was citing statutes not even at issue in the Springer case – statutes not even mentioned. Second, the 1864 statute in the Springer case clearly taxed all income of individual citizens or residents of the U.S., not merely people "connected with the federal government" or "people who received a privilege from the government.
Again, section 116 of the 1864 Act imposed the Federal income tax on "the gains, profits, and income of every person residing in the United States, or of any citizen of the United States residing abroad, whether derived from any kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, or salaries, or from any profession, trade, employment, or vocation, carried on in the United States or elsewhere, or from any other source whatever [ . . . ]". See Revenue Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 223, sec. 116 (June 30, 1864).
I repeat: Mr. Springer was indeed an attorney engaged in the ''profession of the private practice of law'' -- but Mr. Springer's profession itself was not only not material to the ''Springer'' court's decision, it ''wasn't even mentioned'' by the Court in the ''Springer'' decision.
Shooting from the hip? Steve, were you really so stupid that you thought I was shooting from the hip? Did you really think I had not already studied the actual text of the Springer case?
Steve, your “federally licensed lawyer” garbage is verbiage you read somewhere in tax protester literature. No, you didn’t dream this up on your own. And you didn’t find the “federally licensed lawyer” argument by reviewing the texts of court opinions, with your online “account” that you supposedly have.
Here is the exact language from Pollock:
The original record [in the Springer case] discloses that the income [of Mr. Springer] was not derived in any degree from real estate, but was in part professional as attorney at law, and the rest interest on United States bonds. It would seem probable that the court did not feel called upon to advert to the distinction between the latter and the former source of income, as the validity of the tax as to either would sustain the action.
--Pollock, 157 U.S. 429, 578-79 (this is from the first Pollock decision, the April 1895 one).
Income from the profession of an attorney is income from an employment, income from labor, income from the rendering of personal service. Interest income on a United States bond is income from property. A bond is personalty, a species of property. The income tax at issue in Pollock was an income tax on property, as discussed below.
There is no mention here by the Pollock court of Mr. Springer being a “federally” licensed attorney (though he may well have been), and there is no mention that Mr. Springer’s “federal license” (assuming he had one) was seen by the Court in Springer (or by the Court in Pollock, for that matter) as being relevant to any issue before the Court in either case.
Steve, you wrote:
Well I can say we don't know for sure if the SC in Springer considered whether he was a lawyer or not.
and:
Springer put together tons of material to support his position, none of which was mentioned in the case, all of which was certainly considered by the court.
Baloney. I just told you earlier in this discussion: In the United States, we follow the doctrine of stare decisis. Whether there were tons of material on Mr. Springer's law license income in the Springer record, or just one sentence on the subject, is of no moment. Again: the issue of the taxability of that income vel non, based on his being a “federally licensed lawyer,” (1) was not an issue addressed by the Supreme Court in the Springer case (the Springer Court), (2) was not decided by the Springer Court, and (3) not even mentioned by the Springer Court. His “federalness”, if he had any, was not mentioned in the Pollock case either.
A completely doofus argument on your part, Steve.
Steve wrote:
What's more important here is you are clearly wrong about what the case was decided upon.
No, Steve, I am not wrong. I am right. You are wrong. I did my homework. You did not.
Now, let’s look at this from Steve:
Think hard about how Pollock could allow Springer to stand while finding a tax on rents as unconstitutional. Read the dissenting opinions in Pollock.....as a matter of fact try to actually read the case instead of someone's opinion of it. Put a little effort in to your rebuttals.
Steve, do you really think that the rest of us haven’t read the Pollock decisions? What part of our previous analyses do you not understad? The Court in Pollock struck down the 1894 tax Act because the Pollock Court treated the income tax on income from property (in the form of rents, interest and dividends) as a direct tax. The treatments of taxes on incomes from employments, taxes on incomes from the practice of law (federally licensed or not), taxes on incomes from flipping hamburgers at hamburger joints, etc., etc., were simply not at issue in Pollock.
Since direct taxes were required to be apportioned, and the aforementioned tax in Pollock (income tax on dividends, interest, and rent) was not, the Court in Pollock ruled the 1894 statute unconstitutional.
The Court also went to the pain of explaining WHY it was striking the ENTIRE 1894 statute – including the portion that taxed income from “employments” -- even though taxes on incomes from employments were not at issue. Note that the tax on income from employments was STILL CONSIDERED TO BE AN EXCISE (an indirect tax) AND WAS NOT REQUIRED TO BE APPORTIONED. The Pollock court never ruled that an income tax from employments was a direct tax. That issue was not even before the Court. The Court stated that it was ruling the entire Act unconstitutional only because Congress could not have intended that the 1894 Act be applied just to income from employments and not to income in the form of interest, dividends and rents. Under Pollock, the SOURCE of the income suddenly became relevant in determining whether the related tax was a direct tax (required to be apportioned) or an excise (not required to be apportioned).
The Sixteenth Amendment overruled Pollock, by removing the apportionment requirement imposed by the Court in Pollock. The language of the Amendment clearly states “from whatever source derived” and “without apportionment”. The issue -- of whether a particular income tax (e.g., a tax on interest, dividends and rents) would have been considered a direct tax by the Pollock court -- is no longer legally relevant on the apportionment issue. After February 1913, no U.S. Federal income tax is required to be apportioned, regardless of the source of the income.
Think hard, Steve. Think hard.
"My greatest fear is that the audience will beat me to the punch line." -- David Mamet